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Introduction: Historiography of the Humanities
Rens Bod
This volume brings together scholars and historians who share a common goal: 
to develop a comparative history of the humanities. Although separate histories 
exist of some single humanities disciplines – such as the history of linguistics or 
the history of history writing – we feel that a general history of the humanities 
would satisfy a long-felt need and fill a conspicuous gap in intellectual history.
In the field of the history of the natural sciences, overviews have been written 
at least since the nineteenth century (e.g. William Whewell’s well-known History 
of the Inductive Sciences). It may thus be surprising that no such history exists 
for the field of the humanities. The lack of such a history constituted one of the 
major motivations for organizing the First International Conference on the His-
tory of the Humanities: The Making of the Humanities, held at the University of 
Amsterdam from October 23rd to 25th, 2008. As the first conference of its kind, 
we felt the need to create sufficient coherence and focused on one period only: 
the early modern era. The Call for Contributions attracted far more papers than 
could be accommodated: we received 89 submissions, of which only 20 could be 
accepted. In addition to the submitted papers, we had 4 invited talks by Floris 
Cohen, David Cram, Anthony Grafton and Ingrid Rowland, resulting in a total 
of 24 papers divided over 3 days. We decided to have no parallel sessions, so that 
all conferencees could attend each other’s talks and participate in the general dis-
cussions. By the end of the conference, there was an increasing awareness that a 
general history of the humanities could and should be written.
1 Defi ning the humanities and their historiography
What are the humanities? It is as with the notion of ‘time’ in St Augustine’s phi-
losophy: if you don’t ask, we know, but if you ask, we are left with empty hands. 
Since the nineteenth century the humanities have typically been defined as those 
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disciplines that investigate the expressions of the human mind (Geisteswissen-
schaften).1 Thus, the study of music, literature, language, visual arts all belong 
to the realm of the humanities, in contrast to the study of nature which belongs 
to the domain of the natural sciences. And the study of humans in their social 
context belongs to the social sciences. But these definitions are unsatisfactory. 
Mathematics is to a large extent a product of the human mind, and yet it is not 
considered a humanities discipline. A pragmatic stance may be more workable: 
the humanities are those disciplines that are taught and studied at the various 
humanities faculties. According to this definition, the humanities usually entail: 
linguistics, musicology, philology, literary theory, historical disciplines (includ-
ing art history) as well as more recent disciplines such as film studies and media 
studies. In some countries theology and philosophy are also taught in humanities 
faculties, whereas in other countries they constitute faculties on their own.
But why should one wish to separate the history of the humanities from the 
history of the sciences – rather than aiming at a history of all scientific activities, 
from the natural and the social to the humanistic? The endeavor to write a his-
tory of all sciences was attempted by George Sarton in the 1930s.2 However, the 
result of his work, which is based on a strongly positivistic concept of progress, 
does not go beyond the fourteenth century, and even within that period, the hu-
manities occupy a severely marginal position in Sarton’s history. Although Sarton 
includes linguistics and musicology to some extent, he leaves out other humanistic 
disciplines such as art history and literary theory. According to Sarton, the history 
of the visual arts (painting, architecture and sculpture) only throws light upon the 
sciences from ‘the outside’ and does not contribute to scientifi c ‘progress’, in con-
trast to the study of music.3 Sarton does not elaborate any further on this issue, 
but it seems that he is pointing to the history of art itself rather than art history 
as a discipline. Of course, for a history of the humanities, we need to include both 
art history and the study of music (musicology). Of these two, Sarton only accepts 
musicology, mainly because of its importance for scientifi c progress. Th ere is no at-
tempt to come up with a general history of all sciences in his work, despite Sarton’s 
lofty intentions. After his death, no-one seems to have picked up Sarton’s goal.
Both in content and period, the history of the humanities has remained underex-
posed. Th is is all the more striking because many histories of the natural sciences were 
written during the last two centuries.4 And more recently, the history of the social 
sciences has also been taken up.5 Th us, from a historiographical point of view, a history 
of the humanities is dearly missing. While various histories of some single humanis-
tic disciplines have been written, such as the history of linguistics6 or the history of 
literary theory7, connections between methods and principles in literary theory and 
those in art history or between musicology and linguistics are rarely made – perhaps 
because of the notorious fragmentation of the humanities during the last century.
Introduction
Fig. 1: Egidius Sadeler after Hans von Aachen, Minerva Introduces Painting to the Liberal Arts, 
engraving, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
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2 Towards a fi rst history of the humanities: this book
A comparative, interdisciplinary history of the related humanistic disciplines is 
thus badly needed. But how can we make a selection of such an overwhelming 
amount of historical material? This collection, which gathers some of the best 
papers presented at The Making of the Humanities conference, wishes to make 
a start in investigating the comparative history of the various humanistic disci-
plines. They range from art history to poetics and from musicology to philology 
in the early modern period. Each paper proposes and elaborates on a different 
approach to the history of the humanities. These approaches range from external-
istic (focusing on the socio-cultural context of a discipline or person) to internal-
istic (focusing on the internal methodologies of a specific discipline). The papers 
not only cover historiographical overviews, but also make comparisons between 
disciplines and other sciences. Moreover, each contribution ends with a discus-
sion of the pearls and perils of writing a comparative history of the humanistic 
sciences – and some of the papers are fully immersed in such a discussion. In this 
way we also hope that the book will contribute to the methodological problem of 
writing a history of the humanities.8
The first part of the book, entitled ‘The Humanities versus the Sciences’, 
dives directly into some of the methodological issues. It contains three essays that 
position the humanities in their historical relation with the natural sciences. In 
the first essay, Michiel Leezenberg argues for a worldwide perspective on the histo-
ry of the humanities, as is becoming common practice in the historiography of the 
natural sciences. He illustrates his arguments with a case study of the non-Eu-
ropean influence on Spinoza and his circle. Cynthia Pyle’s essay shows that many 
bridges existed and still exist between the humanities and the natural sciences: 
not only did early fifteenth-century scholars like Lorenzo Valla and Leon Battista 
Alberti use methods that have later been termed ‘scientific’, they often contrib-
uted directly to the sciences themselves as well. Floris Cohen’s contribution shows 
that the study of music had humanistic as well as scientific dimensions, both of 
which were investigated and discussed in the early modern period. He points out 
that the disruption of the Pythagorean cosmic harmony came about due to devel-
opments in the exact sciences and in the humanities alike.
The second part of the book, ‘The Visual Arts as Liberal Arts’, starts out with 
an essay by Ingrid Rowland showing that the aim of describing the world was car-
ried out in both the sciences and the humanities, especially in the visual arts. Art-
ists increasingly represented information in a graphic form, like Raphael’s School 
of Athens, where allegory made room for expository habits of thought. The essay 
by Marieke van den Doel further explores the relation between the visual arts 
and philosophy, in particular Ficino. She shows how Ficino’s varied and frequent 
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remarks on the supremacy of painting over music were used by art theorists and 
historians such as Vasari. Ficino effectively wielded a view of the hierarchy of 
the arts in which scholarship and science were subordinate to beauty. Thijs West-
steijn’s contribution then investigates the relations between the visual arts and 
pictography with particular focus on Chinese characters as universally intelligible 
ideograms. The heated discussions about pictography reveal how seventeenth-
century scholars were keen on combining widely different disciplines, bringing 
together linguistics, art theory, archaeology and political thought.
In part three of the book, entitled ‘Humanism and Heresy’, Hilary Gatti ana-
lyzes Giordano Bruno’s concept of metaphor and its impact on the Renaissance.9 
Bruno’s metaphor seems to define what may be ‘the humanities’ for Bruno as op-
posed to natural philosophy or science: the universe of words and images through 
which the mind conducts its search for truth. According to Gatti, Bruno can be 
seen as attempting to dissolve the orthodox Renaissance tradition of the humani-
ties which tended to stress fidelity to classical rules and models. The essay by 
Bernward Schmidt examines the specific conditions of the humanities in Baroque 
Rome between ca. 1670 and 1760. Most Roman scholars were concurrently mem-
bers of the Republic of Letters and of the Roman Inquisition or the Congregation 
of the Index. They had to censor books which they loved to read for their private 
studies. Schmidt argues that there existed no contradiction between learning and 
censoring in Baroque Rome.
In part four, ‘Language and Poetics’, Juliette Groenland examines the pedagogic 
practice of northern humanists, in particular Murmellius, whose Latin manual 
for beginners spread as far as Poland and Hungary. She shows how the human-
ist credo ‘morality through orality’ was put into practice and how the humanist 
reformers created independent minds vouching for tolerance and emancipation. 
Cesc Esteve reviews the history of early modern literary criticism, showing that 
the humanist discourse on the ars poetica evolved towards more secular and ‘sci-
entific’ approaches to the literary past. He argues that literary historiography has 
much in common with the cognitio historica as prescribed and practised in history 
writing in the early modern period. The essay by Paivi Mehtonen explores the 
emergence of the eighteenth-century Literaturwissenschaft. She analyzes the Ger-
man and British conflicts in which the opposing camps gathered the sciences of 
word on the one hand and the ‘solid’ studies of objects, perception and thought on 
the other. She argues that the discipline of Literaturwissenschaft emerged decades 
before the dawn of Romanticism.
Part five, ‘Linguists and Logicians’, starts out with an essay by David Cram on 
the changing relations between grammar, rhetoric and music in the early modern 
period. He discusses language and music from the perspective of philosophical 
languages and combinatorics. The main thrust of the paper is that the shift of 
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music from the quadrivium to the trivium is the result of a complex process that 
involves all disciplines, and whereby a new division between the humanities and 
sciences emerges (see also Cohen’s contribution). Jaap Maat investigates the rela-
tions between grammar, logic and rhetoric in early modern Europe. While the 
upcoming natural sciences were particularly harsh for the disciplines that were 
traditionally concerned with language, Maat argues that the three disciplines sur-
vived the seventeenth century undamaged and that even new approaches to the 
study of language emerged, which gradually superseded the traditional arts.
In part six, ‘Philology and Philosophy’, Már Jónsson analyzes philological 
practice in Northern Europe, showing how insights from fifteenth- and six-
teenth-century Italian humanists were further developed into a new practice on 
philological, linguistic and historical matters. He shows that some of the meth-
ods and ideas developed in these years still retain their validity and have hardly 
been improved. The essay by Piet Steenbakkers explores the circulation of knowl-
edge with respect to Spinoza’s role as a philologist and his place in the history of 
biblical scholarship. Spinoza’s interest in the Bible was not strictly philosophical 
but had strong philological and linguistic penchants, too. Steenbakkers shows 
how Spinoza played a crucial role in the dramatic decline of the status of the Bible 
in western civilization. Martine Pécharman continues on the issue of philological 
criticism of the Bible, especially of the New Testament. Focusing on the debate 
between Simon and Arnauld, she examines the rules of critique in the humani-
ties, which involved linguistics, philology and philosophy.
The last part of the book, ‘The History of History’ starts out with an essay 
by Jacques Bos on the development of historiography in early modern Europe. He 
argues that Machiavelli and Guicciardini created a new mode of historical experi-
ence that actually turned the past into an object of study. He compares the histor-
ical work of the sixteenth century with other disciplines, in particular philology 
and philosophy, and maintains that nineteenth-century historicists like Ranke 
were involved in a very similar project which turned history into an academic 
discipline. Wouter Hanegraaff investigates the historiography of thought which 
began to emerge during the seventeenth century, as German protestant authors 
sought to distinguish the history of rational thought from biblical revelation and 
pagan superstition. Hanegraaff focuses on Jacob Brucker’s monumental history 
of philosophy and argues that his legacy is still with us today: Brucker managed 
to demarcate the history of philosophy, as based solely upon human reason, from 
the history of religion.
Together, the seven parts of this book illustrate the width and depth of the 
history of the humanities in early modern Europe, as well as their mutual inter-
twining and connection with the exact sciences. The humanities instigated a new 
secular world view (Steenbakkers, Leezenberg, Hanegraaff, Gatti), they rebutted 
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forgeries that no-one dared to question before (Pyle, Steenbakkers, Pécharman), 
and with their standard of precision, consistency and criticism (Pyle, Jónsson, Row-
land, Cohen, Groenland), the humanities deeply influenced the exact sciences 
(Pyle, Cram, Maat, Cohen). Many papers in this volume also suggest that dis-
cipline formation had its roots well before the nineteenth-century development 
of the Geisteswissenschaften (Mehtonen, Esteve, Jónsson, Bos, Hanegraaff ). Not 
only was there a wide circulation of knowledge in the early Republic of Letters 
(Gatti, Rowland, Schmidt, van den Doel, Groenland, Weststeijn), there was also 
a far-reaching institutionalization of disciplines such as philology, historiography, 
poetics and the arts (van den Doel, Mehtonen, Steenbakkers, Bos). Their relation 
with the New Sciences indicates that the humanities not only preceded the sci-
ences but also shaped them to a very large extent via the formal and empirical study 
of music, art, language and texts (Cohen, Rowland, Pyle, Weststeijn, Cram, Maat).
Thus, a comparative history of the humanities sheds new light from both 
within and outside the humanistic disciplines. Of course, we have focused in this 
book on only one period in the history of the humanities. The next conference 
(autumn 2010) and book (planned in 2012) will focus on the subsequent period of 
this history and relate it to the previous one, that is: the transition from the early 
modern to the modern period, including influences from outside Europe.
This volume could not have been produced without the success of the original 
conference, The Making of the Humanities, in 2008. A special word of thanks 
needs to go to two persons who were involved with the conference organization 
from its start back in 2007: Peter van Ormondt and Karin Gigengack of the ILLC 
bureau (Institute for Logic, Language and Computation). Without their organi-
zational expertise and support, this book would not be here. We would also like 
to thank Martin Stokhof who brought this conference to the attention of the 
European Science Foundation that turned out to be of great help in distributing 
the Call for Papers. We are indebted to NWO, the Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research, whose generous funding scheme supports two of the editors. 
We are grateful to the former Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, for receiving 
all participants on the first conference day in the Mayor’s Residence, one of the 
finest canal houses of Amsterdam. And we thank the University of Amsterdam 
for making its facilities freely available, as well as the Spui 25 Academic Centre 
that hosted the public event at the end of the second conference day, entitled 
Discoveries in the Humanities that Changed the World. We are most appreciative 
of the excellent editorial help we received from Amsterdam University Press in 
turning the conference papers into the current book. Finally, we wish to thank all 
conference speakers for their marvelous talks, all session chairs for their beautiful 
introductions that were often papers on their own, the dean of the Faculty of Hu-
manities José van Dijck for opening the conference with a splendid speech, and 
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not to forget all participants who actively engaged in the fascinating discussions. 
They all were the persons who turned the conference into a success. They can be 
found at http://www.illc.uva.nl/MakingHumanities/program.html.
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How Comparative Should a Comparative 
History of the Humanities Be?
Th e Case of the Dutch Spinoza Circle
Michiel Leezenberg
1 Introduction
Th e history of the humanities, or Geisteswissenschaften, lags far behind the historio-
graphy of the exact or natural sciences. Th erefore, one may fruitfully look for models 
or examples in the history of the natural sciences in order to avoid reinventing the 
wheel, or running into diffi  culties that have already been encountered elsewhere, 
and perhaps even solved. Th ere are also more principled reasons, however, for the-
matizing the rise of a strict disciplinary opposition between the humanities and the 
natural sciences, an opposition which is more recent and less stable than one might 
think. A strict distinction between them (e.g. as concerned with distinct objects of 
study or employing diff erent methods of research) was unknown to Aristotle and to 
medieval scholars, and only started being made, amidst fi erce discussion and contes-
tation, in the seventeenth century; it did not stabilize until around 1800.
Below, I would like, fi rst, to discuss one famous exercise in the comparative his-
tory of the humanities, Michel Foucault’s Th e Order of Th ings (fi rst edition 1966), 
to raise some outstanding questions that I think deserve more attention. Most 
importantly, I will discuss two kinds of considerations, to do with spatiality and 
language, respectively. Second, I will devote more detailed attention to a subset of 
questions concerning language. Intellectual history, I will argue, should pay atten-
tion not only to changing vocabularies but also to shifts in what are usually called 
‘ideologies of language’, i.e. folk theories of what language is and how it functions. 
Th is becomes especially clear in the case of the so-called ‘vernacularization’, or 
gradual shift towards vernacular languages as the means of literary expression and 
philosophical and scientifi c inquiry, that marks early modern Europe and indeed 
the early modern world at large. Finally, I will try to show in a preliminary man-
ner the potential usefulness of these emphases on language and on long-distance 
connections, taking as a kind of case history the writings of Spinoza and the circle 
surrounding him in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.
 Michiel Leezenberg
2 History, archaeology, or anthropology?
Existing exercises in the history of the humanities typically trace the develop-
ment of an individual discipline, starting either in classical antiquity or in the 
Renaissance, and confine themselves to developments in Europe (or part of it) 
and, from the late nineteenth century onward, North America. This pattern can 
be seen in – deservedly famous – studies such as R.H. Robins’s history of lin-
guistics (1997) or Rudolf Pfeiffer’s multi-volume history of classical scholarship 
(1968-1976).1 Compared to overviews of the history of the natural sciences, how-
ever, these books are somewhat old-fashioned in their approach. Histories of sci-
ence, backed by decades of solid scholarship on individual scientists, disciplines, 
and periods, can boast of various textbooks that are both empirically rich and 
methodologically sophisticated; moreover, almost as a matter of course, they take 
into account developments in non-Western traditions and of the contributions 
they have made to the development of Western science.2
A more substantial problem of histories that confine themselves to individual 
disciplines is that they risk overlooking similar patterns of development occur-
ring in other fields or, even more importantly, the fact that these disciplines did 
not emerge as autonomous fields of study characterized by distinct objects and 
methods, let alone autonomous institutions and social networks, until relatively 
recently. Hence, it may be fruitful, if not preferable, to take a broader perspective 
that systematically thematizes or questions the very disciplinary and territorial 
boundaries that we tend to take for granted. Even the unquestioning use of the 
distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities, or between physical 
science and humanistic scholarship, risks projecting all kinds of disciplinary and 
institutional boundaries that only solidified at a much later date onto a period in 
which they did not yet have a widely accepted existence, and hence risk seriously 
distorting our picture. Most famously perhaps, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaf-
fer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump attempts to question these boundaries (as well 
as those between scientific texts and social contexts) by reopening the debate be-
tween Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle concerning the existence of a vacuum.3 
At first sight, they argue, this might seem a debate between a political philosopher 
and a natural scientist about the merits of experimental science, which, predict-
ably, was won by the scientist. On closer inspection, however, rather more appears 
to be at stake: the question of whether the experimental results produced in the 
Royal Society yield proper natural-philosophical knowledge turns out to reflect 
much wider debates on the nature of reliable testimony, social order, the political 
implications of metaphysical claims, and authority in matters political and epis-
temological. By reopening the debate between Hobbes and Boyle, and capturing 
the terms in which it was actually conducted, Shapin and Scheffer show how 
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the apparently obvious distinction between experimental science as dealing with 
natural facts and political philosophy as being in the realm of opinion was the 
result of a complex, and fiercely contested, array of social practices and rhetorical 
strategies.
In other words, approaches that systematically ignore, transcend, or thematize 
present-day disciplinary boundaries and try to uncover earlier debates or contro-
versies in the terms in which they were actually conducted may be at least as fruit-
ful or promising as attempts at tracing the earlier past of a modern discipline. For 
the history of the humanities, several such approaches can be imagined, and have 
in fact been tried out. On the one hand, there are Anthony Grafton’s systematic 
attempts at combining social and intellectual history.4 Among other issues, this 
combination raises complex questions of spatiality: social history often focuses 
on relatively well-delineated local arenas for competition (say, individual cities or 
states), whereas intellectual developments tend to have a geographically (and in 
this period, linguistically) rather more diffuse and long-distance character. But 
as important as these matters are, I will not address them here, especially as this 
undoubtedly important and fruitful approach has not yet yielded a full-blown 
comparative history of the humanities anyway.
However, another attempt at an interdisciplinary or comparative history of the 
humanities has already been made. I am, of course, referring to Michel Foucault’s 
The Order of Things (Les Mots et les choses), one of the unlikelier bestsellers of the 
1960s.5 The author himself calls it an ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ (which 
include economics and biology), in order to distinguish it from more convention-
al approaches to the history of ideas like, most importantly, Lovejoy’s. Foucault 
has been heavily criticized by historians for his sweeping and aprioristic attempts 
at periodization. One should keep in mind, however, that he was mounting at 
least as much a philosophical, if not political, argument against then-dominant 
Marxist philosophies of history as engaging in a historical exercise in the stricter 
academic sense of the word. More positively, its philosophical bias allows for a 
rather more explicit methodological signposting (taken to much greater lengths, 
if not extremes, in Foucault’s 1969 The Archaeology of Knowledge6) than is usual 
in works of historiography. With the benefit of over four decades of hindsight, I 
would like to discuss some of the most significant descriptive and methodological 
aspects of this important book.
Most famously, Foucault does not look at individual authors or doctrines; he 
does not describe scientific change as the result of individual discoveries in terms 
of originality or influences; rather, he explores radical changes in the underlying 
beliefs or, more properly speaking, statements. These are what he calls the ‘his-
torical a priori’: this underlies or characterizes an entire, historically contingent, 
arrangement of knowledge or, as Foucault calls it, episteme. It consists of state-
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ments or propositions held to be self-evidently true a priori, but it appears to un-
dergo radical historical changes. The radical replacements of the entire historical 
a priori amount to what he calls ‘epistemic ruptures’ (broadly comparable to, but 
wider in effect, than what Thomas Kuhn calls scientific revolutions); these occur 
not only in individual disciplines, but in the knowledge or learning of a period 
as a whole. Thus, they can be equally well traced in almanacs; in literary texts 
like Don Quixote and the writings of the Marquis de Sade; and in the scientific 
or scholarly texts of a period. Foucault argues for two such epistemic breaks in 
early modern Europe: the former occurs around 1600 and includes what is usu-
ally called the Scientific Revolution, although it is much wider in scope; the latter 
occurs around 1800 and amounts to what one might call the ‘human-scientific’ 
or geisteswissenschaftliche revolution. In such ruptures, Foucault argues, the very 
architecture of knowledge is radically reorganized; this makes it difficult to speak 
of, say, seventeenth-century writings on wealth or words as anticipating, respec-
tively, modern economics and linguistics.
Words or linguistic signs are a crucial, if not the major, topic of concern in 
Foucault’s archaeology. This concern has been one of the causes of the widespread 
misunderstanding that his book is an exercise in structuralism. Foucault’s his-
toricizing method, however, is quite different from the structuralist emphasis on 
synchronic analysis of systems of signs. For him, apparently, the most important 
or interesting changes in the historical a priori involve our beliefs about words 
or signs. In fact, he repeatedly called the manuscript of what was to become Les 
Mots et les choses a ‘livre sur les signes’ (‘book on signs’).7 In the Renaissance, he 
argues, signs were not thought of as standing outside the world, but as part of it, 
and based on different kinds of relations of analogy or similarity with particular 
objects in the world. In the classical episteme, or constellation of learning that 
emerged around 1600, words were seen as more or less adequately representing 
(and by implication standing outside) the order of things in the world, whereas 
in the modern episteme emerging around 1800, languages came to be seen as his-
torically developing organisms that primarily express an individual or collective 
‘spirit’ or subjectivity. I will return to the topic of words or signs below.
Much like Thomas Kuhn’s near-contemporary writings, Foucault’s The Order 
of Things emphasizes the discontinuous character of the more radical or revo-
lutionary changes in the sciences. One might qualify the approaches of these 
two authors as neo-Kantian, in so far as both treat systems of knowledge as 
constituted by a well-circumscribed set of historical beliefs or statements: what 
Foucault calls the historical a priori and what Kuhn in later writings calls quasi-
analytic statements. This attention to discontinuity has the effect (or intention) 
of exposing teleological or Whig-historical projections of insights (and indeed, 
disciplinary boundaries) of a later era onto the periods under investigation. 
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Foucault further argues that these ruptures occur simultaneously in all areas 
of knowledge, and hence cannot be explained as resulting from new scientific 
discoveries or insights, or as the work of particularly brave or clever individual 
scientists. However, they are not simply the result of external (read: socio-eco-
nomic) factors either. Indeed, in the preface to the English translation of his 
book, Foucault explicitly denies the possibility, or even desirability, of explaining 
epistemic ruptures in terms of social or cultural factors such as changing class 
relations or modes of production. In his own later work, however, which marks 
a gradual shift from a neo-Kantian to a more practice-oriented approach which 
de-emphasizes the role of language and in particular the historical a priori as 
constitutive of knowledge, Foucault comes to explore the interrelations between 
discursive and non-discursive practices. As a result, the earlier emphasis on his-
torical discontinuities becomes less prominent, and Foucault becomes less reti-
cent in suggesting possible causal links.8
But these considerations are nowadays perhaps not very novel or challenging 
anymore. More problematic, and more relevant to our present discussion, are two 
sets of questions that Foucault’s work raises. These concern, respectively, spatial-
ity and language. To begin with the former: Foucault is not very explicit about 
the geographical delimitation of the epistemic or discursive formations he is in-
vestigating. It is, of course, crucial to his argument to look beyond the bounda-
ries of individual disciplines; but how far his argument holds across linguistic 
boundaries is far less obvious. Although he uses textual sources from different 
modern languages of Western Europe, including German, English, and Spanish, 
there is a pronounced emphasis on French texts, especially for the classical era 
(1600-1800). Hans Aarsleff already noted the French bias of The Order of Things, 
a fact that he sees as complicating the possible generalization of Foucault’s find-
ings to other geographical regions.9 In view of French intellectual pre-eminence 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a focus on French texts is obviously 
defensible; but Foucault does not present us with a principled reason for the par-
ticular choices he has made, let alone for the geographic delimitation of the phe-
nomena he is discussing. Are the epistemes and epistemic ruptures that he claims 
to have uncovered worldwide phenomena, or are they restricted to specific parts 
of Europe? If the latter, do they include Eastern Europe, in particular the Russian 
empire? If not, where should one draw the boundary, and how should epistemic 
divergences between different parts of the world be explained?
There are a number of answers to these questions. Some approaches proceed 
from an a priori assumption of a ‘world time’. This notion originates in Mar-
tin Heidegger’s philosophy but developed into the very un-Heideggerian doc-
trine that historical developments must occur simultaneously worldwide, which 
at times leads to a mechanical search for near-equivalents for, say, some of the 
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prototypical features of the European Enlightenment in other civilizations or 
traditions.10 Another, initially more plausible and long dominant approach has 
it that modernity originated in Europe, from which it gradually spread to the 
rest of the world. This ‘diffusionist’ approach was, of course, part and parcel of 
a self-congratulatory narrative of a European mission civilisatrice; but it down-
played or ignored the internal dynamics of non-Western societies. It also failed 
to account for some processes of modernization that occur too quickly to allow 
for an explanation in terms of a relatively slow process of cultural diffusion. A 
third approach, which may be called ‘interactional’, has been suggested by the 
likes of Cambridge historian Christopher Bayly, who argues that similar histori-
cal patterns of modernization have emerged in different parts of the world, at 
first largely independent of each other, but increasingly through intensive forms 
of – often asymmetrical – contact.11 But, undoubtedly, it is far too early to search 
for explanatory schemes when even our more empirical investigations in non-
Western intellectual history are only in the initial stage.12
Another way of tackling these questions is by focusing on the changing char-
acter of the specific languages in which knowledge is formulated, and on the lin-
guistic boundaries across which intellectual contacts and influences may evolve. 
I think that in this respect, it is highly significant that Foucault only discusses 
questions of signs in the abstract, and does not study the changing roles and sta-
tus of individual languages of learning, or the role of cultural translation. Indeed, 
it is the topic of language that most deserves rethinking in the light of his analy-
ses. Foucault has argued that the classical episteme did not involve any notion 
of time or history as in any way essential to things human. It has been argued, 
however, that the allegedly monolithical classical age itself contained a significant 
rupture. Broadly speaking, the seventeenth century was dominated by debates 
concerning artificial languages as the optimal means of representation (see, for 
example, the discussions in authors like Leibniz, Wilkins, and Dalgarno, and the 
theories about pictography analyzed elsewhere in the present book), whereas in 
the eighteenth century the question of the origin of language took center stage, 
as witnessed in discussions in Condillac, Rousseau, Herder, and many others.13 
In the seventeenth as well as in the eighteenth century, moreover, a rather more 
complex awareness of history and temporality was in existence than is allowed 
for by Foucault’s suggestion that the classical period as a whole is marked by 
an ahistorical order of knowledge representing an equally unchanging order of 
things. Thus, Aarsleff has noted that during the seventeenth century, Adamicism, 
or speculation about the original language spoken by Adam and Eve, is in fact a 
more fundamental notion than representation.14 Pace Aarsleff, however, the influ-
ential eighteenth-century thinker Etienne de Condillac, in his Essai sur les origins 
des connaissances humaines (1746), does not quite make ‘time and progress into the 
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foundations of the human sciences’; for example, he describes linguistic change 
as a succession of discrete stages rather than as a truly diachronic or historical 
development.15
But perhaps more important than these descriptive aspects is the complex 
analytical role of language in the period studied by Foucault. In fact, Foucault 
does not systematically question the role of specific languages at all; despite his 
focus on signs, Foucault appears not to explore how specific languages may in 
fact be constitutive of specific knowledge systems.16 Foucault only makes his own 
linguistic turn more explicit and systematic in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
where he talks of discursive formations rather than systems of knowledge; but 
the discussion in this work proceeds at a very high level of abstraction, merely 
talking about discursive formations in general, without noting phenomena such 
as language shifts, multilingualism, and the like. There are reasons to think, 
however, that a more consistent ‘linguistic turn’ and a more analytical concern 
with the languages used to articulate knowledge may yield some valuable new 
insights in the historiography of the humanities. In particular, the study of ‘ lan-
guage ideologies’ seems promising here, i.e. the changing ways in which language 
is constituted and rearticulated as both a means and an object of knowledge and 
simultaneously as an object of social or even political concern. Thus, it has re-
cently been argued that changing political conceptions of language, culture, and 
tradition have been crucial for the articulation of Western European modernity, 
and for the specific forms of inequality (Eurocentrism, racism, and the like) that 
have accompanied it.17
In short, an archaeological account of discursive formations can be fruit-
fully supplemented by an anthropological account that systematically explores 
the changing interrelations between structural or grammatical factors, linguistic 
usage (roughly, what Foucault would call discursive practices), and folk beliefs 
about language, or what have elsewhere been called ‘language ideologies’. It has 
been argued that fully fledged explanations of changing linguistic practice should 
pay attention to the complex interaction between linguistic structure, language 
usage, and linguistic ideology.18 This would seem to be especially relevant for a 
history of the humanities, in which specific languages, and language in general, 
are not only the medium but often the object of learning.
Ironically, even though The Order of Things is very much about signs and the 
sciences of language, Foucault fails to thematize one crucial linguistic develop-
ment of the long period he is discussing: the shift from Latin to vernacular lan-
guages in early modern Europe and similar linguistic shifts occurring elsewhere 
in the world at around the same time. This point is so crucial that I will elaborate 
on it in more detail.
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3 Vernacularization and the rise of the humanities
For the analysis of the rise of the humanities – and indeed the natural sciences 
– in early modern Europe, one would like to have a systematic discussion of the 
hugely important – if complex and contradictory – gradual shift from Latin to 
vernacular as languages of learning, which was anticipated by the shift to ver-
nacular languages like Italian, French, and English as languages of written literary 
expression that had been prepared by developments as early as the eleventh cen-
tury CE, but gained pace from the fourteenth century onwards. In this respect, 
developments in the humanities may have anticipated, and perhaps even shaped, 
developments in the natural sciences. Thus, it has been argued that one of the 
reasons for Galileo’s success in promoting the new science of physics was the fact 
that he wrote in Italian, that is, in a language that was accessible – and convinc-
ing – to a wider audience.19 If this suggestion is correct, Galileo’s success was at 
least in part predicated on the changing practices and ideologies of vernacular 
language of early modern Europe.
Th is process of the promotion of spoken vernaculars that had hitherto not been 
considered worthy of the written expression of learning and high literature has 
been called ‘vernacularization’.20 Th ese processes have been relatively well docu-
mented; in the case of Europe, the period concerned began with the emergence of 
the Romance languages around 1000 CE. Remarkably, however, as Sheldon Pollock 
observes, similar processes of ‘vernacularization’ took place elsewhere in the world 
around the same time and apparently uninfl uenced by developments in Europe.21 
Another, and for our purposes more directly relevant, wave of vernacularization 
occurred around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when vernacular lan-
guages also became languages of learning. Again, these processes were not unique 
to Europe. In the eighteenth century, South Asia witnessed the emergence of Urdu 
as a new language of high culture (involved in poetry as well as learning) that was 
distinct from Persian, which had hitherto been the language of the court, and 
from the languages of Muslim and Hindu learning (Arabic and classical Sanskrit, 
respectively). Th e rise of Urdu implied a cultural convergence and the development 
of a common language of high culture among Hindus and Muslims alike.
These non-Western processes of vernacularization can only partly, if at all, be 
explained as inspired by European ideas or pressures, since they occur too early 
for any explanation in terms of a hegemonic influence of Western imperialism. 
Thus, in the eighteenth-century Ottoman empire, the earliest Greek linguistic 
innovators, although they were undoubtedly familiar with European Enlight-
enment scholarship, were primarily driven by a domestic revolt against church-
controlled learning. Their attempts at linguistic reform were hesitant, contradic-
tory, and fiercely contested. At first, Eugenios Voulgaris (1716-1806) attempted 
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to revive the ancient language of Plato and Aristotle as distinct from the church 
koiné, ironically for the purpose of translating the modern Lockean epistemol-
ogy; not much later, Iosipos Moisiodax (approx. 1725-1800) tried to make the 
‘vulgar’ dialect spoken by the uneducated population into the basis for a modern 
language of learning that could be more quickly learned than the koiné of the 
church with its complex and archaic grammar. More successful than either of 
these attempts, however, was the project of creating a new and purified language 
(later called katharevousa, literally ‘purified’), pioneered by Adamantios Korais 
(1748-1833). These new language varieties were closer – but not identical – to 
the dialects spoken in the empire. They reflect not only changing concerns of the 
state, but also the educational aspirations of an increasingly self-conscious and 
secular, Greek-speaking Ottoman merchant bourgeoisie.
This project of creating a new public language as the adequate basis for a new 
Greek civilization involved not only a language purified of colloquial elements 
and Ottoman Turkish borrowings, but also the creation of neologisms for vari-
ous concepts of education and science, politics, and culture, rather than the pro-
motion of colloquial forms to the new standard.22 There are some indications 
that these Greek attempts at modernization also inspired other linguistic reform 
movements in the Ottoman empire. Thus, Serif Mardin observes that the expan-
sion of the state bureaucracy led to a desire for a simplified Turkish as a language 
of administration, which was at least in part stimulated by Greek officials, or 
dragomans, in the Ottoman administration.23
Elsewhere, I have argued that new public uses of vernacular languages like 
modern Greek and Turkish were crucial to the emergence of a ‘public sphere’ 
in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman empire. What is more, the 
multilingual character of this new Ottoman public sphere considerably compli-
cates existing historical analyses of the public sphere, which generally ignore such 
questions of language.24 Here, however, I would like to call attention to the im-
portance of such early modern processes of vernacularization for the emergence 
of the modern humanities in Europe.
The process of vernacularization was not only crucial for the history of the 
humanities, it also paved the way for the emergence of the modern nation state. 
Famously, Benedict Anderson has argued that sacred languages like Latin and 
Hebrew (to which one could, and indeed should, add Sanskrit, Classical Arabic, 
Persian, and Classical Chinese or Wenyan) were gradually replaced by ‘a motley 
plebeian crowd of vernacular rivals’, which by implication were no longer religious 
but secularized.25 But vernacularization involves changing attitudes not only to 
languages of religious scripture, but also to languages of classical literature. In 
the European case, Greek and especially Latin also served as topics for classi-
cal literary education. This more worldly or secular literary importance became 
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especially pronounced in Renaissance humanism. But also elsewhere, the great 
cosmopolitan languages, like Sanskrit among Hindus in South Asia and Persian 
in large parts of the Islamic world, had a status that was literary as much as re-
ligious. This literary dimension of both classical and vernacular languages con-
siderably complicates the picture that Anderson sketches of the rise of modern 
nationalism, in which vernacularization is treated as virtually identical to, or at 
least a parallel development to, secularization. But I will not enter into a discus-
sion of these matters here.26
Another way in which the early modern humanities may have shaped modern 
nationalism is through the changing role of classical learning in higher education. 
Most famously, in nineteenth-century Prussia, the Greeks became the model for 
the Humboldtian (and, increasingly, German nationalist) educational ideal of 
Bildung in the service of the modern state. Th e classicist appreciation of ancient 
Greece had gained a new impulse in the mid-eighteenth century, when classical 
Athens increasingly gained prominence over the Roman empire as an educational 
and cultural (and indeed political) model. Although Anderson points out the role 
of classical scholarship and the development of neo-Hellenic nationalism from the 
late eighteenth century onward, he does not discuss the changing role of human-
ism and later classical scholarship in the articulation of secular nationalism in 
Western Europe.27 His picture of modernization as secularization, and of the re-
placement of the sacred language of empire by the secular vernacular of the nation, 
is undoubtedly attractive. It overemphasizes, however, the religious dimension of 
the classical languages. In fact, in Europe, humanistic as much as religious con-
cerns gave Latin such a central place in higher education. Th us, in the eighteenth 
century, it was a new appreciation of classical Greece, and in particular Periclean 
Athens as opposed to imperial Rome, that informed the French patriotism that 
was to culminate in the French Revolution. It also paved the way for the later Ro-
mantic nationalism of Germans and of other nation states that were emerging.28
One crucial feature of vernacularization, and perhaps a crucial aspect of the 
Enlightenment at large, is the steady growth of the reading public. As a result, the 
long-standing opposition between the educated elite and the illiterate masses start-
ed breaking down. Many earlier philosophers, ranging from Plato to Saint Th omas 
Aquinas and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), had held that philosophy was not to be taught 
to the masses. Th e process of vernacularization allowed for language varieties much 
closer to the spoken dialects to be taught at school, thus making it feasible for in-
creasing numbers of children to acquire modern learning. Th us, vernacularization 
paved the way for mass education and indirectly for the concomitant nationalism. 
At present, this process is incompletely understood, as is the role of the humanities 
in it. However, it may well be that the importance of the humanities for the rise of 
the modern nation state is rather greater than is generally thought.
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4 Islam in the Dutch Enlightenment: the case of the 
Spinoza circle
I would like to illustrate some of the general claims outlined above with a few 
brief and preliminary remarks on the circle around Spinoza. This circle was not 
only an important intellectual force in the Dutch Republic. Recently, a decisive 
international intellectual-historical role has been claimed for it as well, as the 
epicentre of what has come to be called the ‘Radical Enlightenment’. In his 2001 
study, Radical Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel argued that these views found their 
most coherent and most influential formulation in Spinoza’s writings, and that the 
full extent and importance of this radical movement can only be noted when we 
systematically look across national and linguistic boundaries. Further, in his later 
Enlightenment Contested (2006), Israel calls attention to Enlightenment views on, 
and appreciation of, the non-Western world.29 Here, I would like to take these 
claims a bit further yet, and suggest that a case can be made for the hypo thesis 
that the experience of the non-Western world exerted a constitutive influence on 
many Enlightenment thinkers and indeed on Spinoza himself. I would like to 
sketch a preliminary argument along these lines, focusing on the Spinoza circle’s 
interest in things Islamic, and on some aspects of Spinoza’s political philosophy.
The Spinoza circle did indeed display a remarkable interest in things Islamic. 
This interest becomes clear from the translations of Islamic works undertaken by 
its members. Most importantly, in 1657 Jan Rieuwerts (1639-?) published a Dutch 
translation of the Qur’an based on the French version; remarkably, the translator, 
Jan Hendrik Glazemaker (1620-1682), was also the first to have translated the 
works of René Descartes into Dutch.30 Other early translations concerned the 
Persian poet Saadi (pen name of Abu Muslih bin Abdallah Shirazi (d. 1283 or 
1291), whose Golestan was rendered in Latin in 1651 (significantly titled Rosarium 
politicum, in an apparent attempt to emphasize the work’s extensive discussions of 
the morality of government), and published in a Dutch version by Jan Rieuwertsz 
in 1654; and, perhaps most famously, Ibn Tufayl’s (1105-1185) philosophical tale, 
Hayy ibn Yaqzân, by an anonymous translator whose initials ‘S.D.B.’ have been 
read as standing for Baruch de Spinoza’s name in reverse. The translation was 
probably made at the behest of the study circle Nil volentibus arduum, which 
counted many close friends of Spinoza’s among its members; it has even been 
suggested that the translation was even undertaken at the request of Spinoza 
himself.
This is not to say, of course, that Spinoza or the members of the social networks 
he belonged to were necessarily sympathetic to the religion of Islam, the prophet 
Muhammad, or the Islamic powers of their own era (most notably, the Ottoman 
empire). Thus, in a 1671 letter to Jacob Ostens, Spinoza argues that his philosoph-
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ical doctrines imply that Muhammad is an impostor because he abolishes the 
freedom allowed by the religion ‘revealed to us by natural and prophetic light’.31 In 
the same letter, Spinoza admits that the ‘Turks’ [i.e. the Ottomans] possess the 
spirit of Christ in so far as they honor God by practicing justice and love towards 
one’s neighbours. Elsewhere, however, most importantly in the Tractatus politicus, 
he suggests that the Ottoman empire owes its stability to an absolute monarchi-
cal rule that reduces the population at large to a state of ‘slavery, barbarism, and 
solitude’.32 It seems that Spinoza owes much of these and other observations on 
the Ottoman empire to the extensive discussion of this country in Jan and Pieter 
de la Court’s Consideratien van staat, more usually called the Polityke weegschaal 
or Political Scales (1661); but the stereotype of Oriental despotism and slavery as 
the rhetorical opposite, or Other, of Western republicanism based on liberty was 
much more widespread.33 Spinoza’s indebtedness to both De la Court’s Polityke 
weegschaal and Franciscus van den Enden’s Vrije politijke stellingen (1665) has been 
noted before; but the concern with Islam as a religion, and with the image of the 
Islamic world of the age, that is very much present in the republican writings of 
the wider Spinoza circle of the time has not yet been explored.34
This holds true even of Spinoza himself: despite this open criticism of both 
the religion and politics of Islam, Spinoza is rather more indebted to Islamic 
sources than he might appear at first sight. Indirect traces of Islamic philosophi-
cal traditions may be found in Spinoza’s thought, especially as mediated by me-
dieval Jewish thinkers like Maimonides and Gersonides, whose work was shaped 
decisively by the elitist and quietist political-philosophical tradition of Muslim 
Spain. Spinoza, too, was a Jewish philosopher, obviously not in the sense of being 
either an observant Jew or a recognized member of the Jewish community, but in 
the sense of belonging to, or reacting to, a Jewish philosophical tradition. As the 
latter is literally unthinkable without its own background in the Arabic-Islamic 
philosophical tradition (Maimonides even wrote his main work, the 12th-century 
Guide of the Perplexed, in Arabic), Spinoza may be said to derive at least part of 
his own philosophical preconceptions directly or indirectly from this Arabic-
Islamic philosophical tradition. These traces were explored in some detail in 
H.A. Wolfson’s 1934 study The Philosophy of Spinoza, but this author’s treatment 
suffered from a number of methodological problems.35 Here, I can mention only 
a few preliminary points, intended to suggest the fruitfulness of exploring these 
lines of investigation rather than to conclusively establish my case. I will discuss, 
first, the question of prophecy, and second, the relation between mass and elite. 
On both counts, Spinoza appears clearly indebted to Maimonides (even though 
he largely rejects much of the latter’s particular convictions on these matters) 
and, through him, indirectly to Arabic-Islamic thinkers such as, most impor-
tantly, al-Fârâbî.36
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Much like Spinoza, al-Fârâbî sees religion as involving laws rather than philo-
sophical doctrines and arguments, and as such it is intended for the illiterate 
or uneducated masses. Equally familiar to Spinozists will be al-Fârâbî’s distinc-
tion between mass and elite, and the suggestion that the latter have no need for 
the revealed laws of religion. Common to both al-Fârâbî and Maimonides is the 
conviction that religious prophecy is an emanation from the supra-human active 
intellect that primarily works on the human imagination rather than on the intel-
lect, even though the latter may be involved as well.37 Concomitant to this episte-
mological doctrine is the claim that the sacred texts of revealed religion contain 
a rhetorical formulation of abstract philosophical truth.38 Maimonides, however, 
staying rather closer to the narrative of revelation than al-Fârâbî does, singles out 
Moses as the only prophet to whom God spoke directly, the others receiving their 
prophesies merely through an intermediary angel. This distinction does not ap-
pear in al-Fârâbî; in fact, the latter’s book al-madîna al-fâdila is remarkable for the 
absence of any explicit reference to Islamic revelation or Muhammad’s prophecy. 
Nowhere in this work does al-Fârâbî suggest that Islamic revelation is qualita-
tively distinct from, or superior to, any other prophecy; instead, we find not only 
the doctrine that all revealed religions are mere rhetorical formulations of an 
abstract philosophical truth, but also the claim that cities with different religions 
may all be virtuous. Like Spinoza, al-Fârâbî and Maimonides also see religious 
revelation, as communicated through prophecy, as a matter of laws.
The main difference with Spinoza is that al-Fârâbî and Maimonides treat re-
ligion and rhetorical argument as not fundamentally different from the demon-
strative proofs of philosophy; they do not maintain a strict distinction between 
philosophy as sole domain of truth and rhetoric as, by definition, the domain of 
falsehood. For Spinoza, rhetoric belongs to the domain of fantasy and the pas-
sions, which are also the sources of superstition; hence, rhetoric is excluded from 
the domain of knowledge proper. On this point, Spinoza shares the generic dis-
trust of rhetoric that also emerges in contemporaries like Descartes and Hobbes.
A second common feature of prophecy, according to Spinoza, is that it is for-
mulated in simple and concrete language rather than general and abstract philo-
sophical terms. It also works through the imagination rather than through the 
intellect. A social-political corollary of this linguistic doctrine is the idea that re-
ligious revelation is intended for, or addressed to, the uneducated masses (vulgus, 
in Arabic ‘âmma) rather than the schooled elite (Arabic khâssa), and in the form 
of laws rather than philosophical doctrines. To this, Spinoza adds that laws have 
a different linguistic status, in that they are to be obeyed rather than believed.
On all of these points, Spinoza in fact appears closer to al-Fârâbî than to 
Maimonides, whose arguments often rely on the authority of Biblical narratives 
rather than that of philosophical argumentation. It should be added, however, 
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that we have no hard evidence of him being directly acquainted with any Islamic 
philosopher. In fact, he cannot even have known Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqzân 
prior to developing at least part of his own philosophical doctrines, as it was only 
translated into Latin in 1671, and into Dutch in 1672.
Spinoza’s articulation of mass and elite is also informed by his work in areas 
other than philosophy proper, which may thus be of considerable relevance both 
to his philosophical work and to an appreciation of his historical role in the history 
of the humanities. Spinoza, after all, was not only a philosopher and scientist who 
attempted to introduce a geometrical method into philosophy and entered into a 
correspondence with Robert Boyle’s colleague in the Royal Society, Henry Olden-
burg (1619-1677), on the merits of experimental science. He was also a philologist 
and a grammarian (one is tempted to say, a humanist scholar) dealing with ques-
tions of language, rhetoric, and religion. Th is once again suggests that present-day 
disciplinary distinctions should not uncritically be projected onto earlier periods: 
by reading authors like Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza as only, or primarily, philoso-
phers, we risk ending up with a biased and distorted picture of their work.
Most importantly in the present context, Spinoza also wrote a Hebrew gram-
mar, the Compendium grammatices linguae hebraeae, reportedly at the request of 
his friends from Nil volentibus arduum who wished to study the holy language 
(discussed elsewhere in the present book by Piet Steenbakkers).39 Presumably 
started around 1670, this grammar was still unfinished at the time of Spinoza’s 
death in 1677; it was subsequently published in the Opera posthuma. This work 
is not only written in Latin; it also uses Latin as a model for Hebrew, as appears 
for instance from his remark that Hebrew nouns are indeclinable and that gram-
matical case is expressed by ‘so-called nouns’ rather than by case endings as in 
Latin (Compendium, Chapter 9). For Spinoza, Hebrew does not quite qualify 
as either a ‘plebeian vernacular’ or a classical sacred language: he explicitly states 
that he sets out to present the grammar of the Hebrew language, not of the sacred 
language of the Bible, thus suggesting that this exercise involves less a vernacu-
larization than a secularization of classical Hebrew. Moreover, he notes that he 
has written this work ‘for those who want to speak the Hebrew language, not just 
chant it’ (Compendium, Chapter 4), suggesting that he wants the use of a classical 
language to be informed by knowledge of its grammar, without necessarily striv-
ing for the education of the vulgus, or the uneducated people.
The latter quote points to a central concern in the Compendium: the problem 
of the normative and rule-governed character of language. The Bible, he argues, 
does not supply normative criteria for correct linguistic usage; for those crite-
ria, an explicit and systematic grammar is necessary. But Spinoza’s own grammar 
does more than specify the rules of grammar; it also appears to reflect, or imply, 
points of philosophical import. Thus, it is both linguistically and philosophically 
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significant that the Compendium gives a central place to the noun, whereas Spino-
za’s predecessors, such as Rabbi David Kimchi (1160-1235) and Johannes Bux-
torf (1564-1629), proceeded from the verb. Departing from the emphasis on the 
verb and on the verbal root consisting of three consonants, which Hebrew shares 
with the other Semitic languages, Spinoza describes Hebrew as a noun-based 
language. Some commentators have read this preoccupation with the noun as a 
projection from the centrality of substance in Spinoza’s philosophical doctrines.40
But we may consider Spinoza’s grammatical doctrines not only as inspired 
by philosophical conceptions; we may also conversely explore to what extent his 
philosophical doctrines were informed by his linguistic beliefs. This question 
has not received much attention since the polemical exchanges between Stuart 
Hampshire, David Savan, and G.H.R. Parkinson in the 1950s; but it is central 
to a comparative approach to the history of the humanities.41 Hampshire argues 
that the geometric method of Spinoza’s Ethics amounts to an attempt to free lan-
guage of the imagination, thus enabling it to express philosophical truth clearly 
and distinctly; against this, Savan proposes the radical reading that according 
to Spinoza, words – including philosophical or geometrical ones – cannot ad-
equately express philosophical truth. Parkinson in turn rejects Savan’s reading as 
too radical, arguing that Spinoza himself appears unaware of the complications 
of his own doctrines on language and thus does not even try to explain how words 
can convey truth. On Parkinson’s account, only some, but not all, uses of ‘universal 
words’ are objectionable. Clearly, the last word on Spinoza’s views on language has 
not yet been said.
Spinoza’s linguistic practices and ideologies are also relevant to the processes 
of vernacularization discussed above, and to the slowly changing conceptions of 
the appropriate public for philosophical and scientific learning. Most important 
to our present discussion is the fact that Spinoza wrote his main philosophical 
works in Latin. This might not seem worthy of attention if Spinoza had not also 
written several shorter treatises in Dutch, as well as a grammar of Hebrew as 
discussed above. Initially, one might ascribe his predilection for Latin to a lack of 
familiarity with Dutch, or a wish to communicate with members of the Republic 
of Letters living outside of Holland for whom Latin was the obvious language of 
communication. This seems to be confirmed in an early letter written in Dutch, 
where he expresses a wish to write down his philosophical thoughts ‘in the lan-
guage with which [he] was brought up’ so that he would be better able to express 
his thoughts. Presumably, this native language was Portuguese or, perhaps, He-
brew.42 His mature philosophical writings, however, were intentionally written 
in Latin instead of Dutch, Portuguese, or Hebrew for quite another reason also. 
Spinoza’s unwillingness to write – or more importantly, publish – in Dutch re-
sulted in part from prudence vis-à-vis the authorities: works in Latin were less 
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likely to attract the attention of the censors, or even to lead to prosecution, than 
Dutch-language publications, which could reach a much wider audience. Oth-
ers, like his friends Franciscus van den Enden (1612-1674) and Adriaan Koerbagh 
(1632-1669), were less prudent in this respect and published their more radical 
ideas in Dutch. Thus, Koerbagh formulated the essentials of Spinoza’s ideas in 
plain Dutch in Een bloemhof van allerley lieflijkheyd and Een ligt schijnende in 
duystere plaatsen (both published in 1668); as a result, he was arrested and locked 
up in the Amsterdam Rasphuis, where he died in 1669. Undoubtedly in connec-
tion with these events, Spinoza was adamant in opposing the spread of his own 
doctrines in Dutch (as distinct from, say, his Dutch-language introduction to the 
philosophy of Descartes): when, in 1671, he heard of plans to publish a Dutch 
translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, he urged his friend Jarig Jelles 
(approx. 1620-1683) to do whatever he could to prevent its publication; publishing 
that work in Dutch, he writes, could only result in its being banned.43
Apparently, however, it was not only fear of the authorities that prevented 
Spinoza from disseminating his views in Dutch, but also fear of the masses, or 
at the very least the conviction that it is useless to try to communicate philo-
sophical truths to them in a language they can easily understand. In this respect, 
Spinoza stands closer to the premodern distinction between mass and elite than 
to modern conceptions of the public sphere. This view of the masses as unfit for 
being educated also shapes and informs Spinoza’s philosophical doctrines, most 
notably in the Tractatus theologico-politicus. Thus, in his preface, Spinoza writes 
that the bulk of humanity will always be driven by irrational fears, implying that 
it is useless to try to educate them concerning religion, morality, and happiness.44 
Virtually absent in this work are the later Enlightenment belief or hope that the 
masses can be liberated from their irrational fears through education and the 
later liberal idea that education, rather than economic independence, is a main 
prerequisite for citizenship. This suggests, among other things, that classical re-
publicanism not only maintains views on education different from those of liber-
alism, but also a distinct ideology of language.
Implicitly, Spinoza treats Latin as the language of the educated elite that is 
open to philosophical and rational thinking, and Dutch as the language of the 
masses for whom only revealed religion formulated as a body of laws is suitable. 
Hebrew takes up an uneasy position between them, being for Spinoza neither an 
ontologically privileged sacred language – or a language of learning – like Latin, 
nor a vulgar or vernacular medium like Dutch. Thus, Spinoza’s strict, and for all 
practical purposes unbridgeable, opposition between mass and elite can be traced 
back to thinkers from the Arabic-Islamic philosophical tradition, such as Mai-
monides, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Bâjja, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), and al-Fârâbî, while it also 
reflects a distinct, and early, phase in the process of vernacularization.
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As noted above, Spinoza also displays a far more negative attitude to rhetoric 
than do al-Fârâbî, Maimonides, and the scholastic tradition more generally. In 
fact, Spinoza’s (and others’) strictures against rhetoric are indicative of new at-
tempts to regiment language and purify philosophy and science, as domains of 
literal language and truth, and concomitantly to dismiss rhetoric as a domain of 
the figurative, that is, of falsehood and the passions. Spinoza thus appears to be 
engaged in an attempt to purify speech from the imagination and the passions, 
and thereby to constitute an entirely novel entity called ‘language’ that primarily 
serves purely factual and descriptive rather than emotional or rhetorical purpos-
es. Similar attempts were made by his contemporaries Hobbes and Locke; the 
very contradictions in their attempts suggest that this process of purification was 
only in a hesitant initial stage at the time.45
Like other authors of his age, Spinoza displays a concern with the emergence 
of the vernacular languages as a medium of learning; but his attitude to this pro-
cess clearly reflects a premodern distinction between mass and elite. In this re-
spect, Spinoza may be less ‘modern’ than he is held to be by the likes of Jonathan 
Israel. For the history of the humanities, the case of Spinoza and his circle sug-
gests that the process of vernacularization did not automatically lead to an expan-
sion of the intended public for humanistic and other learning; rather, this process 
was rendered more complex by the slowly changing – and possibly contradictory 
– ideologies of language and of the mass-elite opposition.
5 Conclusion
Several more general conclusions and preliminary suggestions for the study of the 
history of the humanities emerge from the above considerations. First, I have argued 
that the units of analysis should be spelled out, and motivated, rather than implic-
itly assumed. Th us, one should not project back in time the present-day distinction 
between the humanities and the natural sciences, or between individual disciplines 
like philosophy, philology, and religious studies, onto a period when these distinc-
tions were not made, or not systematically or consistently made. Nor should the 
notion of the linguistic area, let alone that of the nation state, simply be assumed 
as given, or projected back onto a past in which the relation between the vernacular 
and languages of learning was articulated in very diff erent terms. In fact, the very 
things that need explanation are precisely the rise of new national identities, based 
on vernacular languages, and the emergence of nation states with clear territorial 
boundaries and a sense of identity, based on the ideology of a shared language, a dis-
tinct culture and literature, and a common past. Th e disciplines of the humanities, 
notably the study of language, folklore, and history, played an important, if not cru-
 Michiel Leezenberg
cial role in the formation of these national identities. Th ese processes themselves 
did not occur until the nineteenth century, but the earlier process of vernaculariza-
tion paved the way for them. One way of thematizing such changing disciplinary, 
linguistic, and political conceptions and distinctions is by tracing the rise and con-
testation of individual disciplines; another is by exploring long-distance intellectual 
contacts that cross, or even challenge, national and linguistic boundaries.
Second, I have argued for paying more detailed attention to the constitutive, if 
highly variable and contested, role of language in the changing constellations of 
knowledge systems or epistemes. Not only does the worldwide process of vernac-
ularization and the more specifically Western changing relation between rhetoric 
and philosophy, or between eloquence and knowledge, merit further exploration; 
the study of language ideologies, or folk beliefs about words and their societal 
and political roles, may also yield new insights into the changing epistemological 
and political aspects of the humanities, varying from the relaton between logic 
and rhetoric to the shift from premodern polis, empire or republic to the modern 
nation state.
Third, I have made a brief foray into the study of such long-distance connec-
tions and changing concerns with language among the seventeenth-century circle 
around Spinoza, focusing on signs of interest in things Islamic, and on possi-
ble sources of inspiration for Spinoza’s thought in Islamic philosophy. Spinoza’s 
rearticulation of the oppositions between rhetoric and philosophy, and between 
mass and elite, not only hints at the complexities of the process of vernaculari-
zation during this period, it also suggests that the experience of non-Western 
traditions may have contributed to the shaping of the humanities in early modern 
Europe as much as they have arguably shaped the early modern natural sciences.46 
For this reason, one should beware of tacitly imposing either disciplinary, linguis-
tic, or geographical boundaries on one’s analyses. Although the above discussion 
presents only a preliminary account of these questions, I hope that it suggests an 
example for fruitful future research. A comparative history of the humanities, in 
short, may profit from an approach that takes neither disciplinary nor national or 
linguistic boundaries as given, but which instead focuses precisely on the consti-
tution and contestation of such boundaries.
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fear ... Hence, I do not invite the uneducated masses, and all those who share the same 
affects with them, to read this.’) Cf. Y. Yovel, ‘Spinoza: The Psychology of the Multitude 
and the Uses of Language’, Studia Spinozana  (), -.
 Cf. Bauman & Briggs, Voices of Modernity, esp. chapter , ‘Making Language Safe for Sci-
ence and Society: From Francis Bacon to John Locke’; cf. also P. Pettit, Made With Words: 
Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton University Press, ).
 For the latter argument, see e.g. George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the Euro-
pean Renaissance (MIT Press, ).

Bridging the Gap
A Diff erent View of Renaissance Humanism 
and Science
Cynthia M. Pyle
I was overwhelmingly dominated by two passions, a passion
for science and another equally ardent one for the humanities.
... [I]t is impossible to live reasonably without science, or
beautifully without arts and letters.
George Sarton1
1 Th e humane sciences
The topic and goals of this conference are admirable ones: to initiate an ongoing 
investigation of the history of the humane sciences not unlike that of the history 
of the physical and natural sciences conceived of and promoted by George Sarton 
at Harvard in the first half of the twentieth century. Of course there has long 
been a field of the history of scholarship,2 but this promises to be more accessible 
than that, in its implicit nod in the direction of pedagogy through the humani-
ties curriculum, already studied for the Renaissance by such eminent scholars 
as Eugenio Garin, Paul Oskar Kristeller and Augusto Campana (the latter two 
of whom independently pointed out in the 1940s the development of the stu-
dia humanitatis from the trivium of the medieval artes liberales).3 I wish to add a 
somewhat different perspective to these questions by calling attention to bridges 
between the two, in particular the scientific spirit behind these last-mentioned 
changes – a spirit born, I believe, of the arrival of the license to doubt on the wave 
of the calamities (plagues, territorial encroachments, the Avignon papacy) of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.4
I moved into the humanities from biology in the mid-1960s – having decided I 
wanted to work on broader questions and on a period with which I felt kinship.5 I 
then made a discovery regarding the Italian humanism I was learning about: there 
was a clear analogy between the work that was done in the sciences as I had been 
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trained to work in them and the work that the Italian humanists were performing 
on texts. Few scholars at the time, besides the historian of philosophy Eugenio 
Garin, understood this scientific nature of humanism, which he embedded in the 
Platonic and historicizing currents of the time, but which he also related to the 
empirical explorations and technological advances of the Renaissance.6
In the laboratory, we had been seeking to learn how things work in the world 
we live in. We were not seeking – at least not directly – causes (philosophical or 
religious) behind the working of things. We were trying to understand the func-
tioning and mechanisms of things. Experiments were devised to isolate functions 
and portions of functions from more complex questions, paring down variables 
to a minimum so that we could see each portion in as little contaminated a way 
as possible. There was also an attempt – mythologized and idealized for a long 
time – to abstract ourselves and our views away from the scientific undertakings 
we were engaged in, to pretend that we were actually capable of not interfering 
subjectively with our experiments.
Ours was a quest for reality: the reality that exists independently of the fact 
that we see it or how we see it. And we today are coming to know that reality to 
an increasing and amazing extent, especially through the natural and physical 
sciences, but also through the humanities. For there are portions of humanistic 
work – in the sense of work on the humane sciences like literature, philosophy 
and the various histories – that also give us insight into the world as it really is. 
As in science, these are often the less visible portions. Small discoveries are made 
about a painting, a text, a piece of music that give us insight into the workings 
of the human eye, ear and mind. These discoveries, made in the laboratory of 
scholarship, infuse the interpretive works of essayists and critics – even novelists, 
poets, composers and artists – but they are also intrinsically interesting, as mani-
festations of the human mind at work. (For it is not only psychologists, or even 
neuroscientists, who study the human mind.)
Because our brains, for anatomical or physiological reasons, like to think in 
dichotomies and tease out concepts dialectically (to use the modern term), there 
have long (perhaps always?) been two cultures (as C.P. Snow liked to call them).7 
Often one culture (in Snow’s examples, that of creative writers and artists) is 
distinguished by its more metaphorical way of thinking; the other (in Snow’s 
examples, that of physical scientists) proceeds analytically and empirically. Both 
will reach syntheses from these different approaches. The classic examples are of 
course Plato and Aristotle. Plato had a distinctly metaphorical way of conceiving 
the world, thinking and writing in moral parables. His student Aristotle moved 
away from this, to empirically based thought, especially in his zoological work 
during two years spent on the island of Lesbos, where he dissected and analyzed, 
in words and drawings, specimens from the sea, with a precision that is extolled 
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by scientists to this day. What we may decide to call the ‘virtual’ – but perhaps 
actually intrinsic – antagonism of these two viewpoints persisted and persists 
throughout human thought (Western and Eastern).
And yet there are more bridges between these two ways of thinking than many 
realize, and many people in our own day practice and epitomize both. Numerous 
scientists of my acquaintance are versed in literature, art, music or history. Fewer 
of today’s humanists (in the loose sense of that word) are versed in science or 
technology. Yet many humanists practice precise and critical thought, thought of 
a nature that might be termed scientific, based on its use of logic and rigorous 
critical reasoning, exposing their thought to the realities of surrounding circum-
stances and to contradictory ideas.
Years ago, I had the privilege of working on a manuscript in the Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana which embodies this interdisciplinarity. MS Urbinas latinus 
276 is a natural history spanning three centuries. It was written in 1460 and cor-
rected by its author, the humanist Pier Candido Decembrio (1399-1477), who 
based his text on the thirteenth-century encyclopedia of Thomas of Cantimpré; 
it was illustrated 130 years later by Teodoro Ghisi, who based himself on the 
woodcuts of Conrad Gessner of Zurich.8
While relying heavily on Cantimpré’s text, Decembrio exercises a critical spir-
it, at two levels. First, although his copying of the words of the text is nearly 
verbatim, his rejection of its syntax is constant and consistent; he considers the 
text’s Latin style inelegant, and he revises it throughout his own book to con-
form more with classical Latin syntax. In this, he exhibits what many consider 
to be the quintessential characteristic of Renaissance humanism: an insistence 
on rhetoric. But there is another level of critique at work here. While Decem-
brio’s use of his source would be thought plagiaristic today,9 he does weigh the 
information it presents with a critical eye; his acceptance of the subjects treated 
by the text is not slavish. He is not bowing to the text’s authority because it is 
old; he is interacting with it, in a dialogue across the ages. Just so, Francesco Pe-
trarca and Niccolò Machiavelli corresponded with their sources in an epistolary 
dialogue across the ages.
This sort of interaction with the past has something in common with the 
practice of imitatio. Imitatio is an important concept in the study of literature, 
and perhaps especially Renaissance Italian literature. Its singular metaphor is 
Petrarch’s poet, in his Familiares (XXIII, 19, 13-14), who, like the bee collecting 
nectar to make honey, can avail himself of the genius and the style of others, 
not merely apeing their words, but blending separate elements into one, differ-
ent and better.10 This concept is not one of merely copying; it is a vying with 
others – in this case the authors of antiquity. Again, a kind of dialogue with 
the past.
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Such imitatio exists, not only in literature, but in the other arts as well. Josquin 
des Prez took a folk song, ‘L’homme armé’, and made it into a great mass. Even in 
today’s popular culture, imitatio is at work, unbeknownst to most people: I once 
heard a man whistling Guillaume de Machaut in an elevator in New York City, 
and when I commented on that wonderful fact to the whistler, he didn’t have the 
foggiest idea of what I was talking about – he was whistling a pop tune (which I, 
in turn, had never heard of )!
And (but this is seldom articulated) imitatio exists in all fields throughout 
intellectual history, including the history of the natural and physical sciences. 
In these sciences, we have imitation of methodologies across disciplines: there is 
cross-pollination from physics into chemistry and, ipso facto, on into biochemis-
try; certain areas of biology (such as population genetics) and even the so-called 
social sciences, must use statistical analysis, originating in seventeenth-century 
probability theory, to arrive at their conclusions.
What we must begin to realize is that the humanists of Renaissance Italy, 
like writers and artists of all times, were indeed imitating and even emulating 
their sources, but their imitation was of habits of thought and of approaches to 
the world, in their quest to learn more and more about that world. This was, 
in other words, not merely a literary or artistic movement, but an intellectual 
revolution.11
2 Science and history
I have recently explored the case of a near-contemporary, the art historian Edgar 
Wind,12 who, as few may realize, actually embodied a bridge between scientist and 
historian. Wind was professionally trained as a philosopher, by Ernst Cassirer in 
Berlin, and wrote his first thesis in 1924 on aesthetics.13 In his contribution to the 
1936 Festschrift for Cassirer, he explored ‘Some Points of Contact Between His-
tory and Natural Science.’14
In the section of his essay entitled ‘Document and Instrument’, Wind noted 
the normality of circular argument in producing documentary evidence, for it is 
necessary for the historian to know what he is looking for among myriad docu-
ments. This is a phenomenon that can perhaps today more acceptably be thought 
of cognitively as a ricochet or feedback process,15 and which Wind compares to 
the ‘dialectic of the historical document’. Wind also understood that laboratory 
science entails similar circularity or cyclicity in its procedures and thinking.
Interestingly, the sort of dialectic – or argument with one’s sources – to which 
Wind referred can further be compared to many types of what we today call dia-
lectic, from Hegel’s (which of course travels in a sort of spiral, evolving through 
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time into further understandings) all the way back to the agon that Jacqueline de 
Romilly has defined as the necessary element of Athenian democracy.16 Versions 
of dialectic are also essential not only to the active doing of laboratory science – 
in practice a quintessentially democratic, and argumentative, undertaking – but 
even in the scientist’s or the humanist’s solitary moments, during the processes of 
mental feedback already alluded to. Nor, of course, are they unrelated to Kant’s 
antinomies, which underlie his philosophy of history.17
Wind goes even further (in the second section of his short essay) to explicitly 
analyze the subjective element so necessary to the doing of science of all kinds. 
And he is aware that it is never ‘pure mind’ (which cannot exist independently, in 
that mind is generated by the brain18), any more than it is pure material contact, 
that engages scientific problems. Wind is himself conscious of the subjective in-
trusion (and even disturbance) implicit in any contact with the researcher’s mate-
rial or object of study, either in the archive or in the laboratory.
Conversely, Wind points out the effects of that research on the researcher and 
on subsequent events – on history. In the last section of his paper, Wind himself, 
like Kant before him, brings out the need for the scientist/scholar to dare to 
become the creator, the poet (no doubt thinking of the Greek poiein) and to risk 
recognizing and glorying in his or her own power to transform.
Wind ends his essay with a call to combine scientific and historical research. 
And today, that is becoming possible, through the cognitive sciences, in ways he 
could not have imagined.
3 History and the life sciences
Wind concentrated on the doing of physics. But if instead we consider the his-
torical natural sciences, such as astronomy, geology, palaeontology, and especially 
the life sciences, natural history and evolutionary biology, we discover a more 
compatible analogy with the historical and philological sciences of the fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries in Europe.19 The historical natural sciences deal with 
phenomena that develop over time; like history itself, their subject matter can-
not be experimented on but must be considered as nature’s experiments (as the 
evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr20 put it).
We may call these natural sciences ‘historical’ for they all treat of subject mat-
ter which unfolds over time: astronomy and cosmology, of the universe; geology, 
of the earth; evolution, of the myriad forms of life on our planet; palaeontology 
and natural history, of the particular species of plant and animal life which have 
evolved over time; and I would add the more literally historical science of archae-
ology, the study of the traces of human settlement on our planet, begun in the 
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fifteenth century by Leon Battista Alberti and his contemporaries, as Roberto 
Weiss pointed out.21
This introduction among the sciences of the concept of succession through 
time places history itself in the company of more compatible areas of natural and 
physical science than did positivistic attempts to discuss history as a physical sci-
ence, such as that of Auguste Comte. It will be noted that these other areas in my 
argument are not what are commonly termed ‘social sciences’ (branches of social 
psychology, sociology, anthropology and the like) but, I repeat, historical natural 
sciences. Even archaeology, though not perhaps a natural science (unless one con-
siders the artifacts of human animal life a part of nature), is a highly technological 
undertaking, conducted (when possible) under the strict rules of a very literal 
sifting of data and the location of these data geometrically in grills and layers, 
along with their analysis and interpretation.
Of course, as with the social sciences, history (again, to an extent, like archae-
ology) deals with situations and phenomena created by human beings: political, 
military, social, artistic, musical, literary, theatrical, intellectual phenomena. His-
tory must also, like the social sciences, deal with an unmanageably large number 
of variables.
But while the truly social sciences (sociology, anthropology, psychology) seem 
to be still struggling with the management of those often intangible variables 
(emotions, beliefs, visions, human interactions) and how to study them scientifi-
cally (though they are now at last able to rely increasingly on the hard evidence 
of brain physiology – far more reliable than statistics), history itself has long had 
ways of handling its variables – in part of course by stringing them out chrono-
logically over time in a narrative (in keeping with the way they occur), but more 
pertinently by seeking out and using evidence which is empirically verifiable (ex-
cept in extreme cases of expert forgery – and, in fact, even in such cases, once 
moderate skepticism has entered the picture). Such evidence is of course subject 
to the vagaries of time: it can be lost, mutilated by fire, water or breakage, or, now, 
by digital losses in computers. And the record is always incomplete, as it is in the 
historical natural sciences of palaeontology and evolution.
As far as laws and predictability – so often associated with the physical sci-
ences – are concerned the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr first addressed these 
questions in 1982. He pointed out that biologists seldom ask for laws or generali-
zations, being intent on learning facts, and that, in fact, applying mathematiza-
tion or mechanization to the life sciences can result in confusing the issues. He 
noted that laws lack the flexibility necessary for dealing with the complexity of 
the life sciences, and that biologists deal instead in concepts – concepts like clas-
sification, species, and taxon in systematics; or like descent, selection, and adapt-
ability in evolutionary theory. Such intellectual units are open-ended – open to 
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revision as new discoveries are made or old ones matured. It is this very revisabil-
ity that appears blocked when dealing with ‘laws’ – though there may well be laws 
on the horizon for the life sciences.
Mayr also discussed predictability, making the distinction between the phi-
losophers’ logical prediction and the scientists’ temporal prediction. The former 
can apply, for example, to evolutionary theory and be tested, but it is far more 
commonly applied in the physical sciences. Temporal (real-time) prediction from 
laws is rarely possible in the unpredictable life sciences.22
While admitting the existence of paradigm shifts and revolutions in special 
cases, like that of the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859, 
Mayr resisted applying Thomas Kuhn’s paradigmatic thesis regarding the history 
of science, as originally stated, to either the biological sciences or history itself. 
Rather than a long, steady development of scientific knowledge, Kuhn proposed 
dramatic and sudden shifts in thinking that interrupt ‘normal science’ and change 
its course (I would add, in ways resembling those punctuated equilibria proposed 
as mechanisms of evolution by Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould23 in 1972).
By means of these shifts, new paradigms of methodology are created within a 
given science. Yet in Mayr’s view, even large discoveries can result in no conceptual 
changes, and both discoveries and conceptual changes are built on earlier findings 
and insights. Furthermore, once a paradigm shift has occurred, it coexists with 
the older ways of thinking and working for varying periods of time – as we in 
history know only too well.24
We can ask ourselves today, perhaps preferring Mayr’s more gradual (but by no 
means smooth) distinctions, whether the question of the rhythm of discoveries 
and concept shifts is not, after all, very similar among the different sciences. And 
in history, we all admit that smaller discoveries and understandings pave the way 
for large breakthroughs – if not in a black-and-white, dramatic fashion as Kuhn 
is accused of thinking early in the development of his thesis.
For that matter, is this not the way in which intellectual developments occur in 
the doing of history (historia rerum gestarum)?25 Must we not seek out the seminal 
stages of any great shift in the way of looking at things – the point of view – that 
occurs in a given culture? And, indeed, throughout the unfolding of history itself 
(res gestae), as in the evolutionary record described by Mayr’s work in evolution-
ary biology and in Eldredge and Gould’s hypothesis, do we not see that such 
shifts coexist over long periods with the cultural matrices they eventually displace 
(sometimes, as in island population genetics, leading to the development of new 
species)?26 Is that not the very essence of what are called ‘transitional periods’ (as 
if all periods were not transitional)?
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4 Renaissance humanist practice
In considering history as science, then, while we remain conscious of the two 
meanings of ‘history’ – that of the development of historical events (res gestae) 
and that of the development of our study of those events (historia rerum ges-
tarum) – we are here concerned, as I have said, with the process, especially the 
non-narrative portions, of the study of those events rather than their actual oc-
currences through time. (We shall consider the substantive revelations that occur 
in the process of writing – the intellectual feedback, rather than stylistic revisions 
– as part of the analytical phase of the doing of history.)
Now, in our study of history as it was practised in the Renaissance, we must 
furthermore consider both the context and the techniques of the doing of history. 
The context is one of great enthusiasm and excitement (and competition) over the 
rediscovery of lost texts in manuscript, given enormous impetus in the fourteenth 
century by Francesco Petrarca, or Petrarch (1304-74), but carried to heights in the 
fifteenth century by the Italian humanists, including Lorenzo Valla (1407-57) and 
Angelo Poliziano (1454-94), and later by humanists in other countries.
The early part of the fifteenth century witnessed humanists like Valla follow-
ing in Petrarch’s footsteps – working, in fact, on some of the very same codices. 
The pioneering work on these humanists’ scholarship was done in the twentieth 
century by scholars including Giuseppe Billanovich, Alessandro Perosa, Lucia 
Cesarini Martinelli, Silvia Rizzo and Mariangela Regoliosi.27 Their original work 
enabled them to compare the critical, or what we may call the scientific, methods 
of Petrarch and Valla at work on the same texts. This is the case for both Quin-
tilian and Livy, for both of whose texts we have annotated manuscripts by both 
Petrarch and Valla.28
Taking the work of these two at least partially Paduan-oriented scholars, Pe-
trarch and Valla, on the Paduan historian, Livy, as an example (while recognizing 
the thirteenth-century Paduans’ – Mussato’s and Lovato’s – knowledge of and 
reference to the text, which formed a partial basis for, but did not equal in quality, 
the intellectual breakthroughs of their successor Petrarch29), we can recognize Pe-
trarch’s own substantial work on the text in the two Livy manuscripts he owned.30 
Not only did he know enough to acquire these two important manuscripts (in 
Wind’s sense of circular knowledge, or what I am calling a sort of spiralling dia-
lectical, or feedback, knowledge of context and specific case), but he was able 
both to emend the text through educated guesses and to fill in long passages (in 
his own hand) from other manuscripts, including one from a different textual 
tradition.
To consider more specific instances of textual criticism, let us look briefly at 
Lorenzo Valla’s work. Following in Billanovich’s footsteps, Rizzo, Cesarini Mar-
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tinelli and Regoliosi have studied Valla’s emendation marks in his copies of both 
Quintilian and Livy and expanded them plausibly, or suggested possible expan-
sions, in the process uncovering particular techniques used by Valla in his textual 
criticism.31 Regoliosi finds him adopting some abbreviations similar to Petrarch’s, 
but she is also able to confirm his choices through reference to the fiercely in-
vective polemic between Valla and his two colleagues in the Aragonese court of 
Naples, Bartolomeo Facio and Antonio Panormita.32
Regoliosi has confirmed Valla’s preferred use of ope ingenii, or what we 
might call the use of the highly educated guess, as opposed to Facio’s and Pa-
normita’s preference for ope codicum, or a fairly mechanical collation of manu-
script sources. She has compared their readings with today’s text and decided 
clearly in favor of Valla’s procedure (as have modern editors of Livy). While 
Valla may or may not have collated manuscripts too, Regoliosi’s point is that 
his scholarly (scientific) emendations of Livy have the advantage of a seem-
ingly subjective procedure – we today might call it intuitive – based on judg-
ments of a paleographical nature. Such judgments can be made by Valla on 
the basis of his deep knowledge of the Latin language, especially that of Livy, 
and of the characteristics of scripts from different epochs of the Middle Ages. 
So they become more than mere expansions of abbreviations; each expansion 
becomes a thought experiment itself, one informed by previous experience of 
written shortcuts, and knowledge of Roman history, culture, language and 
usage. Occasionally, Valla did have to admit that Facio’s and Panormita’s more 
mechanical emendations from the collation of several mss reached an accept-
able solution; he admitted this through clenched teeth, as Regoliosi puts it. 
In the end, after Valla’s manuscript publication of his Emendationes in 1446-
1447,33 the others were so mortified that they actually destroyed the 3rd De-
cade of the Codex Regius (given to Alfonso d’Aragona by Cosimo de’Medici), 
which they had corrected by hand, and Alfonso had another copy made.
It must be borne in mind that these skills used by Valla are not ‘merely’ or even 
only paleographic or codicological. They are based on an extremely solid and de-
tailed knowledge of the Latin of Livy and his contemporaries (this after all is the 
author of the lasting tour de force of philology: De linguae Latinae elegantia from 
about 1440-144434), as well as an extremely solid and detailed knowledge of the 
history of Rome itself.
As is well known, he had already (in about 1440) tackled a detective story 
fraught with political implications: the forged document (uncovered by Cusanus 
before him in 1433) claiming to prove the donation by the Emperor Constantine 
of a great part of the Roman Empire to the Church of Rome, supposedly made in 
gratitude for Constantine’s discovery of the Christian faith. This document was 
forged in the 8th or 9th century, possibly under the aegis of Pope Paul I (757-767), 
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either by a member of the papal curia or by a sympathizer close to the curia. It 
masqueraded as a document from the 4th century. Valla was able to consult con-
sular records to expose the rather glaring errors of the forger about, for example, 
consular dates – who was consul when and for how long – and about Roman 
Latin usage; developing a most sophisticated technique, he probed the linguistic 
usages of the document (he knew, for example, as many have noted, that the word 
satrap, or nobleman, was misused in the document), many of which he recognizes 
as anachronistic, and some of which he was able to place in the Middle Ages.35
Here, Valla is using methods similar to what Mayr has termed the observation-
al-comparative methods of the observational sciences, including many of the life 
sciences. While Valla, like practitioners of the historical natural sciences, is un-
able to perform laboratory experiments on his discontinuous historical records, 
he is able (with his great intelligence – demanded of today’s significant scientists 
as well, and the quality that makes Petrarch’s and Darwin’s intellectual feats more 
significant than those of their predecessors) to make sound conjectures on the 
basis of past understandings, and to test them against the concepts unfolding in 
the text before him. This is what Mayr might term ‘controlled observation’, and it 
is as valid in the investigation of history, it seems to me, as in research into what 
we call the natural sciences today.
In trying to think about history as a science, and to draw parallels between 
historical and natural scientific methodologies, we must recall that in the natural 
sciences, hypotheses are formed and tested under various conditions. Ernst Mayr 
made the point that in the life sciences, nature (meaning circumstances) creates 
the experiment, the scientist observes it, often from artifacts like fossil bones or 
the geological record, and draws or infers conclusions.36 In human history as well, 
the experiment is created by sometimes very complex circumstances, which leave 
uneven clues. These clues are read by the historian who draws inferences from 
them. The difficulty comes in the testing, for, like Valla’s emendations, historical 
interpretations must be inferred from an incomplete historical record – though 
with gaps less extensive than those in the fossil record.
Like the life sciences, too, history is not obviously amenable to the develop-
ment of laws from which predictions about future events can be extrapolated 
– though there are perhaps general trends that can be perceived by astute observ-
ers, just as there were trends that could be analyzed by Darwin and that form a 
synthetic part of his multifarious theory of evolution.
It may be well to realize that since we are (highly developed) animals – even 
Valla’s equally brilliant successor Angelo Poliziano refers to us as a type of ani-
mal37 – our social, cultural and intellectual history really is a complex form of 
natural history, and the only sensible model for whatever science can be discerned 
in either our making of history or our doing of history (in the sense of analyzing 
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and interpreting it) will, indeed must, come from the life sciences. However ra-
tional we may be, we behave fundamentally as animals – in their excellent as well 
as their less excellent manifestations.
That other Italian humanist polymath, Poliziano, participated fully in both 
cultures. Finding himself as a child, after the murder of his father, in the poeti-
cally Platonizing and metaphorizing surroundings of Lorenzo de’Medici’s circle, 
Poliziano followed the trends he was taught. The production of his early years 
was entirely literary, much of it in the vernacular. Its limpid descriptive power and 
its mythological tropes have been explicitly related to the Platonic mood of the 
times, and of course to the art of such clearly Platonic colleagues as Botticelli and 
Michelangelo – one need only think of Botticelli’s Primavera and Birth of Venus 
(both closely related to Poliziano’s imagery), or Michelangelo’s poetry, or his feel-
ing for the essence of stone – not to mention Lorenzo’s own poetry. Behind all of 
this was of course the figure of the great Platonist, Marsilio Ficino, whose own 
works and translations of Plato set the tone for Florentine culture of the time.
Yet, alongside all this metaphor, we can see an empirical bent in the thought 
of Angelo Poliziano from an early age. It manifested itself even in his youth by an 
interest in the medical learning of his friends and protectors the Benivieni, and in 
the ode he wrote on the death of his contemporary, Albiera degl’Albizzi in 1473, 
when he was 19, including specific references to her symptoms. And in his poetry 
of the 1470s, while the philosophical context is Platonic to the highest degree, the 
limpid imagery is concrete and crystaline. This early vernacular poetry was writ-
ten under the influence of the equally limpid classical poetry of Claudian, Vergil, 
the Greek Anthology, and of Petrarch’s own vernacular verse.
At the age of 26, upon his return to Florence from a trip to northern cities, 
Poliziano left behind the world of Neoplatonic vernacular poetry and, taking up 
a position at the Studio Fiorentino, was able to devote himself to his new and 
deepest interests. We find him lecturing on Quintilian and Statius in 1480-1481.38 
In his prose introduction to that course, he tells his students (to paraphrase): 
Go out and do as Cicero did. Cicero went to study the rhetorical methods of the 
Greeks and, beyond them, those of Rhodes, those of Asia, to make them his own. 
Follow the practice of Cicero, not merely his style; go out and find your own mod-
els.39 It would, I believe, be hard to find a scholastic pedagogue suggesting this.
Even more excitingly, his vision of the Latin language itself is not normative, 
but historical and, furthermore, evolutive. He tells his students, in essence: Don’t 
think of late Latin as degenerate, decadent, corrupt, or worse; think of it as differ-
ent!40 Linguists of our own day (who pride themselves in their scientific approach 
to language) speak in exactly these terms.
In his later Praelectio, Nutricia, for another course at the Studio Fiorentino on 
poets and poetry, Poliziano relates the concept to the fi gure of Orpheus, the semi-
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divine son of Apollo and the muse Calliope, at the origins of both poetry and music, 
and the civilizer of humankind.41 Poliziano’s metaphorical stance is always present, 
but it is accompanied by his scientifi c one. His discussion of music, for example, is 
heavily Platonic, but it is not only Platonic. In Nutricia, and even more explicitly in 
his Panepistemon of 1490, Poliziano is concerned with the practical – the mechani-
cal arts, the technical side of music – and with subjective judgment. He points out 
that Aristoxenus (of the 4th c. BCE) and Ptolemy (whose Harmonica he had tran-
scribed two years earlier) had both advocated judgment by ear (that is, by a subjec-
tive standard) as a substitute for, or at least a complement to, judgment based on 
mathematical relations and Pythagorean intervals of the 6th c. BCE.42
This insistence on the validity of subjective judgments of various kinds is sig-
nificant for, as we have noted, subjectivity is no stranger in the doing of science 
even today – nor should it be. It also goes hand in hand with the individualism 
so often (and correctly) identified as a principal characteristic of Renaissance 
thought.
In all of these contexts, Poliziano is, in a sense, imitating the classics. But note 
that he is not imitating them simply for style or ornament: he is imitating their 
methods of thinking and of approaching their objects of study.
In this spirit of creative imitatio, the fi fteenth-century humanists recognized 
not merely a vague ‘kindred spirit’ in their classical predecessors, but a need to 
learn from their methods of investigation. And what they did falls under method-
ology. Even rhetoric, which has recently been conceived as being in opposition to 
methodology by at least one scholar, can be seen to be a technique, a method, of 
systematically analyzing and addressing questions and problems of civic, political, 
philosophical, religious moment: in essence, a method of teaching and persuading.
5 Other bridges
Like Valla and Poliziano, men in other fields combined craft with intellect. Ar-
chitects like Brunelleschi or Alberti had to have theoretical as well as mechanical 
skills to build the buildings they did and have them last as long as many of them 
have. In both Brunelleschi’s Dome and the creation of his perspective, there is 
clearly an intellect behind the craftsman. And it is crucial to note that Alberti 
used his varied skills in the service of historical research as well as of building 
anew. He went out into the field (of Rome) to see for himself, and to measure for 
himself. Alberti, like his philological counterparts, devised criteria for judging 
the antiquity of his specimens: types of stone, mortar, styles of sculpture, dimen-
sions, inscriptions and, where possible, descriptions of Greek antecedents found 
in ancient texts.43
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Leonardo da Vinci, too, was intent on deriving knowledge first-hand and in-
vestigating with his own eyes and hands, developing a clearer understanding of 
the human brain through dissection and drawing, as has been shown in recent 
dissections.44
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), another humanistically trained observer, re-
lied on his own eyes for his observations. He was able to cite the authorities of 
antiquity for the benefit of his conservative readers, yet, again, he was imitating 
the ancients not for their information, but for their empirical methods of obser-
vation.45
Georgius Agricola’s first publication was a Latin grammar. He then went on 
to study theology and medicine, and assisted with the Aldine edition of Galen 
(1525) in Venice (another technological undertaking) and possibly that of Hip-
pocrates as well (1526). He became the author of De re metallica, still read today 
for its balanced approach to technological, scientific and historical questions of 
metallurgy.46
Andreas Vesalius (1514-64), whose De humani corporis fabrica was famously 
published in the same year as Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus, was another who 
relied on his own observations of the human body, which can be likened to the 
text to which the philologist attempts to return.47
His near-exact contemporary, Conrad Gessner of Zurich (1516-65), epito-
mizes the humanistically educated scientist, whose first scholarly/scientific work 
was a critical edition of Claudius Aelianus and who, besides serving as the town 
physician of Zurich, became the foremost naturalist of early sixteenth-century 
Europe. I will end with Gessner’s explicit statement epitomizing how science/
scholarship is done: ‘Thus [Caius], with whose conjectures I agree, until such 
time as something more certain shall be ascertained by us.’48
Thus it is that we have come full circle from history to natural history, meeting 
Garin’s insight that it was the humanists’ injection of historical understanding 
into the mix that destroyed reliance on earlier auctoritates and allowed the crucial 
scientific component into the making of the humanities. It is my view that this 
development, occurring as it did in an intellectual, cultural and social climate 
more open to doubt (but that is another question altogether), is what permitted 
the sciences, both the natural and the humane, to be reborn in the Renaissance, 
in a way that would resolve C.P. Snow’s – and our – conflict of two disparate 
cultures. Perhaps the best of the Renaissance humanists, especially in their phil-
ological, historical, archaeological undertakings, were better at integrating the 
scientific spirit with the humane sciences than has previously been recognized: 
better, perhaps, than many of us are today.
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Music as Science and as Art
Th e Sixteenth/Seventeenth-Century Destruction 
of Cosmic Harmony
H. Floris Cohen
On the one hand, there is music. We make it ourselves. Music reaches us through 
our ears, and it may affect us quite powerfully, to the point of making us join the 
rhythm in dance, or join the mood and burst into tears of joy or sorrow, on occa-
sion profusely so. Music is definitely a sensual phenomenon.
On the other hand, there are numbers. Numbers are given to us, we do not 
make them. For first inventing, then recognizing and manipulating them, we rely 
on our intellect. There is nothing sensual about numbers as such. Few things, 
then, look more opposed to each other than music and number.1
And yet they are connected, and very closely so – in one sense, music is num-
bers. In 1712, in a letter he wrote on 17 April to his fellow-mathematician Chris-
tian Goldbach, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz defined music thus: Musica est ex-
ercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi (‘Music is a hidden 
arithmetical exercise of the soul, unaware that it is counting’).
What, then, is the connection between music and number? The discovery of 
that connection is traditionally credited to Pythagoras or ar least to the sect of 
the Pythagoreans. Take two wholly arbitrary musical sounds – not necessarily se-
lected from the scale, but just two musical sounds of arbitrarily chosen pitches – 
and sound them, either simultaneously or one right after the other. As a rule, the 
combination of two musical notes will not sound very pleasant. They seem almost 
to collide, they jangle, they do not fit, they are, in a word, dissonant. However, as 
you keep selecting from the full spectrum of musical sounds and try any arbitrary 
combination, from time to time you will encounter a different kind of pair – now 
for a change the two musical sounds go well together, they seem to some extent to 
blend, to melt as it were into each other. A pair of notes sounded together or in 
quick succession is called an interval, and these rare, blending intervals are called 
consonant – a Latin expression which just means ‘sounding well together’.
Naturally, the Pythagoreans had the rules and peculiarities of Greek music 
to go by, and they were familiar with four such consonant intervals. One is the 
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unison – two musical notes of the same pitch, though not of course necessarily 
of the same loudness or timbre. On the modern piano you may get the unison 
just by striking the C key twice. So far, this looks pretty obvious, but only so far. 
Also consonant, yet a little less so, is the octave. You get it by sounding the same 
C together with the next higher c, which you find on the piano by moving up 
seven white keys and then hitting the octave, also called the eighth because it is 
eight steps up in terms of the white keys of the piano. Here the sense of blending 
is not quite so complete as with the unison. Still, it is there, to the point of the 
musical scale being universally reckoned to start all over again from this higher c 
to the next higher one. Going on in the same vein, you encounter among the con-
sonances the fifth, which on the piano is represented for instance by C-G. Finally, 
an interval like C-F, which is called the fourth, is also consonant.
So much for the musical phenomenon of consonance as just a given in terms 
of our auditory experience. But here is Pythagoras’s great discovery: It so happens 
that these consonant intervals correspond to the first few integral numbers 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. ‘Correspond’, what does that mean? Take a taut string, and pluck it or bow 
it. Evidently, if you do this twice while leaving the length of the string the same, 
you get the unison. Thus, the unison is given by a ratio of string lengths 1:1. Much 
more remarkably, if you first sound the entire string and then that same string 
halved or doubled, so that the ratio of string lengths is as 1:2, then you get the 
octave. In similar fashion, the consonance that we call the fifth is given by a ratio 
of string lengths 2:3. Finally, the ratio that produces the fourth is 3:4. To sum up: 
As the Pythagoreans found, the few consonant intervals encountered in the full 
panoply of possible musical sounds are precisely those intervals that are produced 
by strings in ratios given by the simplest integral numbers, 1 to 4. But how can 
that be? How is it that consonance, a sensual phenomenon, matches in so precise 
a manner with numbers, which are produced only in the intellect?
In one sense, this is still a problem. Over twenty-five centuries or so have passed 
between the Pythagoreans and us, and the problem of consonance has repeatedly 
and sometimes quite drastically been redefined – three major redefinitions form 
the principal subject of the present paper. But, for all the ongoing redefinition of 
the problem; for all the enlightening, highly detailed investigations devoted to the 
problem of consonance over the last four centuries especially; indeed, for all the 
claims made over centuries of assiduous research that it has finally been solved, 
most experts still regard the close correspondence between musical sound and 
numbers as an enigma, at bottom and in the final analysis.
Not that those who first discovered the phenomenon failed to hit upon a 
splendid and also very bold explanation. They decided in the first place that there 
is something special about those first four integral numbers. If you add them up, 
you arrive at 10, which for the Pythagoreans was, or became, the sacred number. 
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But also, they accounted for the correspondence between sound and number by 
declaring the whole wide world to be nothing but number. All early Greek, pre-
Socratic speculators about the constitution of the world used to ascribe some 
fundamental principle to the world, be it water, as with Thales, or the indefi-
nite, as with Anaximander, or fire, as with Herakleitos.2 In similar fashion, the 
Pythagoreans declared number to be the fundamental principle that holds the 
world together and that, as such, inheres in all empirical phenomena. Among 
those empirical phenomena, the heavenly motions stand out. The Sun and the 
Moon and the planets represent these ratios, and the entire cosmos is pervaded 
by consonant, harmonious, musical sound. Why, then, do we not hear it? Because, 
paradoxically, we hear it all the time, from the very moment of birth onward. As a 
result, we are so used to it that we fail even to notice it any more – a psychologi-
cally very astute argument to counter an obvious objection.
Objections of quite a different nature came from a disciple of Aristotle, some 
two and a half centuries later than Pythagoras. This musical theorist was Aristox-
enos.3 He rejected not just Pythagorean cosmic harmony, but the entire idea that 
music can usefully be analyzed by focusing on harmonic relations. To Aristox-
enos, it is rather the ongoing flow of the melody that is constitutive of the major 
effects of music. In his view it is not so much the intellect per se, but rather our 
musical experience that must guide any effort to come to terms with what music 
does to us and to provide us with a reasoned account of its effects.
This opposition, between an approach by means of numbers that stand for 
ratios of string lengths and an approach that rather centers on the melody, has 
remained alive for many centuries. Still, in spite of an increasing sense that har-
monic analysis alone cannot exhaust the investigation of the effect that music has 
on us, harmonic analysis has very much dominated the scene. It did so not only 
with the Greeks, but also in those civilizations that later adopted Greek thought 
about the constitution of the world, notably Islamic civilization and medieval and 
Renaissance Europe.4
In Europe the idea of cosmic harmony took shape by means of a threefold clas-
sification– musica mundana or cosmic harmony, musica humana, which reflects 
the harmonious way in which our body and soul are bound together, and musica 
instrumentalis, or music in our restricted, present-day sense of the performance 
of singers or instrument players. The first two are perfect and attainable only by 
way of the intellect; the latter is an audible, necessarily imperfect imitation of the 
former. This division into three stems from a late Roman scholar, Boethius. In the 
early Middle Ages Boethius’s conception became the standard educational tool 
of use all over Europe in teaching the discipline of ‘musica’. Harmonic theory fig-
ured as one of the four liberal arts that, together with arithmetic, geometry, and 
astronomy, made up the quadrivium, alongside the trivium, dialectic, grammar, 
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and rhetoric. As part of the quadrivium, musica, most closely allied to arithmetica, 
was concerned chiefly with the strictly numerical manipulation of numbers and 
figures derived from the ratios for the consonances, and with their actions on the 
three levels of music that Boethius distinguished.
As for the practice of music, the scale in use in musical composition was natu-
rally in accordance with the Pythagorean schema of the consonances. That sche-
ma does not encompass all consonances as we know them today. Notably, the 
major and minor third and sixth are missing. That is why, for instance, the earli-
est pieces of organ music that have been preserved, dating from mid-fourteenth 
century, sound strange in a way that the musically adept recognize at once as the 
absence of the triad in its customary role. Dissonances, or even the triad itself, are 
in need of being resolved on chords on the fifth or fourth, not on chords involving 
the third or sixth.
Why indeed are the consonant third and sixth missing from the Pythagorean 
scale? This is not only because Greek music had no use for them. There is another 
reason as well, which has to do with some basic arithmetic. The only preliminary 
thing one must know to get the point is that our sense of hearing works loga-
rithmically. When we add intervals on the piano (e.g. a fifth like C-G added to a 
fourth like G-c gives the octave), we arrive at the numerical result by multiplying 
their ratios – 2:3 (the fifth) times 3:4 (the fourth) equals 1:2 (the octave). For the 
musical notes in the scale, this means that the whole tone, C-D, which is the dif-
ference between the fifth and the fourth, is represented by the ratio 2:3 divided 
by 3:4, which equals 8:9. Next, adding two whole tones so as to get C-E, which is 
the major third, we arrive at 8:9 squared, which yields 64:81 for the major third 
in the Pythagorean scale. This is a harsh dissonance. It could be used in music 
making only if resolved on a truly harmonious chord that figures only the octave, 
the fifth, and the fourth.
Still, musical composition went its own way, without much regard for theory. 
Two major medieval developments are decisive here. One is the emergence of 
polyphonic music, that is, the composition of pieces that consist of two or more 
melodic lines which run relatively independently of each other. As a consequence, 
harmonic relations become a good deal more critical than before, because it is 
now the simultaneous, rather than just the successive sounding of musical in-
tervals that determines the sweetness of a musical piece and the kind of effects 
that can be attained using the consonant intervals. The consonances now truly 
became the backbone of musical composition. Even more importantly, originally 
Pythagorean polyphony, while flourishing for a couple of centuries, was invaded 
in the fourteenth century by the major third now treated as a consonance in its 
own right. John Dunstaple is the composer usually credited with this innovation, 
which has colored musical composition for many centuries, and in many ways 
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still does – fairly quickly the triad became the standard chord around which to 
organize a piece of music.5
As musicians went ahead, musical theorists felt a need to follow suit. How to 
account for the usage of the thirds and sixths as consonant? Clearly, another ratio 
was at play here than the one given in the Pythagorean schema, 64:81. It began 
to dawn on theorists that the major third now in regular use is given rather by 
the ratio 4:5. But as we readily see from the presence of the number 5 in this par-
ticular ratio, this goes beyond the Pythagorean range of consonance-producing 
integral numbers, which runs only from 1 through 4. Cosmic harmony was appar-
ently richer than the Pythagoreans had conceived it to be. How, then, to fit these 
major and minor thirds and sixths into it?
The theorist to bring this about by mid-sixteenth century was Gioseffo Zarli-
no, maestro di capella at San Marco Cathedral in Venice.6 He was a very learned 
man, drenched in the waters of contemporary humanism, and well read in mu-
sical theory and in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. He acutely perceived 
cosmic harmony itself to be at stake. Since musica mundana, musica humana, and 
musica instrumentalis formed one coherent, closely knit whole, a major anomaly in 
the latter inevitably meant that cosmic harmony or at least the reigning concept 
thereof had to be restored as well. Zarlino restored it by redefining it. He made 
cosmic harmony dependent on the senario, that is, the range of the first six inte-
gral numbers, not 1 through 4 but 1 through 6. Why six? Zarlino enveloped his 
argument in a vast synthesis of theoretical, practical, and philosophical consider-
ations, but the core was a defense of the senario by pointing out the special char-
acter of the number six. For instance, it is the first of the perfect numbers – those 
rare numbers that are equal to the sum of their divisors, as here with 1 + 2 + 3.
Zarlino realized that the Pythagorean scale, with its whole tone 8:9 and its 
resulting major third 64:81, can no longer be maintained once we wish to incor-
porate into musical theory and practice the pure major third 4:5. The difference 
between the Pythagorean and the pure major third, which of course is given by 
80:81, is quite noticeable. How should we handle it? As a true humanist, Zarlino 
cast about in the available ancient literature and came up with a scale he encoun-
tered in Ptolemy’s treatise on harmony. Ptolemy (second century) had sought 
to reconcile the Pythagorean concept of the primacy of harmony in music with 
Aristoxenos’s insistence on the flow of the melody as the major component of 
music, irreducible to harmonic analysis of the Pythagorean kind. This theoretical 
scale of Ptolemy’s has two mutually different whole tones, one with the ratio 8:9, 
the other with 9:10. Zarlino felt that singers follow this scale, in other words, they 
manage to sing all consonances as pure, or, in other words, they remain in tune 
with cosmic harmony. Only with instruments with fixed pitch, notably keyboard 
instruments, some adaptation will prove necessary in practice, Zarlino thought.
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At the time when Zarlino first wrote his treatise, Le istitutioni harmoniche 
of 1558, the musical style now known as ‘Renaissance polyphony’ was at its high 
point. It might have seemed for a little while as if coherence in all three divisions 
of musica had been restored by means of Zarlino’s concept of the senario as the 
true sonorous number, thus incorporating the triad into the whole of musical 
theory. However, for all the impressive coherence attained again between music 
as played or sung and music as conceived in theory, both cosmic and in terms of 
musical arithmetic, Zarlino’s synthesis began to fall apart during his own lifetime. 
The downfall took place in two major stages.
Inspiration for the first stage came from the humanist movement in which 
Zarlino himself was rooted. When in 1562 a Latin translation of Aristoxenos’s 
treatise came out, it led to an attack on Zarlino’s reconstruction of cosmic harmo-
ny that called into question some of its major components. A former pupil was the 
instigator, the composer and musical theorist Vincenzo Galilei. He belonged to a 
group of clients maintained by a Florentine nobleman, Count Bardi, who jointly 
formed the so-called Camerata.7 In typical humanist fashion, with its urgent de-
sire to return ad fontes (back to the sources), these men aimed to reconstruct the 
music that the ancient Greeks had played. In the absence of any real knowledge 
of the subject, they had to reason their way to such a reconstruction, which they 
did using Aristoxenos. They sought to replace the intricate polyphonic style that 
dominated all musical composition from Dufay to Lasso with what they called 
the monody, one sole melody sustained by a figured bass. A few compositions for 
lute by Vincenzo Galilei are still extant, but the first major works in monodic 
style were the earliest operas, with Monteverdi’s Orfeo as the first masterpiece 
to be composed in the new style. Thus, a search to recover ancient music led to 
major innovation – to a new genre, the opera, and to a new style, to which a later 
age has affixed the adjective ‘baroque’. But there was also an important theoreti-
cal counterpart to these new developments. Zarlino’s claim that singers sing all 
consonant intervals as pure, that is, in accord with cosmic harmony, appeared less 
and less tenable.
This was the subject to which his former pupil Vincenzo Galilei directed his 
attack originally. It soon became apparent that the scale that Zarlino had taken 
from Ptolemy, the one with pure fifths and thirds, but also with those two dis-
tinct whole tones 8:9 and 9:10, is irreparably unstable. It can even be calculated 
that certain simple sequences need only occur nine times in a musical piece for 
the note on which the singers started (the tonic) to be raised by one whole tone. 
In other words, in so-called just intonation, one may easily end a full note higher, 
or lower, than where one started. The fact that this does not happen in practice 
is due to the circumstance that singers unwittingly temper the purity of the notes 
they sing to some small extent.
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Or do they? Vincenzo maintained in lengthy polemics against his one-time 
teacher that they do indeed, but of course it is not so easy to prove such an as-
sertion. By the early 1580s Vincenzo changed his basis, and he set up a range of 
experiments that concerned the material make-up of the strings whose various 
lengths determine the ratios of intervals. If we take two strings of the same length 
but made of different materials as, for instance, steel and gut, and if we then 
produce the same note with both, we find that the resulting unison is only ap-
proximate. Even more damaging was Vincenzo’s discovery that if one compares, 
not the lengths of strings, but rather their tensions, the traditional ratios no longer 
hold. If one and the same string is successively stretched by different weights, in 
order to get the octave one must suspend a weight four times as heavy as the first 
from the string, not twice as heavy. Similarly, in order to get the fifth, the weights 
must be in a ratio of 4:9, that is, 22:32. In terms of string tensions, then, the inter-
vals are in a squared proportion to the weights; hence, what ratios appear depends 
on what one decides to measure, and the simplicity of Zarlino’s senario dissolves.8
Musical practice raised further problems with the senario and the alleged 
purity of the consonances. Zarlino had already conceded that on keyboard in-
struments, which are not of course as flexible as the human voice, the purity of 
the scale cannot be maintained. Church organs and harpsichords were tuned by 
means of some practicable compromise, technically called temperament. Now-
adays, apart from the practice recreated by the early music movement, all tuning 
of keyboard instruments is routinely done in equal temperament, which makes all 
semitones equal at the cost of the purity of all consonant intervals, the thirds and 
sixths most of all. Between roughly Zarlino’s and Beethoven’s time, a great debate 
raged over temperament and how to preserve more purity than equal tempera-
ment allows.9 The point of this prolonged debate for our subject is that it helped 
undermine the viability of cosmic harmony: the very instrument that is meant to 
symbolize cosmic harmony, the church organ, apparently uses most consonant 
intervals by approximation only. Also, in a more theoretical vein, what remains of 
the strict distinction between consonance and dissonance if, apparently, the hu-
man ear is well able to put up with minor deviations? Take for instance so-called 
mean-tone temperament. It has one whole tone, which is defined by splitting the 
difference between the two whole tones that one gets when one maintains both 
the fifth and the major third as pure, namely, 8:9 and 9:10, respectively. This re-
sults in a fifth that is no longer quite pure, albeit to so small an extent that many 
a non-professional does not even hear the deviation. But this means that our ear 
is willing to accept as consonant not only the simple ratio 2:3, but also a highly 
irregular ratio like 2:3.01. What, then, remains of the supposedly exact match 
between music and number in the sense of the consonances being given by ratios 
composed of the simplest integral numbers?
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The absolute opposition between consonance and dissonance was undermined 
as well by the musical development just sketched, the rise of the monody, to which 
Vincenzo also contributed. Increasingly, composers like Monteverdi began to cre-
ate novel musical effects by using chords at prominent places that are forbidden 
in strict Renaissance polyphony because they involve too much dissonance, such 
as notably the so-called dominant-seventh chord. A vigorous polemic arose, also 
in Italy, over the usage of such chords, and here the menace of cosmic harmony 
going to pieces formed one major motive of the defenders of the traditional style. 
A well-known event was the fierce debate between the critic Artusi, who stuck to 
the standard rules of polyphony for that very reason, and those who came to the 
rescue of Monteverdi’s daring usage of such unheard-of chords, which were now 
subjected to analysis and assessment in other, more purely aesthetic terms. The 
turn away from ratio to sensus, that is, from grounding musical judgment in the 
intellect toward doing so by auditory experience, was greatly enhanced by these 
very developments.10 
Further complicating the issue of the tenability of the pure scale was the in-
creasing usage in art music of accidentals or chromatic semitones, that is, the 
notes produced by the black keys on the piano. In our present-day equal tempera-
ment, all semitones are made equal so that we can use the same black key on the 
piano for e.g. both C sharp and D flat. But in Zarlino’s pure scale, semitones like 
these are different, and the relations between them made for all kinds of further 
complications.
By the turn of the seventeenth century, then, cosmic harmony was already in 
dire straits. Evidently, the humanist movement was a major agent of its distress. 
The recovery of Aristoxenos’s treatise not only initiated, and served as a ban-
ner for, the theoretical dispute between Zarlino and Vincenzo Galilei over the 
true nature of consonance. The humanism-inspired search for the true nature 
of Greek music also inadvertently opened the gates toward a major change of 
musical style, with profound consequences for musical practice. This made for a 
further blurring of the distinction between consonance and dissonance.
Still, the account so far does not exhaust all that went wrong with Zarlino’s 
vast synthesis of Renaissance polyphony and cosmic harmony as restored by 
means of the senario. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, the kind of rea-
soning behind the senario itself came under increasingly sharp attack. This time 
the attack was led not by musical humanists, but by certain scholars whom we 
nowadays call scientists but who, in the absence of something like our present-
day science, regarded themselves as natural philosophers, albeit of an especially 
innovative, most often experimental kind. These men turned against what they 
perceived as two major weaknesses in Zarlino’s derivation and justification of the 
senario. What was so special about the number six? And did the demarcation thus 
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allegedly accomplished between consonance and dissonance really encompass all 
consonant intervals while duly banning all dissonant ones?11
To take up the latter question first, Zarlino himself had already realized that 
one consonant interval, the minor sixth, presented a difficulty. Its ratio is 5:8, so 
it seems to fall outside the compass of the senario, which after all is the range of 
the first six integers. But if Zarlino had from the outset declared the ottonario, 
or range of the first eight integers, to be the truly sonorous, consonance-gener-
ating number, he would in that very act have included the number in between 
six and eight, which of course is seven. However, this was not regarded at the 
time as producing any consonant intervals at all, but only harsh dissonances. So 
Zarlino took refuge in some special pleading for the ratio 5:8, where the 8 should 
really be regarded, so Zarlino argued, as twice four. This was not the kind of 
reasoning that could find favor with scholars like Johannes Kepler or Galileo 
Galilei or Marin Mersenne, whose novel thinking habits hardly allowed room 
for what they perceived as a mere play with numbers. Their concern was rather 
with finding geo metric proportions in physical entities. In the case of the musical 
conso nances, these men did so in quite different ways. In his book of 1619 on the 
harmony of the world, Kepler replaced the merely numerical senario with a geo-
metric derivation of the consonances, so as to show next how their ratios served 
as constraints on the spacing of the orbits of the planets. That is, he restored the 
hoary Pythagorean idea of cosmic harmony in his own way, which incidentally 
yielded his third law of planetary motion as one by-product.
Galileo handled the consonances differently, in a quite novel manner that was 
soon to banish all remaining speculation on cosmic harmony to the margin rather 
than near the center of natural philosophic thought. In the few pages he devoted 
to the problem of the consonances, he went farther down the pathway opened 
up by his father, while to all appearances, and quite paradoxically so, reinstating 
the range of the consonances that Vincenzo had sought to invalidate. Vincenzo 
had found, after all, that if one considers not string length but string tension, a 
consonance like the fifth is not given any more by 2:3 but rather by 4:9. His son 
now showed that the primary agent of musical pitch is neither string length, nor 
string tension, but the number of vibrations that a string executes in a given pe-
riod of time. That is, unlike with the Pythagoreans or Zarlino or even his own 
father, Galileo did not consider just the numerical properties that may be derived 
from the vibrating string. Rather, he focused on the vibrating itself. He adopted 
a pulse account of sound production. He held that musical sound is yielded by 
the successive pulses (which he called ‘shocks’ or ‘percussions’) transmitted from 
the vibrating string through the air to our sense of hearing. This implies that if 
two different notes are made heard simultaneously, pulses coincide in those cases 
when the intervals in question happen to be given by ratios of the first few inte-
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gers. In the case of the octave (1:2), every second pulse yields such a coincidence; 
with the fifth (2:3), every sixth one, and so on, up to and including the minor sixth 
(5:8). As a result, the traditional range of consonance-yielding ratios is reinstated, 
but now linked solidly to the real-world parameter of vibrational frequency. This 
novel connection, in view of which it is held that consonance comes from the co-
incidence of vibrations, spelled ruin to cosmic harmony in the slightly longer run. 
For it quickly turned out that with these physical parameters, a veritable can of 
worms had inadvertently been opened. Here are a few.
The coincidence account of consonance implies that the more often those 
‘strokes’ coincide, the more consonant the interval in question is. But look now 
more closely at the last of the consonances, the minor sixth. Here the strokes 
coincide every 40th time. Would not on this account the interval 4:7, which does 
not even appear in the scale, have to turn out more consonant than the minor 
sixth? Also, why should the minor sixth keep marking the boundary between 
consonance and dissonance? For what is so qualitatively different between a co-
incidence every 40th time and a coincidence every 72nd time, as with the whole 
tone 8:9? Has not the entire, venerable distinction become blurred now beyond 
possible repair?
To be sure, answers to questions like these could be sought, yet investigators 
found soon enough that these moved them ever farther into new territory where 
no longer musical effects, but rather the properties of sound in general counted 
the most. Throughout the century, experimental research uncovered as yet un-
known or unrecognized phenomena like beats, or the higher partials, or multiple 
vibration. An awareness further arose that between the sounding of a string or 
pipe and our aural perception, several processes intervene which may affect the 
outcome, notably, how the vibrations of our eardrum are transmitted to the inner 
ear and from there to wherever in our brain perception actually takes place. None 
of this was easily or in some obvious manner to be squared with the basic setup 
of cosmic harmony. Small wonder, then, that in the ongoing analysis, the latter 
conception was increasingly lost sight of.
Even more basic in this process of marginalization of cosmic harmony and this 
turning away from the customary manner of accounting for musical effects in ac-
tual musical practice was the very mode of thought which animated these dozens 
of innovative natural philosophers. Rather than aiming all over again for some 
grand schema meant to encapsulate the very essence of the world, investigators 
sought to solve problems piecemeal. They strove to elucidate specific effects, not 
some faraway whole but just this or that particular part of it. As a consequence, 
the more mathematically minded among them henceforth focused their musical 
theorizing on the intricacies of the scale, with most often elegant yet practically 
useless solutions to all kinds of problems of tuning and temperament. At the 
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same time, those who cared more for the experimental discovery of properties 
as yet unknown jointly ushered in a new, specialized discipline that by the early 
eighteenth century became known by the name of acoustics.12
Musical composition, and the analysis of its effects, had by now likewise been 
cut loose from cosmic harmony. The dispute over the uses of dissonances in the 
new, monodic style of Monteverdi and his contemporaries marked the turning 
point – from then on, the way a composer achieves his musical effects turned 
more and more into an autonomous, specialized territory in its own right. Music 
was no longer held to express what binds the world together. It expresses just 
itself.
Not that music has ever ceased to serve as a vast resource of inspiration and 
analogy. As David Cram explains elsewhere in this collection, music served as a 
major resource in combinatorics or in debates about the origins of language.
Nor have efforts to redefine cosmic harmony in some viable way ceased alto-
gether. The point is rather that Kepler’s was the last such effort to stand at the 
center of a great, highly creative thinker’s attention. Even in his case it proved nec-
essary to pry his three laws of planetary motion loose from the harmonic struc-
ture in which he had enveloped them.13
In terms of the objectives of the present collection of papers, what lesson does 
the utterly sketchy overview just presented have in store for us?
 I have sought to show that the disruption of cosmic harmony, which was a 
major intellectual event in early modern Europe, came about due to develop-
ments in the exact sciences and in the humanities alike. Of course all kinds of 
institutional, material, and other changes at the time were also responsible in 
part, such as changes in court culture or the increasing refinement of techniques 
of instrument building, to name just a few. I have focused here chiefly on ideas 
that underlay the making, reconstruction, and finally disruption of cosmic har-
mony. And then it turns out that scholarship on the ‘humanities’ and the ‘science’ 
side of life contributed equally to the process. In one remorseless wave of attack 
after another, Zarlino’s grand schema came in for ever more biting critique – the 
senario appeared to fall short in terms of a large variety of suppositions that were 
now revealed tacitly to underlie it. Among these suppositions, and the critics who 
revealed them, we have encountered along the way quite a mixture of scholars. 
One reason why I have decided to go into some elementary detail about the nu-
merical aspects of cosmic harmony in this chapter is that at the time, scholars 
from all walks of life were occupied with them. Where in all this is the modern 
distinction between scientists on the one hand, and scholars from the humanities 
on the other? For the period here under scrutiny, these are not even viable catego-
ries. Zarlino’s redefinition, or rather saving operation, bound intricate number 
juggling, a choir master’s practice, pieces of current philosophizing, and human-
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ist inspiration together in one vast edifice of, indeed, cosmic harmony. Vincenzo 
Galilei was as much of a musician and a composer as a humanist and an early 
experimentalist. Even with Kepler the humanist inspiration is unmistakable – his 
entire effort at redefining cosmic harmony by means of intricate mathematical, 
astrological, and astronomical computation and analysis went back in good part 
to the Pythagorean legacy, to Plato’s Timaios, and to Ptolemy’s early effort at at-
taining a synthesis between mathematical and more empirical analyses of musical 
sound. Mersenne’s masterpiece likewise bears for good reason the title Harmo-
nie universelle. Even a century later, the theory of harmony still taught at our 
conservatories today came about through the collaborative efforts of a composer 
and music theorist, Jean-Philippe Rameau, and a mathematician, Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert.
And yet, something had changed for good. Although in thinking about mat-
ters of harmony the ways have never quite parted, they did separate to a large 
extent, starting in the seventeenth century. The emergence of modern science 
provides the watershed. Prior to c. 1600, the story of the destruction of cosmic 
harmony is as much a story of the humanities as of the sciences – for that period 
the very distinction fails to hold. Major differentiation sets in with Galileo and 
Kepler, and from then on the gap widens almost by the day. Around 1700 musica 
mundana and musica humana have quietly left the scene. Musica instrumentalis 
henceforth goes its own way, leaving it to the emerging science of acoustics to 
investigate the properties of sound that underlie all music making. Investigations 
in that more purely scientific vein no longer bear upon how we pass judgment 
on music in its extraordinary capacity to affect us so powerfully, to the point of 
making us join the rhythm in dance, or join the mood and burst into tears of joy 
or sorrow, on occasion profusely so. 
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On the face of it, a world of difference separates the official photograph of the 
Solvay Conference of 1911 (Fig. 2) from Raphael’s School of Athens (Fig. 3), com-
pleted exactly four hundred years earlier. At the Solvay Conference, a conclave of 
Nobel laureates and other distinguished scientists actually talked to one anoth-
er, with an enthusiasm we can see in the photograph itself; indeed, Marie Curie, 
the lone woman in the foreground, is so absorbed in a conversation with Henri 
Poincaré that neither of them pays attention to the camera that records their 
presence.1 We may also recognize a very young Albert Einstein, second from the 
right, and, fourth from the right, Ernest Rutherford. Max Planck stands second 
from the left, and Louis De Broglie stands sixth. At the Solvay Conference of 
1927, Einstein would deliver his famous remark to Werner Heisenberg that ‘God 
does not play dice’, but by then the participants were so well confirmed in their 
individual greatness that dialogue had given way to pronouncements. In 1911, 
however, Marie Curie and Poincaré can pore intently over a text that seems to 
puzzle them both. 
This first Solvay Conference intended to assemble the greatest minds in chem-
istry, and it succeeded in that aim; although many of these people might have 
disputed their identification as chemists, without exception they would have 
called themselves scientists and their mode of procedure the scientific method. 
They are immortalized, appropriately, in the new medium of photography, their 
images captured by the light that, just at that moment, struck a treated piece 
of celluloid film. In the background we can see hints of another trick played by 
captured light: a portable screen suggests that the conference-goers must have 
illustrated their presentations by projecting lantern slides.2 But technology, then 
as now, must also have been unreliable: candlesticks on the table suggest that 
the light cast by the electric bulbs overhead, and perhaps by the projector itself, 
might fail. Yet another play of light occurs with the help of two large mirrors: 
these open out, window-like, against the wood-paneled walls. Mirrors have of-
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ten served the same purpose as windows at nighttime in dark, paneled rooms, 
most famously at Versailles.
Raphael’s frescoed School of Athens, on the other hand, captures not a fleeting 
moment but an idea: something intangible, perhaps, but also something durable. 
Begun in 1509 and touched up in 1511, the painting was probably conceived as a 
Triumph of Philosophy.3 With marvelous immediacy, it shows the great philoso-
phers of the world gathered, like the scientists of the Solvay Conference, in con-
versation. Rather than freezing an actual instant in time, however, The School of 
Athens collapses time onto itself, ranging philosophers who lived in the sixth cen-
tury before the Christian era alongside those from Raphael’s own early sixteenth 
century Anno Domini, as well as people from many of the centuries in between 
these two extremes.4 Although the gathering’s nominal place is Athens, many of 
the philosophers assembled together beneath the painting’s majestic vaults never 
set foot in Attica; they lived instead in places like Syracuse, Alexandria, Baghdad, 
and Rome. The building in which they stand is not a real building; we have rea-
son to believe that it is the Temple of Philosophy described by the sixth-century 
writer Boethius in his Consolation of Philosophy, however closely it resembles the 
interior of Saint Peter’s Basilica, designed by Raphael’s relative Donato Bramante 
only a few years before, in 1506.5
Representing the World
Unlike the little, portable photograph of the Solvay Conference (and like St. 
Peter’s), The School of Athens is monumentally large and immovable; it is a painted 
wall that belongs to a particular building in a particular place. The fresco shows a 
certain number of ancient Athenians, but in fact it is rooted in the city of Rome, 
in the heart of the Vatican Palace, where it has stood for four hundred years as 
an announcement not much different from the announcement made, implicitly, 
by the Solvay Conference. Both of these images, one time-bound, one timeless, 
proclaim the birth of a new world of ideas. Both show the individuals who created 
that new world engrossed in conversation with one another; hence the creation 
of this new world is a collective rather than an individual enterprise. Both groups 
focused their primary attention on the workings of the universe, and to the best 
means by which such an investigation might be carried forward; both aimed to 
increase humanity’s general store of knowledge for our common benefit. In many 
ways, then, the philosophers of the nascent sixteenth century were the same kinds 
of people who would become the scientists of the twentieth.
Both Raphael and Julius II, the pope who commissioned The School of Athens, 
believed in a world that could be, and had been, improved over time; so did most, 
if not all, of the conferees at Solvay.6 Cynical Diogenes, sprawled across the steps 
of the Temple of Wisdom, may not have been so optimistic about the future, nor 
Fig. 2 (left): Benjamin Couprie, Th e Participants of the First Solvay Conference of 1911, Brussels.
Fig. 3 (top): Raphael, Th e School of Athens, 1509-1511, Stanza della Segnatura, Palazzi Pontifi ci, 
Vatican City.
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sullen Heracleitus, whom Raphael shows with the facial features of Michelangelo 
– not to mention the dogskin boots that Michelangelo wore so constantly that he 
was said to lose bits of his own skin whenever he took them off .7 But the general 
spirit of Raphael’s great painting, like that of the less consciously artistic photo-
graph, is one of almost ecstatic curiosity about the structure of the world, bol-
stered by a conviction that such curiosity will uncover things of marvelous beauty.
By now the School of Athens, despite a recent restoration, looks almost as ven-
erable as the philosophies it enshrines; it is nearly half a millennium old. With 
portraits of philosophers spanning two thousand years of human history, the 
fresco presents creativity as a matter of tradition as well as invention, whereas the 
photograph of the Solvay Conference, with its new technology, its contemporary 
cast of characters, and a complete absence of references to bygone times or peo-
ple, looks almost entirely forward. Yet there are radically innovative features to 
Raphael’s image as well, features linking it as readily to the history of science as 
to the history of art. 
In the first place, the imposing vaults of the Temple of Philosophy are present-
ed in strict one-point perspective, a technique of representation that had been 
introduced to Italy less than a century earlier by Filippo Brunelleschi.8 Brunelles-
chian perspective applied a clear geometric formula to the representation of 
space, a formula that seemed to Brunelleschi and his contemporaries to mirror 
the actual mechanics of seeing. In a similar spirit and at virtually the same time as 
Raphael’s fresco, Albrecht Dürer produced a famous woodcut showing an artist 
who uses a mechanical grid to insure the geometric accuracy of his perspectival 
foreshortening (Fig. 4).
Raphael makes a much more sophisticated use of perspective in the School of 
Athens. Within its sacred halls, the Temple of Philosophy is divided in two, its 
divisions cued by the marble statues of two gods, Apollo and Minerva, and the 
figures of two ancient Greek philosophers who were themselves accorded nearly 
immortal status in the sixteenth century: Plato and Aristotle.9 Plato, clutching a 
copy of his Timaeus, which speaks of the harmonics of the spheres, and Apollo 
with his lyre dominate the left side of the fresco, while Aristotle, holding his Eth-
ics, rules the right side together with Minerva (the books are labeled in vernacu-
lar: Timeo and Etica). The painting’s vanishing point is clearly to be found in its 
center, but that center is hard to identify securely, located as it is in the graceful 
folds of Plato and Aristotle’s classical robes. 
The obscurity of the vanishing point contrasts with the composition of Ra-
phael’s fresco for the opposite wall of the same room, The Triumph of Theology 
(Fig. 5, usually known today as the Disputa del Sacramento, the ‘Debate about 
the Sacrament’, but it is really a serene conclave). Here the artist has fixed his 
vanishing point in the center of a monstrance displaying the Host; the structure 
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of the entire picture hinges on the Sacrament. So, too, Raphael seems to sug-
gest, Christ, and more specifically the resurrected Christ who is embodied in 
the rite of the Mass, is the focal point of the world – in Raphael’s day, ‘world’ 
was often used to mean the entire universe. Unlike this clear structure, which 
ranges high heaven with its golden rays and showers of cherubs above an im-
age of God the Father, then the resurrected Christ, then the dove of the Holy 
Spirit, then the four Gospels, and then the Host, with a more anarchic crowd 
of saints and sinners below, the School of Athens, with its ancient Greeks, Egyp-
tians, and Persians, and its medieval Muslims, lacks a comparable center: as 
thinkers unaffected by Christian revelation, they lack what Raphael and his 
patron, Pope Julius II (who commissioned these frescoes to decorate his private 
apartments), regarded as the central truth of human existence.10 The vanishing 
point is implicitly present, just as the wisdom of their philosophies is a real 
wisdom, but they have not experienced the full revelation of Christ. The Solvay 
Fig. 4: Artist with mechanical grid, in Albrecht Dürer, Underweysung der Messung, mit dem Zirckel 
und Richtscheyt (Arnhem 1603).
 Ingrid Rowland
Conference, of course, occurred in a more random world, one that would soon 
be thrown into the terrible chaos of the Great War. The commemorative photo-
graph contains fewer compositional messages than Raphael’s frescoes, and more 
fortuitous poses. Curie and Poincaré, for example, are surely rapt in discussion 
because that is how they spent their time, not because they have been asked to 
pose in this way. 
Within the School of Athens, on the other hand, every posture is studied, 
and every posture tells a story. Plato, appropriately, clutches a copy of his cos-
mological dialogue, the Timaeus, labeled in Italian so that the greatest number 
of visitors will understand what is being portrayed here in the pontifical suite. 
Aristotle, gesturing out over our heads, holds his Ethics. Diogenes reclines on 
his side, just as Boethius describes him doing in the Consolation of Philosophy; 
Heraclitus, that inveterate poser of paradoxes, sulks on the side of the fresco that 
belongs to Plato. Pythagoras naturally takes up the Platonic side of the fresco, 
writing energetically in a tantalizingly illegible manuscript (there are no intelli-
gible letters, only lines), while in front of him an angelic youth holds out a tablet 
with a musical diagram (Fig. 6). This diagram juxtaposes the musical interval 
of the diapason with the perfect number ten; in a single image it compresses 
two different kinds of information taken, perhaps, from two different passages 
in Vitruvius: the discussion of music in Book V, and that of perfect numbers in 
the preface to the same book. As a graphic presentation of multiple ideas, the 
diagram is compact and attractive; one of the first instances of a type of illustra-
Fig. 5: Raphael, 
Th e Triumph of 
Th eology (also 





Pontifi ci, Vatican 
City, detail.
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tion that will have a long, fruitful future in the service of philosophy, especially 
natural philosophy, and science.11 Raphael had a genuine knack for this kind of 
visual representation, along with the visual representation of so much else, from 
painting to architecture to graphic arts. But he was hardly alone in exploring 
the possibilities offered by graphs and graphics. His exact contemporary Cesare 
Cesariano also distilled a passage from Vitruvius into a single image. Here, the 
ancient architect attempted to define the ideal length of a prose composition on 
geometric principles:
Pythagoras and those who followed his sect decided to write down their 
precepts using the principle of cubes; they thought that two hundred six-
teen lines constituted a cube and that there ought to be no more than three 
cubes in a single written composition. Now a cube is a body, squared all 
round, made up of six sides whose plane surfaces are as long as they are 
wide. When it is thrown, the part on which it lands (so long as it remains 
untouched) preserved an immovable stability; the dice that players throw 
onto the gaming board are like this. Th e Pythagoreans seem to have taken 
the image of the [literary] cube from dice, because this particular number 
of lines, landing like dice on any side whatsoever, will there produce im-
movable stability of memory.12
Fig. 6: Th e pythagorean table.
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Following this lead of Vitruvius, Cesariano captured the idea of ‘cubic composi-
tion’ in the image of a die (Fig. 7).13
When Vitruvius discussed ‘cubic composition’, he may have concluded that 216 
lines of papyrus text were the ideal amount of information for a reader to absorb 
in a single sitting, and therefore the most effective unit into which a writer can 
divide a composition, but the actual divisions in his own treatise seldom reflect 
this ideal—Vitruvius had too much to say on too many subjects.14 Two thousand 
years after Vitruvius, Robert Silvers, the editor of the New York Review of Books, 
defined the ideal length of an article as three thousand six hundred words. This 
is about twice the length that Vitruvius commends—but it is remarkably close to 
the actual length of the rhetorical prefaces with which Vitruvius begins each of 
his Ten Books [that is, papyrus scrolls; we would call them chapters] on Architec-
ture, and both of them, in turn, hew close to the Pythagorean limit of three ‘cubes’.
Cesare Cesariano himself is an interesting case: an architect who lived in Milan 
and translated Vitruvius without ever having seen the marvels of ancient Rome, 
like the Colosseum and Pantheon—although of course Vitruvius was born too 
early to have seen them either. To illustrate the section of the Ten Books in which 
the ancient architect set out the criteria for evaluating a classical building, ‘sound-
ness, utility, and attractiveness,’ Cesariano therefore turned to his own idea of a 
classic: the cathedral of Milan (Fig. 8).15 To our eyes, and to the eyes of Cesariano’s 
contemporary, Raphael, this building, begun in 1386, with its elongated propor-
tions and lacy spires, is Gothic rather than classical in style. In one sense, then, Ce-
Fig. 7: Image of a die from 
C. Cesariano, Di Lucio Vitruvio 
Pollione de architectura libri decem: 
traducti de latino in vulgare (Como 
1521).
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Fig. 8: Façade of Milan Cathedral from C. Cesariano, Di Lucio Vitruvio Pollione de architectura libri 
decem: traducti de latino in vulgare (Como 1521).
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sariano’s visual vocabulary was strikingly archaic for his era—he did not draw an 
evident distinction between classical and medieval architecture as his contempo-
raries in Florence and Rome were doing. In another sense, however, he understood 
that medieval architects still held to the same classical principles as Vitruvius, and 
that their works, like the cathedral of Milan, were also, in their own way, strong, 
useful, and attractive—and on this point, in fact, Raphael agreed with him.16
As a graphic artist, however, Cesariano belonged to the sixteenth century’s 
most innovative avant-garde, and few of his contemporaries could match the crea-
tive ways in which this Milanese architect could lay out a printed page, or display 
different varieties of information in a concise image.
Cesariano had been taught by the same mentor as Raphael: the painter and 
architect Donato Bramante, whose talents also included composing vernacular 
poetry, playing the lute, and reciting Dante. This extraordinary Renaissance man 
appears in the lower right-hand portion of the School of Athens in the guise of 
the geometer Euclid, bent over a mathematical diagram; both Euclid and — im-
plicitly — Bramante belong, then, to Aristotle’s side of the painting, along with 
the astronomers and the more practical, empirical philosophers. Bramante left 
Milan for Rome in 1500; in the Eternal City he began a close study of ancient 
Roman construction that led him to create modern buildings whose elegance and 
refinement were regarded by many contemporary critics, Raphael and Cesariano 
among them, as equal to the great works of antiquity.17
Bramante’s view of the classical style, and of Vitruvius, would become the pre-
vailing view, first in Rome, and then in the world, first for Raphael, and then for 
Vignola, Palladio, and through Palladio for the English and American classical 
tradition: Inigo Jones in the seventeenth century, Thomas Jefferson in the eigh-
teenth, and McKim, Mead and White in the twentieth.18 Although Bramante’s 
only surviving written work may be an extremely funny mock-rustic poem about 
Rome’s antiquities, the Antiquarie Prospettiche Romane, he was a towering intel-
lect, whose casual conversation with Raphael and others may have given us our 
concept of the classical orders, Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian, and certainly gave us 
our ideas about the majesty of ancient Roman interior space.19 Raphael’s Temple 
of Wisdom owes an immense debt to Bramante’s vision, especially to his plans for 
the rebuilding of St. Peter’s Basilica, and in their own day Bramante’s works were 
revolutionary. The sheer novelty of his architecture is hard for us to recreate now, 
because it so quickly became the definitive style for monumental buildings, both 
sacred and secular, throughout the Christian world.
Bramante’s vision of ancient architecture emphasized the clarity of its overall de-
sign and the distinctiveness of its component parts, but there were other strains in 
early sixteenth-century thought that aimed for intricacy, secrecy, and occult truth. 
A good example of that taste for convolution can be seen on the altar front of Ra-
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phael’s Triumph of Th eology (its popular name now is Disputa del Sacramento ‘De-
bate about the Sacrament’, but in the center of the Vatican of Julius II that debate 
had surely been resolved once and for all) (Fig. 5).20 Th e altar at the fresco’s center 
is covered by a cloth intricately embroidered in golden knots from a single cord, a 
reminder that one of the new luxury arts to come in with the fi fteenth century was 
that intricate creation of knots known as lace.21 Th e making of lace is a matter of 
great complexity and long-term strategy; a lacemaker, no less than a general, must 
anticipate what her threads will be doing in a remote future and deploy them with 
that future in mind. To an extent most ancient writers would not like to admit, 
the grid plans of ancient architecture and city planning derived from the looms 
on which women wove the social fabric along with more literal cloth.22 Similarly, 
in Malta, one of the centers for lace in the early modern world, the most highly 
paid woman was the Grand Master’s lace mistress. ‘Th e world is bound with secret 
knots,’ declared the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher on the title page of his book on Th e 
Magnetic Kingdom of Nature, Magneticum Naturae Regnum, published in 1665.23
Th eology, indeed, presented an increasingly knotty problem for thinkers of the 
early modern period. Cesare Cesariano’s universe was still bounded by the sphere of 
the fi xed stars, but the universe for another son of the sixteenth century, Giordano 
Bruno, had burst forth into infi nity.24 Bruno made his leap by the sheer power of 
thought, shortly before the telescope began to confi rm his fi ndings. When Galileo 
Galilei began to point his telescope toward the heavens, his discoveries expanded 
not only the boundaries of the known universe, by identifying the moons of Jupiter, 
but also, once again, the boundaries of graphic art. In some editions of his Starry 
Messenger of 1612, the book in which he fi rst reported his fi ndings with the telescope, 
the stars of the Pleiades, now revealed as many more than the traditional six (Fig. 9), 
Fig. 9: Th e Pleiades, from Galileo Galiei, Sidereus nuncius 
(London 1653).
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seem to burst the margins of the printed page; in the same way, Bruno’s ideas were 
bursting apart the music of the spheres.25 Bruno’s influence on Galileo was more 
profound than the younger man liked to admit (and not only because Bruno had 
been burned at the stake in 1600); when Galileo insisted, for example, that the 
Bible should be used as a source for moral guidance rather than as a treatise on 
nature, he was actually repeating an idea that Bruno had voiced in his own cosmo-
logical dialogue, The Ash Wednesday Supper.26
Both Bruno and Galileo had the misfortune to live in the aftermath of the 
Protestant Reformation, when European positions on religion began to hard-
en on all sides. The Catholic response to Martin Luther and John Calvin was 
the self-reforming Council of Trent, the great gathering that originally aimed 
to heal the break of the Reformation and ended up instead by reinforcing it.27 
Along with pronouncements on dogma, the Council also issued edicts about 
art and architecture, and it was in this quandary that the painter Michelan-
gelo Merisi da Caravaggio – although we now know for certain that he was 
born in Milan – came down to Rome.28 Caravaggio has often been identified 
as a realist, a painter who took pains to show his subjects’ dirty feet, who used 
prostitutes and cutpurses as his models. And yet a painting like his Deposi-
tion (Fig. 10), now in the Vatican Museum but intended for a chapel in the 
church of Santa Maria in Vallicella, performs a far more complex operation. 
In one sense, this is a painting that aims to show Christ’s burial just as it 
was; the heroic figure of Jesus is explicitly wrapped in the Shroud of Turin, 
which also appears in the stucco decoration of the chapel that was the paint-
ing’s original destination.29 The figures are nearly life size; in the oblique light 
of their original setting, they must have seemed uncannily three-dimensional. 
And yet at the same time they recreate the pose from a famous ancient Ro-
man sarcophagus, now in the Capitoline Museums, depicting the burial of the 
ancient Greek hero Meleager.30 Caravaggio, the great realist, shows here that 
he is also a classicist at heart. In trying to show how this event happened 
in Roman-occupied Judea, in the reign of the emperor Tiberius, under the 
procurator Pontius Pilate, the painter, by now familiar with original works 
of ancient Roman art, gives his figures the movements of ancient Romans, 
and carefully shows Christ wrapped in the long linen shroud, twice a man’s 
height, that is still venerated in Torino. Yet these figures are clothed in early 
seventeenth-century clothing; if they are of ancient Roman times, they are 
also of Caravaggio’s time, and the time of the painting’s first viewers. Similar-
ly, Caravaggio’s Calling of St. Matthew (Fig. 11, page 88) puts Jesus and Peter, 
clad in their Roman togas, just inside the door of a dark little moneychangers’ 
shop, calling ‘follow me’ to men who dress and act like Caravaggio’s contem-
poraries, people who live sixteen centuries later. These scenes therefore show 
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Fig. 10: Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, Th e Deposition, 1602-1603, oil on canvas, 300 x 203 cm, 
Pinacoteca, Vatican City.
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more than the call and the suffering of Jesus; they also strive, urgently, to re-
veal the deep, truthful harmonies that underpin reality, no less than the much 
neater diagram of the diapason in Raphael’s School of Athens. Caravaggio’s 
thoroughly human subjects wear their imperfections in much the same spirit 
as the moon in Galileo’s Starry Messenger, whose pockmarked face the great 
astronomer portrayed in unprecedented detail (Fig. 12); by carefully tracing 
the outlines of lunar craters, Galileo, an exceptional artist, made it increas-
ingly difficult to argue that the spots on the moon’s surface were clouds in 
the Earth’s atmosphere – our satellite was not the perfect crystal sphere that 
Aristotle declared it should be. Yet neither the imperfection of humanity nor 
the imperfection of the Moon disturbed Caravaggio’s conviction that human-
Fig. 11: Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, Th e Calling of Saint Matthew, 1599-1600, oil on canvas, 
322 x 340 cm, Contarelli Chapel, San Luigi dei Francesi, Rome.
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ity could be redeemed by faith nor Galileo’s conviction that the universe was 
fantastically beautiful.
Indeed, Galileo, however inclined he may have been to show the moon warts 
and all, was also his own kind of classicist; by couching his later works in the 
form of dialogues, he harked back to Plato and, although once again he would 
never admit it, to Giordano Bruno, his forerunner in so many ways. Dialogue 
was a medium that allowed both Bruno and Galileo to discuss as well as to 
expose their arguments, especially by showing the process by which intelligent 
but initially skeptical characters like the Londoner Mr. Smitho in Bruno’s Ash 
Wednesday Supper, or the sober Venetian Sagredo in Galileo’s Dialogue on the 
Two Chief World Systems, could be won over by the brilliance of the author’s 
Fig. 12: Th e Moon, from Galileo Galiei, Sidereus nuncius (London 1653).
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alter egos: Bruno’s Teofilo and Galileo’s Salviati. Stefano Della Bella’s title page 
for Galileo’s Dialogue (Fig. 13) is itself a kind of School of Athens, even if one 
member of its conclave, the dimwitted Simplicio embodying Aristotle, hardly 
deserves his place in the Temple of Wisdom. 
Fig. 13: Stefano della Bella, title page from Galileo Galilei, Dialogo ... sopra i due massimi sistemi del 
mondo Tolemaico, e Copernicano (Florence 1632).
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We have already noted Galileo’s mastery of print as a medium; beyond his pun-
gent use of language, his publications deftly exploit art together with prose and the 
appearance of the printed page. And here again, Galileo looked back to the heretic 
Giordano Bruno who had made similar use of printed publication to disseminate 
his ideas, although he did so on a much lower budget, with woodcuts from his own 
hand rather than professional engravings by a master artist like Stefano Della Bella. 
Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the possibilities for 
publishing began to expand as rapidly as the amount of philosophical knowledge 
that print was called upon to disseminate; in Catholic countries, the Inquisition 
was quick to take notice. As a result, printers fl ocked to Protestant cities; Amster-
dam, in particular, became one of world’s greatest centers for the publication of 
books and engravings. Catholic authors took advantage of Amsterdam’s free presses 
no less than their Protestant and Jewish counterparts, none more so than the sev-
enteenth-century German Jesuit, father Athanasius Kircher (1601-1680), who in his 
own day ranked as a scientist in the same league as Galileo (Fig. 14, next page). One 
of Kircher’s Amsterdam imprints shows him in his most distinctive haunt: the mu-
seum he assembled within the halls of Rome’s Jesuit College beginning in 1651, and 
which survived more or less intact until the unifi cation of Italy in 1870.31 Th e mu-
seum hall still exists, although its fresco decorations have been whitewashed away, 
as do a surprising number of the objects we see on display in the engraving. When 
we examine both the setting and the surviving objects, we can see that the whole 
engraved image of Kircher’s museum is perfectly accurate in its proportions, with 
one exception: the human fi gures gathered in its foreground are about half as tall 
as they should be. Th e obelisks we see ranged behind Father Kircher and his guests 
still exist; made of wood, they are all only a meter high. Th e skeleton in the back-
ground has also survived, but it belongs to a human fetus rather than a full-sized 
adult. Th e Temple of Wisdom in Raphael’s School of Athens is truly monumental, 
but this room is monumental only because its occupants have been reduced to the 
size of leprechauns. Th e clever trick of perspective and miniaturization works so 
convincingly, however, that Giambattista Piranesi would borrow it for his terrify-
ingly grand views of Roman ruins—and most architects’ drawings today still glorify 
their work by exaggerating the size of their own buildings and reducing the people 
who will use those buildings to the stature of ants. On the timeline between Ra-
phael’s Temple of Wisdom, where questions about nature are part of philosophy, 
and the paneled room of the Solvay Conference, where nature is the province of 
science, Athanasius Kircher and his Museum stand somewhere in the middle – and 
perhaps they stand more on the scientifi c side than the writers of the 1909 Ency-
clopedia Britannica thought when they described Father Kircher as ‘a man of wide 
and varied learning, but singularly devoid of judgment and critical discernment’. 
Kircher’s reputation suff ered for much of the twentieth century because his eff orts 
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Fig. 14: Th e Musaeum Kircherianum, from Georgius de Sepibus, Romani collegii Societatis Jesu 
musæum celeberrimum (Amsterdam 1678).
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to represent reality included both a theological and what we would call a scientifi c 
purpose rather than a single-minded pursuit of science; however, the death of Gior-
dano Bruno and the imprisonment of Galileo would have reminded Kircher that 
any departure from theological orthodoxy in his own time and place could pose a 
mortal risk. In fact, however, with daring, subterfuge, and an outrageous sense of 
humor, he departed regularly from the standard truths of Jesuit teaching. 
Kircher may be best known today for his Baroque diagrams, like his vision of 
the microcosmic man from his treatise on music, the Musurgia universalis (Fig. 
15), but there was a core of practical empiricism in the man as well. His interest 
in geology was sparked by his year in Malta between 1637 and 1638, when he was 
able to climb both Etna and Vesuvius, but many of his ideas must have come from 
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the limestone plateau of the Maltese islands themselves, from places like Dwejra 
Bay on the island of Gozo. Fossilized sand dollars such as those at Dwejra crys-
tallized his interest in fossils in general; his geological masterpiece, the Mundus 
subterraneus of 1665, devotes several pages to engravings of them. The geological 
strata and fault lines that are particularly visible on the limestone plateau of the 
Maltese Islands eventually led Father Kircher to formulate the forerunner of our 
own theory of plate tectonics, and to explain the loss of Atlantis by the process 
we now identify as subduction. He regarded the Earth as an imperfect sphere 
riddled with veins of fire, air, and water. So too were the Moon and Sun, whose 
troubled faces he had seen with telescope and helioscope (a telescope that pro-
jected the Sun’s image). Kircher’s geology even underpins one of Baroque Rome’s 
most beloved works of art, Gianlorenzo Bernini’s Fountain of the Four Rivers, 
commissioned for the Jubilee of 1650 although it was finished in 1651, several 
months behind schedule (Fig. 16). Beneath an Egyptian obelisk, rivers represent-
Fig. 16: Gianlorenzo Bernini, 
Fountain of the Four Rivers, 1648-1651, 
Piazza Navona, Rome.
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ing four continents gush forth from an enormous water reservoir, what Kircher 
called a hydrophylacium, hidden, like the sources for all the world’s rivers, un-
derneath a great hollow mountain. The similarities between Bernini’s travertine 
mountain and the formations that Kircher imagined after seeing the fault lines 
and stratified layers of Malta show the work of two great observers, and two great 
imaginations. 
The Fountain of the Four Rivers, in a real sense, is also a representation of the 
world, one that Kircher especially, more than perhaps Bernini, conceived as a 
melding of two forces: what he called the vicissitude of nature, and the eternal 
truths of religion.32 The obelisk is made of granite, a supremely hard stone, and 
topped by a dove and cross of gilded bronze, materials to symbolize the eternal 
glory of heaven and the durability of true faith. Below, everything is porous, from 
the surface of the travertine to the very nature of the creatures clinging to the 
water-gushing rocks. Real weeds sprout among Bernini’s carved foliage, proof of 
Kircher’s theory that the world was infinitely fertile as well as of Bernini’s art-
istry.33 The fountain was erected to celebrate a ceremony of Christian repentance 
and forgiveness, the Jubilee, that descended from a similar rite in Judaism; it was 
also a monument to the recent end (in 1648) of the dreadful Thirty Years’ War, 
with its million victims.34 As a single comprehensive image of the world and its 
ways, this important work of urban renewal is not much different from the al-
legory on the title page of Kircher’s later book, the Ars magna sciendi (Fig. 17, 
page 106), where divine wisdom rules over a land whose eroded soil is carried by 
a river into the sea, but built up again by a spewing volcano. In Kircher’s view, the 
physical world moved in an endless circle of change, guided by a transcendent, 
steady higher truth. If he were to be transported magically into Raphael’s School 
of Athens, this redoubtable empiricist would still stand firmly on the side of Plato.
In Obeliscus Pamphilius, the volume that Father Kircher published to celebrate 
the fountain of the four rivers – and at the same time to advertise his own forth-
coming books on Egyptology and geology – he concentrated on translating the 
hieroglyphic inscriptions on the obelisk’s sides, a skill in which he claimed unique 
proficiency, and not entirely without justification; his was the intuition that mod-
ern Coptic would provide the key to ancient Egyptian.35 But perhaps the strongest 
impact of the book resides in the power – or at least the shamelessness – of its ad-
vertising, from the title page that presents the middle-aged, black-clad author as 
a heroic youth to the constant hints that still greater works are poised to emerge 
from his remarkably fertile pen. Kircher’s Jesuit censors called ceaseless and criti-
cal attention to his propensity to brag, but it never seems to have had the slightest 
effect on him.36 The public, meanwhile, begged for more, and more they got.
In 1666, when Kircher and Bernini joined forces a second time to combine 
statue and obelisk, they also played a Jesuitical joke on the Dominicans who had 
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Fig. 17: Title page from Athanasius Kircher, Ars Magna Sciendi (Amsterdam 1669).
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found the artifact in their garden.37 Bernini’s drawings for the project still exist, 
and he toyed with several designs for a pedestal to carry the obelisk, including a 
figure of Hercules staggering under its weight. He and his sponsor, Pope Alex-
ander VII, eventually opted for a more reassuring – and more structurally sound 
– solution on a site that is literally built on the shifting silt of the River Tiber (Fig. 
18). A well-fed elephant lofts his Egyptian needle above inscriptions declaring 
that only a robust soul is fit to bear the burden of wisdom, but his knowing smirk 
seems likely to stem from the fact that all the while he is turning his posterior 
toward the door of the Dominican convent of Santa Maria Sopra Minerva, the 
Fig. 18: Gianlorenzo Bernini, Th e Obelisk of 
Santa Maria Sopra Minerva, 1667, Rome.
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place where Giordano Bruno resided for a time in 1576 and Galileo stood trial for 
heresy in 1633. On the other hand, the elephant could hardly turn his tail toward 
the church next door, and it would be nearly as rude to turn it toward passersby 
on the street. Or so Bernini might have argued, indeed the placement of sculpted 
animals in Roman piazzas always reflects mature consideration of the direction 
in which they aim their various parts. The reign of Alexander VII, who was elect-
ed in 1655, had been ushered in by a series of dramatic events, from the arrival 
of the newly converted Queen Christina of Sweden – of whom the disappointed 
Pope wrote ‘non è bella’ in his diary – to an outbreak of plague.38 He had good 
reason to ask artist Pietro da Cortona to paint him an image of a guardian angel 
(Fig. 19) and may have felt more like the old man in the background hovering on a 
precipice in a dark and stormy night than like the child who strides forward with 
innocent faith in the foreground. In the meantime, however, his friend Father 
Kircher was seeing the plague through empirical eyes, training several varieties of 
microscope on the problem. As the disease raged in Trastevere, the Pope imposed 
a rigid quarantine, encouraged by Kircher, who was convinced that the trouble 
could ultimately be traced to what he called ‘little worms’ and we would eventu-
ally call a microbe.39 The plasmodium Yersinia pestis was too small to be detected 
by the instrument that Kircher called a smicroscopium, and the Jesuit censors de-
layed publication of the book in which he detailed his findings, but Scrutinium 
pestis came out in 1668, the first step in a chain of research that would lead to the 
understanding, if not the eradication, of the bubonic plague. The board of cen-
sors, for their own part, had acted in a way consistent with modern scientific or 
scholarly peer reviewers; Jesuits were not trained as medical doctors, and they 
did not want Kircher’s book to draw conclusions about medicine without having 
a real physician’s approval.40 Pope Alexander’s reaction to plague in 1655, then, 
involved both the invocation of guardian angels and the imposition of quarantine, 
and it is testimony to the courage — and to the faith – of his nephew Flavio Chigi 
and two other cardinals that they made repeated visits into the quarantined area 
without wearing protective plague suits.41 There was no other way for people to 
know that they were cardinals.
Skill with the microscope enabled Kircher’s contemporary Francesco Redi to 
refute another of the seventeenth century’s persistent controversies: the question 
of spontaneous generation.42 Kircher, for example, believed that insects and rep-
tiles were created from straw, dung, and the fertile power of sunbeams; the weeds 
on the Fountain of the Four Rivers testify to that fertile force, which Kircher 
called panspermia rerum, the universal seeds of things.43 Both of them, like their 
Fig. 19: Pietro da Cortona, Th e Guardian Angel, 1656, oil on canvas, 225 x 143 cm, Galleria 
Nazionale d’Arte Antica, Rome.
Representing the World
 Ingrid Rowland
Dutch colleague Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, were horrified to discover what a 
remarkable menagerie lived within normal everyday objects, from peaches and 
melons to the insides of their own mouths and the surface of their own skins. 
Redi, however, was finally able to identify fly eggs in dung and thereby put strict 
limits on the generative powers of panspermia rerum; the term would not be used 
again until the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius, who won the newly minted 
Nobel Prize in 1903, to discuss the origins of life in the universe.44
In general, we can see the early modern period oscillating between allegorical 
and metaphorical means of representing the world, and what we might identify 
now as a more empirical approach. Athanasius Kircher, of course, stands glori-
ously in between the two, with his intricately fanciful diagrams of great corre-
spondences that no longer mean much to us, and the orderly presentation of data, 
to which we attribute much of our own standard of physical and intellectual life. 
It may not be surprising to find a great early modern empiricist like the entomol-
ogist (and Amsterdam resident) Maria Sibylla Merian (Fig. 20) presenting her 
visually ravishing studies of insect metamorphosis as simultaneous comments on 
the transitory nature of life; she was, after all, the member of a strongly pietistic 
Protestant sect, the Reformation’s version, then, of an Athanasius Kircher.45
Fig. 20: Maria Sibylla Merian, 
Tulip.
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But even today, modern scientific representations of our world and its nature 
still make use of art and allegory. The great gas clouds that the Hubble space tel-
escope has revealed giving birth to stars are visible to us only because their colors 
have been artificially enhanced; created no less than the wholly distinctive reds 
and oranges that only Maria Sibylla Merian could ever extract from pigments. 
And a now-common diagram in chemical kinetics presents the reaction of two 
molecules as an event that takes place in an energy field conceived as a landscape; 
here the hills and valleys are made not of earth but of pure energy. Our blue 
planet is the product of scattered light rather than the crunching in a mortar of 
lapis lazuli, but the ends of the universe have not changed their colors for all that; 
a thirteenth-century Coronation of the Virgin (Fig. 21) pictures a round heaven in 
stripes of blue and gold, perhaps only because these are the two most precious 
pigments, perhaps because of the color presented by sun and sky. For Raphael in 
his Triumph of Theology of 1508, as for Titian’s Assumption of the Virgin from ten 
years later, deep space is light gold, the color of the metal electrum, as the prophet 
Ezekiel declared when he described his vision: 
And I looked, and behold, a whirlwind came out of the north, a great cloud, 
and a fi re unfolding itself, and out of the midst thereof as the color of amber, 
out of the midst of the fi re.
Fig. 21: Jacopo Torriti, Coronation of the Virgin, 1295, Santa Maria Maggiore, Rome.
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Now we think of deep space as black, and smelling of sizzling beefsteak, and 
the music of the spheres, as Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001 suggested, is the ¾ time of 
the Blue Danube Waltz. Our representations of the worlds beyond still refer back 
in the end to this shifty world around us, because it is here that we live our lives. 
The Solvay Conference, no less than the School of Athens, is a lofty edifice filled 
with quirky human beings, an overarching universe roiling with errant ideas. The 
history of those ideas is not only a history of science; it is always, equally, a history 
of the humanities, those two fields of study that were once partners in philosophy 
and are still inextricable partners in thought. Today, no less than in the yesterday 
of the School of Athens, Plato still jostles Aristotle, and the still point between 
them is still caught in a swirling mass of drapery.
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Ficino, Diacceto and Michelangelo’s 
Presentation Drawings1
Marieke van den Doel
The Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) was one of the first 
scholars who suggested that painting, which was generally regarded as a craft, 
should be included among the Liberal Arts. His main work, Platonic Theology 
(1482), compared his own time to a Golden Age that ‘has brought back to light 
the Liberal Arts which had almost been extinct: Grammar, Poetry, Rhetoric, 
Painting, Architecture, Music and the ancient art of singing to the Orphic 
Lyre’.2 Ficino not only replaced logic with poetry in the trivium, but formu-
lated an almost completely new quadrivium, removing geometry, arithmetic 
and astronomy, in favor of painting and architecture.3
This paper will demonstrate that Ficino’s ideas, which gave such unprec-
edented importance to the visual arts, provided highly relevant arguments 
for those painters and art theorists who wanted to raise the status of paint-
ing as an activity with intellectual pretensions, perhaps as one of the Lib-
eral Arts or even as more important than the other arts of the humanistic 
curriculum.4 In his philosophy it is the sense of sight in particular through 
which man’s soul may approach heavenly beauty and be reminded of its 
divine origins. The sense of sight and its ‘internal’ counterpart, the imagina-
tion, are therefore key elements in his writings: of the sensory ‘pleasures’, 
‘the lowest is in smelling; the higher, in hearing; the more sublime, in see-
ing; the more eminent, in the imagination’.5 However, Ficino does not allot a 
place among the artes liberales to all types of visual art or artists. This status 
is only granted to individuals who are of a certain mental disposition that 
makes them receptive to divine inspiration. The term ‘genius’, however, is 
in its modern meaning not entirely appropriate for Ficino’s age. As shall be 
argued here, his ideas about melancholic artists precede the modern notion 
of artistic genius.
To assess the importance of Ficino’s statements on the artistic temperament 
properly, one should note that in the arts and the literature from the beginning 
 Marieke van den Doel
of the sixteenth century onwards, there are frequent references to the melanchol-
ic disposition of artists in relation to their exceptional talents. They appear in 
artists’ biographies, not infrequently written by colleagues, but also in personal 
statements by the artists themselves in letters, drawings and paintings of a more 
personal nature. Although already in the course of the fifteenth century artists 
applied the principles of the artes liberales to turn the art of painting into a Lib-
eral Art, searching for shared principles in geometry, rhetoric or poetry,6 from the 
beginning of the sixteenth century onwards there was a marked shift in interest 
as artists and the authors of treatises on the art of painting began to emphasize 
more the inspirational and divine character of the creative process and the neces-
sary innate talent. To put it briefly, there was a shift from ars to ingenium, from 
acquired skills to innate dispositions.7
This article will try to prove the importance of Ficino’s ideas to the pro-
cess of the rise in the artist’s intellectual and social status by focusing on two 
drawings by Michelangelo, from a series of drawings known as the Presentation 
Drawings. In letters and poems, but also in other works, Michelangelo shows 
that he suffers from the whims of the melancholic temperament while at the 
same time flirting with a difficult though brilliant character.8 On top of that, he 
insinuates that his talent is innate and not acquired: as an artist he is capable 
of creative frenzy.9 This self-image was copied by his biographers and admirers, 
such as Ascanio Condivi (1525–1574), Georgio Vasari (1511-1574), and Francisco 
de Holanda (1517-1585). The last one makes Michelangelo speak for himself, in 
his Roman Dialogues (1548), about ‘talented artists’, who ‘are unsociable not from 
pride, but because they deem only very few spirits worthy of their art; ... and in 
order not to debase the elevated imagination that keeps their mind in perpetual 
ecstasy.’10
The image of Michelangelo as a melancholic can also be found in The School 
of Athens, the famous wall painting in the Vatican by his rival Raphael. Michel-
angelo is possibly depicted there as the philosopher Heraclitus in a pose that has 
become standard for the iconography of the melancholic (Fig. 22). In all likeli-
hood, this portrait of Michelangelo was an ode both to his personality and to his 
style of painting.11 The following will first explore Ficino’s ideas about melancholy 
as an artistic affliction, related to man’s ability to contemplate beauty and behold 
a glimpse of the divine. Next, we will study the way Michelangelo may have ac-
quired knowledge of them. Finally, we shall see how he subsequently tried to give 
visual form to these ideas, in images that may be interpreted as allegorical self-
portraits, reflecting on the status of the artist. 
Ficino, Diacceto and Michelangelo
1 Melancholy and frenzy in De vita and Th eologica Platonica
Ficino was the fi rst philosopher to elaborate, in his De vita libri tres (1481-1489), 
the notion that melancholy, in spite of being the most problematic of tempera-
ments, also contained the possibility of genius.12 De vita formulates therapeutic in-
structions to restrain the excesses of the melancholic temperament, such as anger, 
gluttony, sexual desire and moods of intense gloom.13 Th at the melancholic should 
be capable of genius, Ficino explains from an excess of black bile that makes the 
spiritus of the melancholic refi ned and infl ammable. Ficino’s directions are aimed 
at setting the melancholic’s highly infl ammable spiritus aglow, without causing it to 
be consumed entirely.14 Th e subtlety of the spiritus causes the imagination of the 
melancholic to be exceptionally strong. Its ‘burning’ brings about a state of furor or 
frenzy which makes one fi t for new inventions and discoveries in the arts.15
Ficino’s notion of the melancholic temperament, as a combination of a dif-
ficult character and an inspired personality, seems to have been a model for 
the artistic temperament that emerged from art literature and self-referential 
works of art since the end of the fifteenth century.16 Ficino´s emphasis on the 
melancholic´s imagination and the faculty of phantasy as an important tool 
in the process of inspiration has played an important part within this devel-
opment.17
Ficino’s ideas are based on a tradition derived from Aristotle, who stated that 
the imagination is a faculty of knowledge, intermediary between the senses and 
the intellect (or rational intelligence). Together with the common sense (sensus 
communis) and the memory it belongs to the so-called interior senses. It forms a 
bridge between sense-perception and intellect, because the soul does not think 
Fig. 22: Raphael, School of Athens (detail: 
Heraclitus), 1509-1511, Stanza della 
Segnatura, Vatican City.
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without images or so-called phantasmata. The imagination, situated in the fore-
head, transforms the sense impressions perceived by the body into phantasmata 
by means of which they can be visualized in the mind, thought about or remem-
bered. Sensory impressions are led from the senses to the soul by means of spir-
itus, a semi-material, vaporous substance. The spirit is also the instrument by 
which phantasmata are led through the soul and by which the soul communicates 
with the body.18
In this Aristotelian frame Ficino attempted to incorporate Neoplatonic no-
tions such as Plato’s postulate, from the Phaedrus, that on the one hand the imagi-
nation – since it is connected with the sense impressions perceived by the body 
– can drag the soul down to the material world or prevent it from flying back to 
its divine origin. On the other hand, sensing or imagining earthly beauty might 
cause the soul to remember the heavenly beauty of the World of Ideas, so that, 
finding itself in a state of frenzy, it can return to its heavenly homeland.19 The 
theme of divine inspiration was elaborated in Plato’s Timaeus where it is empha-
sized that phantasmata are created by God in the soul and that man is not always 
capable of understanding the images that he receives in a state of inspirational 
frenzy. This notion is echoed in Ficino’s Theologia Platonica (XIII.2):
[P]oets in a frenzy sing of many things, and marvellous ones at that, which a 
little later, when their frenzy has abated, they themselves do not suffi  ciently 
understand: it is as if they had not pronounced the words but rather God 
had spoken loudly through them as through trumpets. ... [M]en of great 
prudence and those most learned from their youth have not turned out to 
be the best poets. Rather, some of the poets were mad, as was said of Homer 
and Lucretius; but others were uneducated as Hesiod himself bore witness.20
Translating and writing a commentary on the works of Plotinus, which he stud-
ied around 1490, must have had a profound impact on Ficino’s ideas on the 
imagination. According to Plotinus, the human soul descends at birth from the 
Intelligible World of Ideas into the body. All individual human souls emanate 
from the World Soul in order to unite with the lower material world. A small 
part of every individual soul always remains in the Intelligible World, and be-
cause of this, the human soul, more than nature, is capable of conceiving the 
ideal Forms that are captured within the material world, which is an imperfect 
shadow of the Intelligible World. Although nature is led by some kind of intel-
ligent principle in producing mirror images of the Ideas, it does so blindly with-
out intellection. Since part of the human soul always dwells in the World Soul, 
it is better capable of forming within itself, through the imagination, an image of 
the beauty of the Ideas.21
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In De amore, a commentary on Plato’s Symposium, Ficino dealt extensively 
with the way in which the soul can rise to the divine by imagining and contem-
plating beauty.22 Prior to the soul’s descent to the material world, impressions 
of the ideas were made on the soul, like ‘pictures on a wall’,23 and by experienc-
ing earthly beauty the soul remembers the immutable perfection of the World 
of Ideas to which it desires to return. Within this Platonic context, physical 
beauty is seen as a divine reflection shining through a human body, and loving 
this body is never considered negatively by Ficino.24 In De amore, love is the 
all-encompassing force that harmonizes all elements of the cosmos. Through 
love of the higher for the lower, God rules the angels, the angels rule the souls, 
and the soul rules the body. Hence this all-pervading force is the master of all 
arts and sciences.25 In addition, love causes the soul to forget itself so that it is 
overtaken by the desire to dwell in the soul of the beloved. If this love is mutual, 
the soul finds itself again, safely kept in the soul of the beloved: ‘one death, but a 
double resurrection’.26 The melancholic’s imagination is most likely, through its 
highly inflammable spiritus, to succeed in rising to the divine as a result of the 
contemplation of beauty. This means that melancholics are, according to Ficino, 
very sensitive to the lures of love. Because through the presence of bile in the 
body, the spiritus is consumed so forcefully, the blood turns thick and heavy so 
that love is a cause of much melancholy.27
2 Michelangelo’s melancholy and Neoplatonism
In order to connect Ficino’s ideas on melancholy to Michelangelo’s works, we 
should point out that Michelangelo was familiar with Platonic theories of love. 
This is clear from Condivi’s biography that toned down gossip regarding Michel-
angelo’s homosexuality by pointing out that Michelangelo spoke about love fre-
quently, but always in a Platonic sense.28 Both Condivi and Vasari relate how the 
young Michelangelo was trained in the sculpture garden of Lorenzo de’ Medici 
at San Marco, situated near the monastery of that name in Florence, where art-
ists could work after the example of ancient works.29 In 1635, Ottavio Vannini 
(1585-c.1643) depicted the San Marco garden on a fresco in the Palazzo Pitti: 
it includes the young Michelangelo. This image was placed next to a fresco by 
Francesco Furini (c. 1600-1646) depicting Ficino’s so-called ‘Platonic Academy’ 
that possibly was Lorenzo de’ Medici’s intellectual circle (Fig. 23, next page).30 In 
Lorenzo’s household Michelangelo would have become acquainted with classical 
myths and philosophy, especially the Neoplatonism so characteristic of the circle 
around Il Magnifico to which Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), 
Cristoforo Landino (1424-1498) and Angelo Poliziano (1454-1494) belonged;31 if 
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Fig. 23: Francesco Furini, Th e Platonic Academy at Careggi, ca. 1635, Salone di Giovanni da San 
Giovanni, Palazzo Pitti, Florence.
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we may believe Condivi, the last one had a particularly personal interest in the 
young sculptor.32
Through Michelangelo’s introduction into this household, it is likely that the 
Neoplatonism of Lorenzo’s circle was part of his education. Platonic theories 
of love were available through the Italian version of Ficino’s De amore, which 
possibly had circulated in manuscript form since 147433 or through the work of 
Ficino’s pupil Francesco da Diacceto (1466-1522).34 Both Michelangelo and Di-
acceto were members of a learned academy established in 1515, the Accademia 
Sacra dei Medici.35
As I have studied elsewhere in more detail, the contact between Diacceto and 
Michelangelo through the Accademia Sacra could have been of great importance 
for the sculptor’s Neoplatonic ideas as found in his poetry and drawings.36 In the 
following, I will argue that they can also be found in two drawings with intri-
cate iconography that refers to love, beauty, and the imagination. Diacceto may 
have lent a manuscript to Michelangelo with the Italian version of Ficino’s De 
amore, but more likely, Michelangelo was familiar with the Platonic theories of 
love which Diacceto expounded in his Panegirico all’amore, a slightly revised sum-
mary of Ficino’s De amore, finished in 1508.37 Also, Diacceto’s I tre libri d’amore, 
on which he worked between 1508 and 1511 and which was probably in circulation 
before it was published in 1561, may have been a source for the sculptor.38
The two drawings that will concern us were probably part of a series, now 
known as the Presentation Drawings, that Michelangelo presented as gifts to 
Tommaso dei Cavalieri (c.1509-1587), a young nobleman he loved. They are dated 
around 1533, shortly after their first meeting. In a letter dated January 1, 1533, 
Tommaso stated that on receiving the first drawings, he intended to contemplate 
them at least two hours a day;39 according to Vasari, the drawings were possibly 
intended to instruct Tommaso in draughtsmanship.40 In any case, the drawings 
were clearly gifts of love and were part of the letters and poems that Michelan-
gelo dedicated to the young man. The theme of melancholy surfaces in a poem 
in which Michelangelo compares himself to the moon, the night and darkness; 
Tommaso is the sun.41 The poems in Tommaso’s honor also testify to the Platonic 
conception of love, as there are frequent references to the soul’s ascent to God 
through the perception of visible beauty. In one of the earliest poems there is 
a reference to souls in two bodies becoming one and ‘soaring up to heaven with 
equal wings’.42 Repeatedly, Michelangelo hints at Tommaso’s outward beauty as a 
reflection of the beauty of his soul.43
The following will focus on two drawings that probably belonged to the series, 
The Dream and The Archers, which, I will argue, reflect ideas about the status of 
the sense of sight, the imagination, and the artistic temperament, and maybe even 
about the artist himself.44
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3 Michelangelo’s Th e Dream: Love as a ‘Great Demon’
When Panofsky studied the drawing known as The Dream or Il Sogno (Fig. 24), 
he described the figure in the drawing as a young man surrounded by a wreath of 
unreal and vaguely depicted figures or groups which can easily be recognized as 
dream visions.45 He thought that they represent the seven cardinal sins: gluttony, 
lust, avarice, pride, wrath, envy and sloth.46 But some scholars have remarked that 
of the seven cardinal sins depicted in the drawing, pride is lacking, which casts 
doubts on Panofsky’s interpretation.47
According to Maria Ruvoldt, the meaning of the drawing should be looked 
for in views on melancholy, inspiration and furor, especially Ficino’s. The globe 
on which the young man leans may refer to the iconography of the melancholic. 
On Dürer’s famous Melencolia I and also on Jacob de Gheijn’s engraving on the 
same topic, there is an unmistakable depiction of the globe which traditionally 
refers to the melancholic’s skill in geometry (Figs. 25, page 126 and 26, page 127). 
Talking about the causes of melancholy, Ficino refers to the relation between the 
melancholic temperament and the earth:
Th e natural cause seems to be that for the pursuit of the sciences, espe-
cially the diffi  cult ones, the soul must draw in upon itself from exter-
nal things to internal as from circumference to the center, and while it 
speculates, it must stay immovable at the very center ... of man. Now to 
collect oneself from the circumference to the center, and to be fi xed in the 
center, is above all the property of the Earth itself, to which black bile is 
analogous.48
In relation to the engravings by Dürer and De Gheijn, one can point at the 
similarity in attitude between the two melancholics and the presumed por-
trait of Michelangelo as Heraclitus in The School of Athens (Fig. 22). Not only 
the globe in Michelangelo’s drawing refers to the iconography of the melan-
cholic temperament, but also the depicted vices, which can be characterized as 
gluttony, lechery, wrath, and sloth. Following the semicircle with the cloudlike 
figures from left to right, we can detect a man roasting meat above a fire; an-
other one drinking voraciously (gluttony); various nude and kissing figures; 
genitals (lust); a hand with a purse; two people fighting (wrath); and finally, 
to the right, a sleeping figure (sloth). This calls to mind the deficiencies of 
the melancholic temperament as described by Ficino,49 who at the time was 
looked upon as the most important authority on this subject. Along with the 
vices just mentioned, avarice can also be identified in the image of the purse; 
this is something that Ficino did not expound but that nevertheless belongs 
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Fig. 24: Michelangelo, Th e Dream of Human Life (Il sogno), 1533, Th e Samuel Courtauld Trust, 
Courtauld Institute of Art Gallery, London.
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Fig. 25: Albrecht Dürer, Melencolia I, 1514, Fondazione Magnani Rocca, Corte di Mamiano.
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to the iconography of the melancholic: a money bag can be found in Dürer’s 
Melencolia I, and also in Ripa’s image of the melancholic (Figs. 25 and 27). 
Alongside the frailties of this temperament, Ficino mentions an overactive 
imagination which came about through a surplus of black bile.50 The cloudlike 
dream images seem to point at this. So far the iconography of Il sogno seems to 
be more concerned with the vices of the melancholic temperament than with the 
seven cardinal sins, and the drawing seems to be the equivalent of the engravings 
by Dürer and De Gheijn, with the difference that Michelangelo’s figure was not 
depicted in a pensive or depressed mood, but rather an inspired one. Il sogno 
shows not only the negative qualities of the melancholic, but also his disposition 
that may result in a state of frenzy. An angelic figure, which could best be denoted 
by the polysemic term spiritus, blows on the young man with a trumpet from 
above so that the concept of inspiration is depicted almost literally. Regarding the 
trumpet, we may repeat Ficino’s remark, quoted above, that ‘Poets in a frenzy sing 
of many things ... it is as if they themselves had not pronounced the words but 
God had spoken loudly through them as through trumpets.’51
The fact that the trumpet is not blown in the ear of the youth is an important 
detail according to Ruvoldt, since it is quite contrary to what one would expect 
from the use of a wind instrument and also contrary to the traditional depiction 
Fig. 26 (left): Jacob de Gheijn, 
Melancholy, Th e Elisha Whittelsey Fund, 
Th e Metropolitan Museum of Art, New 
York.
Fig. 27 (top): Melancholy, in: Cesare 
Ripa, Iconologia overo descrittione di 
diverse imagini cavate dall’ antichità, e di 
propria inventione (Rome 1603), p. 79.
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of the evangelists inspired by angels.52 The trumpet is sounded on the forehead, 
precisely there where the imagination resides. Ruvoldt points at a thirteenth-
century image of a melancholic whose forehead is cauterized to prevent halluci-
nation. Also, a later depiction from the scholar Robert Fludd’s (1574-1637) work 
clearly shows the location of the oculus imaginationis (Fig. 28). 
Rather than the melancholic temperament, the youth seems to represent the 
‘melancholic artist’ whereby the visual orientation of the imagination is empha-
sized. Perhaps Michelangelo wanted to make a statement about his own self-im-
age by surrounding the artist with the vices of his melancholic temperament and 
the divine gift of inspiration.53 In connection to this idea, various scholars have 
pointed out the physiognomic similarities between Michelangelo’s self-portraits 
and the central mask beneath the youth.54 In a general sense, the masks seem to 
point at the deceptive side of phantasia and imaginatio, as larva can mean both 
‘mask’ and ‘phantasm’.55 If the Sogno drawing is, in fact, a personal statement, the 
masks should not be interpreted in a purely negative sense, for creating illusions 
is one of the primary tasks of the artist.56 The fact that the drawing is a gift of love 
also strengthens the assumption that we are dealing here with a personal content, 
maybe even an allegorical ‘self-portrait’.
A Neoplatonic or Ficinian context of the dream drawing is not unthinkable.57 
Diacceto’s I tre libri d’amore and Panegirico all’amore can serve as a summary of Fi-
Fig. 28: ‘Oculus imaginationis’, in: Robert Fludd, Ars Memoriae (Oppenheim 1620), Vol. II, p. 47.
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cino’s philosophy, terse and simple, and written in Italian; both works originated 
in Michelangelo’s milieu. Diacceto elaborates on Ficinian ideas on the imagina-
tion within a frame of Neoplatonic theories of love, explaining how the spiritus, as 
‘the refined vehicle of life’, connects body and soul, activates the imagination and 
makes man share in all the gifts of life.58 He describes the spiritus as a divine fire 
which makes man the most beautiful part of Creation and through which he can 
call himself a ‘piccolo mondo’, a small world.59 The spiritus will burn more fiercely 
when the lover sees the beauty of his beloved, even though heavenly beauty can 
only be perceived through the ‘eternal eye’ of the intellect60 and never through the 
eyes and ears of the body.61 Moreover, Diacceto explains that the soul suffers from 
melancholy the moment it perceives earthly beauty, which reminds it of its divine 
origin.62 God’s greatest gift to man, according to Diacceto, is the ability to behold 
divine beauty.63 The most important themes of the Sogno, melancholy, inspiration, 
furor and imaginatio, are all present in the two texts by Diacceto in the context 
of the perception of beauty and love – a frame eminently suited for a gift of love.
In the sixth oration of his De amore, Ficino gives an explanation of Socrates’s 
exposition in Plato’s Symposium in which he remarks that love is a ‘great demon’, 
positioned between the ugly and the beautiful, born from the union of affluence 
and poverty. The power of love that emanates from the World Soul thus connects 
the high and the low, the divine and worldly matter, and this ‘demon’ pervades the 
entire universe: ‘the love of the World Soul, ‘the great demon’ which, hanging over 
all things throughout the whole universe, does not permit hearts to sleep, but 
everywhere wakens them to loving.’ Diacceto specifies Ficino’s crucial remark in 
his Panegirico:
Th erefore, love is not called God or mortal, but a great demon, because de-
monic nature, which is placed between men and gods as an interpreter, con-
ducts the prayers and sacrifi ces of men to the gods, and the will and com-
mandments of the gods to man. And in no other way but through demonic 
nature, men, be they awake or asleep, are inspired by divine goodness.64
The all-pervading power of love and the concept of the refined and omnipres-
ent spiritus seem to overlap in the texts of Ficino and Diacceto, whereby spiri-
tus should be interpreted as the semi-material instrument of love. What Ficino 
and Diacceto expressed in their treatises, Michelangelo translated into images: 
the angelic figure in the Dream-drawing, which earlier on was labeled with the 
term spiritus, visualizes love, demonic nature or the World Soul that inspires 
divine goodness in waking or sleeping man. Michelangelo’s drawing thereby gives 
a more adequate expression of the Platonic theory of love than Ficino’s or Di-
acceto’s words, since it is especially the sense of sight which, in this philosophy, 
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can bring about the recollection of heavenly beauty, thereby opening the soul to 
divine inspiration.65 Michelangelo’s drawing Il sogno thus visualizes in a very in-
ventive way the theme of divine artistry which is inspired by the sight of beauty 
and the experience of love.
4 Th e Archers: the soul’s search for its heavenly homeland
The second drawing that is relevant to our discussion is now known as The Ar-
chers (Fig. 29). It is derived formally from a classical relief from Nero’s Domus 
Aurea, as Michael Hirst remarks. Descriptions of the lost prototype show us, 
however, that Michelangelo made radical changes regarding the original, chang-
ing the group of archers in such a way that they seemed to be flying.66 The most 
conspicuous element in this image is that the depicted archers seem to aim at a 
target, but have nothing in their hands: neither bow nor arrows. 
Some art historians concluded that the work is unfinished; already Panofsky 
opposed them by suggesting that the objects were left out on purpose, since the 
drawing has been worked up in such detail.67 The archers aim at a shield attached 
to a figure that is usually identified as a so-called ‘herm’, a human-like creature 
Fig. 29: Michelangelo Buonarroti, Th e Archers, c. 1530, Th e Royal Collection Queen Elisabeth II, 
Windsor, RL 12770.
Ficino, Diacceto and Michelangelo
whose lower legs disappear into an architectural element. In spite of the absence 
of bows, some of the arrows seem to have hit the herm. On the left in the drawing 
are two putti (or spiritelli) fanning a fire. At the lower right is a sleeping winged 
Cupid holding a bow and arrows. It has been frequently suggested that what is 
depicted here is the Neoplatonic idea that only actions based on love can be suc-
cessful.68 The sleeping Cupid is the only one with the instrument to shoot arrows 
and to hit the herm; whilst love is asleep, everything misses its target.69
Scholars have related The Archers to two poems which Michelangelo wrote for 
Tommaso and in which there is a reference to arrows and archery.70 References 
to arrows appear frequently in Michelangelo’s poems and usually symbolize the 
cruelty or painfulness of love, but The Archers is not an illustration of a specific 
sonnet.71 As will be argued here, Michelangelo’s readjustments to the image on 
the antique relief, on which The Archers seems to be a personal variation, are 
inspired by the sixth oration from Ficino’s De amore, which is a commentary on 
Socrates’s oration on Diotima from Plato’s Symposium. Again, we should note 
that it is probable that Diacceto’s more accessible I tre libri d’amore was the actual 
source for the drawing.
In the earlier mentioned oration, Ficino explains how the spiritus of the lover 
reacts to the beholding of his beloved:
A man’s appearance, which is often very beautiful to see, on account of an 
interior goodness fortunately given him by God, can send a ray of its splen-
dor through the eyes of those who see him and into their soul. Drawn by 
this spark as if by a kind of hook, the soul hastens toward the drawer.72
Earlier, the Platonic idea emerged that the lover possesses his beloved only in part 
and that love for that reason is partly beautiful and partly ugly. Love is born from 
Porus and Penia, poverty and affluence, and a demon placed between the higher 
and the lower. In Socrates’s oration love was called the son of poverty, ‘thin, dry, 
and meager’. In De amore, Ficino tries to explain this remark by stating that the 
man tormented by love eats nothing and becomes meager because the spiritus is 
disbalanced and thus food is not digested. On top of that, he remarks that
wherever the continuous attention of the soul is carried, there also fl y the 
spirits, which are the chariots, or instruments of the soul. Th e spirits are 
produced in the heart from the thinnest part of the blood. Th e lover’s soul 
is carried toward the image of the beloved planted in his imagination, and 
thence toward the beloved himself. To the same place are also drawn the 
lover’s spirits. Flying out there, they are continuously dissipated.73
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A permanent influx of fresh blood is necessary according to Ficino, not only 
because the lover does not digest his food, but also because otherwise the blood 
would immediately grow thick, dry and black so that melancholy will rear its 
head, and the soul is chased day and night by ‘deformed and terrible images’.74
Next, Ficino tries to give an allegorical explanation of the negative properties that 
are attributed to love in Socrates’s oration and that are a consequence of the fact that 
love, along with being beautiful, is also half ugly. In this oration it is expounded that 
love is not only thin, meagre and dry, but also ‘barefoot’ and ‘humble’.75 Ficino imme-
diately adds that the Greek word that Plato used for ‘humble’, chamaipetes, literally 
means ‘fl ying low’.76 He explains this remark by saying that lovers fl y low because they 
live without reason and through their trivial obsession fail to achieve great ends.77
According to Socrates, love is ‘without a home’, which Ficino explains by remark-
ing that the soul of the lover abandons its own body and tries to leap to the soul 
of the beloved. Th e soul thereby deprives itself of its natural seat, the Lares, and is 
doomed to remain unquiet forever.78 Moreover, love is ‘without bed and blanket’, 
because the lover, on seeing the beauty of his beloved, tries to fl y back into the body 
of the other.79 Love, fi nally, sleeps ‘on the threshold’, as was forwarded in Socrates’s 
oration. Ficino explains that the door of the soul is formed by our eyes and ears. 
Th rough these doors the beauty of the beloved enters, so that the soul can no longer 
concentrate on itself, and continually wanders out through the eyes and ears.80
As noted earlier, love was never judged negatively by Ficino. Indeed, those 
who aim at the divine aspects of love are rewarded with her generosity which is 
born of affluence. The dark sides of love emerge from poverty: those who aim at 
physical love only are ‘dry, naked, humble (flying low), dull’ and – Ficino adds – 
‘unarmed’: ‘Unarmed because they succumb to shameful desire. Dull because they 
are so stupid that they do not know where love is leading them, and they remain 
on the road, and do not arrive at the goal.’81
Diacceto’s third book from his I tre libri d’amore is a paraphrase of Ficino’s sixth 
oration from De amore, in which the expositions on the workings of the spiritus 
have been extended. He explains elaborately how this instrument of the senses 
and the fantasia is moved vehemently on seeing the beloved,82 and is emitted from 
the eyes to behold the object of admiration.83 Like Ficino, he warns against sur-
rendering oneself to physical pleasure solely, because this love is dry and meager, 
and ‘without home, bed or blanket’.84 Diacceto explains that it is especially this 
love that incites to melancholy85 and flies low:
It is called fl ying over the earth, because the lover becomes a slave of physi-
cal beauty. Th is state of aff airs is born from extreme ignorance and extreme 
madness because our souls belong to the divine things that should rule and 
not serve physical things.86
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That Michelangelo was familiar with the concept of spiritus flying out through 
the eye and trying to reach the image of the beloved and even to capture that im-
age and bring it back into the soul or the body is shown clearly from some of his 
poems, among which the following lines: ‘You entered me through my eyes ... / as 
a cluster of unripe fruit goes into a bottle and, / once past the neck, grows where 
it is wider; / so does your image ... / grow once it’s inside the eyes, so that I stretch 
/ like a skin inside of which the pulp is swelling’.87 This theory was not exclusively 
Platonic, but a generally recognised opinion on the working of the eye.88
The sixth oration from Ficino’s De amore and Diacceto’s paraphrase of it in I 
tre libri d’amore prove to be a key to the meaning of Michelangelo’s Archers. The 
missing arrows in the depiction can refer to the invisible love arrows of the spiri-
tus beaming from the eyes of the archers. This was not only a literary or a philo-
sophical concept, but one that had a pictorial tradition in the early modern pe-
riod, which is shown from an emblem by Otto Vaenius of a woman whose glance 
pierces the heart of her beloved like an arrow (Fig. 30).89 The emblem, however, 
does in fact provide a depiction of the arrows from the eyes of the woman. Next 
to her is a sleeping Cupid who may symbolize the absence of higher, divine love. 
In Michelangelo’s drawing, which also contains a sleeping cupid, this absence ap-
Fig. 30: Love emblem, in: Otto Vaenius, Amorum emblemata (Antwerp 1608).
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pears from the fact that the archers are only aiming at the physical side of love, so 
that they are literally ‘nude’, ‘flying low’, ‘unarmed’: they ‘do not know where love is 
leading them’ and ‘do not arrive at the goal’. 
Michelangelo depicted the archers flying low and made the group dynamic 
which seems to refer to their living without reason and their failure to achieve 
their goals through their obsession.90 Their souls are drawn to their lovers ‘as with 
a hook’, whilst their spiritus tries to reach the beloved with great zest,91 so that 
their souls will dry out and succumb to melancholy. The depicted putti or spiritelli 
fan this fire even further.
The herm, who is without legs or arms, seems to be a defenseless prey for 
the archers. However, in antiquity this object was often outfitted with a phallus 
whereby the figure symbolized unrestrained physical lust.92 In the case of this 
drawing, it is possible that the depicted figure was not intended as a herm, but 
as a humanoid sitting duck as used frequently in tournaments.93 Herm or sit-
ting duck, the figure is at any rate a target for the archers. In the upper left hand 
corner of the drawing, we see an archer with a bow. He does not aim at the herm 
and does not shoot, but holds the bow inversely. Given his contrasting posture, 
it could be that he symbolizes the victory of lust; he will not be tempted to base 
desire. Possibly, this is a self-portrait of Michelangelo.
5 Conclusion
The hypothesis that Michelangelo sought to convey complex ideas about melan-
choly, love, and inspiration through carefully drafted images is in accordance with 
Ficino’s philosophy. By means of an image, we are not only reminded of the beau-
ty of the Ideas which will bring us in a state of frenzy or furor, but we may also 
understand divine truths in a flash, as a whole; as Ficino puts it: ‘When Apelles 
looked at a field he tried to paint it with colors on a panel. It was the whole field 
which showed itself in a single moment to Apelles and aroused this desire in 
him.’94 In his Commentary on Priscianus Lydus, Ficino calls sight ‘the most perfect 
of senses, and the visible, as the most perfect of sense-objects, have an order 
from the multitude to the one that the other senses do not have.’95 Within the 
framework of the Florentine philosopher’s ideas, the visual arts that involve the 
sensory act of seeing as well as the inner eye, or the faculty of imagination, seem 
to underlie his inclusion of painting among the Liberal Arts.
Michelangelo’s drawings of Th e Dream and Th e Archers are a visualization of 
Ficinian thought in which central statements from the Platonic Th eology, De vita, 
and especially De amore are depicted. Th emes such as the imagination, the artistic 
temperament, and frenzy prove to be of importance for sixteenth-century thought 
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about art. Although the meaning of Michelangelo’s Presentation Drawings can be 
explained through Ficino’s ideas on love, furor and inspiration, it is nevertheless 
more probable that Diacceto’s I tre libri d’amore and Panegirico all’amore served as 
actual sources for the drawings. Several themes, which are scattered throughout 
Ficino’s works and are relevant for interpreting the iconography of the drawings, 
are dealt with tersely, concisely, and consecutively. Michelangelo must have known 
Diacceto personally; both were members of the Accademia Sacra dei Medici 
where such themes were debated. We have seen that the elaborate allegories of 
Th e Dream and Th e Archers contain detailed references to the sixth oration from 
Ficino’s De amore or, more plausibly, to Diacceto’s summary of that text.
The Dream shows the negative and positive sides of the artistic temperament. 
Inspiration achieved in a state of furor, usually reached through beholding physi-
cal beauty and experiencing love, is represented as a winged genius, Ficino’s ‘great 
demon’ which ‘either awake or asleep, inspires by divine goodness’. The work is the 
visualization of profound philosophical ideas on the sense of sight, the imagina-
tion, and divine inspiration: as an artist’s statement on the intellectual status of 
artistic creation, it is without precedent, a key moment in the development of the 
intellectual status of the artist. It may be interpreted as an allegorical self-portrait.
The negative aspects of the themes of beauty, love, and inspiration are explored 
further in The Archers. The details of the drawing may be explained through the 
sixth oration of De amore. The archers are unarmed because they are ‘subject to 
shameful desires’ and ‘ignorant of whither love leads them’, while their spiritus 
eagerly tries to reach the object of their love.
Michelangelo’s two drawings illustrate how the interconnected themes of Pla-
tonic love, the beholding of physical beauty, and the working of the spiritus and the 
imagination found their way to the artist’s studio. Ficino’s theories on melancholy 
and inspiration could be used in an artistic context to plead for the divinity of inspi-
rational art; in comparison to this claim, his idea that painting should be included 
among the Liberal Arts seems not only an obvious, but a rather innocent statement. 
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‘Signs that Signify by Th emselves’
Writing with Images in the Seventeenth Century
Thijs Weststeijn
In his treatise on painting of 1678, the Dutch artist Samuel van Hoogstraten 
(1627-1678), one of Rembrandt’s pupils, pleaded for the inclusion of the art of 
painting among the liberal arts. One of his strategies was connecting the visual 
arts to ideas about language and letters developed by influential philologists such 
as Gerardus Vossius (1577-1649) and Franciscus Junius (1591-1677). In this con-
text, Van Hoogstraten’s book touched on the subject of pictography, the ideal of 
a script based on pictures rather than letters. He discussed this in connection 
to the art of the Chinese. Just like the Egyptians and the Mexicans, they have 
‘written their books with meaningful pictures, instead of letters; and their way of 
expressing themselves has reached us now in the art of painting’.1
In Van Hoogstraten’s view, the writing system of the Chinese entailed two 
promises for Western culture. First, through pictography, the art of painting 
would automatically gain a rightful place among the accepted arts of the trivium, 
grammar, logic, and rhetoric: this would bring to completion the process of social 
and intellectual emancipation that Dutch painters had gone through from the 
early sixteenth century onwards. They became interested the ‘culture of the brush’ 
that allegedly characterized classical Chinese civilization in which painting was 
closely related to scholarship and high public office. Van Hoogstraten thought 
that in East Asia even the Emperor, whenever he goes out, ‘includes eminent 
painters among those who are called his courtiers’.2
A second point of interest suggested that, since paintings are the ‘Books of 
the Illiterate’, pictography would make possible a language that could be under-
stood by everyone regardless of cultural and linguistic background. This second 
point will concern us most as a great many seventeenth-century scholars were 
involved in the search for pictographic signs.3 The ‘Golden Age’ in Dutch painting 
had its counterpart in an exceptional flowering of philology. Van Hoogstraten’s 
statements on Chinese may well have been inspired by two key figures in tex-
tual scholarship in the Netherlands: Gerardus Vossius, the first professor of the 
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Athenaeum Illustre (forerunner of the University of Amsterdam), and one of his 
sons, Isaac (1618-1689), a great enthusiast of Chinese culture and the first Euro-
pean to write a defense of Chinese visual art.4 Gerardus assumed that Chinese 
characters had developed out of a pictographic script, postulating that each sign 
was a miniature painting of the object it referred to. He concluded this from the 
fact that a single script was used for unrelated languages. As he wrote in De arte 
grammatica (1635):
for the Chinese, there are no fewer letters than there are words: however, 
they can be combined together, so that their total number does not exceed 
70,000 or 80,000 ... Th e Chinese and Japanese, although their languages 
diff er just as much as Hebrew and Dutch, still understand one another if 
they write in this manner. For even if some would have pronounced other 
words when reading, the concepts would nevertheless have been the same. 
Indeed, now as people of diff erent languages who see the same thing, un-
derstand the same thing, likewise, those who see the sign of a thing would 
have the same understanding of it.5
Since Chinese characters express concepts without the medium of language, they 
are similar to paintings: ‘In the same sense, from the painting of a human figure, 
a horse, a tree, or a house, all people obtain the same concept’.6 From the example 
of Chinese writing, Vossius concluded that it was possible to learn ‘as many char-
acters as there are things’, if this was done from an early age onwards.7
Even though Vossius’s estimate of the total number of characters was too 
high, to his contemporaries these scholarly conjectures about the Chinese script 
seemed realistic.8 They were based on the early modern emphasis on thinking in 
images, in contrast to the stress on language as the basis for thought that is so 
popular in twentieth-century philosophy. When Renaissance writers about the 
visual arts used the formula ut pictura poesis, it was not to highlight the ‘textual’ 
nature of works of art but rather to elaborate on Aristotle’s assumption that ‘the 
mind never thinks without images’.9 The visual components of the art of memory, 
aimed at remembering the parts of a speech by association with physical objects 
in an architectural setting, as well as the popularity of illustrated emblem books, 
were based on the fundamental role allotted to images.10
Without the ambition to be comprehensive or incontrovertible, this chapter 
will explore three aspects of the seventeenth-century discourse on writing with 
images. First we shall trace the purported geographical spread of pictograms: 
although based on hieroglyphical roots, they were allegedly put to use most fruit-
fully in China. Furthermore, we will analyze how ideas on the common root of 
Christian and Oriental civilizations inspired speculations about a pictographic 
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origin of the world’s various scripts. Finally, we shall situate the projected signs 
that were independent of speech in the context of seventeenth-century attempts 
at philosophical language.
Joining artistic, linguistic, historical, and geographic arguments, the debate 
about signs that signify themselves constituted a lively, albeit short-lived chapter 
in the history of the humanities. It brings to the fore how religious and antiquar-
ian credulity, extending to the Chaldaeans, Sibyls, and the people before Adam, 
went hand in hand with scholarship heralding modernity, such as comparative 
linguistics and symbolic logic.
1 Emblems, hieroglyphs, and the Chinese script
To explain the possibility of pictography, Vossius referred back to the rediscovery 
of the Egyptian hieroglyphs in the fifteenth century.11 In his capacity as art theo-
rist and philologist, Leon Battista Alberti had been the first to develop an interest 
in the inscriptions on Roman obelisks that he thought could be deciphered also 
without knowledge of the language spoken in Egypt.12 His treatise on architec-
ture advised avoiding letters for inscriptions on monuments made for posterity, 
and replacing them with ‘Egyptian’ pictograms that could always and under all 
circumstances be read by scholars.13 Later in the century, a spurious text surfaced 
with two hundred fanciful ‘explanations’ of hieroglyphs, attributed to Horapollo, 
a priest of late antiquity. It was reprinted nine times up to the seventeenth century 
and thus catalyzed the fashion for emblems:14 images that combined various sym-
bols, provided with an interpretive epigram. Andrea Alciati’s Emblematica (first 
edition 1505) provides one example, which refers to the creed of making haste 
slowly: it combines a dolphin, symbolizing speed, to an anchor, denoting slowness 
(Fig. 31, next page). That this symbolism sometimes exploited its own ambiguity 
is suggested by a visually very similar image (combining a snake and an arrow) 
that was given a different meaning (it denotes the idea that things need time to 
mature) (Fig. 32, page 137).15
An infl uential modern student of this topic, Ernst Gombrich, analyzed how, ac-
cording to Renaissance scholarship, vision conveyed a specifi c kind of knowledge 
that was unmediated by language. Images made in the right manner were regarded 
as direct refl ections of Platonic ideas. Th ey were expected to leave an adequate 
imprint of these ideas on the viewer’s mind; seeing was therefore deemed the most 
truthful kind of perception.16 Even though in the seventeenth century there was 
less stress on the multiplicity of meanings that could be attached to visual symbols, 
the idea that images were a purer kind of communication than language remained 
popular. Th e best example may be Jan Amos Comenius’s (1592-1670) treatise Orbis 
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Fig. 31 (top): ‘Princeps’, in: Andrea Alciati, Emblemata … cum … notis Laurentii Pignorii Patavini 
(Padua 1661), p. 615.
Fig. 32 (right): ‘Maturandum’, in: Andrea Alciati, Emblemata (Leiden 1584), p. 58.
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pictus (1658), which based a system of education entirely on confronting children 
with illustrations from an early age onward. In this system, knowledge of the world 
is classifi ed and communicated through simple images (Figs. 33 and 34).17
Fig. 33: Illustration from J.A. Comenius, Orbis sensualium pictus quadrilinguis (Nurnberg 1679), p. 6.
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Comenius worked in the Netherlands, where he aspired to visit Vossius 
whose work he admired,18 but the Dutch discussion on pictography was in-
spired most markedly by another scholar, a German Jesuit living in Italy: Atha-
nasius Kircher (1602-1680). His ideas on universal language and writing were 
part of his works on ancient Egypt and China that were published in Amster-
dam and partly translated into Dutch.19 In Kircher’s works, the Middle East 
and the Far East were closely interrelated, as his discussion of pictography 
demonstrates.
Father Kircher’s original ambition had been to become a missionary in China, 
but his request was denied.20 In 1635, he arrived in Rome with the special as-
signment of deciphering the hieroglyphs; soon he claimed to have succeeded 
– and to have related them to Chinese characters. Under Kircher’s supervision, 
Fig. 34: Illustration from J.A. Comenius, Orbis sensualium pictus quadrilinguis (Nurnberg 1679), p. 162.
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an ancient obelisk was erected on Piazza Navona in Rome. He also published an 
extensive translation of the inscriptions.21 This project, in which Egyptian wis-
dom appeared as a forerunner of papal doctrine, sparked his ambition to write 
‘world history’: to chart the spread of civilization from its origin in the ancient 
Middle East to the rest of the world, including East Asia and the Americas. Re-
actions to this ambiguous scholarship, which ostensibly combined observation 
with speculation, were mixed. When Spinoza consulted the Jesuit’s writings in 
the library of a friend, he reported that his host sardonically ‘praised [Kircher’s] 
piety, but not his ability’.22 To put Kircher’s ability to decipher exotic scripts to 
the test, someone sent him a note with invented characters; he soon received a 
translation.23
Isaac Vossius’s work reveals an ambivalent attitude. Speaking as Kircher’s 
friend, he states that ‘even his friends wish that he had not written his Oedipus 
[Aegyptiacus]’, the book in which Kircher claimed to have translated the hiero-
glyphs.24 At other moments, however, Vossius demonstrates his interest in the 
Jesuit’s ideas.25 In 1642 he even went to Rome to visit the ‘Museo Kircheriano’ that 
contained extensive collections of ancient Egyptian objects. It also displayed vari-
ous things collected by the Jesuits in China and demonstrated that Kircher had 
more access to knowledge about East Asia than any other scholar in Europe.26 
Eventually, some of Kircher’s writings came to hold pride of place in the Dutch 
republic of letters, not least his China illustrata (1667) that was translated im-
mediately.27
Upon returning from his ‘Grand Tour’, Vossius tried to rival Kircher’s network 
in various ways, seeking contact with other Jesuits and with the governor of the 
Dutch East India Company to obtain manuscripts and printed texts on China.28 
Remarkably, all this remained a bookish affair. In the project to find the clavis si-
nica, the presumed key to the interpretation of the Chinese characters, no scholar 
cared about consulting the East Asians who visited the Netherlands. Already in 
1654, a Chinese named Michael Shen Fu-tsung had come to Amsterdam, in the 
service of a Flemish Jesuit, to visit the famous playwright Joost van den Vondel 
(1587-1697).29 He made as little impression as two students at Leiden University, 
sons of a Dutch official and a Japanese woman, who were born and raised in Ja-
pan. Another son of a Japanese woman, Pieter Hartsinck (1637-1680), became a 
distinguished mathematician at Harderwijk; he was never consulted by Vossius 
or any other Orientalist.30
Instead, it was Kircher who remained the chief authority. He called the Chi-
nese characters ‘pictograms’ and explained how they developed from images: 
‘ The ancient Chinese have based their letters on all things that present them-
selves to the eye, and have revealed and expressed the thoughts of their mind 
solely through the varied combinations and compositions of these things’.31 
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Kircher found proof for this idea in the fact that the Chinese do not write 
with pens, but with ‘paintbrushes’; their writing should rather be termed ‘paint-
ing’.32 To highlight this idea, the illustration to his discussion of Chinese writ-
ing includes a monkey, the Renaissance symbol for visual art as ‘ape of nature’ 
(Fig. 35).33 Kircher thought that the Chinese based their pictograms on ob-
jects classified according to the categories of the elements. For the element of 
air, they used birds; for earth, plants and leaves; for water, fishes; and for fire, 
dragons.34 In the earliest stage of Chinese civilization, these images would have 
been painted by the mythical first Emperor, ‘Fohi’. In the course of the centu-
ries, their figurative forms had become increasingly abstract (Figs. 36-40, page 
152-154). 
Fig. 35: An illustration of the Chinese method of writing, from Kircher, China illustrata 
(Amsterdam 1667), p. 233.
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Fig. 36 (top): Example of 
Chinese characters, from 
Kircher, China illustrata 
(Amsterdam 1667), p. 227.
Fig. 37 (left): Image from 
Kircher, China illustrata 
(Amsterdam 1667), p. 228.
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Fig. 38 (left): Image from 
Kircher, China illustrata 
(Amsterdam 1667), p. 229.
Fig. 39 (bottom): Image 




Fig. 40: Image from Kircher, China illustrata (Amsterdam 1667), p. 231.
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2 Primeval knowledge and the primitive language
Fohi brings us to the heart of Kircher’s project of linking Chinese civilization to 
that of Egypt and hence to the history of the Western world. In his view, the Em-
peror, when he developed pictographic writing, must have been inspired by some-
one from the Near East, perhaps one of Noah’s sons who had come to China im-
mediately after the Flood. Another possibility would be the ancient philosopher 
Hermes Trismegistus who had given the Egyptians their art, their religion, and 
their hieroglyphs: ‘The origins of their writing ... the [Chinese] learned from Fa-
ther Cham, and from Mercurius Trismegistus, the counselor to his son Nefraim 
and the first instigator of pictograms. And surely, those ancient characters of the 
Chinese, that are equal to pictograms in all aspects, are an important proof for me 
to believe in this [Egyptian origin]’.35 The assumption that the Chinese charac-
ters were emblem-like, ‘hieroglyphical’ signs with ambiguous meanings lay at the 
basis of the Jesuits’ view of ‘world history’. It allowed them to interpret oriental 
languages and art typologically as coming from a Christian origin.36 Their argu-
ment was that the Chinese themselves no longer recognized the hidden meaning 
of their own signs: Christian missionaries, trained in the art of emblematics, were 
needed to rediscover it.37
In the account of sacred history in Oedipus Aegyptiacus (1652), pictography 
appears as a key element. To Kircher, the hieroglyphical origin of Chinese writ-
ing proved that all civilizations were offshoots from the ‘one primeval wisdom’, or 
prisca philosophia, that had originated in Egypt and had modern Catholicism as 
its purest representative. Likewise, all languages could be traced back to the pri-
meval tongue that had been spoken before the Flood and was first written down 
in Egypt. The title page of Obeliscus Pamphilius (1650) represents this geneal-
ogy of languages by means of a stack of books, on which a winged personifica-
tion (apparently Kircher’s muse) rests her elbow (Fig. 41, next page). The image 
suggest that Egyptian wisdom lay at the foundation of Pythagorean, Greek, and 
Chaldaean knowledge. To the figure’s right, there are slabs of stone inscribed 
with fake Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic letters and a fourth script of unclear origin 
(Chaldaean or Egyptian?), highlighting the importance of writing systems for 
Kircher’s hypothesis of a chain of religions linking the Near East to the rest of 
the world. Similarly, in China illustrata, Kircher developed the view that ancient 
Asian idols were of Egyptian origin: one example is his interpretation of ‘Pussa’, 
or a bodhisattva, as a local version of the Greek nature goddess Cybele ‘or Isis of 
the Chinese’ (Fig. 42, page 147). 
In the Netherlands, not all scholars were inclined to accept the Jesuits’ no-
tion of ‘world history’; it even sparked theological controversy. Reports about the 
flowering of Chinese civilization seemed to modify the point of view centered on 
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Fig. 41 (above): Frontispiece of Athanasius Kircher, Obeliscus Pamphilius (Rome 1650).
Fig. 42 (right): Th e goddess ‘Pussa’, from Kircher, China illustrata (Amsterdam 1667), facing p. 140.
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Europe. What is more, the historical chronology as laid down in the Bible could 
not accommodate a civilization that, according to the Chinese historiographers, 
was older than the Flood. Isaac Vossius took this observation as the basis for seri-
ous Biblical criticism.38 Echoing his father’s assumptions about the pictographic 
character of Chinese writing, Vossius concluded that Chinese historical accounts 
must be reliable as they were based on a script that dated back 5,000 years and 
could still be understood.39
Vossius was a champion for China’s culture for its own sake and thus called 
Kircher’s conclusions about its Egyptian origin ‘absurd’.40 However, together with 
his text ‘On the Arts and Sciences of the Chinese’ (1685), in which he praised the 
visual arts and writing of the Chinese, Vossius published a discussion of the kind 
of ‘world history’ proposed by Kircher. This related to a corpus of ancient texts, 
the so-called Sibylline Oracles.41 These ‘oracles’ were reported to have been written 
by the pagan soothsayers who had foretold the coming of Christ. Traditionally, 
the ancient prophetesses had exotic names such as the Ethiopian, the Libyan, and 
the Persian Sibyl: they formed an important typological link, not only between 
classical and Christian civilizations, but also between the Eastern and Western 
worlds.42 What is of interest to our discussion is the controversy about the lan-
guage spoken by the Sibyls when they communicated directly with God. One op-
tion that had to be considered seriously was Chinese. If Chinese was indeed un-
corrupted since the period before the Flood, it could well have been the language 
in which God had spoken to Adam when he named the animals and had perfect 
and complete knowledge. Although Vossius pleaded for an alternative chronology 
to replace accepted sacred history, he did not himself draw these ultimate conclu-
sions; he also refrained from the idea that the earth had already been populated 
before Adam, a thesis that could account for various problematic issues in the 
writing of ‘world history’, put forward in Isaac la Peyrère’s work Prae Adamitae 
(1655).43 On the basis of Vossius’s writings, however, the British architect John 
Webb claimed that all languages are essentially derivations from Chinese in his 
Essay Endeavouring the Probability that the Language of the Empire of China is the 
Primitive Language (1669).44
In the Netherlands, Vossius was mainly criticized for his ideas on the reli-
ability of Chinese history writing. His most intrepid opponent was the histo-
rian Georg Hornius (1620-1670), a devout protestant based at Harderwijk, who 
criticized the highly controversial idea that the Bible should not be taken liter-
ally.45 The scholar thus not only adhered to Kircher’s world view of the basis 
of Chinese religion in the Middle East but even expanded on it: returning to 
the discussion on pictography, he concluded that Egyptians, via China, ended 
up in the Americas.46 Supposedly, the difficulty in learning the great number 
of Chinese characters had led the American peoples to use simplified signs:47 
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‘I confess that the way of writing among the ancient Mexicans and the Chinese 
was not the same, but it was also not very different ... The Chinese write with 
a paintbrush, and one character comprises many letters and makes an entire 
word’.48
3 Pictograms as ‘Real Characters’
The discussion about ‘world history’ illustrates how the pictographical theory, by 
assuming a legible script dating back to the beginnings of history, put to the test 
established religious and scholarly views. There was another, even more contro-
versial chapter to this story that we need to address. Ultimately, ideas about prisca 
philosophia became intertwined with ideas on communication by means of sym-
bols. Pictography inspired particular experiments with philosophical language: 
the ideal of communication based solely on reason, independent of culture and 
tradition. This language needed signs that directly expressed things instead of 
sounds: these were the ‘real characters’, to quote Francis Bacon who thought that 
‘it is the use of China ... to write in Characters Real, which express neither letters 
nor words in gross, but Things or Notions’.49
In the first serious attempts at a philosophical language, Chinese writing also 
returned as a source of inspiration. One example was the work of George Dal-
garno (1626-1687), who, in developing a complete philosophical language in his 
Ars signorum (1661), called out to ‘You far-seeing Chinese’: ‘do not, we beseech 
you, render blind us one-eyed ones, anxious as we are to look more intently at 
your affairs, by displaying enchanting images in place of letters’.50 He also thought 
that ‘real characters were in use before vocal characters’, as he concluded from the 
examples of Chinese and Egyptian writing.51 Dalgarno’s colleague, John Wilkins 
(1614-1672), had similar ambitions. His Essay towards a Real Character and a Phil-
osophical Language (1668) stated that he was inspired by ‘the men of China, who 
have for many Ages used such a general Character, by which the Inhabitants of 
that large Kingdom ... communicate with one another, everyone ... reading it in 
his own Language’; as an example he included Our Lord’s Prayer written in Chi-
nese characters.52 In his own alphabet of ‘real characters’, Wilkins used symbols 
that are not truly pictograms but what may be called ‘ideograms’, signs represent-
ing the categories of reality (Fig. 43, next page). It allots specific symbols to the 
elements, such as stone, metal, and vegetation, in a manner not dissimilar to how 
Kircher thought that the Chinese characters reflected the way the Chinese dif-
ferentiated classifications in nature. 
The two discussions related to pictography, on ‘world history’ and philosophi-
cal language, remained intertwined throughout the seventeenth century. One phi-
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losopher in particular tried to combine speculations on philosophia perennis with 
logical and linguistic theories: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz’s work reveals 
the influence of Kircher, who was one of his correspondents; ideas about Chinese 
script were an early source of inspiration for Leibniz’s work on symbolic logic.53 
Kircher even published an innovative book on logic based on symbols, Ars magna 
sciendi (1669), before Leibniz’s better-known work on this topic. The title page 
reveals how pictograms lay at the basis of symbolic logic: it includes an image of 
Kircher’s alphabeta artis, listing various symbols that index argumentative com-
binations, such as a heart for ‘concordance’ and an omega for ‘conclusion’ (Figs. 44 
and 45). The list concludes with small images of a man, an animal, a tree, and a 
stone to denote categories related to the hierarchy of creation, and even an angel’s 
head to refer to any angelic aspects of intelligence. 
Any statement written in this alphabet would lay bare the structure of its ar-
gument in an unambiguous way. This use of pictograms as classification symbols 
is revealing about the seventeenth-century view towards the Chinese characters. 
Leibniz expected that the combinations of signs in Chinese script reflected the 
way the Chinese organized and represented knowledge; finding the clavis sinica 
would thus be a great contribution to epistemology.54 The symbolic logic based 
on this would reveal the workings of the mind, as Leibniz concluded from his 
Fig. 43: Example of ideograms from John Wilkins, Essay towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language (London 1668), p. 387.
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idea that ‘all our thinking is nothing but the connection or substitution of signs, 
whether these are words, or marks, or images’.55 Leibniz therefore asked for figures 
significantes par elles mêmes which could immediately be understood: a script with 
‘signs as natural as possible’ (notas quam maxime naturales) that could be read 
without a dictionary.56
Unsurprisingly, Leibniz’s ambitions, which were based on a mistaken view of 
the Chinese characters as ideograms, proved a dead end. When the philosopher 
studied the signs used in the Yi Jing (or I Ching), as they were reprinted in the Je-
Fig. 44 (left): Detail from title 
page of Athanasius Kircher, Ars 
magna sciendi (Amsterdam 1669).
Fig. 45 (below): ‘Alphabeta artis’, 
from Kircher, Ars magna sciendi 
(Amsterdam 1669), p. 24.
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suits’ writings, his ideas on Chinese thought were equally misguided: he thought 
they were Fohi’s ‘hieroglyphs’ representing the Infinite and the Chaos from which 
God had rescued mankind (Fig. 46). He also thought, however, that he had re-
vealed a system of binary relations in the Yi Jing. This assumption inspired his 
search for an ideal language: ‘a new characteristica which will appear to be a con-
Fig. 46: Th e 64 hexagrams of the Yi Jing, from Martino Martini, Sinicae historiae decas 
prima (Munich 1658), p. 6.
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tinuation of Fohi’s, and which will provide the beginning of the analysis of ideas 
and of that marvellous calculus of reason that I am planning’.57 As historians of 
science commonly assume, this characteristica univeralis catalyzed the develop-
ment of modern symbolic logic and eventually of digital electronics.58
4 Th e failure of the pictographic project
Ultimately, ideas on China as a ‘culture of the brush’ led to a vision of a distant 
utopia: pictography would be a key to universal knowledge and a prerequisite for 
a harmonious world order. Comenius, for instance, saw the ‘real character’ as a 
basis for the reconciliation of humankind. He spoke of the ‘pleasing light’ granted 
by the ‘knowledge we received about the symbolic characters used by the Chinese; 
that these characters help men of different languages to understand one another; 
... If this is a good thing, why should we not devote ourselves to the discovery of 
a Real Language, which all men equally should understand ...; the discovery not 
only of a language but of thought, and what is more, of truth of things themselves 
at the same time?’59
To conclude, we should note that it is not hard to see why the idea of Chinese 
pictography appealed to seventeenth-century scholarship in Europe. Chinese let-
ters, just like the Egyptian hieroglyphs, presented a great philological challenge 
precisely because nobody fully understood them. To many, their intractability 
made any connection with ‘hidden’ or ‘lost’ knowledge a self-evident conclusion. 
As pictography was a central argument in the new science of ‘world history’, 
the clavis sinica presented itself as one of the most promising tasks for modern 
scholarship. Such exalted expectations led Vossius to suppose that a cultural and 
philosophical utopia had been realized in China. Not only did he prefer its visual 
arts above those of the West, he also concluded that the Chinese had realized 
an improved version of Plato’s ideal reign of the philosopher-king: ‘These things 
may seem unbelievable, but [only] to those who do not know that in China the 
Platonic republic has always flourished, and that since so many thousands of 
years there have only reigned philosophers’.60
Precisely these ideological assumptions eventually encountered serious criti-
cism, equating an interest in China with philosophical radicalism and even her-
esy. Thus, strict Calvinist authors, who condemned the art of painting as idola-
try, also criticized Chinese pictography. The Frankfurt professor of logic Elias 
Grebnitz (1627-1689) attacked Chinese language as a product of the devil. He 
thought that every time the name of God was written in Chinese, one commit-
ted a sin against the Second Commandment that prohibits the depiction of the 
Divinity.61 Another Protestant, the Leiden-educated orientalist Andreas Müller 
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(c.1630-1694), made a set of types of Chinese characters that contained over three 
thousand signs.62 Soon Leibniz wrote to him, asking whether ‘this language can 
be introduced easily in Europe, and whether those who constructed this language 
understood the nature of things’.63 But when Müller finally found his key to Chi-
nese that was a key to the hieroglyphs at the same time, he was accused of heresy 
and, in the hour of his death, threw his materials into the fire.64 Also, Isaac Vos-
sius’s Chinese utopia presented dangers to accepted authority; one critic com-
pared them to the work of ‘Libertines, spoiled by a false metaphysics’ that would 
‘lead to nothing less than a total subversion of all Religion’.65
It soon transpired that this criticism was not really necessary. As the ‘real char-
acter’ was concerned, from a practical point of view, the great number of signs 
necessary for writing Chinese discouraged linguists and philosophers in Europe. 
Dalgarno, for instance, complained about the ‘near infinitely burdensome’ num-
ber of letters, which would make them unfit for philosophical language.66 Never-
theless, eighteenth-century scholarhip kept attempting seriously to trace Chinese 
writing back to the Coptic language, based on the actually correct assumption 
that the language expressed in the Egyptian hieroglyphs is Coptic.67
Despite the failure of pictography as a utopian project, we should be wary of 
dismissing Kircher and Vossius as ‘more charlatans than savants’, to quote Des-
cartes.68 We should rather take account of the unprecedented nature of the Eu-
ropean confrontation with China in the seventeenth century: to quote one mod-
ern scholar, ‘never before had Europe received so powerful and varied an artistic 
stimulus from a distant civilization’.69 Pictography proved a means of showing off 
scholarship about this most topical area of discussion that, while appealing to 
common notions about thinking in images, called for the abandonment of widely 
held convictions about language and literacy.
Pictography was undoubtedly one of the more imaginative moments in the 
history of the humanities. Its main importance may have laid in highlighting the 
affinities between the visual arts and the study of language, as parts of the same 
project, the communication and organization of knowledge. There were, however, 
unintended spin-offs. Vossius’s ideas on the reliability and accessibility of the 
Chinese historians, for example, eventually inspired a respected school of Bible 
criticism.70 What is more, without his misguided ideas on ‘perennial philosophy’ 
and the nature of Chinese writing, Leibniz may not have pursued his ‘univer-
sal characteristics’; eventually, this project catalyzed the development of modern 
logic and computer languages.71 Although pictography itself did not become a vi-
able tool for scholarship, the seventeenth-century discussions about it sparked a 
creative impulse that contributed in unexpected ways to society as well as modern 
science.
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 Notes
 ‘d’Egyptenaeren, Chinezen ... hebben hare boeken met Zinnebeelden, in plaets van let-
teren, geschreven; en deeze wijze van uitbeelden is met de schilderkonst ook tot ons geko-
men’, Samuel van Hoogstraten, Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst; anders de 
zichtbare werelt (Rotterdam: Van Hoogstraten, ), .
 ‘[Z]oo heeft hy onder de geene, die men zijn gezelschapsheeren noemt, ook treffelijke 
Schilders’, Van Hoogstraten, Inleyding, .
 An earlier study providing a long, but for the seventeenth century rather superficial, his-
torical overview is S. Köhn, ‘Hartnäckige Mythen der Wissenschaft; vom vermeintlich 
ideographischen Charakter der chinesischen Schrift’, Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Na-
tur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens (NOAG) / (), -; further remarks on the 
subject can be found in general studies addressing seventeenth-century Sinology, such 
as D. Mungello, ‘Proto-Sinology and the Seventeenth-Century European Search for a 
Universal Language’, in: Curious Land; Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, ), -; and Donald F. Lach, ‘China in 
Western Thought and Culture’, Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener 
(New York: ), I, -: . 
 On Isaac Vossius’s scholarship on China, see my ‘Vossius’s Chinese Utopia’, in: Eric Jorink 
& Dirk van Miert (eds.), The World of Isaac Vossius (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
 ‘[P]rodidit Nicolaus Trigaultius ... non pauciores Sinensibus literas esse, quam voces nu-
merantur: eas tamen iter inter se componere, ut LXX, aut LXXX milia non excedant. 
Imo idem refert, Sinenses & Japanenses, etsi lingua aeque differant, ac Hebraei, & Belgae; 
tamen, quae sic scribuntur, intelligere ... Utcumque enim in legendo alii alia verba pronun-
ciassent: tamen iidem fuissent conceptus. Nempe uti nunc variarum linguarum homines 
rem eandem conspicientes eandem rem concipiunt: ita idem [sic] rei signum intuentes, 
eundem haberent conceptum’, Gerardus Vossius, De arte grammatica libri septem (Amster-
dam, ), I, . Vossius discusses Chinese writing on pp. - and .
 ‘Quomodo ex pictura hominis, equi, arboris, domus, homines omnes eundem habent con-
ceptum’, Vossius, Grammatica, .
 ‘[T]ot prope characteribus fore, quot res sunt’, Vossius, Grammatica, .
 The most complete Chinese dictionary of the seventeenth century, Mei Yingzuo’s Zihui of 
, listed , characters.
 Aristotle, De anima III,  (Bekker a). 
 On early modern mnemotechnics see F.A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago/London: 
, ed. princ. ). 
 Vossius refers in particular to Lorenzo Pignoria (whom he calls his ‘very good friend’), 
Kircher’s immediate predecessor in the interpretation of the hieroglyphs, Vossius, Gram-
matica, . Vossius corresponded with Pignoria, cf. G.A.C. van der Lem and C.S.M. Ra-
dermaker, Inventory of the Correspondence of Gerardus Johannes Vossius (-) (Assen 
& Maastricht: Van Gorcum, ), .
 Erik Iversen, The Myth of Egypt and Its Hieroglyphs (Copenhagen: Gad, ), ; and 
more recently Brian Curran, The Egyptian Renaissance; the Afterlife of Egypt in Renaissance 
Italy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ). 
 Iversen, Myth of Egypt, ; Alberti, De re aedificatoria X, VIII, .
 The editio princeps in Greek was printed by Aldus Manutius, Venice . Also Kircher 
(on whom more below) used the interpretations attributed to Horapollo; on the book and 
its reception in the Renaissance see Iversen, Myth of Egypt, -, , -. 
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 The literature on emblems is vast; see the overview in John Manning, ‘Introduction’, in: 
id., The Emblem (London: ), -.
 Ernst Gombrich, ‘“Icones Symbolicae”; the Visual Image in Neo-Platonic Thought’, Jour-
nal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes  (), -.
 Jan Amos Comenius, Orbis sensualium pictus (Nuremberg ); on the ideal of education 
through images cf. John Edward Sadler, J.A. Comenius and the Concept of Universal Educa-
tion (New York & London: Routledge, , ed. princ. ).
 C.S.M. Rademaker, The Life and Work of Gerardus Johannes Vossius (Assen: Van Gor-
cum, ), .
 Kircher’s works in Dutch were Het eerste deel van het groote licht der natuur-kunde of 
tweede vervolgh op de eminente oratie van ... Digby, getrocken uyt de Lat. geschriften Athan. 
Kircherus, transl. J. Casteleyn (Haarlem: , other editions , , ); Toonneel 
van China, door veel, zo geestelijke als werreltlijke, geheugteekenen, verscheide vertoningen 
van de natuur en kunst, en blijken van veel andere gedenkwaerdige dingen, geopent en ver-
heerlykt, transl. J.H. Glazemaker (Amsterdam: Van Waesberge and Weyerstraet, ); 
Naturelijke en geneeskonstige navorsching der peste, waar in nevens de oorzaken, teekenen, 
werkingen en genezingh des zelfs, ontel’re geheymen der nature ontdekt worden, transl. Z. van 
de Graaf (Rotterdam: ); d’Onder-aardse weereld in haar goddelijk maaksel en wonder-
bare uitwerkselen aller dingen (Amsterdam: van Waasberge, ).
 Aldo Mastroianni, ‘Kircher e l’Oriente nel Museo del Collegio Romano’, in: E. Lo Sardo 
(ed.), Athanasius Kicher; il museo del mondo, cat. exh. Roma, Palazzo Venezia (Roma: De 
Luca, ) -, .
 This was Obeliscus Pamphilius (Rome ). In the last decade, an increasing number of 
scholarly studies has been devoted to Kircher; some of them have been collected in Paula 
Findlen (ed.), Athanasius Kircher; the Last Man who Knew Everything (London & New 
York: Routledge, ).
 The passage has survived in the correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, cited in a letter of 
October , , reprinted in A. Wolf, ‘An Addition to the Correspondence of Spinoza’, 
Philosophy / (), -: . 
 Anton Haakman, De onderaardse wereld van Athanasius Kircher (Amsterdam: Meulenhof, 
), .
 ‘Oedipum ejus, quem tamen amici nollent ab illo scriptum’, Isaac Vossius, Castigationes ad 
scriptum Georgii Hornii de Aetate Mundi (Den Haag: Vlacq, ), .
 Despite his criticism of Oedipus Aegyptiacus, Vossius praises Kircher’s ‘ingenuity and eru-
dition’, Vossius, Castigationes, .
 On the museum cf. Mastroianni, ‘Kircher e l’Oriente’. For Vossius’s contacts with Kircher 
in Rome, cf. his remarks on ‘Kircherus [...] mihi olim Romae amicus’, Vossius, Castigatio-
nes, . On his visit to Rome in , Coenraad Burgh gave Vossius’s regards to Kircher, 
cf. Frans F. Blok, Isaac Vossius and His Circle; His Life until his Farewell to Queen Christina 
of Sweden (Groningen: Forsten, ), .
 China monumentis qua sacris qua profanis, nec non variis naturae & artis spectaculis, 
aliarumque rerum memorabilium argumentis illustrata (Amsterdam, ), published by 
J.J. van Waesberge and in a pirated reprint by Jacob van Meurs; within a year the Dutch 
edition, Toonneel van China, appeared.
 Marion Peters, ‘Mercator sapiens’ (de wijze koopman); het wereldwijde onderzoek van Nico-
laas Witsen (-), burgemeester en VOC-bewindhebber van Amsterdam (Diss. Rijk-
suniversiteit Groningen, ), -.
 Peters, ‘Mercator sapiens’, .
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 It can be assumed they had some knowledge of Chinese characters; the family had left 
Japan in ; the sons had been born in  and . The younger François was listed 
in the matriculation register as japonensis; cf. P.F. Kornicki, ‘European Japanology at the 
End of the Seventeenth Century’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies / 
(), -: .
 ‘d’[E]erste Sinezen hun merkletteren uit alle de dingen, die zich voor’t gezicht vertonen, 
genomen, en alleenlijk naar de verscheide schikking en ordening dezer samengezette din-
gen de bevattingen van hun geest geopenbaart en bekent gemaakt hebben’, Kircher, Toon-
neel van China, . The Dutch edition coins the neologistic term beeld-letteren or beeltlet-
ters, literally ‘image letters’, for pictograms. 
 Kircher, Toonneel van China, , .
 The classical study of ape symbolism is Horst W. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, ).
 ‘If they were to discuss things of a fiery nature, they used serpents, asps, and dragons, 
which, arranged in this or that pattern, stood for this or that thing. To describe airy mat-
ters, arrangements of birds were needed; for watery topics, fish; for the description of 
vegetable nature, flowers, leaves, and branches’, Kircher, China Illustrata (Amsterdam, 
), . Kircher’s book correctly lists the various other elements also differentiated in 
classical Chinese thought, besides the four that were common in Europe.
 ‘d’[E]erste beginselen der letteren, die zy van Vader Cham, en van Merkurius Trismegis-
tus, raat van zijn zoon Nefraim, en d’eerste insteller van de beeltletteren ... geleert hadden. 
En zeker, deze oude merkletteren der Sinezen, in alles met de beeltletters gelijk, zijn een 
gewichtig bewijs, daar door ik bewogen word om dit te geloven’, Kircher, Toonneel van 
China, .
 Cf. Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France (-) 
(Paris: , first ed. ), Chapter II, paragraph , passim.
 Claudia von Collani, Die Figuristen der Chinamission (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
), .
 Vossius formulated his Bible criticism in relation to his Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi, 
qua ostenditur natale mundi tempus annis minimum  vulgarem aeram anticipare (The 
Hague, ); on Vossius’s sinophilia in relation to his reputation as a libertine, cf. my 
‘”Spinoza sinicus;” an Asian Paragraph in the History of the Radical Enlightenment’, Jour-
nal of the History of Ideas / () -; Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested; 
Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man - (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, ), ; and Edwin J. van Kley, ‘Europe’s “Discovery” of China and the Writ-
ing of World History’, The American Historical Review / (), -. 
 ‘Soli in hoc nostro mundo sunt Seres, qui iam a quinque fere annorum millibus peren-
nem & nunquam interruptam conservavere literaturam’, Isaac Vossius, ‘De artibus et 
scientiis Sinarum’, in: Isaaci Vossii variarum observationum liber (London: Scott, ), 
-: -.
 Vossius, Castigationes, -.
 I. Vossius, ‘De artibus et scientiis Sinarum’ and ‘De Sibyllinis aliisque quae Christi Na-
talem praecessere oraculis’, in: Isaaci Vossii variarum observationum liber (London: Scott, 
), -, -.
 One argument, common in seventeenth-century travelogues, was that one of the Sibyls 
had prophesied the European ‘discovery’ of the Far East, cf. Arnoldus Montanus, Geden-
kwaerdige gesantschappen der Oost-Indische Maetschappy in’t Vereenigde Nederland aen de 
kaisaren van Japan (Amsterdam, ), .
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 Vossius refers to La Peyrère’s thesis in Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi, . Cf. most re-
cently A. Schnapp, ‘The Pre-adamites: An Abortive Attempt to Invent Pre-history in the 
Seventeenth Century?’, in: History of Scholarship; a Selection of Papers from the Seminar on 
the History of Scholarship, Held Annually at the Warburg Institute, ed. C.R. Ligota & J.-L. 
Quantin (Oxford: ), -. La Peyrère’s book was also translated into Dutch, as 
Preadamiten (n.p.: ). 
 John Webb, An Historical Essay Endeavouring the Probability that the Language of the Em-
pire of China is the Primitive Language (London, ), references to Vossius on pp. -
, -, . Cf. Christoph Harbsmeier, ‘John Webb and the Early History of the 
Study of the Classical Chinese Language in the West’, in Ming Wilson & John Cayley 
(eds.), Europe Studies China: Papers from an International Conference on the History of 
European Sinology (London: Han-Shan Tang Books, ), -. On the ‘primitive’ 
status allotted to Chinese, see C. Marrone, Le lingue utopiche (Viterbo: Stampa alterna-
tiva, ), -.
 On Hornius see J.P. de Bie and J. Loosjes, Biographisch woordenboek van Protestantsche 
godgeleerden in Nederland (The Hague: Sijthoff, ), Vol. IV, -. For his discus-
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Giordano Bruno and Metaphor1
Hilary Gatti
Giordano Bruno was born in Nola, near Naples, in 1548, and died in Rome in 
1600, burnt at the stake as a heretic. That means he was born only five years after 
the first publication of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus in 1543, and only thirty-
odd years after Martin Luther’s excommunication from the Catholic church had 
divided Europe and its culture into two militantly hostile factions. During the 
second half of the sixteenth century, in a lifetime of wandering through the cul-
tural capitals of an often blood-stained Europe, Bruno was able to witness first 
hand, as few of his contemporaries could do, the crisis that Copernicus, Luther 
and their numerous progeny were bringing about, in their different ways, in the 
previously compact culture of renaissance humanism initiated by Petrarch. For 
the universal values deriving from the cultures of ancient Greece and Rome had 
from the beginning of the humanist movement been grafted onto the universal 
Christian values claimed by the papacy (although with increasing difficulty). The 
result had been an extraordinary and unique moment of cultural progress and 
rich, sometimes tense, but ultimately harmonic diversity. Now that line of devel-
opment had been shattered in many of its core assumptions. In the seventeenth 
century the universal values of European humanism would be re-forged under 
the sign of the dominion of reason, and the scientific mechanicism to which it 
gave rise. Eventually, however, the romantic movement operated what William 
Blake saw as a liberation from the ‘mind-forged manacles’ of an oppressive ob-
session with rules. The rest is the story of a modern culture based on the idea 
of diversity, in which the humanities (as renaissance Europe conceived of them) 
struggled to survive.2
Bruno’s lifetime in the second half of the sixteenth century thus covers a vi-
tal if often turbulent moment of cultural transition, which would radically af-
fect the history of both science and the humanities. This paper will primarily 
be concerned with his thinking about language, and especially with his thoughts 
about metaphor, thus aligning itself with an interpretative model of early modern 
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culture that establishes ‘representation’, both of thought and of the world itself, 
as a problem of which historians are increasingly aware.3 For it is clear that the 
sixteenth century witnessed what one commentator has called a ‘Crise des signes’ 
that would radically destabilize not only the way of reading texts but also the read-
ing of the world.4 By following this path, I hope to show how in some ways Bruno 
anticipated the coming enlightenment, while in others he tended rather to indicate 
alternative routes, some of which would only be pursued at a much later date.5
I take as my starting point a passage in Bruno’s first cosmological work, writ-
ten and published in London in 1584, usually known in English as The Ash 
Wednesday Supper. Still a humanist text in its use of dialogue as an appropriate 
way of facing up to a scientific dilemma, Bruno here celebrates in realist terms the 
new heliocentric theories of Copernicus which were destined to replace the old 
geocentric cosmology propounded by Aristotle and Ptolemy, and sanctioned by 
numerous Biblical texts. Later on, in the seventeenth century, Galileo would take 
over many of Bruno’s formal solutions, as well as many of his pro-Copernican 
arguments in his Dialogue on the Two Major World Systems, which would get him 
into serious trouble with the inquisitors in Rome.6 Bruno already puts forward 
an argument in the fourth dialogue of the Supper, later to be repeated by Galileo 
which would get him too into serious trouble, against the use of Biblical texts in 
cosmological discussion. Cosmological and Biblical discourse, Bruno maintains, 
are of two quite separate kinds; and he defines the difference between them in 
terms of metaphor. In English translation, the passage reads like this:
When the divines speak as if they found in natural things only the mean-
ings commonly attributed to them, they should not be assumed as authori-
ties; but rather when they speak indiff erently, conceding nothing to the 
vulgar herd. Th en their words should be listened to, as should the enthusi-
asm of poets, who have spoken of the same things in lofty terms. Th us, one 
should not take as a metaphor what was not intended as a metaphor and, on 
the other hand, take as truth what was said as a similitude.7
This passage is based on the traditional idea of Biblical discourse as containing 
four different levels of meaning: the literal level, the metaphorical level, the tro-
pological level and the anagogical level.8 Protestant theologians, from Luther to 
Calvin, had reduced these levels of meaning to two: the literal and the metaphori-
cal level. Indeed, at times Calvin seems to consider the whole of the Bible as es-
sentially metaphorical in so far as the human mind is, in his opinion, to be consid-
ered incapable of contemplating God directly. Bruno seems to be using such ideas 
to compare metaphor with scientific truth.9 The Copernican discussion within 
which this statement occurs makes it quite clear that the Copernican principle of 
Giordano Bruno and Metaphor
heliocentricity, particularly when expanded to include the infinity of the universe, 
is considered by Bruno as a cosmological picture of universal truth, and not as a 
purely instrumental hypothesis to facilitate astronomical calculations. The pas-
sage suggests that Frances Yates, in her distinguished and much discussed book 
on Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, was wrong to consider Bruno’s Coperni-
canism as a Hermetic hieroglyph or diagram – let us say a metaphor – within 
which, hidden and concealed, lay ‘potent divine mysteries’: mysteries which, she 
went on to claim in the same book, make him into a ‘reactionary’ who had noth-
ing to do with the advance of the new science.10 On the contrary, the Copernican 
heliocentric principle is, for Bruno, not a metaphor but the truth itself, which 
has recently been brought to light. Copernicus is, for Bruno, the genius who 
dragged the heliocentric principle from under the shadows of a centuries-long 
distorted picture, or false metaphor, of a geocentric universe. It was Copernicus’s 
heliocentric principle that supplied Bruno with the foundations on which to 
construct what he thought of as a true picture of cosmological infinity. Arguing 
in favour of an infinite universe in The Ash Wednesday Supper, and filling that 
universe with an infinite number of solar systems in which all the celestial bod-
ies revolve around their central suns, Bruno strongly rejected the objections of 
his neo-Aristotelian critics that such a vision was pure hypothesis, or even fan-
tasy, claiming that he was, on the contrary, talking about ‘real things’ (ista sunt res, 
res, res).11 Metaphorical expression (here identified with the geocentric universe 
to be found in so many Biblical texts) and scientific truth (here identified with 
the Copernican heliocentric principle extended to infinity) seem at this point to 
be antithetical.
Does this mean that for Bruno metaphor as such is to be banned? Surely not. 
In many contexts, metaphor seems to define what we may call for Bruno ‘the hu-
manities’ as opposed to natural philosophy or science: that is to say, the universe 
of words and images through which the mind conducts its search for truth. Like 
Francis Bacon after him, Bruno had no qualms about ‘praying metaphors to come 
to his aid’ for heuristic, explanatory and evaluative purposes.12 Bruno tends to as-
sociate ‘the humanities’ in this sense with above all three groups: the true divines, 
or those philosophers who attempt to reveal the hidden face of divine truth; the 
true poets, who are closely associated by Bruno with true divines (this is consist-
ent with his choice of the Biblical Song of Songs as one of the greatest texts ever 
written); and the true painters, whose visual images combine with words to form 
Bruno’s universe of languages. The intimate relationship that Bruno envisages be-
tween these three groups is expressed in an early work on the art of memory where 
he writes: ‘Philosophers are in some way painters and poets; poets are painters 
and philosophers; painters are philosophers and poets. Which is why true poets, 
true painters and true philosophers search for and admire one another’.13
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Yet if we interpret Bruno’s passage in The Ash Wednesday Supper in the light of 
these ideas, we are obliged, I think, to notice that it contains some degree of ambi-
guity. In what contexts, if any, do we find theologians and poets who renounce the 
use of metaphor in order to express the divine truth ‘directly’ in some way? Or is 
his distinction rather between good and bad metaphors, between metaphors that 
significantly illuminate the path towards truth and those, like the biblical stories, 
which simply explain difficult concepts in pictorial terms comprehensible to what 
Bruno rather scathingly calls ‘the vulgar herd’? Perhaps help might be gleaned on 
this point by considering Bruno’s sources.
Bruno was not only a renaissance thinker and writer, but his early education 
had been received at the Dominican monastery in Naples, which had been closely 
associated in the past with a famous fellow Dominican: Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
The course in philosophy Bruno followed would have been largely based on Tho-
mistic doctrines inspired by Aristotle. Undoubtedly, Bruno was strongly anti-
Aristotelian in many respects, particularly as far as his physics, and especially 
his celestial physics, was concerned. Nevertheless, he always included Aristotle 
in his many lists of the true philosophers; and it is only natural that Aristotle’s 
concept of the metaphor would have been present in Bruno’s mind when he wrote 
on that subject.14 It could, in fact, be claimed that Bruno’s distinction between 
two different types of discourse, in which the metaphor assumes different values, 
derives fairly directly from Aristotle himself. For example, in Book II of the Pos-
terior Analytics, in a passage where he is concerned with a discourse referring to 
an external world of objects, and thus with the necessary clarity of definitions, 
Aristotle writes: ‘And if one should not argue in metaphors, it is clear too that one 
should not define either by metaphors or what is said in metaphors; for then one 
will necessarily argue in metaphors’ (97b37). In Book VI of the Topics, Aristotle 
makes an even more critical comment, claiming that a metaphorical expression is 
always obscure, if not actually false (139b34). In his study of Rhetoric, however, 
where he is concerned with a discourse referring to the internal mind and its style 
of expression, Aristotle’s attitude changes to one of praise for the metaphor. ‘Met-
aphor gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can,’ he writes 
in Book III, adding that it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to 
another. Metaphors, Aristotle adds, require an acute mind, not only a poetic but 
also a philosophical mind, capable of perceiving resemblances even in things far 
apart (1405a-1412a).15
This Aristotelian root to Bruno’s thoughts on the two types of language is still 
evident in his final Latin masterpiece, the so-called Frankfurt trilogy published 
in that town in 1591. In the introductory Letter to the trilogy, Bruno formulates a 
clear distinction between the truth value of the three works of which the trilogy 
is composed. What he is above all concerned to underline is the ‘unquestionable 
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certainty’ of the final work of the trilogy, the De immenso, which he presents as 
the climax of his cosmological speculation concerning the infinite universe, in 
which all celestial movements are based on a principle of heliocentricity. In this 
work Bruno considers he has reached an intuition of certain truth, whereas he has 
no qualms about underlining the relative uncertainty of the other two works of 
the trilogy, dedicated to the concept of the minimum and to number symbolism.16 
It is in the light of this certainty pertaining to the objective truth of the infinite 
universe that Bruno makes a series of comments on the need for a new language 
which, without denying the solemn tones of epic poetry such as he himself is 
writing here, will be made up, if necessary, of newly invented words, devoid of 
rhetoric and flourish, capable of describing the world of nature as it is. To-day 
we would call that a scientific language. In this passage, Bruno seems to be pro-
ceeding towards a Cartesian concept of clear and distinct ideas, already seen as 
necessary if the truths of nature (thought of as a world of external things) is to be 
grasped and held firmly in the mind:
We will be the source of a new (linguistic) usage once we have drawn forth 
from the deep shadows the famous teachings of the ancient men of wisdom, 
expressed in their ancient words, to serve as a basis for new things, if need 
be, however those teachings may most easily be extracted. We will be inven-
tors of new words. Th e grammarians are the servants of words, but words 
serve us. Th e grammarians should observe the usage we establish...17
On the other hand, Bruno himself would never create a work in which he fully 
implemented what seem already to be enlightenment and rationalistic linguistic 
criteria. In some cases the apparent divergence between his intentions and his 
actual practice is strident. For example, in his Italian dialogue, Lo spaccio della 
bestia trionfante (a title usually translated into English as The Expulsion of the Tri-
umphant Beast), Bruno claims that he is speaking simply and literally in this work, 
naming bread as bread and wine as wine, and giving everything else its proper 
name. However, he then goes on to develop one of his most complex construc-
tions of myth and fable, envisaging a universal reform of a polluted cosmos in 
terms of a last-minute reform of the classical astrological images by an aged and 
rapidly decaying Jupiter, described by Bruno himself as ‘the subject of our meta-
phors’.18 If this work is couched in terms of a radical re-make of classical Greek 
mythology, the last work Bruno wrote and published in London, in 1585, the He-
roici furori, reaches its final ecstatic vision of a now infinite universe through 
the medium of Petrarchan sonnets re-written in the light of the imagery of the 
biblical Song of Songs, which Bruno himself describes as a work in which the im-
ages are ‘clearly and openly treated as metaphors’. These are hardly examples of 
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what today we would think of as scientific languages, as Bruno himself seems to 
underline when, in the passage immediately following the remark on the Song of 
Songs quoted above, he asks his reader to believe that his own work is drawn up 
according to quite different criteria.19 So it is difficult to know how to construe 
the fact that Bruno’s own sonnets in the Furori are themselves composed of com-
plex metaphors: such as the refined conceit of a dialogue between the eyes and 
the heart; the powerful epistemological images of Actaeon pursuing the moon 
goddess Diana, only to be consumed in the moment of vision by the hounds of his 
own thoughts, or the phoenix rising gloriously from the ashes of its funeral pyre. 
Clearly, these, too, are sonnets composed in a metaphorical mode; and Bruno is 
obliged to go to great lengths in the prose comment to explicate and deconstruct 
them into their rational components of argument and reasoning.
In attempting to understand what would appear to be a serious contradiction 
between linguistic intention and actual practice in Bruno’s work, help may be 
gleaned, in my opinion, by turning to some more modern thoughts on the sub-
ject of metaphorical expression. In his seminal study entitled La métaphore vive, 
the twentieth-century philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, also takes as his starting point 
Aristotle’s comments on metaphor that have been quoted above. He then goes 
on to ask himself if the time has not come to give up the opposition between a 
discourse directed towards the external world, or a scientific discourse of descrip-
tion, and a discourse directed towards the internal world that represents a state of 
mind and puts everything in hypothetical terms. According to Ricoeur, we need 
to ask ourselves if it is not the very distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
which has become more and more uncertain, together with that between repre-
sentation and emotion. To support his point, Ricoeur quotes from Heidegger a 
statement underlining a difficulty in the concept of language that corresponds to 
a difficulty in the concept of being.20 These post-Kantian thoughts on language 
may be more helpful in understanding Bruno’s dilemma than the pre-Cartesian 
context to which an orthodox historical discourse confines him. It is worth re-
membering that whereas the enlightenment placed Bruno in a marginal position, 
above all recognising him as an inspiration to philosophical libertinism (Des-
cartes himself thought that there was no need to read his works21), the modern 
rebirth of Bruno criticism starts with such post-Kantian figures as Schelling and 
Hegel in Germany, or Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was both a philosopher and 
a poet, in England.22
It would be easy to further my claim that it can be useful to discuss Bruno’s 
ideas on metaphor in the light of more modern considerations on the subject. 
For example, the current interest in Vico’s anti-Cartesian ideas on metaphor as 
a foundation of what, in his New Science, he calls ‘poetic logic’ is being developed 
in the light of Charles S. Peirce’s definition of metaphor as a type of icon.23 It is 
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an enquiry that should raise the question of whether the Neapolitan Vico had 
read the works of his renaissance countryman, Giordano Bruno. Furthermore, 
the ideas put forward quite recently by cognitive science, which sees metaphor as 
a founding element of all language, and of all knowledge scientific and otherwise, 
could well be related to Bruno’s ideas on the art of memory, which he develops 
as a study of the image-making properties of the creative mind in all branches 
of its search for knowledge of the infinite whole.24 From another, if quite closely 
related, point of view, the recent discoveries in neuropsychology, which have led 
to incomparably more knowledge than we previously had of the workings of our 
divided brains, are currently being used to further our understanding of such 
subjects as the nature of dialogue or of works of art – both subjects on which 
Bruno himself had much to say – and have been posited also as the bases of a new 
understanding of scientific knowledge itself.25 Such recent enquiries remind us 
that Bruno was already thinking in terms of the connecting powers of the mind, 
which nowadays we associate with the connecting networks set up by our neu-
rons during the processes of learning and of thought.
Bruno’s own texts often highlight the capacity of the mind to connect various 
levels of both discourse and being. I wish to refer here particularly to a passage 
in the Heroici furori, Part I, Dialogue iii, where Bruno writes: ‘Beneath sensible 
images and material objects, he (that is, the frenzied searcher after knowledge) 
recognizes divine orders and counsels’.26 This remark, with its neo-Platonic over-
tones, seems to indicate that all knowledge consists of a comparison between 
different levels of being and is, therefore, always to some extent metaphorical.27 
On the other hand, Bruno always distinguished between what he considered the 
essential and the accidental truths of nature. The essential truths, as Bruno saw 
them, are few but absolutely essential, and not subject to metaphorical expres-
sion: the infinity of the infinite universe; the heliocentric nature of motion within 
an infinite space populated by an infinite number of solar systems; and finally, if 
slightly less certainly, the atomistic composition of an infinite substance. Towards 
these truths, which Bruno describes as representing ‘the master-plan’ of the uni-
verse in which we live in the same dialogue of the Heroici furori mentioned above, 
the individual mind proceeds in myriad ways. If it proceeds more often indirectly 
than directly, it is because the individual mind is nothing more than a fleeting 
pinpoint within infinite space and time.
Bruno expressed this last idea with surprising clarity during a session of his 
trial for heresy in Rome, during which the inquisitors requested him to declare 
his opinion on the immortality of the soul. Bruno replied that there is no im-
mortality of the individual soul, but only of the infinite, universal framework 
within which each soul or mind searches for knowledge of an infinite truth. He 
made his point through the use of a traditional but powerful metaphor, saying 
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to his judges: ‘it is as if many fragments of a mirror all came together to form 
an antique mirror. The images animating each single fragment are annihilated, 
but the glass or the substance remains, as it has always been and always will be’.28 
And if Bruno here, in front of the inquisitors, says that he is talking only of the 
souls of beasts, and not of those of human beings, which continue to live even 
after separation from the body, it should be remembered that in his works he had 
frequently advanced the far more audacious claim that there is no substantial dif-
ference between the soul of a human being and the soul of an animal: or, indeed, 
between the souls of animals and those which are to be found in all things: ‘For all 
the spirits emerge from the Amphitrite of a single spirit, and to that they return’.29
Initially, the metaphor of the mirror, or of Amphitrite, may seem little more 
than orthodox neo-Platonism, with the concept of a world soul surrounded by 
biblical overtones reminding the inquisitors (as Bruno clearly intended) of St. 
Paul’s famous dictum in his First Epistle to the Corinthians 13:12 that on this 
earth we can only see ‘as in a glass, darkly’. However, as always with Bruno, it has 
to be remembered that everything he says applies for him within the context of 
a universal infinity, foreign to his sources, that radically transforms the meaning 
of his images. The mirror becomes a synonym of substance itself, meaning an 
infinite substance, with the shadow of Spinoza already looming on the horizon.30 
And it is precisely the infinite substance, in my opinion, that tends to identify 
with the divinity itself, and as such to defy metaphorical expression. God is not 
‘like’ something else: God simply ‘is’.
It is a point underlined forcibly by Bruno himself when, in part II, dialogue 
1, of the Heroici furori, he describes the ‘excellent and magnificent goals’ that the 
heroic mind will forever go on striving for, until it has risen to the point of desi-
ring ‘divine beauty in itself, without likeness, figure, image or species, if that be 
possible, and, moreover, if it is able to reach such heights’.31 It is clear from this 
passage that non-metaphorical expression is identified by Bruno with the divine 
truth, or truth (as he calls it) ‘without likeness’. Such purity of truth is seen by 
Bruno as the ultimate goal of the enquiring mind; but although he often refers 
to such truth as ‘divine’, both in its beauty and its goodness, Bruno is consistently 
adamant that his is not a theological but rather a ‘natural’ discourse. The truth 
he is enquiring into requires the use of mental tools (such as logic, geometry, 
numbers, the art of memory) to take the measure and probe the evolution of an 
infinite universe; and the understanding of such truth, as he represents it in the 
final pages of the Furori, is to be seen as the ultimate good ‘on earth’ (il sommo 
bene in terra), and not as a mystical intuition of a transcendental ‘beyond’.32 Bru-
no’s discourse may frequently make use of a religious terminology, but it moves 
within the horizon of the new science. At the same time, arriving at the vision 
of such truths about the natural world has become problematic to the extent 
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of being feasible only in those exceptional circumstances in which the mind is 
stretched almost to a breaking point, and its language purged, ‘if that be possible’, 
of all false ‘likenesses’.
It is not my aim, in approaching my conclusion to these few remarks, to make 
large claims for the importance of Bruno’s thought. He was well able to make such 
claims himself, and recently many of them have been picked up and eloquently 
illustrated in Ingrid Rowland’s new Bruno biography.33 What I am concerned to 
point out is rather that Bruno’s thought on the nature of the humanities and 
the sciences, and particularly his thought on the languages within which they 
are necessarily formulated, may often seem familiar to us today. For we live in 
a world which has – it would seem definitively – assumed the immense dimen-
sions of both space and time already foreseen by Bruno, just as he foresaw the 
atomistic fragmentation of all bodies within the infinite whole. The crisis of the 
thinking subject which this new vision implies was solved by Bruno by placing 
a special emphasis on the creativity of the individual mind: a neural activity of 
imaging, connecting – formulating patterns and ever varying strings of letters, 
words, numbers, images – which was, in his time, belied by the increasing em-
phasis on rules which was beginning to dominate both the arts and the sciences. 
Descartes may have conceived of his Rules to Guide the Intelligence as pertaining to 
the structure of the mind; but he could only find certainty in pure concepts such 
as figure or extension that do not suppose anything that experience has rendered 
uncertain.34 The resulting dualism between mind and matter is about as far as it 
is possible to imagine from Bruno’s view of things.
Bruno knew that the close link he was attempting to forge between the think-
ing mind and the infinite amount of matter from which all minds emerge (to-day 
we talk about the ‘embodied mind’) inevitably gave rise to an idea of all knowledge 
as fragmented and incomplete. Even mathematics, for Bruno, was knowledge of 
approximations, in a denial of the special status of pure mathematical entities of 
which Kepler (an avid reader of Bruno) would strongly disapprove.35 On the oth-
er hand, post-evolutionary philosophers and scientists in the nineteenth century 
would rediscover Bruno with enthusiasm. In some manuscript notes on Bruno, 
the Italian philosopher Bertrando Spaventa wrote in the middle of the century: 
‘the same principle which in nature forms and figures things thinks in the human 
mind’.36 Later on in the century, a disciple of Darwin’s evolutionary theories, John 
Tyndall, published a book – widely read in its time, and frequently republished 
– called Fragments of Science.37 Tyndall dedicates many pages to Bruno’s infinite 
cosmology and to his theory of the infinite evolution together of matter and 
mind. Tyndall’s title may not have been a gratuitous coincidence. He often cites 
from Bruno’s cosmological dialogues, of which the first was The Ash Wednesday 
Supper (the starting point for this paper) where Bruno had admitted that his text 
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hardly added up to a traditional scientific treatise. Sometimes, Bruno points out, 
it is poetry; sometimes oratory; sometimes celebration; and at others vitupera-
tion. Only occasionally, he continues, will you find ‘demonstrations and teaching, 
in physics and mathematics, in morals and logic: in short, it can be said that there 
is no branch of knowledge of which you will not find some fragment’.38
The individual minds, then, are seen as passing fragments, destined to dissolve 
into the eternal and infinite substance, which they can only glimpse momentarily 
in its perfect and incomparable purity. Their attempt to arrive at this vision is 
seen by Bruno as heroic: the true hero of the modern world becomes the intel-
lectual searcher after natural truth. Such a search involves making an elaborate 
series of connections between different levels of being, and will be essentially 
metaphorical: at least until the infinite object is, even if momentarily, grasped 
and held in the mind. In this way knowledge, for Bruno, becomes the object of the 
search not only of the new scientist, but equally of the true theologian, the true 
poet, the true painter and the true philosopher. So, we can conclude by saying 
that, at the very beginning of the Enlightenment, Bruno vigorously denied that 
strict division between disciplines and genres that an ever more neo-Aristotelian 
culture was already busy sanctioning. Not only did he want to see dialogue and 
collaboration between the different disciplines of the humanities, he also wanted 
the humanities and the sciences to come closer together in an effort to share their 
fragmentary forms of knowledge of an elusively infinite whole.
The interdisciplinary nature of the humanities, as the plural name implies, was 
implicit in their development from their beginnings, following the example of 
Petrarch and his immediate followers. Basing their activities on the classical no-
tion of the seven liberal arts as they had survived into the medieval period as the 
Trivium (logic, grammar and rhetoric) and the Quadrivium (arithmetic, geome-
try, music and astronomy), the early humanists were, however, acutely aware of 
the temporal or historical dimension of their enquiries with respect to the domi-
nating influence of theology and the search for transcendent and eternal truths 
which had animated the long centuries of medieval culture. The idea that religion 
was despised by the humanist culture of the Renaissance has long been rejected. 
There can, however, be little doubt about the increasing value given to the ter-
restrial or secular sphere of human experience, so hauntingly evoked by Petrarch 
himself in his Secretum, or his secret text written in his old age, full of premoni-
tions of an approaching death, in which he reveals, in an imaginary conversation 
with St. Augustine, his anguished doubts about the validity and endurance of 
his religious faith. That faith had, in Petrarch’s younger years, been subjected to 
almost unbearable tensions by his earthly love for Laura, not by chance expressed 
in the Italian vulgate, already modeled into a superb poetic language by Dante, 
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rather than in the more formal Latin of which Petrarch, who found so much of 
his inspiration in the ancient Greek and Roman classics, was also a master.
The dramatic schisms brought about by Luther and his followers at the begin-
ning of the sixteenth century, from within the fabric of a Catholic church which 
prided itself on its universal values, were undoubtedly intended by their perpe-
trators to augment rather than to destroy an authentic religious experience. On 
the other hand, the fragmentation of religious life in a previously united Eu-
rope acted as a stimulus to the birth of new territorial and geographical forms 
of political as well as religious autonomy. They were further stimulated by the 
writings of Machiavelli, whose bold accusation that the church had for too long 
directed people’s attention to a world beyond, undervaluing the necessary study 
for the community at large of political history and strategy, resounded dramati-
cally throughout the sixteenth century and beyond. History – not just political 
but also cultural history – has been integral to the development of the humanities 
from their origins and, on numerous occasions, has been directed towards a his-
tory of the various disciplines known as ‘the humanities’ themselves.
One might cite as examples taken from the early modern world texts such as 
Vasari’s Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors and Architects; or Bruno’s 
own Heroici furori, which can be read as a history of the Petrarchan sonnet tradi-
tion from its origins until his own day. It is interesting to remember in this con-
text that Bruno himself declared in Venice, shortly before his arrest at the hands 
of the Inquisition, that he was writing a book entitled Le sette arti liberali (The 
Seven Liberal Arts) and that he hoped to go to Rome and present it to the Pope 
himself, Clement VIII, who was known to be a patron of philosophy and letters. 
No text of this work has survived, although it seems clear from the references to 
it in the documents of the time that it was intended as some kind of sixteenth-
century history of the humanities. Exercises such as these need to be renewed 
from the differing perspectives of each generation as the contours of this essential 
complex of disciplines vary and acquire new meanings. 
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‘In Erudition Th ere Is No Heresy’
Th e Humanities in Baroque Rome
Bernward Schmidt
In many historical accounts, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Rome is 
marked by its splendid buildings, fine art and political insignificance. Baroque 
Rome – and moreover all of Italy – appears barren on an intellectual level as well, 
with every impulse of modern thought oppressed by a dominant papacy and the 
Inquisition; the case of Galileo Galilei had induced a long-term trauma. Even 
contemporaries complained about Italy’s backwardness compared with the well-
known home of scholarly exchange, France.
For a long time, historical research has stuck to these stereotyped paradigms,1 
and only a few scholars have paid attention to intellectual life in Rome,2 most 
notably Françoise Waquet in her important study on Italian and French intel-
lectuals in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (1989). It was only recently 
that an extensive anthology of the École Française de Rome, mainly compiled 
by Italian and French scholars, highlighted that intellectual life in the city of 
the popes was manifold and worth investigating.3
In this contribution, it will obviously not be possible to describe in full de-
tail the situation of the humanities, meaning in this case chiefly historical and 
textual scholarship, in Rome between around 1670 and 1760. Rather, some as-
pects of the institutions of intellectual life in Rome in the years around 1700, 
as well as some selected Roman scholars and their work, will be presented in 
order to characterize the situation of scholarship in Baroque Rome, and the 
specific consequences it engendered for the history of the humanities. This will 
involve a comparative analysis of textual criticism and ecclesiastical history; as 
will become clear, these disciplines only came to fruition through the careful 
negotiation of educational institutions, censorship, and scientific notions that 
were classified as heretical.4
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1 Institutions of scholarly exchange: academies
Because vastly more than one article would be needed to present just the most 
important institutions of Roman erudition individually,5 I would like to present 
an overview in order to convey an impression of what some scholars call ‘Roman 
polycentrism’.6 However, I will exclude the universities of the city, such as the 
pontifical Sapienza, the Jesuit Collegio Romano or the Collegio Urbano of the 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. These institutions were mainly dedicated to 
the education of the clergy and were thus not actually centres for discussion or 
the development of scholarly learning. In the Sapienza, for instance, historical 
criticism of the Biblical text was introduced only in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, mainly by Agostino Antonio Giorgi.7
Whereas the universities may have been belated in their acceptance of the 
most recent intellectual approaches, the academies, as places where the latest top-
ics and newest publications were discussed and lectures were given, correspond 
to the Republic of Letters – the ideal community of individual scholars.8 In the 
period in question, Rome experienced different phases of flourishing academies: 
the first lasting from 1671 until about 1715, the second phase from 1740 until 1758, 
and the third only began in the 1770s.9
The history of Roman academies of the late seventeenth century cannot be 
extricated from the figure of Giovanni Giustino Ciampini,10 who – together with 
Giovanni Pastrizio11 and Benedetto di S. Giacomo – founded the Accademia dei 
Concili in the spring of 1671.12 The mission of this academy was to study ec-
clesiastical history in its entirety. The history of councils – in dispute with the 
Protestants, Jansenists and Gallicans – was highly relevant at that time, and the 
topic allowed academicians to describe, as well as stress, the pope’s authority over 
the Church.13 In order to emphasize papal power, scholars focused on the history 
of the early councils of the fourth through sixth centuries, attaching particular 
importance to the interaction of profane, theological and ecclesiastical history. In 
doing so, scholars tried to make use of the modern methods of historical criticism 
to establish an irrefutable basis for their argumentation.
Such an academy was an inevitable result of not only the effort to defend the 
theological and legal claims of the Holy See but also the need to improve the level 
of education among the Roman clergy in general. Devoted to the neo-Tridentine 
ideal of the respectable and learned prelate, the Accademia dei Concili staked a 
claim to education of the clergy.14 This was especially evident in the choice of its 
meeting place: the palace of the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, which was then 
regarded as the centre of ecclesiastical erudition, inter alia due to the already men-
tioned Collegio Urbano, which was specialized in the education of missionaries.
The Accademia dei Concili was successful, perhaps too successful; just one 
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year after its founding, its meetings were overcrowded. After Pope Innocent XI 
praised the work of the academy at the very beginning of his pontificate, it be-
came fashionable to be seen there.15 Because numerous cardinals attended its 
meetings, a considerable ceremonial effort had to be expended, and several par-
ticipants complained of feeling restricted in their freedom of speech.16 Neverthe-
less, Ciampini’s academy simultaneously became a form of elite university for the 
Curia. Several Roman scholars who would become important figures later – such 
as Francesco Bianchini17 or Giusto Fontanini18 – attended the academy; even the 
future popes Clement XI and Benedict XIV studied at this academy. The fact 
that the Accademia dei Concili became so popular and successful also reflects 
the poor quality of the Roman universities. But as a consequence of the develop-
ments described, its scientific quality deteriorated.19
Despite the supervision of Clement XI, who was well aware of the slow de-
cline of the Accademia dei Concili, it was not possible to maintain the institution 
in the long run. After Domenico Bencini,20 the head of the academy, left Rome 
in 1715, it was forced to close.21 However, erudition remained such a significant 
priority for the pontificate of the Albani-pope Clement XI that he included the 
concept of academies in his cultural and educational policy, and he provided these 
educational institutions with his support.22 Besides the Accademia dei Concili, 
there were various other institutions which were concerned with theological de-
bate and the education of young clergymen, such as the Accademia dei Nobili 
Ecclesiastici23 or the Accademia Dogmatica in the Sapienza.
In contrast to these academies which were dedicated to theological matters, insti-
tutions which specialized in the natural sciences were not primarily educational cen-
tres; instead, they were dedicated to intellectual exchange among established schol-
ars. Once more, a foundation by Ciampini is most representative in this context: the 
Accademia Fisico-Matematica.24 Th e academy was open to any contribution from 
the fi eld of natural sciences, preferably experimental science. When Francesco Bi-
anchini returned to Rome from England in 1714 and reported on his contacts with 
Edmond Halley, John Flamsteed and Isaac Newton, the interest of the academy 
was increasingly drawn to astronomy.25 A great diversity of opinion predominated 
in the Accademia Fisico-Matematica; among its members were Aristotelians, Ato-
mists and the followers of Galileo Galilei and René Descartes. It should be noted 
that many of the academy’s members were clergymen of the Curia, including the 
Jesuit Antonio Baldigiani26 and Francesco Bianchini, who were both censors of the 
Congregation of the Index, as well as Stefano Gradi27 and Emmanuel Schelstrate,28 
who worked as librarians in the Vatican Library.29 Although this academy was not 
directly connected to the humanities, it is important to mention it in this context 
because it clearly proves that Rome in the late seventeenth century was by no means 
reduced to a norm predetermined by the Curia, and that the consequences of the 
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‘case Galileo Galilei’ were not as severe as often claimed.30 Due to limitations of the 
current format, we have to pass by the Accademia matematica (founded in 1689)31 of 
Domenico Quarteroni32 and the Congresso medico romano (founded in 1681)33 of 
Giovanni Maria Lancisi,34 as well the academies of poetry and rhetoric, which Lu-
dovico Antonio Muratori judged useless institutions for windbags.35
Two popes, Clement XI and Benedict XIV, left a particular ecclesiastical mark 
on the academies. But whereas in 1700 Clement XI was able to fall back on al-
ready existing institutions,36 such as Ciampini’s Accademia dei Concili, in 1740, 
when Benedict XIV accepted office, there were hardly any surviving academies.37 
The names of the four academies then established by the pope shortly after his 
election are significant for defining a programme of restoration, aimed at the 
preservation and revival of ecclesiastical heritage as well as the defence of Catho-
lic positions: Accademia di Storia Romana, Accademia di Liturgia, Accademia di 
Storia Ecclesiastica and Accademia dei Concili.38 They were almost exclusively 
staffed with clergymen from the Curia who had already acquired a reputation as 
impeccable scholars, such as Giovanni Gaetano Bottari, Fortunato Tamburini, 
Ridolfino Venuti or Giuseppe Agostino Orsi. It is furthermore significant that all 
four academies declined around 1758, the year of Benedict XIV’s demise, which 
marks an actual turning point of epochs in the cultural history of the papacy.
2 Institutions of scholarly reading: libraries
Rome had numerous large libraries, most of which were owned by cardinals, monas-
teries (e.g. Augustinian friars of S. Agostino; Dominicans of S. Maria sopra Minerva) 
or universities (e.g. La Sapienza, Il Collegio Romano). Th e largest and oldest library 
was and still is the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, which was signifi cantly enlarged 
three times during the seventeenth century. In 1622/1623 the Bibliotheca Palatina of 
Heidelberg was donated to the Vatican library by the Bavarian elector Maximilian, 
and in 1631 the library of the Dukes of Urbino was integrated into its collection, fol-
lowed in 1690 by the library of Christina, Queen of Sweden. Even today, the books 
from these libraries form separate collections (known by their abbreviations Pal., Urb., 
Reg.) within the Vaticana.39 Because of its huge collection of manuscripts, scholars 
travelling to Rome found the Vatican library worth visiting: Jean Mabillon, Bernard 
de Montfaucon as well as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz visited the Vaticana, and their 
historical research benefi ted from the expertise of the librarian Emmanuel Schel-
strate.40 Th eology, liturgy, the history of music and more purely scholarly pursuits 
such as ecclesiastical history, philology and other liberal arts (logic, grammar, rhetoric, 
linguistics) were topics that could be investigated with the help of Vatican collections. 
Frequently, books were also lent to foreign scholars and institutions.41
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The existing inventories of Roman libraries list mainly books dealing with 
various disciplines that are relevant to the history of the humanities. Two exam-
ples are the exceptionally well-stocked libraries of the cardinals Giuseppe Renato 
Imperiali42 and Domenico Passionei.43 Although there were small sections de-
voted to the natural sciences in both libraries, theological, juridical and historical 
issues were predominant. We may understand library catalogues as a reflection 
of Roman scholarly reading and research, enabling us to reconstruct which books 
were available in Rome and which Roman publications were included in ambi-
tious collections. It is important to note that in all large Roman libraries, there 
was a great number of works listed in the Index of prohibited books, which were 
nevertheless catalogued and apparently used without doubt or distinction.
3 Girolamo Casanate and Giusto Fontanini: two concepts of 
libraries
Th e history of libraries also enables us to gain an insight into the general situation 
of textual and historical scholarship in Rome at about 1700. One important library, 
which is still extant, illustrates the contemporary state of aff airs: the library of the 
cardinal Girolamo Casanate, prefect of the Vatican library and the Congregation 
of the Index as well as a member of the Roman Inquisition.44 Casanate owned one 
of the largest Roman libraries, which he willingly made available to other scholars. 
In his last will and testament, he stated that the library was to become the property 
of the Dominicans of S. Maria sopra Minerva and explicitly stipulated how it was 
to be run in future. Th ree Dominicans who censored books (in the Congregation 
of the Index and/or the Inquisition) were to sit on the board at the same time: the 
Master of the Sacred Palace, the secretary of the Congregation of the Index and 
the commissioner of the Holy Offi  ce.45 Th e entire library was to be made available 
for the work of the censors in the Congregation of the Index and Holy Offi  ce and 
was to be further expanded for this purpose. Because the library was actually put 
to use as Casanate envisioned, the history of the Roman Inquisition in the eight-
eenth century is closely connected to the Biblioteca Casanatense.46 In addition to 
the library, Casanate intended to create a centre of learning where the theology of 
St. Th omas Aquinas would be studied and taught.47 Based on these plans, we can 
conclude that Casanate’s objective was to create an ‘inquisitorial’ library, where an 
undeniably orthodox theology was to be practised and which was to distinguish 
the ‘true Catholic doctrine’ from the various heresies.
A completely different idea of libraries was represented by the collection over-
seen by Giusto Fontanini, one of the most important Roman scholars of the era. 
In 1697, he became the librarian of Cardinal Giuseppe Renato Imperiali. Imperi-
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ali likewise owned a well-stocked collection of books, which was merged with the 
libraries of the cardinals Lorenzo Imperiali and Jan Walthersz. Sluis and which 
Fontanini cultivated and expanded (he, for instance, bought the library of the 
scholar Marcello Severoli).48 Since Imperali welcomed guests with open arms, 
his library was popular and appreciated by scholars all over Europe. It was Fon-
tanini who put this enormous collection of books into a characteristic order; his 
catalogue represents one of the earliest uses of a well thought-out system.49 The 
order developed by Fontanini exceeds the library of his cardinal by far; in the end, 
it is the attempt to completely systemize all knowledge available in print. In the 
eighteenth century, the term bibliotheca meant both physically tangible collections 
of books as well as more generally all the literature listing knowledge.50 This may 
be the reason why Fontanini’s catalogue was presented in the Acta Eruditorum, a 
Lutheran journal from Leipzig, which was popular all over Europe.51
Giusto Fontanini was, just like Girolamo Casanate, a member of the Republic 
of Letters, the international, virtual association of scholars in which members were 
able to engage in discussion on equal footing. Fontanini was not only able to stay in 
contact by writing letters but more importantly, by meeting face-to-face with schol-
ars visiting Rome.52 Furthermore, his task as a librarian allowed Fontanini to come 
into contact with numerous Protestant publications, which he obviously even read 
without inhibition. It would have been very diffi  cult for him to remain in a purely 
Catholic world of scholars as prescribed by the ‘offi  cial’ Roman theology.
4 Francesco Bianchini: ecclesiastical history between historical 
criticism and theological standards
What are the characteristics of Roman theology in the years around 1700? Pri-
marily, theological discourse was dominated – as it was everywhere – by the dis-
tinction between speculative and positive theology. Counted among the latter 
approaches are Biblical exegesis and ecclesiastical history, disciplines based (in 
simple terms) on material sources and not only theological thought.53 For the 
present discussion, we can leave aside speculative theology and concentrate on 
ecclesiastical history as part of positive theology.
In 1697, Francesco Bianchini published a first volume of his Istoria universale 
(Universal History); further volumes did not follow.54 The book was dedicated 
to Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni, nephew of Pope Alexander VIII, who had died in 
1691 – a topic we will address later. An extensive, yet very concise depiction of 
his programme concerning ecclesiastical history can be seen in the frontispiece 
of the work, in a much more suggestive form than in Bianchini’s introduction to 
the book (Fig. 47).55
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Fig. 47: Title page of Francesco Bianchini, La istoria universale provata con monumenti e fi gurata con 
simboli degli Antichi (Rome 1697). © Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen.
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In the centre of the picture, there is a female figure that can be called veritas or 
religio. In each case, the term needs an additional adjective: veritas christiana or 
religio catholica. This results from the context: John the Evangelist sits enthroned 
above her, at his feet an eagle, his attribute, is spewing water into a basin. The 
female figure fills a bowl with this water in order to pour it – as if in a baptismal 
ceremony – over the heads of the personifications of the Four Continents kneel-
ing at her feet. Next to the central figure is a man in ancient Roman armour who 
– owing to Christ’s monogram on his helmet – can be identified as the Emperor 
Constantine. He holds a crown, also showing Christ’s monogram, over her head.
At first glance, it is easy to overlook the fact that the woman is sitting on a 
rectangular stone; this stone, however, according to Cesare Ripa, symbolizes the 
cornerstone of Christ (1 Peter 2,7-8).56 Its inscription in Greek letters refers to 
Christ’s representative on Earth, Pope Alexander VIII.
Still, the romanitas in this picture goes further: the Basilica of the Lateran in 
the right-hand background of the picture is easily identifiable; on the opposite 
side, the ruins of the Palatine can be seen. As is generally known, there are several 
obelisks in Rome; the popes of the early modern period used them systematically 
to mark important places. However, this one has a very atypical inscription. ‘New 
and old, which I have laid up for thee, O my beloved.’ This quotation from the 
Old Testament (Songs of Solomon 7,13) is a reference to the long continuity of 
Roman history, from the ancient world to the present, and to the activities of the 
historian Bianchini as well as to the old and new discoveries that he presents to 
his readers.
The coins and other objects lying at Constantine’s feet are just as ambigu-
ous: they serve as indications of Roman power over its subjugated peoples, even 
the whole world, but they are also references to Bianchini’s method which he 
describes in the preface. For his writing of ancient history, Bianchini made spe-
cial use of archaeological finds to present facts, so that he could avoid relying 
exclusively on the ancient myths of chroniclers. Scholars had only begun to place 
archaeology among the sciences and to recognize its importance for critical histo-
riography around 1700, so Bianchini’s method was very up-to-date. He was active 
as an archaeologist in Rome himself; in 1703 he was probably named Presidente 
delle antichità di Roma by Clement XI.57
Altogether, the frontispiece of Bianchini’s Istoria universale shows an under-
standing of ecclesiastical history that is oriented toward the Roman Church and 
the Catholic denomination and that is not afraid of the latest methodological 
achievements; however, these are subordinate to the aim of the depiction. Thus, 
history can only be represented as the creation, spread and growth of Roman 
Catholic Christianity, to which all people should be converted. Only the religio 
catholica, not a secular sovereign such as Constantine, should be given the honour 
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of gifts and genuflection. The emperor, standing on the treasures of his subjects, 
has finally recanted the pagan religion, as indicated by the reversed torch. He now 
dedicates his rule to the religio catholica, which he crowns with the victor’s crown 
and at whose feet there is a globe, symbol of the world. The Holy Scripture, the 
Word of God (represented by St. John) proves the truth of the Church and that 
the beginning and the end of the world (alpha and omega) are included in it. The 
pontifical authority, symbolically present in the stone, its inscription and the Ba-
silica of the Lateran, represents and guarantees the religio catholica in the moment 
of reading as well. In my opinion, this picture sums up what Roman historical 
scholars recognized as their task.
Yet, Helmut Zedelmaier’s observations also have to be taken into considera-
tion, namely that history as an independent discipline was just being developed 
during the first half of the eighteenth century.58 The ‘historicization’ of think-
ing and historical critique, however, have their established place among Roman 
erudition. This can be seen, for example, in the well-publicized argument about 
the rights of the pope or the emperor to the city of Comacchio and the Duchy of 
Parma and Piacenza. Giusto Fontanini was particularly committed to this subject 
and defended the position of the Holy See on the basis of historical sources.59 In 
order to sharply outline what I feel to be the most important aspect of this sub-
ject, we have to make a detour to the Holy Office and have a look at its censors.60
In the years 1705 and 1706, the Holy Office considered a critical edition writ-
ten by the Benedictine Benedetto Bacchini,61 who now asked the Inquisition for 
permission to print. The edited text was the Liber pontificalis by Agnello of Ra-
venna, a history of the archbishops of Ravenna dating from the ninth century.62 
History can be dangerous or helpful to actual positions, so expert’s reports by 
two outstanding scholars, Lorenzo Alessandro Zaccagna,63 first custodian of 
the Vatican library, and Francesco Bianchini, librarian of the Ottoboni, were re-
quested by the Roman Inquisition64 and read in a congregatio extraordinaria on 
3rd March 1705.65 Both scholars agreed: critical editions in general were not to be 
condemned, not even because of the published text; rather, it was important what 
the editor made of it. With Agnello’s text, Bacchini had enclosed a comment that 
was probably explanatory rather than critical. And this was exactly what the two 
censors condemned in their very detailed analyses. For in the ninth century, Agnel-
lo had strongly stressed the independence from Rome of the Church of Ravenna 
and attributed this independence to its close connection with the Byzantine em-
peror.66 Th us – to give one example – the archbishops of Ravenna are said to have 
received the pallium, the very vestment that symbolizes their dignity,67 not from 
the pope but from the emperor. It was mainly on this subject that Zaccagna and 
Bianchini insisted Bacchini should distance himself from Agnello more strongly 
and should reveal in his commentary how misguided the view of the mediaeval 
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bishop was. Why? On this point, Agnello’s text was highly topical, beyond the 
question of historical truth. By means of this text, French and German move-
ments strongly oriented towards national churches would have been able to build 
an argument for more independence from the pope.68 This would not have been 
in the interest of the Roman Curia, leading to the creation of national churches at 
the expense of the one Universal Church. The processes of the Inquisition were 
designed to prevent such unintended effects. However, it was not necessary to 
ban a complete edition; the advantage of such an editorial attempt was evident to 
Zaccagna and Bianchini.
Bacchini agreed to revise his manuscript and presented a new draft to the 
Inquisition several months later.69 Once more, Zaccagna and Bianchini were re-
quired to hand in reports; once more, their judgment was that Bacchini should 
distance himself from Agnello’s view more clearly. Still, this seems to have en-
countered resistance even within the Inquisition, especially since Bacchini was 
recommended by Domenico Passionei and Giusto Fontanini, who were both very 
influential and put in a word for Bacchini with Pope Clement XI.70 The pope 
charged a third well-known scholar, Giuseppe Maria Tomasi,71 to write a fifth 
report.72 Although Tomasi did not directly contradict his predecessors, he nev-
ertheless left leeway for a possible publication of Bacchini’s manuscript. He de-
clared many aspects that would have been marked as indication of heresy by other 
Roman censors to be irrelevant, especially since Bacchini could not be rebuked 
for purely describing facts. Tomasi’s recommendation was that in ecclesiastical 
historiography, it would be best to generally stick to Caesar Baronius,73 so noth-
ing could go wrong. The final permission for Bacchini to publish his edition was 
given after an oral presentation by Cardinal Tommaso Maria Ferrari74 of all five 
reports in the congregatio on 5th May 1706.75
All five reports written on Bacchini’s edition demonstrate a lot of respect for 
both the scholar and his work as well as a high regard of the historical-critical 
method. Tomasi’s open-minded attitude towards Bacchini’s results was eventu-
ally decisive for a publication of the work. But as Françoise Waquet writes, ‘cen-
soring the Agnello, this perfect expression of the new science, would have meant 
condemning the entire programme of cultural renewal...’76
5 Th e double loyalty of the ‘pio letterato’
This rough outline of Roman erudition in the late seventeenth and early eight-
eenth centuries allows us to describe the situation of Roman textual and histori-
cal scholars in a few short theses:
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1 Roman erudition was polycentric in terms of an institutional framework 
which consisted of various academies and particularly libraries; both forms 
of institutions were generally accessible for Roman as well as foreign scholars 
with appropriate contacts.
2 From a socio-historical point of view, around 1700 Roman erudition was 
principally erudition in the context of the Curia; it was mostly supported by 
members of the Curia or those connected to it, a circumstance that is not 
surprising considering contemporary social structures in Rome. However, this 
also means that impartial research and education were not feasible, rather they 
were only possible in the context of the Curia or the religio catholica.
3 Insight into the situation of the various disciplines can primarily be derived 
from the history of libraries and their catalogues. Casanate’s ‘inquisitorial’ con-
cept and Fontanini’s ‘polyhistorical’ one are only two examples from the rich 
culture of ecclesiastical erudition of the time.
4 Most of the disciplines of humanist scholarship in Rome were closely con-
nected with theology, especially ecclesiastical history as its leading discipline, 
and the method of historical criticism with its investigation of written and 
non-written sources. This becomes particularly clear in Francesco Bianchini’s 
publications.
5 Roman erudition in the first half of the eighteenth century was always ‘in-
tentional’ erudition as could be seen in the case of Bacchini’s edition: It was 
dedicated to the Holy See, both in terms of its theological positions and its 
political interests.77
6 For that reason, Roman scholars were loyal to both the Curia and to the Re-
public of Letters. This observation can be illustrated by asking what they 
were reading. How could someone who censored – for instance – Protestant 
books in service of the Inquisition or the Congregation of the Index also enjoy 
reading these very books at home and benefit from the experience? After all, 
numerous forbidden books could be found in Roman libraries; for example, 
people read Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), and the Biblioteca 
Corsiniana decorated its halls with portraits of the most important scholars 
– above all Protestants. Certainly, the reading of banned scholarship was not 
always a matter of knowing what the heretics wrote in order to better censor it 
afterwards. More often, a purely scientific interest or thirst of knowledge was 
the driving force.
7 Françoise Waquet uses a beautiful term, and although she only applies it to 
Ludovico Antonio Muratori, it is adequate for characterizing Roman scholars 
in general: pio letterato – pious scholar.78 The two essential elements are in-
cluded in this term, and only by considering both will it be possible to under-
stand what Roman scholars wrote around 1700 and to do justice to them. The 
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adjective ‘pio’ means more than just spirituality or the piety of the Church; it 
likewise indicates loyalty to the Pope and the theology of the Roman Church. 
‘Letterato’ implies a connection to the Republic of Letters and thus, the schol-
ar’s reading habits. The standard of scholarship certainly required a compre-
hensive knowledge of what had happened and what was published in the entire 
Republic of Letters. For the mere ‘letterato’, confessional boundaries were not 
necessarily important; the ‘pio letterato’ on the contrary was not able to ignore 
opinions that questioned the papacy and Roman theology. No scholar would 
be declared a heretic simply because of his academic research and reading. The 
notion dominant at that time is confirmed by Scipione Maffei in the remark, 
which also heads this contribution: ‘Nell’erudizione non si dà eresia’ – in erudi-
tion there is no heresy.79
Given the very dissatisfactory state of research on the Roman scholarly world 
of around 1700,80 only a rough overview could be presented. In particular, the 
Roman censoring institutions of the Inquisition and the Index could not be dis-
cussed in detail without going beyond the scope of this article.81 Furthermore, the 
development of single humanities disciplines or the reception of ideas in Rome 
during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is still to be examined.82 
It has become clearer, however, that Rome, rather than being a scientifically back-
ward stronghold of the Inquisition, was an exemplary theatre for welcoming the 
Europe-wide network of the Republic of Letters. With its well-developed schol-
arly infrastructure and its large educational institutions and libraries, which had 
few parallels elsewhere in Europe, the city made possible the double loyalty of the 
‘pious scholar’ to the Curia and the Republic of Letters.
A history of the humanities in Rome from about 1650 to 1750 still has to be 
written; all research on the subject should consider what was said about the ‘pio 
letterato’. For a general history of the humanities, the Roman scholars of the pe-
riod demonstrate the great importance of historical research and thinking as well 
as the considerable role of religion and theology. But the infrastructure of the 
city with its academies and libraries was favourable not only to these leading 
disciplines, but also to more subordinate ones like grammar, logic or rhetoric, as 
Fontanini’s catalogue of the Imperiali library proves. In defining the place of this 
part of the humanities, its relation to historical and theological premises should 
be taken into consideration without neglecting the situation of the Curia as a 
melting pot of European cultures (scholarly). As the state of research on Roman 
and Italian scholars and their work in the second half of the seventeenth and the 
first half of the eighteenth centuries is indeed very poor at the moment, this con-
tribution also invites scholars to concentrate on this topic more intensely.
‘In Erudition There Is No Heresy’
 Notes
 For a historiographical overview, see Françoise Waquet, Le modèle français et l’Italie sa-
vante. Conscience de soi et perception de l’autre dans la République des lettres (-) 
(Rome: Ecole Française, ), -; Brendan Dooley, Science, Politics and Society in 
Eighteenth-Century Italy. The Giornale de’letterati d’Italia and its World (New York-Lon-
don: Garland Publishing, ). Peter Hersche established a ‘culture against progress’: 
Peter Hersche, Italien im Barockzeitalter, -. Eine Kultur- und Sozialgeschichte (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, ), -.
 Cf. Jean Boutier et al., ‘Les Milieux intellectuels italiens comme problème historique. Une 
enquête collective’, in Naples, Rome, Florence. Une Histoire comparée des milieux intellectuels 
italiens (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles), ed. Jean Boutier et al., (Rome: Ecole Française, ), -.
 Jean Boutier et al. (eds.), Naples, Rome, Florence. Une Histoire comparée des milieux intel-
lectuels italiens (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles) (Rome: Ecole Française, ). This volume was 
preceded by important but nearly unconnected studies by Mario Rosa, Maria Pia Donato 
and others, e.g. Mario Rosa, ‘Un ‘mediateur’ dans la République des Lettres: le biblio-
thécaire’, in Commercium Litterarium. La communication dans la république des lettres / 
Forms of Communication in the Republic of Letters -, ed. Hans Bots and Françoise 
Waquet (Amsterdam-Maarssen: APA, ), -; id., ‘Curia romana e ‘repubblica delle 
lettere’’, in Papes, princes et savants dans l’Europe moderne. Mélanges à la mémoire de Bruno 
Neveu, eds. Jean-Louis Quantin and Jean-Claude Waquet (Geneva: Librairie Droz, ), 
-; Maria Pia Donato, ‘Le strane mutazioni di un’identità: il ‘letterato’ a Roma, 
-’, in Gruppi ed identità sociali nell’Italia di età moderna, ed. Biagio Salvemini 
(Bari: Edipuglia, ), -; id., Accademie romane. Una storia sociale (-) 
(Naples-Rome: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, ); Brigitte Sölch, Francesco Bianchi-
ni (-) und die Anfänge öffentlicher Museen in Rom (Munich-Berlin: Deutscher 
Kunstverlag, ).
 This essay summarizes some important results of the author’s dissertation Virtuelle Büch-
ersäle. Lektüre und Zensur gelehrter Zeitschriften an der römischen Kurie - (Pader-
born : Schöningh, ).
 For a general overview see Mario Rosa, ‘I depositi del sapere: biblioteche, accademie, archi-
vi’, in La memoria del sapere. Forme di conservazione e strutture organizzative dall’antichità 
a oggi, ed. Pietro Rossi (Rome-Bari: Laterza, ), -.
 Cf. Marina Caffiero et al., ‘De la catholicité post-tridentine à la République Romaine. 
Splendeurs et misères des intellectuels courtisans’, in Naples, Rome, Florence, .
 Agostino Antonio Giorgi OSA (-), Roman Theologian, Professor at the Sapi-
enza;  Consultor of the Holy Office. See Filippo Maria Renazzi, Storia dell’Università 
degli Studi di Roma detta comunemente la Sapienza. Vol.  (Rome: Pagliarini, ), , 
. Giorgi’s method can be seen clearly (e.g.) in his Fragmentum Evangelii S. Ioannis 
Graeco-Copto-Thebaicum Saeculi IV. Additamentum ex vetustissimis membranis lectionum 
evangelicarum divinae missae cod. diaconici reliquiae et liturgica alia fragmenta veteris the-
baidensium ecclesiae ante Dioscurum ex Veliterno Museo Borgiano (Rome: Fulgoni, ).
 Introductions to the Republic of Letters: Hans Bots, Republiek der Letteren. Ideaal en 
werkelijkheid (Amsterdam: APA, ); Hans Bots, Françoise Waquet, La République des 
Lettres ([Paris]: Belin, ); Lorraine Daston, ‘The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of 
Letters in the Enlightenment’, Science in context  (): -; Anne Goldgar, Impolite 
Learning. Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters - (New Haven-Lon-
 Bernward Schmidt
don: Yale University Press, ). For the ideal of scientific academies: Anthony Grafton, 
‘Where was Salomon’s House? Ecclesiastical History and Intellectual Origins of Bacon’s 
New Atlantis’, in Die europäische Gelehrtenrepublik im Zeitalter des Konfessionalismus, ed. 
Herbert Jaumann (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, ), -.
 Maria Pia Donato, Accademie romane. Una storia sociale (-), Naples-Rome 
. A list of all Roman academies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is given 
in Naples, Rome, Florence, -. For the latest phase which cannot be discussed in this 
place: Marina Caffiero, ‘Accademie e autorappresentazione dei gruppi intellettuali a Roma 
alla fine del Settecento’, in Naples, Rome, Florence, -.
 Giovanni Giustino Ciampini (-), Roman scholar; collaborator in the Giornale 
de’Letterati by Nazari (-), editor of an own Giornale de’Letterati (-); 
founder of the Accademia dei Concili and the Accademia Fisico-matematica; owner of an 
important library. See also Silvia Grassi Fiorentino, ‘Ciampini, Giovanni Giustino’, Dizio-
nario Biografico degli Italiani  (), -.
 Giovanni Pastrizio / Ivan Pastrič (-), Theologian and Polyhistor, born in Croa-
tia, lived in Rome.
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, -; id., ‘Le due Accademie dei Concili a Roma’, in 
Naples, Rome, Florence, -.
 Cf. William J. Bouwsma, ‘Gallicanism and the Nature of Christendom’, in Renaissance. 
Studies in honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho, John Tedeschi (Florence: Sansoni, 
), -; Wolfgang Mager, ‘Die Kirche als Gehäuse der Freiheit. Die Ausbildung 
liberaler Anschauungen über den Aufbau der Kirche und des Staates in Frankreich als 
Entgegnung auf die päpstliche Bulle ‘Unigenitus’ ()’, in Französisch-deutsche Bezie-
hungen in der neueren Geschichte, ed. Klaus Malettke et al. (Hamburg: LIT, ), . 
In the middle of the eighteenth century, the secretary of the Congregation of the Index, 
Giuseppe Agostino Orsi, published two volumes on this subject which summarize the de-
bate: Giuseppe Agostino Orsi, De Irreformabili Romani Pontificis in Definiendis Fidei Con-
troversiis Judicio (Rome: Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, ); id., De Romani Pontificis 
in Synodos Oecumenicas et earum Canones Potestate (Rome: Congregatio de Propaganda 
Fide, ).
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, . See also Luigi Fiorani, ‘Identità e crisi del prete ro-
mano tra sei e settecento’, Ricerche per la storia religiosa di Roma  (), -.
 Cf. Donato, Le due Accademie dei Concili, -.
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, -.
 Francesco Bianchini (-), Roman theologian, archaeologist and astronomer, 
librarian of Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni. See also Salvatore Rotta, ‘Bianchini, Francesco’, 
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani  (), -.
 Giusto Fontanini (-), Roman scholar and theologian; uditore and librarian of 
Cardinal Giuseppe Renato Imperiali;  participant at the Concilio Romano (synod of 
the Roman province). See also Dario Busolini, ‘Fontanini, Giusto’, Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani  (), -.
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, .
 Francesco Domenico Bencini (-), - professor at the Collegio Urbano 
de Propaganda Fide, - professor in Torino. 
 Cf. Donato, Le due Accademie dei Concili, .
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, -; Christopher M. S. Johns, ‘Papa Albani and Fran-
cesco Bianchini. Intellectual and Visual Culture in Early Eighteenth-Century Rome’, in 
Francesco Bianchini (-) und die europäische gelehrte Welt um , ed. Valentin 
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Kockel, Brigitte Sölch (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, ), -.
 Several letters and plans concerning the Accademia dei Nobili Ecclesiastici can be found in 
Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Fondo Albani, .
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, -.
 Cf. Sölch, Francesco Bianchini, -.
 Antonio Baldigiani SJ (-), Roman scholar, lecturer of philosophy and theology 
at the Collegio Romano, relator () and consultor () of the Congregation of the 
Index as well as qualificator of the Holy Office ().
 Stefano Gradi (-), scholar and diplomat from Ragusa, in  custodian at the 
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana.
 Emmanuel Schelstrate (-), First Custodian at the Biblioteca Apostolica 
Vaticana, consultor of the Congregation of the Index. For Schelstrate see Herman H. 
Schwedt, ‘Emmanuel Schelstrate († ) nella Roma dei santi e dei libertini’, Bulletin de 
l’Institut Historique Belge de Rome / Bulletin van het Belgisch Historisch Instituut Rome  
(), - (reprint in: Censor censorum. Gesammelte Aufsätze von Herman H. Schwedt, 
ed. Tobias Lagatz, Sabine Schratz [Paderborn: Schöningh, ], -); id., ‘Schelstrate, 
Emmanuel’, Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon  (), -.
 On the variety of the participants, see Donato, Accademie romane, -.
 Cf. Francesco Beretta, ‘Le Siège Apostolique et l’Affaire Galilée: Relectures romaines 
d’une condamnation célèbre’, Roma moderna e contemporanea  (), -; id., 
‘L’heliocentrisme à Rome, à la fin du XVIIe siècle: une affaire d’étrangers? Aspects struc-
turels d’un espace intellectuel’, http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/////
PDF/TexteBeretta.pdf; Antonella Romano, ‘A l’ombre de Galilée? Activité scientifique et 
pratique académique à Rome au XVIIe siècle’, in Naples, Rome, Florence, -.
 Cf. André Robinet, ‘L’Accademia matematica de D. Quarteroni et le ‘Phoranomus’ de 
G.W. Leibniz (Rome, )’, Nouvelles de la République des Lettres  (), -.
 Domenico Quarteroni (-), Roman mathematician, founder of the Accademia 
matematica.
 Cf. Donato, Accademie romane, -.
 Giovanni Maria Lancisi (-), Roman doctor of medicine, leading member of the 
Congresso medico romano.
 Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Primi disegni della Repubblica letteraria d’Italia (), in 
Dal Muratori al Cesarotti. Vol. ,: Opere di Ludovico Antonio Muratori, ed. Giorgio Falco, 
Fiorenzo Forti (Milan-Naples: Ricciardi, ), : ‘La pompa della sola poesia non ha 
altra virtù che quella de’fiori.’
 Cf. Johns, Papa Albani and Francesco Bianchini, -.
 For Benedict’s pontificate see Mario Rosa, ‘Benedetto XIV’, Enciclopedia dei Papi  (): 
-; Elisabeth Garms-Cornides, ‘Benedikt XIV. – Ein Papst zwischen Reaktion und 
Aufklärung’, in Ambivalenzen der Aufklärung, ed. Gerhard Ammerer, Hanns Haas (Mu-
nich: Oldenbourg, ), -; id., ‘Storia, politica e apologia in Benedetto XIV: Alle 
radici della reazione cattolica’, in Papes et papauté au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Philippe Koeppel 
(Paris: Honoré Champion, ), -.
 For the Academies founded by Benedict XIV, see Donato, Accademie romane, -. 
Consequently, the production of books florished in Rome during the pontificate of Bene-
dict XIV: cf. Valentino Romani, ‘Tipografia e commercio librario nel Settecento Romano: 
Note intorno al pontificato di Benedetto XIV’, in Benedetto XIV (Prospero Lambertini). 
Convegno Internazionale di studi storici, Vol.  (Ferrara: Centro Studi ‘Girolamo Baruffaldi’, 
), -.
 Bernward Schmidt
 Cf. Jeanne Bignami Odier, La Bibliothèque Vaticane du Sixte IV à Pie XI. Recherches sur 
l’histoire des collections de manuscrits (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ), 
-.
 Cf. Christine Maria Grafinger, ‘Studiosi nella Biblioteca Vaticana del Settecento’, Archivi-
um Historiae Pontificiae  (): -.
 Cf. Christine Maria Grafinger, Die Ausleihe vatikanischer Handschriften und Druckwerke 
(-) (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ).
 Giuseppe Renato Imperiali (-), nephew of Cardinal Lorenzo Imperiali, as cardi-
nal () member of the Holy Office () and the Congregation of the Index (), 
owner of a huge library which was catalogued by Giusto Fontanini. Cf. Stefano Tabacchi, 
‘Imperiali, Giuseppe Renato’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani  (), -.
 Domenico Passionei (-), scholar, papal diplomat and nuntius; as cardinal () 
member of the Holy Office and the Congregation of the Index (); Prefect of the 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (); associated member of the Académie des Inscrip-
tions et des Lettres in Paris; owner of a huge library on the Quirinal in Rome. Cf. Alfredo 
Serrai, Domenico Passionei e la sua biblioteca (Milan: Sylvestre Bonnard, ).
 Girolamo Casanate (-),  Inquisitor in Malta,  Assessor of the Holy 
Office; as cardinal () member of the Holy Office, Prefect of the Congregation of the 
Index () and of the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana (); Cf. Lucien Ceyssens, 
‘Casanate, Girolamo’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani  (), -.
 For the offices of the Congregation of the Index and the Inquisition, see Herman H. 
Schwedt, ‘Die römischen Kongregationen der Inquisition und des Index: Die Personen 
(.-. Jh.)’, in Inquisition, Index, Zensur. Wissenskulturen der Neuzeit im Widerstreit, ed. 
Hubert Wolf (Paderborn: Schöningh ), -.
 Cf. Vincenzo de Gregorio, La Biblioteca Casanatense di Roma. Naples: Edizioni Scientifi-
che Italiane, ; Margherita Palumbo, ‘La ‘bibliotheca haeretica’ del cardinale Girolamo 
Casanate’, in Dal torchio alle fiamme. Inquisizione e censura: Nuovi contributi dalla più antica 
Biblioteca Provinciale d’Italia, ed. Vittoria Bonani (Salerno: Biblioteca Provinciale, ), 
-. The connection between library and congregation can be shown in the case of Dan-
iel Georg Morhof ’s ‘Polyhistor’: Cf. Bernward Schmidt, ‘’Sollicita ac provida vigilantia’. 
Die ‘Indexreform’ Benedikts XIV.’, in Verbotene Bücher. Zur Geschichte des Index im . und 
. Jahrhundert, ed. Hubert Wolf (Paderborn: Schöningh, ), -.
 For prosopographical indications, see Alberto Guglielmotti, Catalogo dei Bibliotecari, 
cattedratici, e teologi del Collegio Casanatense nel convento della Minerva dell’Ordine 
de’predicatori in Roma dal principio di loro istituzione sino al presente (Rome: Tipografia 
delle Belle Arti, ).
 Cf. Flavia Cancedda, Figure e fatti intorno alla biblioteca del Cardinale Imperiali, mecenate 
del ‘ (Rome: Bulzoni, ).
 [Giusto Fontanini], Bibliothecae Josephi Renati Imperialis Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Car-
dinalis Sancti Georgii Catalogus (Rome: Gonzaga, ).
 Cf. Roger Chartier, ‘Bibliothèques sans murs’, in L’Ordre des livres. Lecteurs, auteurs, biblio-
thèques en europe entre XIVe et XVIIIe siècle, ed. Roger Chartier (Aix-en-Provence: Alinea, 
), -; Colette Nativel, ‘Bibliotheca selon Morhof ’, in Les premiers siècles de la Ré-
publique européenne des Lettres, ed. Marc Fumaroli (Paris: Baudry, ), -.
 Cf. Acta Eruditorum, May , -: ‘Inter celebriores Urbis bibliothecas, quae codi-
cum impressorum & selectu & copia sese commendant, non minima est, quae Purpura-
tum modo dictum Eminentissimum possessorem ac dominum habet. Tribus enim spatiis 
seu cameris sat amplis, in aedibus ejus ad Forum Antonii sitis, distincta patet, atque haud 
‘In Erudition There Is No Heresy’
raro hospitum literatorum accessu, quibus & nos aliquando immixtos fuisse non sine 
voluptate recordamur, quotidie ferme frequentatur.’
 Cf. Domenico Fontanini, Memorie della vita di Monsignor Giusto Fontanini arcivescovo di 
Ancira, canonico della Basilica di S. Maria Maggiore e abbate di Sesto (Venice: Valvasense, 
), -.
 Cf. Bruno Neveu, ‘Quelques orientations de la théologie catholique au XVIIe siècle’, Sev-
enteenth-Century French Studies  (), -.
 Francesco Bianchini, La Istoria universale provata con monumenti e figurata con simboli 
degli Antichi, Rome: de Rossi, . A reprint was published in  with the same editor.
 Cf. Susan M. Dixon, ‘Francesco Bianchini’s Images and his Legacy in the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century: From Capricci to Playing Cards to Proscenium and back’, in Francesco Bianchini 
(-) und die europäische gelehrte Welt um , ed. Valentin Kockel, Brigitte Sölch 
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, ), -; Sölch, Francesco Bianchini, -, -.
  Peter ,-: ‘Unto you therefore which believe he is precious: but unto them which be 
disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the 
corner, and a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the 
word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed.’
 According to François de Polignac, this nomination cannot be proven though reported by 
Bianchini’s biographer Alessandro Mazzoleni (). Cf. Sölch, Francesco Bianchini, .
 Helmut Zedelmaier, ‘’Im Griff der Geschichte’. Zur Historiographiegeschichte der frühen 
Neuzeit’, in Historisches Jahrbuch  (): -.
 E.g. [Giusto Fontanini], Historia Summi Imperii Apostolici Sedis in Ducatum Parmae Ac 
Placentinae Libri Tres. Rome: anonymus, . Cf. Gesine Göschel, Das ‘bellum diploma-
ticum’ um Comacchio zu Beginn des . Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt/M.: Johann-Wolfgang-
Goethe-Universität, ).
 For an introduction to the procedures of the Inquisition see Adriano Garuti, ‘La santa 
Romana e Universale Inquisizione. Strutture e procedure’, in L’Inquisizione (Vatican City: 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ), -. Hubert Wolf, Einleitung - (Pad-
erborn: Schöningh, ), - (in English).
 Benedetto Bacchini OSB (-), Savant from Parma, librarian of the Dukes of 
Modena, teacher of Ludovico Antonio Muratori. See A. Momigliano, ‘Bacchini, Benedet-
to’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani  (): -; Paolo Golinelli, Benedetto Bacchini 
(-). L’uomo, lo storico, il maestro (Florence: Olschki, ).
 Agnelli, qui et Andreas, ... Liber pontificalis, sive Vitae Pontificum Ravennatum. D. Benedic-
tus Bacchinius Abbas S. Mariae de Lacroma O.S.B. Congregationis Casinensis ex Bibliotheca 
Estensi eruit, dissertationibus, & observationibus, nec non Appendice Monumentorum illu-
stravit, & auxit ... (Modena: Capponi, ). The text was revised and re-edited in  
by Ludovico Antonio Muratori and in  by Jacques-Paul Migne. Modern editions: 
The Liber Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis, ed. Deborah Mauskopf Deliyannis (Turnhout: 
Brepols, ); Agnellus von Ravenna, Liber Pontificalis – Bischofsbuch, ed. Claudia Nau-
erth,  vols. (Freiburg: Herder, ). 
 Lorenzo Alessandro Zaccagna (-), in  Relator of the Congregation of the 
Index, First Custodian of the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana.
 The entire material can be found in the Archives of the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith (ACDF), SO CL -, no. . Some notes also in ACDF Decreta SO , fol. 
r and , fol. r and rv. Cf. Franz Heinrich Reusch, Der Index der verbotenen 
Bücher. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Literaturgeschichte. Vol. , (Bonn: Cohen, ), 
-.
 Bernward Schmidt
 Besides, Antoine Arnauld’s Difficultez proposées à M. Steyaert were censored in the same 
congregation. Cf. ACDF Decreta SO , fol. r; ACDF SO CL -, no. .
 Cf. Girolamo Arnaldi, ‘Agnellus’, Lexikon des Mittelalters  (): -.
 Cf. Theodor Klauser, ‘Pallium’, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, nd edition,  (): -; 
Louis Duchesne, Les origines du culte chrétien, th edition (Paris: Boccard, ), -.
 Cf. Günther Wassilowsky, ‘Katholizismus’, Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit  (): -; 
id., ‘Gallikanismus’, Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit  (): -.
 Discussed on st April , cf. ACDF Decreta SO , fol. r. The provisional de-
cree of this day read ‘Eminentissimi dixerunt non impediandam esse editionem libri, de 
quo agitur facturo in primis per Auctorem Commentarii eiusdem libro iis omnibus ad-
ditionibus, explicationibus, ac correctionibus, quae opportuna, et necessaria visa sunt, et 
videbuntur illis qui ad revisionem libri praefati fuerunt iam deputati, et deputabuntur.
 Et eadem die in solita audientia facta per me relatione Sanctissimo Patri Nostro Sanctitas 
Sua S. Congregationis sententiam approbavit, ac iussit revisionem supradicti libri com-
mitti Patri Thomasio Ordinis Theatinorum.’ (ACDF SO CL -, without page 
number).
 Cf. Francesco Andreu, Pellegrino alle sorgenti. San Giuseppe Maria Tomasi. La Vita – il 
Pensiero – le Opere (Rome: Curia Generalizia dei Chierici Regolari, ), -.
 Giuseppe Maria Tomasi (-), Roman theologian and historian, examinator epis-
coporum, qualificator of the Holy Office, consultor of the Congregation of the Index; as 
cardinal () member of the latter one.
 Tomasi’s report was published in his Opera, vol.  (Rome: Pagliarini, ), -.
 Cesare Baronio (-), Roman scholar, author of a huge ecclesiastical history;  
director of the Roman Oratory, as cardinal () member of the Congregation of the 
Index and prefect of the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana ().
 Tommaso Maria Ferrari (-), - Master of the Sacred Palace, as cardinal 
() member of the Holy Office () and prefect of the Congregation of the Index 
().
 ACDF Decreta SO , fol. rv: ‘Facta relatione in voce per E.mum S. Clementis 
de correctionibus factis super libro manuscripto P. D. Bened. Bacchini monaci Ordinis 
Cassinen. cuius tit. = Agnelli qui et Andreas (de quo alias  Martii ) E.mi dixerunt, 
scribendum esse P. Inquisitori Mutinae, quod imprimi permittat praefatum Librum cum 
dictis correctionibus, quae una cum dicto Libro ad ipsum transmittant.’
 Waquet, Le modèle français et l’Italie savante,   : ‘Censurer l’Agnello, cette parfaite 
expression de la nouvelle science, ce serait, en effet, condamner tout le programme de 
renouveau culturel ...’
 Cf. Schmidt, Virtuelle Büchersäle, -.
 Cf. Françoise Waquet, ‘Ludovico Antonio Muratori. Le ‘pio letterato’ à l’épreuve des faits’, 
in Die europäische Gelehrtenrepublik im Zeitalter des Konfessionalismus, ed. Herbert Jau-
mann (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, ), -; id., ‘De la ‘Repubblica letteraria’ au ‘pio 
letterato’. Organisation du savoir et modèles intellectuels dans l’Italie de Muratori’, in 
Naples, Rome, Florence, -; Schmidt, Virtuelle Büchersäle, -.
 Scipione Maffei, [Expert opinion on the reform of the university of Padua], in ‘Un parere 
di Scipione Maffei intorno allo Studio di Padova sui principi del Settecento’, ed. Biagio 
Brugi, Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti  (-), .
 Cf. Schmidt, Virtuelle Büchersäle, -.
 Cf. Patrizia Delpiano, Il governo della lettura. Chiesa e libri nell’Italia del Settecento (Bolo-
gna: Il Mulino, ); Schmidt, Virtuelle Büchersäle, -.
‘In Erudition There Is No Heresy’
 The ideas of Athanasius Kircher, for example, were apparently barely discussed at that 
time – but this should be examined. I am thankful to Rens Bod for this suggestion. Fur-
thermore, I am deeply grateful to Jessica Buskirk who ameliorated and smoothened my 






Humanism in the Classroom, a Reassessment
Juliette A. Groenland
History’s well-fi lled dustbin contains many events and persons that once attract-
ed great attention but have since been eclipsed by greater events and greater indi-
viduals, and that languish in an historical limbo, disturbed only by an occasional 
doctorate candidate trying to exhume events and personages that (so far as our 
general comprehension of the past is concerned) might almost never have existed 
at all. Yet sometimes these historical non-events can cast light on the greater 
events which have eclipsed them.
Charles G. Nauert1
1 Introduction: the merits of a practical pedagogue2
Starting from a single case-study into a virtual historical nonperson, Joannes 
Murmellius (ca.1480-1517), this paper purports to draw attention to a basic tenet 
of Renaissance humanism and of the humanities, both pedagogical movements 
in origin: the classroom practice. A most characteristic profile sketch of the pio-
neer northern humanist school teacher is to be found in his own account of his 
pedagogic standpoint:
Iam vero in tanta opinionum et sententiarum diversitate quam discipulos 
instituendi rationem sequar, paucis accipe. Quid super ea re Quintiliano 
rhetori diligentissimo visum fuerit haud ignoras, quid item Baptista Gua-
rinus, et Erasmus noster (ut ceteros preteream) de discendi docendique 
modo ac ordine sentiant et precipiant legisse te compluries non dubito. Ve-
rum eorum praecepta penitus exequi in hisce ludis trivialibus ob plurimas 
causas non est opportunum. ... Sed meruerunt illi quidem laudem non par-
vam suadentes optima praeclaris ingeniis ad summam exactae eruditionis 
et eloquentiae arcem foeliciter tendentibus. Nos vero quamplurimis simul 
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consultum cupimus, nec iis modo qui melioris sunt ingenii, sed tardioribus 
etiam et tamen id literaturae quaerentibus, quod suffi  ciat ad deo optimo 
maximo sancta morum integritate militandum. Non enim omnium est (ut 
veteri fertur adagione3) Corinthum navigatio, nec cuivis datum absolutum 
illum doctrinarum orbem, et oratoriam consequi facultatem. Bene ait Ho-
ratius4 Est aliquo prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.5
‘Learn in a few words which method amidst so great a diversity of opinions 
and sentiments I follow in teaching my pupils. You are familiar with the 
thoughts of that most diligent teacher of oratory, Quintilian, on the matter, 
and I am sure you have often read what method and programme of learning 
and teaching Battista Guarino and our own Erasmus (not to mention oth-
ers) envisage and recommend. But it is not expedient to keep to the letter of 
their precepts right here in the Latin school ... Th ey certainly deserve lavish 
praise for giving choice advice to excellent talents successfully aiming for 
the zenith of knowledge and eloquence. We, however, long to have regard 
for as many pupils as possible at the same time, not only the quicker ones, 
but also the slow-witted ones seeking to get acquainted with just enough 
literature to serve the Lord with sound and sacred morality. For it is not 
every man’s lot to set sail for Corinth (as the old saying goes), and not every 
man can complete the full circle of knowledge and aspire to the gift of elo-
quence. Horace rightly says: “Th ere is some point to which we may reach, 
if we can go no further.”’
Murmellius, conrector (deputy headmaster) and rector (headmaster) of Latin 
schools in Westphalia and Holland in the early decades of the sixteenth century, 
belonged to the early generation of northern teacher humanists. Labouring for 
the introduction of the studia humanitatis in the overcrowded and noisy class-
rooms, they performed the humble fieldwork in the shadow of their contem-
porary Erasmus. Murmellius was not only a gifted schoolmaster, who attracted 
hundreds of pupils to his schools, from the farthest corners of Europe. He also 
composed the necessary books to enable and support curricular changes in other 
classrooms than just his own. During his short lifetime he published the remark-
able number of more than fifty writings: school editions of ancient and humanist 
texts, handbooks, pedagogical treatises and poems. Some of his schoolbooks were 
reprinted dozens of times until as late as the eighteenth century, and spread as far 
as Poland and Hungary.6
In spite of the considerable short- and long-term effects of his work, Murmel-
lius’s name is not primarily remembered for any of his lifetime achievements. 
Within the history of northern humanist pedagogy, the practical contributions of 
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the schoolteachers, even those from a successful and prolific writer like Murmel-
lius, have from the start been outshone by the great achievements of more aca-
demic pedagogues like Agricola and Erasmus.7 Significantly, when Murmellius’s 
name comes up twice in Erasmus’s correspondence,8 it is not by virtue of any of 
his pedagogic activities. The immediate cause was the schoolmaster’s untimely 
death, at the age of 37. Rumour had it, Murmellius had been poisoned by order 
of a rival schoolmaster. The fascinating humanist murder story, unravelled on 
another occasion,9 must be left in peace here, for this paper aims to highlight the 
life work of Murmellius.
Why should a Latin school teacher be worthy of a place within the history 
of humanism, even when his oeuvre apparently constitutes a rare direct product 
from and for the early northern humanist classroom? What is more, why should 
he be included in the even grander scheme this book is intended to initiate? In 
other words: what did Murmellius ever do for us? The call for papers of the First 
International Conference on the History of the Humanities, the starting point 
of this book, stated the urgent and lofty goal of a comparative history of the 
humanities:
We are especially keen on understanding the mutual interplay between 
the humanities and how they developed from the artes liberales, via the 
studia humanitatis, to early modern disciplines. Although there exist sepa-
rate histories of single humanities disciplines, a comparative history would 
satisfy a long-felt need, and fi ll a conspicuous gap in intellectual history. 
... While the focus is on the early modern period when the humanities 
started to emerge (roughly 1400-1800), we also welcome proposals for pa-
pers exploring interesting links with earlier or later periods. ... We strongly 
favor abstracts that are as comparative as possible, i.e. that explore the con-
nections between diff erent disciplines and/or persons in the history of the 
humanities.10
As for ‘connections between different disciplines’, like all other humanists Mur-
mellius was interdisciplinary by nature from a modern point of view. Similarly, as 
for ‘connections between different persons’, Murmellius’s reputation as a school-
master and author, like that of all his fellow humanists, depended heavily on his 
network within the respublica literaria. But besides that, would Murmellius or 
rather a case study based on his works truly be worthy of a place within the pro-
posed comparative history, or should it be left to others − Valla, Scaliger, Spinoza 
− to set sail for Corinth? In short, this paper promotes Murmellius as just the 
right person to teach a very relevant lesson: it is a delicate balance between theory 
and practice, between lofty ideals and humble reality. More elaborately, the ar-
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gument involves a twofold explanation: what can the writings and textbooks of 
this teacher-pedagogue teach us about the way the humanist ideals were put into 
practice? And how, if at all, does this case study fit in with a comparative history 
of the humanities?
For just like Murmellius in the opening quote decided his practical experi-
ence had something to add to the ambitious theories expounded by great minds 
like Quintilian, Guarino junior and Erasmus, I believe a case study on this level-
headed teacher-pedagogue might just be the necessary practical touchstone that 
has something to add to such awe-inspiring, thought-provoking projects as the 
intended comparative history of the humanities and the work which has demand-
ed attention for the early modern classroom, drawing parallels with the modern 
humanities education, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine’s From Humanism to 
the Humanities.11 Turning to the school practice of Murmellius, we will see how 
this teacher-pedagogue can serve as a phenomenal touchstone for hasty and gen-
eralizing assumptions that have been made about the practitioners of the studia 
humanitatis, and the way this Renaissance programme of studies12 relates to our 
present-day humanities.
2 Th e humanist educational reform in context
In their inspiring study From humanism to the humanities Grafton and Jardine 
rightly argued that, with all the progress made in educational history since the 
rise of social history in the 1960s and 1970s, cultural historians have not paid 
enough attention to what actually went on inside the Renaissance classroom. 
However, instead of referring to the lack or inscrutability of relevant source 
material for a ready explanation, they pointed a finger at ‘traditional intellectual 
historians’:
... themselves believing in the preeminent value of a literary education, 
committed to preserving a canon of classics and a tradition of humanism, 
[they] have treated the rise of the classical curriculum and the downfall of 
scholasticism as the natural triumph of virtue over vice. Like the humanists 
they study, whose words they often echo faithfully, they assume the barbar-
ity and obsolence of medieval education and the freshness and liberality of 
humanism.13
According to Grafton and Jardine, the humanist educators failed to put their high 
moral aspirations into practice. In contrast, the scholastic method is made out to 
have been a stimulus of creative and independent reasoning, which was stifled by 
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the elite, conservative curriculum of the humanists, attuned to ‘the ideals and at-
titudes of government and those in power’:
Scholasticism bred too independent an attitude to survive. In the Renais-
sance as in other periods, in sum, the price of the renewal of art and litera-
ture was collaboration in the constriction of society and polity.14
The method employed by Grafton and Jardine, case studies based on primary 
sources, has pointed the way for researchers to try and open up the classroom 
doors.15 However, the newly acquired vision was instantaneously blurred by the 
central argument dominating From Humanism to the Humanities, which was ex-
plicitly prompted by a topical message:
What we are stressing is that the independence of liberal arts education 
from establishment values is an illusion.16
Throughout the book the case studies are employed to substantiate this thesis 
by demonstrating the gap between the humanist ideals and harsh reality. The 
limited access of women humanists to the studia humanitatis is meant to prove 
‘the limitations of the humanist liberal arts education as a general education, 
suitable for any cultivated person’.17 Similarly, primary sources from the school 
of the pioneer pedagogue Guarino − textbooks, commentaries, and student and 
teacher notes − are mobilized to expose the bookish, ineffective classroom prac-
tice of the humanist educators, which does not concur with their high moral 
aspirations.
Thus, at crucial instants, when the fruits of otherwise commendable explora-
tions of primary source material are evaluated, the topical viewpoint takes the 
upper hand and induces anachronisms. As for the difficulties facing women hu-
manists, in practice the studia humanitatis were never meant for all human beings 
alike, they were tailored to the active man of affairs. The scattered and limited 
achievements of the female aspirants cannot be used as a test case for the liberal-
ity of the studia humanitatis, the studies deemed fit to prepare the future male 
citizen to fulfil his civic duties.18 If anything, they are illustrative of the socio-
historical context from which the Quattrocento humanist ideals arose. From this 
point of view, the fact that some female humanists nonetheless managed to make 
a lasting name for themselves could just as well be interpreted as a sign of the 
relative liberality of the humanist movement.
As for Guarino’s school practice, one could also dispose of Murmellius’s com-
mentaries as testimonies of a dull daily word-for-word analysis. From a modern 
perspective, one may even, like Grafton and Jardine, be prompted to resort to 
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terms like a ‘ruthless drilling’19 or ‘an overwhelming preoccupation with a profu-
sion of tiny details’.20 But on second glance, what impression do these textbooks 
make when approached from a more historical point of view?
2.1 Latin from theory to practice
Within the brief period of circa 1500-1520, Murmellius and his fellow humanist 
schoolteachers carried through a profound reform in the Latin schools of the 
Netherlands and Westphalia. During the Middle Ages, following a decree of 
the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215), parish and chapter schools had been 
founded in order to prepare boys for offices at the service of the church, under the 
wing of the ecclesiastical authorities. With the late medieval rise of towns, most 
municipalities had gained control of the schools. The humanist schoolteachers 
met the increasing demand of the town establishment for a more liberal educa-
tion, which was to prepare their citizens-to-be for ecclesiastical as well as secular 
offices. In concordance, the aim of the studia humanitatis, teaching literature and 
moral values hand in hand, was not only the transfer of knowledge, but expressly 
also citizenship education.21 Or, in the humanist maxim adapted from Seneca: 
Latin education was meant to be useful non scholae, sed vitae (‘not for school, but 
for life’). Consequently, literature of sound moral content became the main sub-
ject, at the expense of linguistics.
In the late Middle Ages, the dialectical method had defined grammar educa-
tion. At school pupils were drilled in a complex system of grammatical rules. The 
most widespread late medieval textbook Doctrinale, originally composed by Alex-
ander de Villa Dei around 1200, theorized on linguistic subtleties. The handbook 
confronted the student with an intricate web of morphological and syntactical 
rules, formulated in verse in order to facilitate memorisation. However, the rigor-
ous metrical form generated contrived, distorted expositions that could only be 
grasped by more advanced students, with the help of explanatory remarks. The 
happy few that succeeded in taking the theoretical hurdle still faced the hazardous 
task of applying the artificial formulas in practice and turning them into fluent 
speech. Following the lead of Italian humanist teachers, Murmellius considered 
the bulky medieval grammar Doctrinale to be inexpedient for young children.22 In 
contrast to the deductive approach of the Doctrinale, he advocated an inductive 
method. Through an intimate acquaintance with ancient literature, pupils would 
pick up and learn to apply the language of the classical authors in practice:
Bonus praeceptor et dignus, qui pueris docendis praefi ciatur, sit singula-
ri virtute et doctrina praeditus, cum a sermonis, tum maxime a morum 
barbarie alienus ... Caveat imprimis, ne, ut plerique faciunt, supervacaneis 
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rudimentorum grammatices praeceptis et diff usis variisque plurimorum 
vocabulorum circa Alexandri Galli versus interpretationibus discipulos 
detineat, qui multo commodius longeque maiori studiorum gratia regulis 
grammaticis breviter transmissis in Bucolico Vergilii carmine vel comoedia 
aliqua Plauti seu Terentii vel in epistolis dialogisve M. Tulli et verborum 
signifi catus ediscere et verae sinceraeque Latinitati assuescere possent.23
‘A good teacher, worthy of an appointment to teach the youth, should be 
endowed with singular virtue and knowledge, and refrain from barbarisms 
of speech and especially of moral conduct. ... He should in particular take 
heed not to delay his pupils, as most teachers do, with unnecessary rules for 
the elementary grammar and the diff use and divergent interpretations of 
many words around the verses of the Frenchman Alexander, whereas they 
could much more easily and with much more delight in their studies learn 
the meaning of words and get acquainted with real and pure Latin by read-
ing an eclogue of Vergil or a comedy of Plautus or Terence or the epistles 
or dialogues of Cicero.’
Murmellius not only advocated less grammar and more literature furthering the 
Latin eloquence and morals of his pupils in treatises and handbooks. He also 
enabled the necessary curricular reform, by publishing short grammar summaries 
and editing a range of classical, early Christian and humanist texts.
When in 1512 a young Joannes Bugenhagen wrote a letter from Treptow filled 
with words of admiration to his fellow schoolteacher in Westphalia, he showed 
the highest regard for the actual school practice of Murmellius, based upon the 
progress both his under-teacher and his brother had made while attending classes 
in Münster. He also explicitly expressed his esteem for the conciseness and qual-
ity of Murmellius’s manuals and annotated text editions:
Detestatus posthac longas quas dicunt continuationes, quas facimus et 
male quidem in explanandis autoribus, in eam tandem veni sentientiam, 
nihil esse abs te scriptum, vel interpretatum, quod non summopere amplec-
tar, nihil praeceptum persuasumve, quod non sequar aut vel sequendum 
alios hortando praedicem.24
‘Ever since [I became acquainted with your textbooks and school editions] 
I detest those long sequences of words that we use, and wrongly too, when 
explaining authors, and have fi nally come to see that you have written or 
explained nothing that I cannot wholeheartedly embrace, and prescribed 
and advised nothing that I don’t follow or urge others to follow.’
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Three years later Bugenhagen took it upon himself to prepare an edition of 
Murmellius’s revolutionary concise grammar summary De latina constructione 
viginti quinque praecepta (‘The Construction of Latin in 25 Rules’), treating in a 
nutshell such basic rules as congruence, the cases, and specific Latin construc-
tions like accusativus cum infinitivo, supinum and ablativus absolutus.25 In the 
dedicatory letters to a prior, town secretary and headmaster, Bugenhagen sells 
the content as ‘common property, compiled in an uncommon fashion’.26 In the 
form of a dialogue between the original author and the editor, the title page 
not only advocates the merit of the booklet, but Murmellius’s groundwork as a 
schoolteacher in general:
Murmellius: Cur mea das aliis? Bugenhagen: Non ut mea sed tua doctis
 Dedico: quo inter nos nomen habere queas.
Murmellius: Infi ma cur doctis? Bugenhagen: Ut tutent, infi ma nec sunt
 Quis sine maiora frustra adit ipse puer.27
‘Murmellius: “Why do you give my rules to others?” Bugenhagen: “Not as 
mine but as yours I dedicate them to learned men, so that you can make 
your name among us.”
Murmellius: “Why do you give base rules to learned men?” Bugenhagen: 
“So they can protect them, and they are not base, because without them a 
boy proceeds to greater things to no avail.”’
2.2 Hard-won change from the bottom up
A discussion of the lengths a northern school reformer like Murmellius had to 
go to attain his goal is not in keeping with a mere ‘natural triumph of virtue over 
vice.’28 As difficult as a teacher’s life in general must have been in those days, set-
ting oneself up as a revolutionary humanist pioneer does not appear to have been 
the line of least resistance. On top of that, a happy outcome was far from predict-
able, especially for the infantry in the line of fire.
Like many of his colleagues, Murmellius embarked on a living as a Latin school 
teacher right after graduating from the academic Artes faculty, since he could not 
rely on the necessary means or family ties to purchase alternative options.29 From 
a commoner background, Murmellius had entered the University of Cologne in 
1496 as pauper living at the typical poor man’s college Laurentiana.30 As soon as he 
had become a master of arts in 1500, the force of circumstances made him switch 
over to the cathedral school in Münster, to become a deputy-headmaster at the 
age of nineteen:
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Sed fortuna novercante compulsus sum non multo post alios docere, dum 
ab aliis mallem discere, et coactus profi teri artem grammaticam, dum ma-
gis cuperem audire dilucidam et synceram sacrorum voluminum explica-
tionem. 31
 
Fortune turned against me, and not long afterwards I was forced to give 
lessons to others, while I had rather taken lessons from others, and I was 
compelled to teach grammar, while I longed to attend lectures on the clear 
and accurate interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.
The pedagogue Murmellius would time and again urge his pupils to proceed, 
if possible, to the higher Faculty of Theology, the ideal final destination of any 
study career, which had remained out of his own reach. For a social climber like 
Murmellius, the Latin school turned out to be the starting point as well as the 
finish line of his social mobility.
Correspondingly, teaching was not held in very high regard. The northern 
humanist pioneer Rudolph Agricola, who did have the means for an extended 
college life not only at the Universities of Erfurt, Cologne, and Leuven, but all 
the way to the academies of Pavia and Ferrara, acknowledged in letters that he 
was not the sort of man to take on the arduous tasks of a schoolmaster. He had 
declined a lucrative offer from the city of Antwerp: ‘I would have been head of a 
grammar school, rather a lowly position in itself, but also one which would have 
greatly hampered my studies.’32 ‘So to school with me? Where would I get the 
time for studying, where the leisure, where the peace and quiet to invent or cre-
ate anything? Where one or two hours (...) to spend on explaining some author, 
when most of the time is needed for dealing with the boys, which so utterly upsets 
the master’s patience that he needs the rest of his time to recover and regain his 
sanity rather than studying.’33 Considering the average school timetable and the 
class size, Agricola’s rejection has good grounds. Seven days a week, from 6 a.m. 
until 5 p.m., the average teacher found himself at the head of a class that could 
amount to a hundred pupils.34 Shortly after the invention of the printing press, 
books and paper were precious, so the learning process for the most part was con-
ducted out loud, causing a true bustle in the classroom. Apart from the rod and 
cane a teacher had to rely on advanced pupils to instruct their classmates and on 
occasion snitch on them. Agricola’s reservations about the combination of school 
and study seem to find support in Murmellius’s prefatory statements – relevant 
applications of a commonplace excuse − that he has composed his writings only 
very hastily in his scarce spare time as a schoolteacher.
While Agricola kept to a more academic career, he nonetheless instigated the 
dearly won reform in the Latin schools. In terms of the genealogy construed by 
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Erasmus in his Adagia, Murmellius could be considered another grandson of 
Agricola, with Alexander Hegius being his father.35 Agricola imported the stu-
dia humanitatis in his ‘barbaric’ native country, where he found a willing pupil in 
his friend Alexander Hegius, headmaster of the Latin school in Deventer.36 As 
a result, Hegius’s school became an early stronghold of humanism where Mur-
mellius, Erasmus and a whole generation of humanist reformers-to-be were edu-
cated. Hegius introduced several precursory humanist changes in the classroom, 
presenting his pupils with ancient literature while at the same time clinging to 
the Doctrinale, albeit in a modified version, leaving it up to the next generation to 
proceed on the course laid out. Murmellius, even though necessity had called him 
to the classroom in the first place, took on the challenge far from half-heartedly. 
Once a teacher himself, he cultivated some specific educational notions his own 
former teacher had employed: the introduction of elementary lessons in ancient 
Greek, the auxiliary use of the vernacular in Latin textbooks for beginners and, 
most strikingly, the habit to have pupils compile their own ‘diaries’ of quotations 
and exercises, a rudimentary version of the humanist common place books.37 
Above all, Murmellius recognized in Hegius – legendary for his devotion to both 
his pupils and (at night) his scholarly work, and for his modesty and charitable 
deeds – the textbook example of the ideal humanist teacher, showing in person 
the correspondence between acquired learning and sound morality.
Murmellius’s first teaching job confronted him with harsh reality, serving as 
deputy-headmaster under a principal who in his view failed to meet the dou-
ble standard of erudition and decency. On the bright side, the young university 
graduate was taken in as a protégé by the Münster provost Rudolf van Langen, 
who had been in close contact with both Hegius and Agricola through corre-
spondence and study meetings in the so-called Academy of Adwert, an abbey 
near Groningen. Van Langen had put forward the ambitious idea for a humanist 
reform of the cathedral school, following the example Hegius had set in Deventer. 
Timann Kemener, another Deventer alumnus of an allegedly more authoritative 
age and nature than Murmellius, acquired the position of headmaster. Kemener’s 
textbooks show that he indeed had the ambition to become a leading school re-
former, but was held back in practice by a tendency to conform to the traditional 
demands of a solid manual. His substantial compendia summarizing all available 
material on a subject served the purpose of reference books, rather than teaching 
methods for children. Soon he was outshone by his deputy, who turned out to 
be a more radical and charismatic reformer. Besides his textbooks, Murmellius’s 
poetic Elegiae morales (1507), treating the humanist theme of human dignity, es-
tablished a fi rm name for Murmellius in humanist circles.38
In the writings of Murmellius, a growing resentment can be traced towards 
unspecifi ed writers of compendia obstructing the progress of schoolchildren; they 
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could make better use of their time editing ancient literature. Towards 1508 the 
alienation between the two humanist reformers culminated to the point that Mur-
mellius, for the time being, had to retreat from the cathedral school and settle for 
the headmastership of the less prominent parish school of St. Ludgeri in Münster.
Thereafter, Murmellius made his grudges against Kemener manifest in print 
without reservations: ‘He believes he has published ‘time-savers’ (compendia), 
while in fact they are ‘time-spenders’ (dispendia).’39 Murmellius’s open sneers at 
the avaricious would-be scholar − in his eyes − show that the conflict did not 
only revolve around the content of the curriculum, but also concerned status 
and money. The episode reveals the vulnerable status of an under-teacher at the 
time. His position and earnings were under the control of the school head, who 
received a guaranteed basic income from the municipality, which was to be sup-
plemented with tuition fees from the students. Given this underdog position and 
the less than reverential remarks about Kemener, Murmellius’s comeback at the 
chapter school in 1512 as deputy under the very same headmaster can only be 
explained as revealing evidence of both the continued support of Van Langen 
and the reputation Murmellius had by now earned as a pedagogue and publicist.
The come-back results in an innovation representing a milestone within the 
history of education, while at the same time strikingly underlining the depen-
dent relationship of an under-teacher. Restored to his former position, Murmel-
lius played a significant part in bringing about the crown achievement of the 
humanist reform: lessons in ancient Greek. Evidently, Joannes Caesarius, private 
instructor of Greek in Cologne, had been made an offer by Timann Kemener to 
come and teach at the Münster chapter school. However, as can be gathered from 
two letters that Caesarius wrote to Murmellius, Kemener did not follow up on 
the agreement.40 Since Caesarius had already gone to great expense by ordering 
300 Greek grammars from Paris, he asked Murmellius to intervene. From a sec-
ond letter of Caesarius, filled with words of gratitude to Murmellius, it appears 
he did indeed lecture in Münster, during the fall of 1512, not only to educate the 
schoolboys but most of all the schoolmasters. Caesarius’s stay can be labelled a 
landmark, for thanks to his tuition under-teacher Joannes Hagemann acquired 
sufficient knowledge to continue the lessons in Greek. Reputedly, the chapter 
school became the first humanist school in Germany to teach the second ancient 
language.41 However, the epoch-making Greek teacher himself received small 
thanks for his pains, as appears from the account he gave Murmellius. Kemener 
did not pay him the agreed fee, and neither did most other teachers. When Cae-
sarius left town that very same year, he had earned hardly enough money to cover 
his travel expenses.
In 1513, according to Murmellius’s own statement after generous offers from 
several other towns, the city of Alkmaar employed him as head of the town 
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school. All the way in the northwest of Holland, Murmellius freely enjoyed the 
privileges of a headmaster. In his programmatic pedagogic letter, containing the 
self-conscious statement quoted in the introductory paragraph, we find him am-
bitiously outlining a humanist school programme, recommending literature and 
textbooks.42 On the other hand, the school regulations in the same letter show 
us a glimpse of the daily trials and tribulations that came with the position. A 
headmaster was at all times and places accountable for the conduct of his pupils. 
Not only are students admonished to fear God, obey their parents and teachers, 
show priests, civil servants and teachers due respect, and be kind to their land-
lords, housemates and fellow students. They are also told not to use violence, 
touch other people’s property, sleep outside their lodgings or wander the streets at 
night. In no uncertain terms the adolescent boys are told to keep clear of brothels, 
bars, women, weapons, gambling and alcohol abuse. Nonetheless, the headmaster 
stayed productive in print, and after many years of preparation finally issued his 
philological masterpiece: an edition and commentary of Boethius’s De consola-
tione philosophiae (1514), incorporating a transcript of enarrationes autographas 
(handwritten annotations) of Agricola.43
During the four years of Murmellius’s headmastership, not merely the school 
but the whole town of Alkmaar thrived: sources add up to a number of ca. 900 
students in a town which at the time may have counted some 4200 inhabitants. 
In 1515, the town council and rector were so delighted with their settlement that 
Murmellius’s contract was renewed for nine more years. However, before too long 
both cultural life in general and a schoolmaster’s position proved feeble. In 1517, 
a band of soldiers from the south conquered and plundered the town. Robbed of 
his belongings, Murmellius fled the town and its region. Heading eastward, the 
established pedagogue was forced to take on a job as a subordinate teacher once 
again, under headmaster Gerardus Listrius in Zwolle. Although Listrius had al-
ready published his commentary on Erasmus’s Moriae encomium, a testimony of 
his humanist learning, the Doctrinale was still in use at his school − to the great 
indignation of Murmellius. For the second time Murmellius became entangled 
in a fierce controversy with his headmaster. After just a few months, Murmellius 
left Zwolle to become a teacher in Deventer, at the school where he spent his 
adolescent years. Only two weeks after his arrival in Deventer, and following his 
publication of the sharp Epigrammata paraenetica questioning Listrius’s humanist 
learning and moral standard, Murmellius suddenly fell ill. The Epicedion by fel-
low humanist Hermannus Buschius informs us that not only the learned world 
was left destitute, but also a wife and infant child.44
The funeral poem by Buschius ends on a positive note: Murmellius’s life may 
have been taken away, his humanist ideals will live on ever so vigorously. In fact, 
Murmellius’s schoolbooks were to be used by children long after his lifetime. 
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Many of his pupils grew up to be schoolteachers themselves or otherwise advo-
cates of humanism. Today, the classical and humanistic texts he edited and the 
handbooks, pedagogical treatises and poems he composed provide an exceptional 
inside-look into the rather dark beginnings of humanist education in the Low 
Countries. Not only the lack of source material or the singular excellence of Eras-
mus has left the northern Latin schools lingering in the dark. Vision was clouded 
for a long time, since the initiation of the humanist reform at the Deventer school 
was mistakenly attributed to the Brethren of the Common Life.45 Later, the atten-
tion paid to academic training may have blocked the view towards pre-university 
education.46 However, Murmellius’s achievements are a continuing reminder of 
the essential contribution of the people in the field. Before humanist education 
gained a foothold at the universities, the reform at the Latin schools was already 
well under way. If dedicated schoolmasters like Murmellius had not laboured to 
win over the next generation, the studia humanitatis would never have gained such 
extensive and lasting territory. In sum, to quote the evocative words of Willmann: 
’The humanists had to delve the source from the rock, and then laborious school-
men had to dig rivulets for it’.47
2.3 Humanism versus scholasticism?
Striving for their ideals, humanist reformers met with opposition on their way. 
Polemics rose that, as in the case of Murmellius and Kemener, could escalate 
into full-scale affairs through a combination of factors − including more material 
matters such as status and money. As a consequence, the humanist reform activi-
ties brought about a polarisation and splits that may have been unwanted at the 
outset, or downright inconceivable. Reviewing the case of a pioneer like Murmel-
lius, it becomes clear that the diff erentiation between scholastics and humanists 
at the time was not as black-and-white as hindsight may suggest. Apparently, dur-
ing Murmellius’s college years in Cologne, the tensions between humanists and 
scholastics had not yet surfaced. Only gradually, after the turn of the sixteenth 
century, did the University of Cologne become the focal point of a fi erce struggle 
that would go down in history as the battle of the humanists versus the scholastic 
viri obscuri (‘obscure men’). Similarly, the split between pre-university education 
and the academic curriculum seems to have surfaced only in due time. Whereas 
the humanist reform in the northern schools would expand rapidly after 1500, 
humanism would only step by step gain a foothold at the universities. Instead of 
radically turning around the traditional academic study programme, the studia hu-
manitatis had to fi nd their way within a tightly structured scholastic curriculum.48
In this respect we need to bear in mind that, unlike the term studia humani-
tatis, the designation humanist is an anachronism,49 stressing discontinuity in 
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hindsight where continuity played its part as well. Whereas we might be inclined 
to speak of the humanist reform in terms of a transition from the traditional artes 
liberales to the Renaissance studia humanitatis,50 Murmellius and his humanist 
colleagues used related terms almost synonymously: referring to their field of 
activity, they spoke of philosophia (philosophy), liberales artes (liberal arts), bonae 
artes (good arts51) or humanae artes (humane arts).52 Still, a difference in overtone 
surfaces in a work like Murmellius’s Aurea bonarum artium praeludia (‘Prelude to 
the good arts’, 1504). In a nutshell the booklet treats the different artes disciplines 
belonging to the collective called philosophia, but it does so humaniori stylo (‘in a 
more humane style’): the booklet is meant to prevent students from withdrawing 
from the study of philosophy altogether because of the perceived barbaric lan-
guage in the traditional handbooks.
The terminology further indicates that to a Latin schoolteacher like Murmel-
lius – a deputy headmaster teaching only the most advanced pupils heading for 
university53 − the distance between his own field of activity and the academic 
arts study might have appeared relatively small. After all, in his schola triviali the 
three liberal arts of the so-called trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic)54 were 
taught in preparation for the liberal arts study at the propaedeutic Artes fac-
ulty, designated philosophicum gymnasium.55 In hindsight the Artes faculty can be 
typified as ‘a grammar school within university’.56 As can be gathered from a text-
book like Murmellius’s In Aristotelis decem praedicamenta isagoge (1513), the Latin 
schoolteacher fully accepted his responsibility to cram his choice pupils for the 
academic curriculum, dominated by Aristotle. The concise introduction in the 
ten Kατηγορίαι (Categoriae), an indispensible component of Aristotelian logic, 
was incorporated in Joannes Caesarius’s Dialectica (first edition 1532), a much 
reprinted textbook that would in time substitute the ‘barbaric’ Summulae logicales 
by Petrus Hispanus at most Catholic universities.57
Murmellius’s treatise Didascalici libri duo (1510), striking academic ground, de-
fines the artes disciplines in more detail, confirming that the teacher-pedagogue 
did not set out to rigorously replace the traditional system, but to give it a crucial 
humanist twist.58 Outlining a recommendable course of study, Murmellius sticks 
to the traditional seven artes liberales.59 However, following the Italian humanist 
Giorgio Valla60 and referring to his former teacher Hegius, he significantly adds 
ars poetica as an eighth discipline.61 The treatment of rhetoric might reveal the 
author’s humanist tendencies; also dialectic − the key to the scholastic method 
of logical argument and formal disputation dominating university education – 
receives due attention. Murmellius shows little consideration for the skirmishes 
between the prevailing, opposing philosophical schools: via antiqua versus via 
moderna and Albertism (the current school of thought at his former college Lau-
rentiana) versus Thomism. On the other hand, he does proclaim, both in the 
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Didascalici libri duo and elsewhere, his high regard for the scholastic thinkers 
Albertus Magnus (honoured as teacher in the artes humanae62), Thomas Aqui-
no and Duns Scotus.63 Whereas the relatively clear expositions of these doctores 
theologiae fitted Murmellius’s fundamental belief that Studia omnia ad Dei cultum 
convertenda (‘All study is to be turned to the worship of God’), the subtle quib-
blings of their self-proclaimed followers apparently were considered irrelevant or 
even an impediment to this ultimate goal.64 The paratext of the Didascalici libri 
duo strikingly reflects how a humanist innovation was not perceived − for the 
time being − as a threat to the traditional academic system: the book is dedicated 
to Murmellius’s beloved former tutor of the Bursa Laurentiana, the theologian 
Arnold van Tongeren; a liminal poem by Ortwinus Gratius, another alumnus 
from Deventer who tried to make a living in Cologne as a teacher of rhetoric and 
poetic, hails Murmellius for heralding foelices anni nobis, nova tempora mundo 
(‘blessed years for us, new times for the world’).65
Even when Gratius wrote these hopeful words, the first fissures had already 
appeared that would in time divide the learned world and dissolve dear relations 
– as both Gratius and Murmellius would experience all too well. At the time 
of Murmellius’s clash with his less innovative headmaster Kemener in Münster, 
humanist acquaintances had come into conflict with the academic establishment 
in Cologne. In 1507, the popular Italian law professor Peter of Ravenna was dis-
ciplined by the board of theologians for criticizing a princely ban on burying 
criminals who had accepted God’s grace just before their execution. In the fall of 
1509, Hermannus Buschius was blocked in his attempts to reform the academic 
curriculum by replacing the Doctrinale with the Ars minor of the fourth-century 
Roman teacher Donatus. His plans were hindered by Ortwinus Gratius, who 
deemed Donatus an appropriate textbook for schoolchildren, but the Doctrinale 
essential teaching material for students proceeding to a higher level.66 The con-
flict documents a growing awareness of the far-reaching consequences a humanist 
educational reform would have at the academic level: ‘In terms of the established 
pattern, humanism forced a crisis by proposing a program, which in effect chal-
lenged the primacy of dialectic and, in so doing, impugned the whole curricular 
organization and the teaching professions as such, and thereby threatened the 
intelligibility of the whole universe.’67
Both Ravenna and Buschius decided not to take their blows submissively, but 
to fight back in print, just like Murmellius did in his controversy with headmaster 
Kemener in Münster. In the case of Peter of Ravenna, a chain of polemics devel-
oped, not only between the principal antagonists, Ravenna and the theologian 
and inquisitor Jacob van Hoogstraten, but also involving sympathizers taking up 
their pen in support.68 In March 1508, Ortwinus Gratius established himself as 
Ravenna’s most vocal defender by issuing an apology. A few weeks later, when the 
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Italian professor felt forced to leave Cologne, Murmellius wrote a farewell eulogy, 
praising the professor’s pious, honest and true doctrines.69 Polemics continued 
up to the point that Hoogstraten published his closing statement Protectorium in 
1511, although his opponent had already died in 1509. Apparently, the stakes were 
deemed high enough. The Protectorium contained many declarations in support 
of Van Hoogstraten’s standpoint, including a liminal poem by Gratius who had 
by then evidently conformed to the academic establishment. In the conflict over 
Donatus between Buschius and again Gratius, Murmellius found two of his more 
familiar colleagues opposing each other. However, he appears to have maintained 
a neutral position, as for the time being relationships continued seemingly un-
harmed.70 In 1513, Buschius and Gratius would even find their names side by side 
in a textbook of Murmellius, to which they both contributed a liminal poem.71
Later on, from his outpost in Alkmaar, Murmellius kept close track of friends 
and affairs more eastward as well. At the University of Cologne the notorious 
conflict between Joannes Reuchlin and the leading theologians broke out, mobi-
lizing humanists far beyond the city walls.72 The jurist Reuchlin, an expert in the 
third classical language Hebrew, had declared himself openly against the confis-
cation and destruction of Hebrew writings, arguing that they had to be studied 
and discussed in order to convert Jews to the Christian faith. The essentially legal 
conflict escalated stepwise into an unprecedented polarizing polemic between 
humanists and academic scholastic theologians. Reporting to Murmellius from 
the frontline, Buschius at first showed himself hesitant to take sides.73 Subse-
quently, Buschius became one of Reuchlin’s foremost defendants, collaborating 
with fellow humanists in writing the infamous Epistulae obscurorum virorum, fic-
titious satirical letters ridiculing the theologians as illiterate obscurants.74 Two of 
Murmellius’s respected acquaintances fell prey to the humanist propaganda for 
siding with Reuchlin: his former philosophy professor Arnold van Tongeren and 
the ‘traitor’ humanist scholar Ortwinus Gratius. At the expense of these long-
standing relationships, Murmellius threw in his lot openly with the humanist 
camp and published an eulogy of Reuchlin in 1516.75
The conflicts affecting Murmellius’s closer and wider circle expose the fine 
line between humanists and their allegedly more ‘obscure’ opponents. Murmel-
lius found himself countered in his attempts to bring about a humanist reform at 
the chapter school in Münster by headmaster Kemener, at the outset a Deventer 
alumnus just like him, committed to the same task of introducing the studia hu-
manitatis in the curriculum. Likewise Gratius, another former student and even 
underteacher of Hegius, was essentially a fellow humanist. However, he took a 
more moderate, conformist stand, promoting a programme of academic reform 
that ‘could be fitted into the scholastic curriculum without seriously challenging 
the values and intellectual method of scholastic learning.’76 Gratius’ academic ca-
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reer is symptomatic for the marginal existence granted to humanists at the faculty 
of arts in Cologne and other universities.77 Humanists could teach their courses 
in rhetoric and poetry, but only extracurricularly. They did not qualify for the 
same financial compensations as the regular members of staff, but were forced to 
scrape together an income by private tutoring and jobs on the side, for instance at 
one of the printing houses.78 There is an indication that Murmellius for a while 
also tried to come to some sort of rapprochement with the academy in Cologne, 
but had to give up disillusioned.79
Over the course of time, the mutual policy of tolerance between the more radi-
cal humanists and the academic establishment fell apart. The realization dawned 
that a fundamental curricular reform constituted a fundamental threat to the 
traditional scholastic study programme. More than that, however, the escalating 
polemics around Ravenna and Reuchlin proved provoking and polarizing. Con-
fronted with the nonconformist views of Ravenna and Reuchlin, the academic 
establishment of theologians felt compelled to assert its authority. Humanists, 
craving for scholarly and financial recognition, were not triggered at first by the 
essential legal and religious issues at stake. Slowly but surely, however, they adopt-
ed the conscientious stand of admired scholars as their common struggle against 
the scholastic academic stronghold. Using the printing press as their weapon, 
they launched a striking propaganda campaign against their ‘obscure’ opponents 
that would mark them for centuries to come.
Gratius, in a favourable position at the Quentell printing house, tried in vain 
to counter the bad press. Retorting the satire of his opponents, Gratius issued 
in turn fictitious Lamentationes obscurorum virorum (‘Complaints of the obscure 
men’, 1518), quoting one of Murmellius’s former tributes to Van Tongeren to dem-
onstrate the untruthfulness of the Reuchlinist allegations.80 Before that, still 
during Murmellius’s lifetime, Gratius had edited a second print of Murmellius’s 
commentary on Boethius ’s De consolatione philosophiae (1516), removing the head-
master’s positive evaluation of Reuchlin’s Defensio. Murmellius struck back in his 
Scoparius (‘Broom’, 1517) with a tart judgment on the edition in question. Gratius 
had the last word in a posthumous reprint of the pamphlet (1518), not limiting 
himself to removing the unwelcome comments, but even putting a denunciation 
of the Epistolae obscurorum virorum in the mouth of the late author. Nonetheless, 
Murmellius’s Scoparius clearly voices a radical humanist stand, with the inten-
tion of sweeping away all enemies of humanism, from scholastic theologians to 
illiterate priests. Consisting of more than a hundred quotations from ancient and 
humanist authors, the work is a manifestation of humanist learning as much in 
form as in content. In two especially noteworthy chapters, where grammatical 
and lexical textbooks and sound commentaries on an impressive selection of au-
thors are listed, the practical pedagogue Murmellius speaks up one last time.81
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2.4 Th e morality and liberality of humanist schooling
The combination of ideology and practical guidelines which comes to the fore in 
the Scoparius and many other writings of Murmellius82 allows us to reassess our 
perspective on the moral bias of humanist education. As indicated above, Grafton 
and Jardine accused intellectual historians of taking over ideological claims in 
prefatory boasts ‘as part of a historical account of humanist achievement’. Instead, 
zooming in on the textbooks and student notes from the school of Guarino, they 
argued that:
One glance at the mass of surviving classroom material from the humanist 
schools of the fi fteenth century must make it obvious that, whatever the 
principles on which it was based, the literary training it provided was a 
far cry from this sort of generalised grooming for life. Even a charismatic 
teacher presenting the information which survives in student notes and 
teachers’ lecture notes would have been hard put to convert the dense accu-
mulation of technical material into quintessential ‘humanity’. Yet if we are 
to evaluate the impact of the humanist teaching curriculum on fi fteenth-
century ‘life and thought’, it is to this body of taught humanism that we 
must turn.83
Furthermore, Robert Black in his impressive study of the manuscript glosses of 
324 Florentine schoolbooks concluded that ‘Morals and philosophy make an oc-
casional appearance, but invariably such comments are lost in an immense ocean 
of philological minutiae’.84 However instructive and fruitful explorations of such 
commentaries and annotations may be, it remains to be seen whether the margin 
is the place to look for morality. To assess to what extent humanist educators put 
their ideals into practice and evaluate their socio-cultural impact, should we not 
try to take the bigger picture into account as well? Grafton and Jardine, evaluat-
ing a rhetoric course of Guarino on the basis of surviving notes on the opening 
lecture, resort to an evocative image to voice their doubt on the teacher’s effective-
ness:
Th ere is little attention to Cicero’s train of thought or line of argument − 
this is entirely lost in the scramble for detail. ... It is as if the teacher had on 
his desk a beautiful, completed jigsaw puzzle − the text. Instead of calling 
up his students to look at the puzzle, he takes it apart, piece by piece. He 
holds each piece up, and explains its signifi cance carefully and at length. 
Th e students for their part busy themselves writing down each explanation 
before the piece in question vanishes into the box. And the vital question 
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we have to ask ourselves is whether the accumulation of fragments which 
the student made his own could ever take shape as the whole from which 
they originated.85
Rather than the limitations of the humanist teacher, this metaphor poignantly 
exposes the limitations of the source material in question. What results can we 
expect when we base our evaluation of an educational system merely on sources 
providing us with annotation and notes? Should we jump from such a specific 
point of departure to the conclusion that there was a discrepancy between the 
moral claims of the humanists and their classroom instruction? When we only 
focus on the little pieces of the puzzle, will we ever get hold of the whole from 
which they might have originated – a whole that in surprising coherence might 
open up to us an unforeseen vista?
An exploration of the bigger picture should take into account the objectives 
and principles behind textbooks and school editions and therefore include ideo-
logical treatises and prefaces − not in order to take the humanists at their word,86 
but simply because these writings (or paratextual parts of them) were deemed the 
appropriate channels to express and justify underlying ideas and aims. Grafton 
and Jardine are right to warn about the commercial aspect of introductory state-
ments.87 Prefaces as well as treatises do not constitute unproblematic sources be-
cause of their persuasive nature and the rhetorical conventions at play. However, 
should we therefore disqualify their substance as meaningless claims altogether? 
Or can we try and evaluate the ideological statements, making due allowance for 
their rhetorical make-up, by examining them in their literary and socio-cultural 
context and taking into account other relevant primary and secondary literature 
at hand?
A corpus as wide-ranging as the oeuvre of Murmellius, combining ideology 
and practicality, allows us the desired multifaceted perspective. Taking in the 
panorama opened up by the life and works of the teacher-pedagogue and on the 
look-out for manifestations of the moral claims of the humanist educators, two 
phenomena stand out: the choice of the literature and the authors to be read in 
class, and the flores (‘flowers’) or loci communes (‘common places’).
As for the relevancy of the first phenomenon, Murmellius shows in ideological 
writings a clear preference for morally edifying literature above grammar, result-
ing in practical curricular outlines and book lists. He also produced the school 
editions and commentaries deemed essential for materializing these ideals. Fo-
cusing on the content of the editions, we may flinch for ‘the scramble for detail’. 
However, taking these school texts in as constituents adding up to a greater whole 
− a curricular shift to literature selected for its perceived moral value − their sig-
nificance for the implementation of a moral agenda becomes manifest.
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Furthermore, the method of ‘flowers’ (choice quotations) and ‘common places’, 
recurring in various shapes and in various places in Murmellius’s oeuvre, was a 
way to materialize claims of an education ‘for life’. Like his Italian predecessor 
Guarino and in the direct footsteps of Hegius, Murmellius promoted to teachers 
and pupils alike the method of noting down memorable quotations while reading 
ancient literature and listing them by topic, 88 so as to have them ready at hand 
when composing a poetry or prose composition.89 As Ann Moss has convincingly 
argued, these so-called loci communes were not only a method for reading, memo-
rizing and composing, they were a way of structuring Renaissance thought.90 The 
common place-books would become a big hit in the years to come, not in the 
least thanks to Erasmus, successfully exploiting the heritage of Rudolf Agricola, 
as Grafton and Jardine have pointed out.91 Murmellius’s works indicate, however, 
that before Erasmus’s De copia and De ratione studii or the success of his Adagia, 
the notebooks had already become common practice in the schools. Murmellius’s 
most successful school edition, an anthology of Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid, 
illustrates how the method of common places could be used to bring home a mor-
al message. After Wimpheling had condemned the writings of the controversial 
pagan poets as too lascivious to be presented to children uncensored, Murmellius 
published a choice collection of the ancient love poets consisting of flores (choice 
verses) preceded by loci communes (common places) articulating a moral sense or 
twist.92 The booklet was reprinted as many as 130 times until the eighteenth cen-
tury: by expurgating the ancient love poets, Murmellius ensured a lasting place 
for them in the school curriculum.
The Flores also signal that, while we scan the vista opened up by Murmellius 
for the ethical streak of humanist education, we should not overlook the liberality 
toning down the morality of the humanist schoolmaster. After all, Murmellius 
did not ban the controversial pagan poets altogether but made room for their 
verses − albeit selective and torn from their original context − in the Latin school 
curriculum. Another bestseller by Murmellius, his elementary Latin teaching 
method Pappa puerorum (‘Porridge for children’, 1513) fills in the picture.93 The 
bilingual textbook originally consisted of five parts: a concise lexicon arranged by 
topic, about 100 sentences schoolboys could use for daily conversation, 90 moral 
precepts, 43 proverbs and an overview of the conjugations. The Pappa proved an 
immediate success, with some 50,000 copies during the first 50 years after the 
first edition. The vernacular language and local references were adapted to new 
High German regions, and the content was expanded. The separately reprinted 
dictionary was greatly enlarged, translated into Polish94 and even Hungarian,95 
and republished until far into the seventeenth century. A startling impression 
of daily school life in Murmellius’s own days is provided by the colloquial sen-
tences. Schoolboys could find out how to meet and greet, look for a place to stay, 
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and borrow books and money in perfect Latin. Murmellius also taught them the 
words to snitch on a fellow student and − against school regulations − to play 
about, calling each other names, and spitting and peeing upon books and shoes. 
So here we arrive again at the key lesson from Murmellius that we should take 
to heart: it is a delicate balance between theory and practice, between lofty ideals 
and humble reality.
3 A history from the artes liberales to the humanities?
Above, the authors of the innovative study From humanism to the humanities have 
been appraised for opening up the early modern classroom doors. At the same 
time, they were criticized for looking in with too short-sighted a view, limiting 
themselves to a preconceived topical perspective. Correspondingly, while the edi-
tors of this volume deserve due recognition for launching the initiative of a his-
tory of the humanities, similar reservations apply to the design that is suggested 
by the central question of the conference:
how did the humanities develop from the artes liberales, via the studia hu-
manitatis, to the (early) modern disciplines?
In the entailed proposition, the descent of the present-day humanities is traced 
all the way back to the medieval and early modern disciplines in a seemingly 
linear evolutionary chain. If we follow this line of thought, we run the risk of 
ending up with too simplified a picture that does not hold up on close scrutiny, 
overlooking shades and focusing on contrasts where a more differentiated view 
would be appropriate.
As for the presumed transition from the artes liberales to the studia humani-
tatis, as mentioned above the studia humanitatis were promoted by Renaissance 
educators but not at the expense of the artes liberales. At the level of the Latin 
school, the so-called humanists were giving the linguistic trivium, which had been 
dominated by a dialectic approach to grammar in the preceding centuries, no 
more (but certainly also no less) than a literary turn, shifting the focus to the 
rhetoric form and moral content of ancient literature. Moreover, at the academic 
Artes faculty, where humanists struggled to obtain a firm footing, the scholastic 
curriculum was not taken over by the studia humanitatis, but modified at best.
As for the second transition in the proposed evolutionary chain, it is a big step 
for mankind from the medieval and early modern Artes curriculum to the hu-
manities practised at today’s universities. Different from the propaedeutic Artes 
faculty obligatory for all other academic fields of study, the humanities make up 
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a fully grown faculty on their own, on the same level as the other faculties of 
the natural, formal and social sciences. A list of the branches of study nowadays 
belonging to the humanities faculties shows at first sight a mix of disciplines of 
longer and shorter pedigree: history, philosophy, religion, languages and linguis-
tics, literature, visual arts and performing arts. However, there has been such a 
great shift in the content and the mutual relations of the disciplines that a closer 
look forces us to take a smaller step back in time. As it seems, the roots of most 
present-day academic humanities disciplines can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century − the century which witnessed at the very start the birth of both the 
pedagogic Neuhumanismus of Wilhelm von Humboldt cum suis and simultane-
ously the concept of humanism, creating in retrospect a time-honoured pedigree. 
In fact, the same treatise of Friedrich Emmanuel Niethammer that represents the 
first documented appearance of the word humanism – Humanismus as an edu-
cational system elevating man’s spirit as opposed to the more practical school of 
Philanthropismus − also explicitly makes the genealogical link between the studia 
humanitatis and the Humaniora.96
On close analysis, the proposed evolutionary chain falls apart in three incon-
gruous schemes – three histories of the humanities with a distinct point of depar-
ture and a distinct goal. In imagery reminiscent of the introductory quote: when 
we aim for Corinth, the overload should not be squeezed onto one unwieldy ship. 
Instead, three ships with separate cargoes should sail and try and make it to port 
safely on their own account. 
First of all, when outlining a history of the humanities with the proposed ti-
tle The Making of the Humanities, the point of departure, as follows from the 
observation above, should be the nineteenth century, when the traditional arts 
curriculum was supplemented with non-classical languages and literature, and 
the university was enlarged with social sciences like politics and economics and 
technology disciplines like chemistry and engineering.
Second, aiming at a history which goes all the way back to the artes liberales 
actually means not taking the present-day humanities as the point of departure, 
but instead starting from the first element in the evolutionary chain: the seven 
artes liberales, a curriculum inherited from antiquity97 that constituted within the 
medieval university the programme of the propaedeutic Artes faculty, providing 
the entrance ticket to the higher faculties of Law, Medicine or Theology; seven 
arts traditionally divided in the trivium, with its three linguistic disciplines of 
grammar, rhetoric, logic, and the quadrivium, consisting of the four quantitative 
disciplines of geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy. The result would be a 
history of the curriculum in Western education, developing into more than only 
the humanities. Since the humanities and sciences were not separated of old, the 
latter should be included as well.
Humanism in the Classroom, a Reassessment
The third possible scheme is not the history of a set of disciplines or the whole 
western curriculum, but of the ancient idea(l) of humanitas, linking linguistic 
competence with moral standing,98 metamorphosing in such different shapes 
as the studia humanitatis, the Humanismus coined by Niethammer or even the 
present-day humanities.
4 Epilogue: between idealism and realism
However appealing the ideal of humanitas may have turned out to be throughout 
Western history, reality has caught up with us today to such an extent that we, 
humanities scholars, can no longer sustain the belief that the great literature of 
the past necessarily, as a matter of fact, ennobles its readers. After all, following 
the level-headed assessment of Stanley Fish in his New York Times blog: ‘If it 
were true, the most generous, patient, good-hearted and honest people on earth 
would be the members of literature and philosophy departments, who spend 
every waking hour with great books and great thoughts, and as someone who’s 
been there (for 45 years), I can tell you it just isn’t so.’99 Nonetheless, the privi-
lege of perceiving in the humanities a way to pursue personal fulfilment and 
happiness has drawn many of us to this field of study. On the other hand, these 
disciplines are certainly no better a way to get to Corinth than the sciences, and 
there are many other ways besides. Likewise, it is important to note that the 
humanities most certainly are no more dependent on establishment values than 
the sciences.
With the zest for humanitas put in perspective, are the humanities in danger 
of losing their right to exist − especially given demands for valorisation, re-
flecting ever prevailing issues of status and money? To my mind, a most clinch-
ing argument in support is to be found exactly in the profound impact such 
historic counterparts as the artes liberales and the studia humanitatis have left 
on our Western history, shaping our culture during the time that their socio-
cultural position seemed much more self-evident. Even when those disciplines 
differ from ours in their basic principles, content, and socio-cultural position, 
they still constitute a most valid and crucial object of study within our human-
ities departments. On that account, research into the history of education, not 
only chasing the great names but also receptive to the relevancy of seemingly 
historical non-persons, constitutes a lofty and urgent goal truly worth striving 
for.
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Th e History of Poetry in Early Modern Literary 
Criticism
Cesc Esteve
In his ‘Essay upon the Epic Poetry of the European Nations’, which first appeared 
in London in 1727, Voltaire reproaches ‘the greatest part of the critics [who] mis-
take commonly the beginning of an art, for the principles of the art itself ’ and 
complains about their tendency to believe ‘that everything must be, by its own 
nature, what it was when contrived at first’.1 Voltaire understands that, since all 
the inventions of art change because fancy and custom differ in time and from one 
nation to another, critics should find the nature and eternal rules of epic poetry 
in those features that have been common to the genre in different periods, peo-
ples and literary traditions. Voltaire is probably referring to most of the authors 
of poetic treatises from the sixteenth century, because they share the conviction 
that the essential nature of poetry, as well as its purest and greatest forms, lie 
at its origins. Apparently, Voltaire’s theoretical criteria are much more sensitive 
to historical and cultural change than those of the critics of whom he disap-
proves. However, the somewhat paradoxical fact is that this confusion between 
beginnings and principles ensured that early modern critics adopted historical 
approaches and methods for the study of literature.
Needless to say, there are significant differences between the ways that schol-
ars of each period conceive of literary history and consider its value as a branch 
of knowledge. For most Renaissance critics, studying the history of poetry de-
serves less attention and effort than classifying its genres and types of verse, 
defining its universal features and effects, and instituting artistic rules and moral 
precepts in order that future writers achieve literary excellence and lead read-
ers towards virtue. The interest in relating the origins of lyric poetry, discover-
ing who invented the hexametre or recalling the names of the first authors of 
tragedies very often complements and completes philosophical research. Ancient 
and illustrious authors supply the theories and systems displayed in the treatises 
with practical examples and models for imitation, and exploring the ancient past 
of poetry offers critics the opportunity to show off their erudition.2 Like the 
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accounts of the origins and founders of poetry, which appear in the margins of 
the artes poeticae, historical research occupies a minor position in the genres of 
early modern literary criticism, where its function is subordinate to theoretical 
purposes.3
However, it is worth noting that the scientific status and the forms of literary 
history change over the course of the sixteenth century. Research into the past 
becomes more complex and more autonomous from the methods and goals of 
poetics: in this process, early modern literary historiography develops interests 
and practices more similar to those of Voltaire and his contemporaries. Thus, 
critics who, at the beginning of the Cinquecento, under the influence of the hu-
manist tradition of defence and praise of literature, focus their attention on the 
sacred origins of poetry gradually give way to historians who have to take into 
account recently discovered ancient and medieval sources and authorities in ad-
dition to contemporary accounts not only, as was customary, about the first poets 
and the causes of the invention of the literary art, but also about the foundation 
of modern vernacular literatures. As I will show, these narratives involve different 
and sometimes contradictory versions of the chronological beginnings of poetry 
and its original forms and functions. New evidence and arguments force critics 
to intervene in the controversies arising from the various claims for the honour 
of having discovered such an illustrious art, and, more importantly, these new ac-
counts imply a reconsideration of the same concept of origins and a shift towards 
a more secular assessment of its historical relevance.
Nonetheless, we need to avoid certain misconceptions that are quite common 
among historians of literary history and students of Renaissance poetics. Some 
scholars have dismissed these narratives because they lack scientific autonomy 
and do not form a separate genre. Others have assumed that, since the critics use 
these accounts to legitimize their theories, to praise their authors and literatures 
and to denigrate rival traditions, these narratives cannot be treated as proper 
instances of historical research, motivated and ruled by genuine historical in-
terests and methods. According to this view, the accounts should be studied as 
examples of a pseudo-history or, at best, as preliminary sketches of a modern 
literary historiography that is still only embryonic. As I pointed out, the quest 
for the origins of poetry in the Renaissance is founded on premises and practices 
that will gain relevance in the literary historiography of subsequent periods. 
But aside from these features and trends, it is necessary to bear in mind others 
which, although they may be alien to modern conceptions of the discipline, also 
provide these accounts with historiographical qualities and make them part of 
contemporary historical discourse.4 As a first step, therefore, I would like to 
show how the underpinnings of this narrative of origins are indeed genuinely 
historiographical in the Renaissance sense, in order to examine its role in the 
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conceptual framework of literary history as it developed towards more modern 
forms. An efficient way to do this is to consider why and how the quest for ori-
gins is also central to contemporary theories and genres of political and cultural 
history.
1 Th e historiography of origins in the Renaissance
It is worth recalling that both early modern historians and authors of artes histori-
cae consider that one of the main tasks of the historian is to find out and explain 
the origins of nations, the founders of cities and the causes of wars and revolu-
tions. Many of them share the strong belief that it is not possible to get a full, true 
and useful understanding of the nature and history of these and other entities, 
such as languages, customs and laws, without first knowing their origins. Histo-
rians and theorists formulate this principle in different terms because the idea 
has been transmitted to early modern culture by various traditions of thought. 
The Italian humanist Marco Antonio Sabellico, for example, in the preface to 
his Latin chronicle of Venice, written around 1470 but edited in translation on 
several occasions over the course of the Cinquecento, expresses his admiration for 
the extraordinarily high standards of civic and material progress achieved by the 
city. In his opinion, this exemplary wealth of good conditions is due to the virtues 
and wisdom of the founders of Venice, who would have been able to provide the 
political, legal and material means to guarantee, over the centuries, not only the 
support of the Venetians for the original institutions and forms of government, 
but also their commitment to developing all their inherent capacities.5
The conviction that the founders of a city and its first political regime imprint 
indelible characteristics on its inhabitants had already been stated by Leonardo 
Bruni and other humanist historians and would be repeated in the historical trea-
tises of the sixteenth century.6 The formula makes it relevant and useful to search 
for the origins of a city, and to trace its history from its origins, because it endows 
them with the power to determine and control its fortunes. The reflection on the 
historical importance of origins that the French linguist and orientalist Guil-
laume Postel makes in the prologue of his work De originibus et de varia incon-
siderata historia links with that of the humanist chronicles told ab urbe condita, 
but also adds new reasons to defend the value of this principle. His work, edited 
in Basel in 1553, is a compilation of various unknown histories of nations, but is 
also a catalogue of the origins of peoples, languages and customs. That is why 
he not only argues that everything he explains about the history of these entities 
is true because it is built on the solid ground of the absolute knowledge of their 
beginnings and causes, but also justifies the interest in the origins in their own 
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right and appeals to the intellectual and moral benefits of capturing the primeval 
substance of things. In this case, the value of origins is derived from their location 
at the beginning of time (or even outside of it), and stems from their capacity to 
protect the integrity of historical entities from corruption or any other kind of 
change caused by usage and the passing of time.7
Similar thoughts can be found in the very popular genre of military history. 
In the prefatory epistle of a chronicle of the recent wars of religion, published in 
1572, Henri de la Popelinière insists on the premise that to achieve the deepest 
understanding of anything, it is compulsory to grasp its origin and cause.8 In a 
book published a few years earlier, in 1564, the Italian writer and editor Thomaso 
Porcacchi explains that this same principle has inspired his compilation of the 
causes of ancient wars, but what is more significant is that Porcacchi draws on the 
authority of Aristotelian philosophy to conclude that the cause which motivates 
historical research is that which takes place at the beginning of the events and 
reveals the reason for which something has occurred or has been created.9 The 
French historian François Hotman exploits the belief that the origins of things 
preserve their true aims in order to prove that the abolition of the états générales, 
ordered by the king at the end of the fifteenth century, is a historical aberration. 
According to Hotman, the états générales would have been the latest in a long se-
ries of forms adopted by the first counsel created to guarantee the legitimacy and 
proper use of the French constitution, so to dismantle them would have meant 
abolishing its traditional function and, with it, corrupting the original political 
regime of the nation.10
As I will discuss later, some accounts of the origins of poetry are designed 
rhetorically to advance particular views in the debate over the real purpose of lit-
erary art. But political and military history deploys another conception of origins 
worth considering for its influence on literary history. Again, it is formulated in 
terms of a cause, but in this case it is related to the attitudes and motives of kings 
and generals, regarded as the main protagonists of history. Giovanni Pontano, 
Sebastian Fox Morcillo and Antonio Viperano are some of the historical philoso-
phers who tackle this issue throughout the sixteenth century. They take part in a 
long discussion, which has its roots in classical historiography, that focuses on the 
theoretical difference between the beginnings and the causes of wars, conspira-
cies and revolutions. Their opinions on the nature of each category vary and are 
quite complex, but what matters is that their definitions of causes often include 
the intuitions, prejudices, fears and hopes of rulers and commanders and that all 
of them agree that the characters and passions which determine events have an 
exemplary value: since they constitute circumstances that happen once and again, 
the reader of history who learns them is able to anticipate, prevent or improve the 
results expected from each cause.11 What is significant for the historical discourse 
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on poetry is the idea that ethics and passions may lie at the origins of things and 
determine their history. This is a key factor for the historians who attribute the 
invention of poetry to insane or divinely inspired authors and for those who link 
the proliferation of literary genres to the different characters and passions of an-
cient poets.
The genre of the catalogues of inventors of arts and various other things also 
emphasises the exemplary and personal dimensions of origins. The most popu-
lar work of this kind during the Renaissance was Polidore Vergil’s De inventori-
bus rerum, published in Venice in 1499, and re-edited in many languages and 
on many occasions throughout the sixteenth century. What needs to be stressed 
from Vergil’s research is a deep theoretical contradiction that also affects many 
contemporary literary histories. One of Vergil’s primary concerns is to unmask 
false inventors of arts and to restore the legitimate honours to those who really 
contributed with their discoveries to the progress of civilization. The problem 
arises when Vergil takes advantage of the superiority assigned to the primeval 
forms and regards these true inventors as the perfect masters: because in doing so, 
he contradicts his own progressive view of human history by implicitly question-
ing the possibility that imitators may improve the original achievements.12 Early 
modern historians of vernacular literatures adopt the overt political use of cul-
tural history that Vergil exemplifies. European critics’ need to impose their own 
versions of the origins of vulgar poetry is crucial for succeeding in the struggle 
over the supremacy of modern national literatures. However, the spread among 
Renaissance poetics of a progressive conception of literary history strips the ori-
gins of poetry of some of their key qualities.
2 From divine to natural origins. Th e Aristotelian turn of 
Renaissance literary history
The principles and methods of research into origins that Renaissance literary 
criticism shares with most contemporary historical genres start to take form in 
the first Italian artes poeticae of the sixteenth century, particularly in their first 
chapters, where the critics regularly repeat a short account about the sacred ori-
gins of poetry. This narrative (found, for example, in the treatises of Bartolom-
meo della Fonte, Girolamo Vida and Lelio Giraldi) derives from the work of sev-
eral prominent humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, like Petrarch, 
Boccaccio and Cristoforo Landino, and is adopted without significant changes to 
its form and function.13 With the aim of proving that the study of literature, and 
especially classical pagan poetry, is not an immoral and useless activity, this nar-
rative gathers ancient and medieval testimonies – Plato, Cicero and Saint Isidore, 
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among them – which are used to state that, at the beginning of human history, 
God inspired the first human beings to write verse or, alternatively, the need to 
create a poetic language, as the best way to communicate with the divine. Ac-
cording to this history, the first poets would have been virtuous and wise priests, 
prophets, theologians and philosophers in charge of the religious, moral and civic 
education of the community. Thus, originally, poetry would have played an essen-
tial civilizing role and constituted a discourse common to all the sciences, which 
would have been taught through metaphor, allegory and music.
In addition to these general statements, the narrative involves a discussion 
of specific issues, such as which authors invented poetry and when and how the 
literary art spread among other nations. Critics usually put the verses of the Old 
Testament devoted to God by Moses and David before the predictions of the Or-
acle of Delphi and the hymns of the vates Orpheus, Museus and Linus. Most of 
them draw on Hebrew and Christian medieval apologists, like Joseph, Eusebius 
and Jerome, to argue that the Jewish nation is much older than the Greek and that 
only the poets and prophets of the true faith could have really been inspired by 
the Holy Spirit. The theological difference and the chronological primacy of bib-
lical poetry prove its artistic superiority: thus, the narrative declares that pagan 
authors would not have learnt the literary art from Jewish masters until centuries 
later and affirms that, at the time of the first Greek poets, divine inspiration de-
generated into a much more common innate genius.14
It is clear that the efficiency of this apologetical function depends on the ac-
ceptance of the premise that at least some of its ancient virtues and purposes 
remain in all poetry. However, it is worth dwelling on the fact that the value of 
these exemplary origins is eroded when the controversy over the inventors enters 
the narrative, because this debate has its own concerns and focuses attention on 
the temporary dimension of literature, on its changes over time and its national 
differences. In any case, this is a minor conflict in the history of this narrative 
when compared with the deep contradictions that arise when critics have to take 
into account Aristotle’s version of the origins of poetry, following the increasing 
influence that his Poetics exerts in literary theory from the 1540s onwards. The 
discursive strategies that critics have to develop to incorporate the philosopher’s 
view into a coherent but still apologetical narrative mark a decisive turn in the 
formation of Renaissance literary historiography.15
As is well known, Aristotle considered that poetry was brought into being 
from two natural causes: the faculty of imitating, innate in every human being, 
and the pleasure of learning through imitation.16 Having established these natural 
causes, Aristotle traces a slow and gradual process in which those with a natural 
capacity for mimetic activity and the use of metres began to improvise composi-
tions and divide poetry into types according to their own characters: the more 
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dignified imitated noble agents and actions with hymns and encomia, while the 
more vulgar preferred invectives devoted to the actions of base men. According 
to the philosopher, the known history of these old poets started with Homer, 
and both types of literature evolved towards more dramatic forms thanks to his 
exemplary works.
Up to this point, Aristotle’s narrative calls into question the truth and the util-
ity of the whole history of sacred origins. This completely new version obliges 
theorists to assume that since the faculty of poetry came naturally to ancient 
peoples and began to take shape through spontaneous improvisations, anyone 
could have invented it, regardless of his moral and intellectual conditions, with 
no apparent purpose but to imitate and enjoy. In this view, there is no reason to 
consider that original poetry was pure, perfect and exemplary: its divine inspira-
tion and religious and educational functions vanish, its founders are forgotten, 
and what is more, some of the ancient poets are regarded as having had abject 
characters, while all those who wrote before Homer’s time and the discovery of 
dramatic literature become anonymous due to their lack of talent.
The contradictions between the two most authoritative versions are so sharp 
that some critics do not even attempt to combine them: those who strictly fol-
low Aristotelian doctrine, like Giovan Giorgio Trissino, adhere to the naturalist 
and progressive historical account of the philosopher. Those committed to the 
promotion of Christian, theological and platonic principles and literary models, 
like the Jesuit Lorenzo Gambara, Francesco Patrizi or Pierre Ronsard, neglect 
Aristotle’s view and insist on relating the history of the sacred authors, forms and 
functions of original poetry, lamenting the decline and degeneration of literary 
art due to its secularization and yearning for the restoration of its virtues and ef-
fects.17 These poetics continue to conceive of origins as the site which preserves 
the integrity of the essential qualities and purposes of poetry and as a literary 
Parnassus, the natural and sacred dwelling of the finest poets. Consequently, in 
these treatises the critics consistently justify the benefits of historical research in 
universal and exemplary terms.
However, the accounts which best demonstrate the tensions occurring within 
Renaissance literary historiography following the Aristotelian shift, as well as the 
need to develop new interests and methods, are those of the critics who deploy 
narrative strategies which aim at merging both versions and reducing their con-
tradictions. This is the case with the history that Giulio Cesare Scaligero rewrites 
in his influential Poetices libri septem, published in Lyon in 1561. Like Aristotle, 
Scaliger classifies the first poets according to their character, not to separate the 
noble from the vulgar, but the wild and rude from the ministers of God. He then 
proceeds to divide the latter into those who were divinely inspired and those who 
were exemplary for their virtues. Once the critic has accounted for all types of 
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originary poets, he categorizes them according to chronological period: the rustic 
ones are confined to a remote and unknown age, Orpheus and the rest of proph-
ets are assigned to the second age, while Homer marks the beginning of the third. 
Not satisfied with this classification, Scaliger then ranks them again according to 
the subjects of their poems so that he can describe them as theologians and moral 
and natural philosophers.18
Thus, Scaliger’s history assumes that poetry evolved from the very basic forms 
of the first unknown poets to more complex genres and authors who belong to 
another age and deserve to be remembered for the virtues and knowledge they 
instilled in their poems. Like Aristotle, Scaliger concedes to Homer a key posi-
tion in literary history, but also fills the gap that the philosopher leaves before 
the poet by describing which authors preceded and trained him. This way, the 
critic manages to omit from the prehistory of poetry all those qualities, purposes 
and authors that have traditionally bestowed the origins with exemplary values. 
Later critics, like Giason Denores in 1586, will follow Scaliger’s strategy with less 
sophisticated but equally efficient narratives which assert that poetry was born 
twice: the first time, in a spontaneous and crude manner, the second one, when it 
became an art.19
Scaliger’s narrative and its influence allow us to perceive slight but significant 
biases in Renaissance literary history: the spread of a progressive view of art pres-
sures historians to secularize their narratives and to shift their attention from 
origins to change. Thus, the theoretical, apologetic and exemplary profit of his-
torical research tends to be transferred from the discovery of origins and the com-
memoration of inventors to the value of more accurate, organized and detailed 
accounts (what cannot be known falls into literary prehistory) and, above all, to 
the learning that stems from tracing the specific vicissitudes of poetry.
3 Towards the invention of modern literary traditions
Contemporary historiography of vernacular literatures reveals similar biases 
towards interests and methods closer to those of modern cultural history. In 
Italy, for example, critics and linguists start using historical research to prove 
that Florentine literature descends from Latin and to advocate the exemplarity 
of its new ‘founders’, Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, after one thousand years of 
cultural decline. But the study of these same poets promotes research into their 
vernacular sources and influences, a trend that propitiates that European histo-
rians tend to pay more attention to the relationships, exchanges and filiations 
among different vernacular literatures and to start exploring their histories from 
comparative (also competing and conflictive) points of view.
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In the Prose della volgar lingua, published in 1525, Pietro Bembo offers a history 
of the origins of Italian language and poetry that illustrates both the potential 
and the tensions that these research trends generate in early modern literary his-
toriography. As many humanists had done before, Bembo dates the invention of 
Italian rhymes soon after the formation of the vernacular tongue, which would 
have resulted from the corruption of Latin caused by the contact with the bar-
barous languages spoken by the northern European tribes that had invaded and 
destroyed the Roman empire in the fifth century and settled down in Italy since 
then.20 Thus, the origins of Italian vernacular poetry appear in this narrative at 
the beginning of an age of ignorance and are linked to the nations and languages 
responsible for the obliteration of the cultural legacy of ancient civilization. This 
is seen by many Italian humanists as the ‘guilty’ birth of an alien literature in-
herently incapable of progressing in intellectual and artistic terms. Since Bembo 
aims at persuading the reader of the literary qualities and potential of the ver-
nacular, its history needs to be reconsidered from its origins.
The critic tackles the issue with several strategies. The simplest one consists 
in recalling that vernacular literature would have had a second and much better 
birth in the fourteenth century: due to the talent and learning of Dante, Petrarch 
and Boccaccio, Tuscan letters would have achieved excellence after a very short 
period. The crucial role that humanist historians, biographers and commentators 
attribute to the Florentine writers lies in their mastery of Latin and of the rules of 
classical eloquence, a knowledge that they would have applied in their vernacular 
works. Bembo tries to emphasize the benefits of the influence of Latin on the 
vernacular by arguing that it occurred at the very beginning of its formation. 
Thus, according to the linguist, in the vernacular Italian the Latin substratum 
would have prevailed over the elements which had stemmed from the barbarous 
idioms. Two historical factors shaped this process: the power of the aboriginal 
land, which had impregnated the vernacular with the natural language of the Ro-
man country, that is, Latin, and the fact that the transalpine peoples who settled 
in Italy changed over time, a process that reduced their linguistic influence over 
the vernacular. With these arguments, Bembo underlines the belief that Italian 
would have had a natural filiation with Latin, since both idioms would share geo-
graphical and national origins.21
This primary attribute of the vernacular would also explain its later devel-
opment, or rebirth, as a literary language. But Bembo adds another historical 
reason for this progress, related now to the Provençal heritage of Tuscan poetry. 
The historian dismisses the hypothesis that the earliest Italian authors learnt 
the art of composing in rhyme from Sicilian poets in favour of the version that 
considers the Occitan troubadours the first masters of Italian literature. To jus-
tify his decision, Bembo argues that the lack of textual and historical evidence of 
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primitive Sicilian poetry makes it impossible to appreciate its influence on the 
compositions of ancient Italian poets. Otherwise, especially in Tuscan poems, the 
critic finds many characteristics that reveal lexical and prosodic borrowings from 
Provençal poetry, which Bembo presents, significantly, as the oldest vernacular 
literary tradition in Europe. By establishing this historical relationship, the critic 
transfers from Occitan to Florentine poetry the prestige and exemplarity conven-
tionally assigned to ancient and original forms.22
It is worth noting that not many contemporary Italian critics are as willing as 
Bembo to admit that Dante, Petrarch and most of their disciples owed so much 
to a foreign literary tradition which, after all, emerged and developed among bar-
barous nations. Some of them prefer to keep strengthening the classical heritage 
of vernacular poetry by searching, for example, for the etymologic connections 
between the words rhytmus and rime, and for a historical explanation of how 
the resource of rhyming derived from techniques and usages already observed 
by ancient Greek and Roman poets.23 The history of lyric poetry that Antonio 
Minturno relates in his Arte poetica thoscana, printed in 1564, establishes a line of 
continuity between the primeval hymns and sacred songs of the prisci vates and 
the chaste love sonnets composed by Petrarch. Since Minturno wishes to advo-
cate the view that his fellow Italian poets are the modern privileged inheritors 
of classical literature, he is reluctant to contaminate his history of Italian lyric 
poetry with foreign and barbarous elements, so he does not mention any source 
or influence from the European literary traditions which, according to humanist 
history of learning, belong to the Dark Ages.24
However, Minturno’s historical awareness of the influence of French medieval 
poetry in contemporary Italian literature changes dramatically when he reports 
the history of the romanzo. The critic admits that Lodovico Ariosto and the rest 
of romanzisti learnt how to cultivate this narrative genre from Provençal and 
Spanish authors, though he immediately suggests that this is not a positive influ-
ence at all, since the name of this chivalric poetry comes from the term that origi-
nally designated the vernacular languages which emerged in Roman settlements 
in France and Spain after Latin was corrupted by indigenous idioms. Thus, the 
romanzo seems to carry the guilt of being an anticlassical kind of poetry, a feature 
that allows Minturno to consider it a foreign and barbarous genre and, as such, a 
very minor variety of heroic poetry, unable by nature to achieve epic perfection.25
The interests and interpretive patterns that shape Italian literary history 
spread across contemporary western Europe: they are assumed and adopted by 
French, British and Spanish critics, among others, but also reformulated and con-
tested through different research priorities and new accounts. Nevertheless, in 
this larger intellectual and political framework, the question of origins remains a 
central concern for the historical discourse on poetry.
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It is easy to notice that the attitudes and arguments with which European 
writers discuss Italian humanist cultural history change in a significant manner 
in the last decades of the sixteenth century, notably in France. In his Art poetique 
françoise of 1548, Thomas Sebillet reproduces the standard literary history dis-
seminated by Italian critics and expresses the conviction that Dante and Petrarch 
were the refounders of eloquence and poetry due to the fact that, since they were 
Italians, they could preserve some vestiges of ancient Roman literary knowledge. 
Sebillet dares to add to this narrative that soon after the Florentine writers re-
stored the art of poetry, French authors like Jean de Meun and Jean le Maire con-
tributed to its progress with their chivalric romances.26 A few years later, Jacques 
Peletier prefers to adopt a different strategy: instead of aligning French literature 
with a prestigious vernacular tradition with classical roots, he attempts to erode 
the power to determine the potential and development of languages and litera-
tures assigned to their origins. Thus, he argues that, since most accounts assert 
that poetry is a gift from God, there is no sense in searching for its inventors. 
Moreover, considering that this same celestial origin is universal, everyone should 
accept that literary skills must have been equally distributed among all languages 
and nations, and therefore no poetry can claim to be superior because of its an-
tiquity or its inventors.27
Later reactions from historians such as Henri Estienne, Étienne Pasquier and 
Claude Fauchet in France, Fernando de Herrera in Spain and Samuel Daniel in 
Britain are more aggressive and overtly question the premises, hierarchies and 
periods of the cultural history of Europe written by Italian humanists. These 
authors elaborate new reports to contest the origins, status and roles that this 
hegemonic narrative has given to their literatures, and they produce new his-
torical arguments to challenge the authority and exemplarity of Italian poets and 
scholars. I will focus my review on the works of Fauchet and Daniel because they 
represent a divergence from traditional approaches to the history of vernacular 
poetry and also because their methods provide some examples of the emergence 
of more sophisticated patterns for understanding literary history.28
To rival the prestige and influence that Italian literature has gained in the Ren-
aissance, many French historians attempt to find evidence of the ancient classical 
origin and heritage of their national predecessors, the Franks and the Gauls, in 
order to purify their culture and language from barbarous and corrupted traces 
and to displace them from a decadent age.29 In the Recueil de l’origine de la langue 
et poesie françoise, printed in 1581, Fauchet discards this strategy and devotes his 
research to demonstrating that, after the formation of the vernacular languages 
out of the corruption of Latin, French became the most important language and 
poetry in Europe. To support this statement, the historian adduces that French 
appeared before the rest of vernaculars, that it was spoken in many European are-
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as, and that its poetry was especially influential in Italy, Spain and Germany. Fau-
chet draws on common beliefs about historical relationships between vernacular 
literatures, disseminated by critics such as Bembo and Minturno, and arranges 
them to prove that French poetry was the source of most of the genres, resources 
and vocabulary of medieval European literature. According to the author, French 
masters taught the other nations how to write chivalric romances and lyric com-
positions. He finds evidence of this superiority in the great number of Italian 
words derived from French, in the fact that most modern epic heroes were in-
spired by French characters, in the subjects, images and meters that Petrarch and 
other lyric poets adopted from the troubadours, and, above all, in several testimo-
nies that confirm that the art of rhyming was invented in France and transmitted 
to the rest of Europe through French dominions, such as Sicily.30
Nor does Samuel Daniel need to discover the ancient Greek or Roman roots 
of English poetry to defend its value against those who, like Thomas Campion, 
wish to improve it by adapting it to a classical versifying system.31 In A Defence 
of Rhyme, published in 1603, Daniel designs his literary history with the aim of 
proving that modern poetic styles and fashions, deeply influenced by Continen-
tal and especially Italian tastes, may pervert the nature of English poetry, rather 
than increase its achievements. To make this statement acceptable, Daniel as-
sumes that some powerful historical prejudices and conventions established by 
humanist historiography need to be reconsidered. Therefore, he accuses all those 
to be profoundly ignorant who believe that an age of cultural decay followed the 
fall of Roman empire and that not until recent times there has been a revival of 
learning. The historian argues that a close examination of the history of arts and 
sciences reveals that long before sixteenth-century scholars such as Erasmus and 
More emerged, many men from many nations contributed to the advancement of 
knowledge: not only those students from the long list of Italian humanists, from 
Petrarch to Pico della Mirandola, whom Daniel cites, but also fellow compatriots 
such as the venerable Bede, who ‘flourished’ many centuries before, in a presumed 
period of darkness.
Daniel adds some crucial reflections to his defence of cultural progress in the 
Middle Ages concerning certain prejudices and risks that condition historical 
scholarship and are too often undetected by writers and readers. The most rel-
evant is the inclination of historians to judge peoples from the past not only as if 
they had to be very different from those of present times, but necessarily inferior 
regarding their intellectual capacity. Daniel holds that researchers should take 
into account the fact that history provides a quite superficial knowledge of re-
gions, customs and their circumstances and, in addition, should bear in mind that 
human powers are more universal, that is, more equally distributed among na-
tions and periods than most historians suppose. Thus, according to these premis-
The History of Poetry in Literary Criticism
es, Daniel suggests that one should reassess the accuracy and validity of the histo-
ries that describe ancient civilizations as a golden age, the Middle Ages as a long 
and uniform period of cultural crisis, and current times as the greatest revival of 
learning ever seen, and for the same reasons, one had better distrust clear-cut 
concepts such as classical knowledge and barbarous languages and literatures. As 
every nation receives a portion of universal wisdom, and the history of English 
medieval letters reveals a long succession of achievements, Daniel concludes that 
his nation has an eloquence of its own and that English poetry has developed a 
pleasant rhythm of diction sanctioned by custom. Therefore, it goes against the 
nature and the history of English eloquence to try and subject its forms to clas-
sical rhetorical and metric rules, because they are alien to its literary tradition.32
Fauchet and Daniel are both audacious enough to find new ways of exploiting 
historical discourse for the purpose of defending and promoting their vernacular 
literatures and allowing them to rival Italian poetry. In both cases, the interest 
lies in tracing the development of each tradition and relating it to the present 
rather than associating it with a particular past, detracting the historical value at-
tributed to origins, causes and inventors (Daniel does not even mention who the 
first English poets might have been). Since identifying classical roots is no longer 
perceived as the only possible tool (or the most efficient argument) for ennobling 
vernacular poetry, this narrative conveys a higher sense of change and singular-
ity, which is reinforced by the appeal to learn to estimate the worth of a poetry 
because it is naturally one’s own.
Th e changing perception of the relevance of origins and the increasing infl uence 
of progressive views of the cultural past go along with the secularization of literary 
history. In the narrative of the evolution of vernacular languages, God and divine 
causes tend to lose their role as the inspiration for poetry and poets, not only 
giving way to human agency, but also to impersonal forces and social and politi-
cal factors, such as institutions, customs and technology: Fauchet attributes the 
diversity of his country’s vernacular dialects to the proliferation of feudal courts in 
medieval France, and the widespread infl uence of French letters to its dominions 
across Europe; Daniel argues that the invention of printing involved an advance-
ment of learning, but also sees the development of military ordnance and printing 
technologies as a decisive historical factor for the emergence of the religious and 
political confl icts which put an end to the allegedly peaceful Middle Ages.
This interpretive framework results from conceptual changes that affect his-
torical thought and scholarship in the second half of the sixteenth century, but 
also takes shape due to the need to contest the particular views and claims of 
Italian humanism, as well as to question its grounds. It is in this context that 
the following hypotheses lose their validity: that the individual talent of certain 
authors, such as Dante and Petrarch, and the inherent and primeval potential 
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of languages, such as classical Italian and barbarous French, may determine the 
development of literary traditions. In addition, Renaissance poetics acquired au-
tonomy from ancient literary criticism as a result of a historical scholarship that 
stimulates cultural relativism and finds other historical reasons to legitimate and 
encourage literary preferences, for instance, when Daniel adduces history sanc-
tioned by custom to advocate the use of a plain style.
Some of the principles that sustain Voltaire’s criticism of the premises and 
methods used by previous scholars, as well as his proposal for a more consistent 
approach to the understanding of poetry, begin to take shape and come into ef-
fect in the late sixteenth-century historiography on vernacular literatures, and 
undergo a process of maturation over the following century. Voltaire overtly as-
sumes literary change and equates the exemplarity of Greek and Roman poetry 
with that of Italy, France, England and Spain, though he also firmly believes in 
universal and eternal laws, enacted by nature, and in national tastes and styles, 
produced by particular customs and characters, which also explain a given na-
tion’s instinctive dislike of foreign literatures. These are the parameters that de-
fine the new ‘commonwealth of letters’ and that create the conditions for the rise 
of historical and comparative approaches in modern literary studies. But these 
are also the terms that stimulate a new hierarchical conception of universal po-
etry and literary value, in which certain Western literatures now occupy the high 
status of ancient poetry, and encourage competition among national scholars. In 
short, the formation of early modern literary criticism and history reveals some 
of the foundational contradictions and conflicts that shape modern comparative 
literature.
Studying how the humanities evolved as a discipline must also take into account 
similar conflicts, which arose from tensions between their ideological principles 
and purposes and their actual development. As an educational and political pro-
gramme, humanities have at their core a human, anthropological and universal 
conception of culture. The disciplines devoted to the study of this human culture 
should enable an understanding of all the qualities common to the human condi-
tion, and help us appreciate the value of the humanities as a way of reconciling 
conflicting interests in the political and cultural domain.
However, the construction of the humanities as an interlocking set of disci-
plines also facilitates the emergence of national cultures, since the humanities 
are also used to promote the study of their particular histories, languages, arts 
and sciences as the necessary ideological terrain for the growth of qualities and 
values that we define as ‘human’. As this second dominant strain emphasizes what 
is unique and different in national cultures, it calls into question the very idea of 
a human (or Western or European) culture that evolves towards a more civilized 
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community. In addition, and precisely in order to avoid this contradiction, it be-
comes necessary to assume that only or principally national cultures provide the 
common elements of human culture and that some nations possess these com-
mon elements and advance them more than others. This resulting human culture, 
then, derives from a selection and hierarchy of components which are biased by 
the political interests, criteria and conflicts that the humanities claim to leave 
behind.
Early modern literary history allows us to perceive this same tension at work 
within the different conceptions of poetry. The narrative of the origins of po-
etry involves descriptive and normative approaches to literary art because its 
beginnings and developments are conceived of in terms that are simultaneously 
chronological and contingent (i.e. historically determined) as well as essential and 
exemplary (i.e. universal). This philosophical dimension of historical discourse 
accounts for a good deal of its transcendence and utility as a branch of knowledge 
in the Renaissance. However, its evolution towards modern historiographical 
forms implies a process by which the common premises and functions of his-
tory and philosophy are reconsidered and reassigned; the same evolution affects 
shared features of history, rhetoric and literary narrative. This process clearly sug-
gests that studying the making of the humanities must attend to these relations, 
shifts and redefinitions between their disciplines from a comparative point of 
view. 
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Transitional Texts and Emerging Linguistic
 Self-Awareness
Literary Study in the Late Eighteenth Century
P.M. Mehtonen
Humanism is the exertion of one’s faculties in language in order to  understand, 
reinterpret, and grapple with the products of language in history, 
other languages and other histories.
Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism,
New York 2004, p. 28
There is probably no post factum disagreement about the claim that the so-called 
linguistic turn was a significant scientific event in the twentieth century. How-
ever, the pre-history of such a turn – the turn itself consisting of a host of simul-
taneous intellectual processes rather than an abrupt moment of revolution – is a 
vaguer and largely unwritten story.1 This vagueness in itself may be challenging 
and a key to such slow processes that cannot easily be detected in scientific mani-
festos, axioms or groundbreaking innovations. One unmistakable element of the 
twentieth-century linguistic turn was a claim for the linguistic framework of hu-
man perception, cognition and pursuit of knowledge. But how did such a linguis-
tic self-awareness develop historically, in different sciences? This paper will ask, 
in a somewhat broader historical perspective and narrower disciplinary focus: 
what was the linguistic self-awareness of the systematic study of literature before 
the twentieth-century linguistic turn – and before even linguistics and literary 
studies were established as academic disciplines, in the nineteenth century?
It is not an unambiguous pursuit to determine what belongs to the history of 
a discipline before its name, ‘founding’ works, academic place and other noticeable 
circumstances have been established. A challenge for a comparative history of 
the humanities is thus to negotiate a consensus regarding each comparans and 
comparandum, to explore the forking paths of concepts and disciplines and not to 
ignore developments that have, in the history of the subjects, diverged in radically 
different directions or even remained as dead ends on the roadmap of sciences. 
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My present focus in this quest for a growing linguistic self-awareness of a disci-
pline is literary study in the period preceding the well-documented eighteenth-
century emergence of ‘comparative literature’ (littérature comparée, vergleichende 
Litteratur, vergelijkende letterkunde, etc.) as a systematic approach and, gradually, 
university subject in its own right.2
The investigation begins with names. Since the term ‘comparative literature’ 
refers to the approach and discipline that matured in the nineteenth century, 
in what follows the term ‘literary study’ is used as an English equivalent to the 
broader European term (Allgemeine) Literaturwissenschaft in German, (yleinen) 
kirjallisuustiede in Finnish, (algemene) literatuurwetenschap in Dutch, and so forth. 
(There is no exact English equivalent to these terms, which literally translate 
as ‘general science of literature’.) Thus, comparative literature belongs to literary 
study, but not all literary study is comparative literature; Literaturwissenschaft is 
thus the broader – and historically more undeterminable – field that comprises 
literary theory, history and analysis/interpretation.3
The two cases examined here, from the 1750s and the 1770s, are transitional 
texts; they are synthetic in a way that it is difficult to say exactly what is the dis-
cipline they represent, and therefore they can be found in the histories of many 
arts and sciences. The earlier of them, Alexander Baumgarten’s Latin Aesthetica 
(1750–1758; henceforth A), became the founding text of the new discipline of 
aesthetics.4 Yet the text is far more oriented towards linguistics, rhetoric and po-
etics than aesthetics as a discipline was to be in its later phases. My second can-
didate for a transitional text, George Campbell’s English Philosophy of Rhetoric 
(1776; henceforth PR), was not able to found a new discipline, largely because 
it leaned on a keyword and tradition that was losing its status and appreciation 
in the European academies: namely rhetoric.5 Nevertheless, Campbell’s system-
atic and synthetic approach to language again became appreciated along with the 
twentieth-century renaissance of rhetoric – an important factor in the linguistic 
turn – in literary study and communication studies.
Baumgarten (1714–1762) is regarded as the German father of aesthetics and 
the scholar who ‘distinguished the realm of art from the realms of philosophy, mo-
rality, and pleasure’.6 George Campbell (1719–1796) was a Scottish philosopher, 
theologian and rhetorician. Despite their obvious differences – Baumgarten’s Aes-
thetica stemming from German Rationalism (Leibniz–Wolff ) whilst Campbell’s 
Philosophy of Rhetoric was inspired by British Empiricism (Locke–Hume) – there 
are also remarkable likenesses between the texts. Baumgarten and Campbell fo-
cus on the systems of perception, cognition and language in a way that is not as 
nation-specific or language-specific as much of the criticism of the time was.7 
Their preoccupation with contemporary philosophy as well as sound knowledge 
of the trivium arts makes their approaches systematic in a way that is applicable 
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to many subjects. The rest of this paper is devoted to a closer look at two further 
similarities that clarify the concept of what is called here a ‘transitional text’ in the 
history of the humanities.
Firstly, both books aim for a synthesis of different conceptual systems. The 
old framework (in this case, the trivium arts) is not wholly scrapped but is vis-
ibly incorporated in the new horizon (Rationalism in Baumgarten, Empiricism 
in Campbell).
Secondly, neither book is easy to read; on the contrary, recent scholarly litera-
ture often remarks on the notorious difficulty of their language and structure. 
Could this be seen as the fate of transitional texts also more generally speaking? 
To be able to fully accept or grasp an approach that combines different concep-
tual frameworks, the reader – whether contemporary or later – ought to be well 
versed in both the old and new systems of scientific concepts. We shall return to 
this second feature of transitional texts towards the end of this article.
1 Transitional texts between old and new scientifi c frameworks
An influential pan-European trend in the eighteenth century was the connection 
of languages and nations – or, in Claudio Guillén’s terms, ‘the obsession with 
nationalism and preoccupation with history’.8 The use of Latin as a scholarly lan-
guage was waning (Germany) or had already faded (England). The consequenc-
es for literary study, deeply rooted in language, were challenging. ‘[T]he weight 
placed upon the vernacular for social cohesion,’ as recently observed by Kramnick 
in the English context, ‘meant that literary expertise was particularly troubled.’ 
Literary specialists were seen to work ‘in an arcane idiom that was of little use 
to a society more and more defined by its shared reading of the national litera-
ture’.9 At the same time there was another well-documented process going on. It 
was marked, in different parts of Europe, by theoretical activity that contributed 
towards a more systematic study of literature and ‘reaffirmed the possibility of – 
indeed the need for – a rational, discursive theory of poetry’.10
Both Baumgarten and Campbell represent specialist scholarship that seems 
to work against the ideal of accessible criticism and public writing on national 
literature. They conceived the subject of the systematic study of language and 
literature – its method and expression – partly in terms of the classical trivium 
concepts. Yet these transitional texts amalgamated the traditional subjects of 
grammar, rhetoric, logic and poetics with the modern philosophical theories of 
human cognition. One of Baumgarten’s keywords in this process is philosophia po-
etica, whereas Campbell explores the general structure of linguistic communica-
tion (in sciences, literature, journalism) under the umbrella term of a ‘philosophy 
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of rhetoric’. In terms of literary study, these linguistic terms lean on an important 
observation that Baumgarten and Campbell had inherited from the Rational and 
Empiricist philosophies of cognition: that the logic of literature and its language 
is different from the logic of reasoning. Literature cannot be subsumed under the 
(Cartesian) epistemology of clear and distinct ideas or the (Lockean) demand for 
clear and distinct words. Literary language and its perception are often inherently 
vague, even obscure; this is a topic to which both Baumgarten and Campbell of-
ten return. However, neither of them opposed literature and its study to reason. 
On the contrary, the inability of reason to conceptualise literary phenomena in a 
clear and distinct manner was a realization that necessitated a more critical – i.e. 
not a dogmatic, or purely evaluative – study of literary language and meaning.
If we focus on literary study as it appears in Baumgarten’s and Campbell’s texts 
mentioned below, their methodological toolkits may be represented as follows.
BAUMGARTEN CAMPBELL
Infl uences Leibniz; Wolff Hume; Gerard (An Esssay on Taste)
Founding 
works of new 
approaches
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad 
poema pertinentibus (1735; Philosophical 
Meditations Concerning Some Conditions of 
Poetry)
Aesthetica (1750–1758; Aesthetics)






• General poetics: the study of epic,
dramatic and lyrical forms
• General rhetoric: the study of spiritual, 
secular, juridical, demonstrative and 
deliberative modes
RHETORIC
as the general theory of 
communication (includes both logic 
and grammar)
• Study of meaning






Poem (poema) as the smallest unit of 
poetic presentation
Poetry is  ‘a particular mode or form 
of certain branches of oratory’
Th e constituents of poetry:
• the medium of language
• the general rules of composition: 
narration, description, 
argumentation
• the use of tropes and fi gures
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Even this sketchy table shows the literary keywords of the two theories and serves 
the purpose of some comparative remarks.
2 Baumgarten
Baumgarten, a teacher of Latin poetry and rhetoric, presents his ‘philosophy of 
poetics’ as a branch of his general theory of the liberal arts (theoria liberalium 
artium) that, in the opening passages of Aesthetica, is also called ‘aesthetics’. The 
range of disciplines associated with this theory is thus extensive, including rheto-
ric, poetics, hermeneutics, philology, and so on (A 1–2).11 It is noteworthy here 
that Baumgarten’s theory deduces general principles from the linguistic fields – 
the trivium – which had traditionally been linked to the practice of speaking and 
writing well. By combining classical rhetoric and eighteenth-century epistemolo-
gy in the vein of Leibniz-Wolff, Baumgarten thus filters elements of early modern 
rhetoric and poetics into a philosophical terminology. This ‘theory’ has very little 
to do with criticism as an art of critical judgment which focuses on individual 
works, genre or authors. In contrast, the new science explores more general struc-
tures of poetic presentation and thus requires a scientific redefinition of even 
rudimentary terms such as ‘poetics’ as well as a ‘poem’.
This enterprise of developing new technical vocabulary is, no doubt, also a 
source of linguistic difficulty. It is only proper here that one thematic pair of con-
cepts explored in Aesthetica is light (or clarity) versus obscurity, as in the chapters 
Lux aesthetica and Obscuritas aesthetica. Baumgarten constructs his basic divi-
sions via the various degrees of shadow and half-light, as already well represented 
in earlier German philosophy but now also in the new context of art: literature 
and its study must resemble the principles of nature. Nature makes no leaps from 
obscurity to brightness; between night and noon there is dawn.12 Likewise, poetic 
presentation is to the perceiver at its most perfect and most beautiful clarus et 
confusus, clear and confused. Its understanding and perception will always involve 
factors which lie beyond the reach of categorical analysis.
In Baumgarten’s redefinition – as presented in Meditationes philosophicae 
(henceforth MP)13 and Aesthetica – it is the task of ‘Poetics’ to study poetic pre-
sentation. The ultimate objective of poetic presentation is clarity but not that 
clarity and precision which logicians, mathematicians and many philosophers 
had prescribed as the criterion of truth. According to Baumgarten the philoso-
pher presents his thoughts as he thinks them, without need to consider the rules 
of presentation or the sonic aspects of articulation; this is why it is possible to 
foster lucidity and distinctness of thought in the realms of philosophy and logic. 
In contrast, literature appeals to the senses, and the study of its understanding 
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and reception calls for different methods, to which Baumgarten seeks access 
via general rhetoric and general poetics. These involve an understanding of the 
workings of literary language and the ways we are able to understand it. Thus, 
Baumgarten’s task of redefinition continues towards the smallest units of poetic 
presentation (such as a poem, poema as a structure that is formed by – obscure or 
clear – sensitive representations; MP 40).
Baumgarten’s approach is not a radical defense of obscure literature and its ob-
scure study; he claims that his theory will doubtless put paid to writers who erro-
neously believe their outpourings to be all the more poetic the more obscure and 
involved they make them (MP 41). At the same time he opposes the subjection 
of poetry to the demand for lucid and precise information as was being pondered 
in many quarters of the mid-eighteenth century. Baumgarten’s theory constitutes 
a description of poetry and poetics as peculiar elements in human thought, and 
likewise, his Aesthetica can be read as a ‘formal statement’ that speaks for new 
ways of presenting this elusive subject.
3 Campbell
Some decades later George Campbell, too, was preoccupied with the relationship 
and mutual division of labour among the elements of the trivium. While Baumgar-
ten feels at home with classical – Latin – citations, Campbell applies his observa-
tions to examples culled from contemporary literature and journalism, and their 
analysis. However, his approach is far removed from criticism which focuses on 
individual authors. In his Philosophy of Rhetoric he seeks to establish a position for 
rhetoric in the framework of empirical epistemology. As a general theory of com-
munication, Campbell claims, rhetoric is concerned with both meaning and modes 
of expression. Rhetoric is the architectonic language art that subsumes within it 
both logic and grammar.14 Rhetoric is ‘the grand art of communication, not of 
ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes’ (PR lxxiii).
This architectonic concept of rhetoric thus also covers poetry which is ‘prop-
erly no other than a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory’ (PR 
lxxiii). Although Campbell thus seems to classify poetry tightly, he nevertheless 
includes it in a methodological network which makes the conventional toolkit of 
rhetoric its general frame in a rather twentieth-century fashion. As shown in the 
table above, Campbell lists as the ‘constituents’ of poetry the medium of language; 
the general rules of composition, namely narration, description and argumenta-
tion; and the use of tropes and figures (PR lxxiii). These are indeed permanent 
constituents of poetry, whereas features such as versification belong to the mere 
appendages of poetry which constitute ‘only variety, and not a different species’.15
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Campbell’s work is significant here since it explores the problems and anoma-
lies of language within the framework of thought, words and reality – the frame-
work upon which linguistic communication is founded. Philosophy of Rhetoric 
contains a lengthy section dealing in close detail with features such as obscurity, 
unintelligibility, nonsense; no language is capable of absolute perfection (PR 
2.6., 217). It is here that we find reflection on the discourse of the treatise Phi-
losophy of Rhetoric itself, too. Whether a speaker or writer seeks to convey infor-
mation, convince, please, move or persuade, he must make himself understood. 
It does not follow automatically, though, that the dichotomy clear-obscure over-
laps with the dichotomy understandable-incomprehensible. Campbell interest-
ingly asks, with reference to the Roman rhetorician Quintilian: ‘May not then 
obscurity, on some occasions, be as conducive to the effect intended, as perspi-
cuity is on other occasions?’ (PR 2.8.1., 273–274). For an unremarkable writer, 
deliberate obscurity is not appropriate: though ‘the genius of the performance 
renders obscurity to a certain degree excusable, nothing can ever constitute it an 
excellence’ (PR 2.9., 284).
Regarding our present quest for moments of linguistic self-awareness among 
disciplines, Campbell makes an even more noteworthy concession that comments 
on the meta-language of criticism. He namely warns against too much clarity 
since too much of it has ‘a tendency to cloy the reader’ as it gives ‘no play to the 
rational and active powers of the mind’ (PR 2.9., 283–284). Thus, in some cases 
obscurity is defensible.
Perhaps I have said too much on the subject: for a review of what I have 
written, I am even apprehensive lest some readers imagine, that after quot-
ing examples of the unintelligible from others, I have thought fi t to produce 
a very ample specimen of my own. Every subject, it is certain, is not equally 
susceptible of perspicuity: but there is material diff erence between an obscurity 
which ariseth purely from the nature of the subject, and that which is chargeable 
upon the style. (PR 2.1., 265; emphasis added.)
While Campbell, like Baumgarten, was certainly very moderate in his defense of 
obscurity, he took several steps away from the Empiricist cult of clarity that he 
knew so well. In literature as a subject of study, he indeed found elements that 
serve as a criterion – or a material difference, in his terms – between decent study 
(even when difficult) and a mere academic Mischmasch.
We have seen that both Baumgarten and Campbell were involved in explo-
rations into obscurity and clarity as elements of language in general and liter-
ary language in particular. However, their own critical language was not above 
such concerns either. The attempts of Baumgarten and Campbell to redefine old 
 P.M. Mehtonen
concepts to novel purposes participated in producing new technical vocabularies 
regarding even the very basic elements of literature. Now the question that sug-
gests itself is: were these transitional writers also searching for a space for a more 
specialist discourse of literary study? If the epistemological structure of literary 
language was confused and even obscure an sich, how should or could this ana-
lytic insight be expressed?
4 Th e style of the meta-language
If one listens to some modern critics of Baumgarten and Campbell, their strug-
gle for a specialist language of literary study was not successful. Their works 
are appreciated for their content, but language-wise they are seen as disasters. 
Baumgarten has been blamed for the Paragraphen-Verpuppung der ungelesenen 
Aesthetica (‘the paragraph-pupation of the unread Aesthetics’16). Another critic 
sees that this Latin work remains untranslated ‘in part (due) to the scholastic 
method of presentation and the sharply defined theoretical framework in which 
Baumgarten was clumsily moving, as in heavy armor’.17 A more recent commen-
tator observes Baumgarten’s ‘ largely inconspicuous wit [that] occasionally inter-
rupts his often-tedious analyses’.18 Somewhat surprisingly, the stylistic fame of 
George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric is hardly any better. After all, it was 
not addressed to the ‘scholastic’ Latin-reading community but to the vernacu-
lar readership. According to a recent commentator, Campbell’s language in this 
work is ‘a frustrating read’ with its turgid and elliptical style. ‘Key points are ... 
lost in prose that lectures us on what seems obvious’, and the text is even reluc-
tant ‘to dramatize what is original and important about the theory advanced’ 
(Waltzer 2003, 1).
These are heavy accusations, especially when we recall that Baumgarten aimed 
for a systematic theory of the liberal arts, and Campbell himself criticized ironi-
cally the sort of difficult language he called ‘The learned unintelligibility’: ‘if non-
sense ever deserves to be exposed, it is when she has the arrogance to assume the 
garb of wisdom’ (PR 2.6.2, 253). Does, then, something lurk behind the modern 
critics’ comments that reveals more of our present paradigms and aspirations of 
literary study than those of the late eighteenth century?
Here we are at the heart of a characteristic that both describes and haunts 
modern humanities in general and literary study in particular. To put it as tau-
tologically as possible: the disciplines that study language and literature produce 
language on language. Is this meta-language – if we believe in the difference be-
tween a meta-language and an object-language (Roland Barthes did not19) – sup-
posed to be a language of expertise that tolerates difficulty and specialist vo-
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cabulary (as is the case, say, in medical sciences)? Also within the humanities and 
cultural studies, the production of specialist new vocabularies has been seen an 
aspect of many disciplinary ‘turns’ or shifts of paradigms.20 Or, on the contrary, 
should the meta-language of the researcher communicate to the broad reading 
audience that shows interest in the topic? As pointed out earlier, in the eighteenth 
century the preoccupation with this topic was actually due to the emerging na-
tional language and criticisms.21 However, the recent comments on Baumgarten 
and Campbell show that these issues and demands have not become obsolete. It 
has been recently argued, for instance, that much of contemporary literary study 
lacks a rational and methodologically precise approach. Instead of a systematic 
study of literature, scholars persist in writing ‘metaphorical narrative and essay-
istic description’.
While it is true that the results of literary study should be made accessible 
to the general public, this approach is only half of the work that needs to 
be done and then as a second and/or parallel step. First, scholarship should 
be performed in the form and content of ‘high’ science and only after that 
should popularization occur. ... [S]cholarly books and work should not be 
written for the general public neither in the natural (basic) and medical sci-
ences nor in the humanities and literary study.22
This healthy recent reminder is nothing new as such but merely rehearses the ear-
ly twentieth-century manifestos written by the architects of the linguistic turn.23 
If Tötösy de Zepetnek is right, however, then we may conclude that the prevailing 
paradigm of literary study may not recognise or at least appreciate the self-confi-
dent ‘formal statements’ of its predecessors. For a Baumgarten or a Campbell, the 
expert language may have served as an antidote to mere literary dilettantism. As 
Campbell sees it in the Philosophy of Rhetoric, the best method for theory creation 
combines a study of practice and the abstract knowledge of theory.24 This realisa-
tion went hand in hand with the historical process where grammar, rhetoric and 
poetics were transformed and eventually amalgamated into the newly emerging 
disciplines of comparative philology, linguistics and literature in the nineteenth 
century.
5 Th e future of linguistic self-awareness?
Baumgarten and Campbell represent a period when the divorce of philosophi-
cal and literary language had not taken place and the age of the professional, 
university-based literary study did not yet exist. However, their search for the 
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‘constituents’ of literature contributed to creating intellectual space for the emer-
gence of literary study as a discipline. Moreover, obscurity and clarity were not 
just subjects of study and features of literary language but, likewise, also elements 
of the ways in which the observer’s mind allegedly organises and structures the 
sensory world.
This takes us back to the critical struggle between difficult technical expert 
language versus reader-friendly humanism. Writers such as Baumgarten and 
Campbell neither claimed that literary criticism should not have an essential 
use within polite society nor wrote for the everyman of the late eighteenth 
century. Thanks to their synthetic efforts, the language of literary study was – 
decades before the dawn of Romanticism – conceptually ready to defend both 
its existence as a discipline and its interest in obscure discourses. However, 
there is a limit to any science – a limit George Campbell captures well as he 
warns ironically:
Th e more incomprehensible the subject is, the greater scope the [speaker] 
has to talk plausibly without any meaning (PR 2.7., 249–250).
Such an excessive ‘ learned incomprehensibility’ is not alien to the present com-
munities of scholarship and politics either. Language is the place where such 
incomprehensibility is produced – but also the place wherein the humanists 
may rewrite the canons and let ‘vernacular energies play against revered termi-
nologies’.25
Finally, the debates on expert languages and past linguistic turns reflect 
more general currents. Today the connections of languages and nations in Eu-
rope look completely different than in the eighteenth century. What would a 
history of humanities written in the year 2100 find when looking back to the 
early 2000s? A globalized, multilingual Europe, with a growing number of 
world languages spoken in everyday life. Yet the future historian would realise 
that at the same time – somewhat paradoxically – the number of languages 
offered by universities dropped. She would also discover that the European 
universities, from the north to the south, increasingly offered courses and de-
grees in any subject in English. More and more people learning fewer and fewer 
languages?
One does not have to be a prophet to conclude that there is thus no end to the 
fruitful debates between clarists and obscurantists or between defenders of read-
er-friendly science versus self-consciously technical languages of literary study.
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Th e Changing Relations between Grammar, 
Rhetoric and Music in the Early Modern Period
David Cram
1 Th e tradition of the trivium and quadrivium
This paper aims to trace the changing architecture of the liberal arts in the sev-
enteenth century, with primary focus on grammar and music. Both of these dis-
ciplines underwent radical internal developments over this period, and there are 
strong reasons for studying each strictly within its own boundaries. But there 
are also changes in the relations between the liberal arts which only emerge if one 
takes a broader perspective. This is most clearly manifest in the case of music, 
which undergoes a dramatic realignment from the quadrivium to the trivium over 
this period – from the artes reales (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) to 
the artes sermocinales (grammar, logic and rhetoric).1
The main thrust of the paper is that the shift of music from the quadrivium 
to the trivium is symptomatic of a larger set of developments which have compli-
cated knock-on effects for all the disciplines involved. What appear to be simple 
structural realignments within the traditional framework of the liberal arts, in-
volving grammar as well as music, are in fact part of a process whereby an older 
architecture of knowledge is fundamentally dismantled, and a newer division be-
tween the humanities and natural sciences emerges. This development was out-
lined by George Sarton in his History of Science.2 Sarton argues that, within the 
set of liberal arts which formed the basic syllabus for education in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance, the division between the quadrivium and trivium is 
not the same as the one that was later to be drawn between the sciences and the 
humanities. ‘For one thing,’ he asks (rhetorically), ‘is not music part of the hu-
manities?’
I have long maintained that the main cleavage in education is not vertical, 
between humanities on the right and science plus technology on the left, 
but rather horizontal, between grammar at the bottom and the humanities 
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above it. Th ere were humanities as well as grammar in the trivium, there 
were humanities as well as science in the quadrivium.
(Sarton, A History of Science, 1959, p. 311)
In other words, the emerging distinction between the humanities and the scienc-
es is orthogonal to the existing division between the trivium and the quadrivium, 
and the newer dichotomy does not simply replace the older but overlays it, in the 
manner of a palimpsest. Thus, although ‘before-and-after’ snapshots can reveal 
robust differences between the start and finish of the seventeenth century, the set 
of intervening changes presents an enormously complex and multi-dimensional 
picture. At the risk of oversimplifying, I would like to argue that focusing on 
changes in the links between the various individual disciplines can go some way 
to explaining how the larger reconfiguration is ‘driven’ and also help illuminate 
some crucial developments within the individual disciplines themselves. This can 
be illustrated, before we descend to more detail, by the changes in the links which 
music and grammar have to rhetoric.
As we have noted, music in the Western tradition is grouped under the 
mathematical arts of the quadrivium. This linkage goes back to Greek antiq-
uity and is exemplified by the discussion of harmonic structures in terms of 
the geometrical and arithmetical patterns within the musical scales, and the 
parallels between musical ratios and proportions and those of the movements 
of the heavenly bodies.3 These mathematical aspects of music (arithmetical, 
geometrical and astronomical) continued to be the focus of scholarly attention 
throughout the seventeenth century, at least as an academic discipline studied as 
part of the university curriculum.4 However, a radically different sort of musical 
analysis emerges at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which 
explicitly places music within the framework of rhetorical theory, thus linking 
music to the other language arts of the trivium. This new approach is typified 
by Joachim Burmeister’s treatise on musical poetics, Musica Poetica, which ap-
peared in Rostock in 1606 and which exerted a strong influence throughout 
Europe.5 By the second half of the century, this realignment was sufficiently well 
established for music to be listed along with the artes sermocinales in Comenius’s 
encyclopedia for schoolboys, the Orbis Sensualium Pictus.6 The double identity 
of music (as both a rhetorical and a mathematical art) is itself only one aspect of 
the turbulent changes which music underwent during the seventeenth century, 
caught up as it was in the sectarian and political controversies of the civil war 
and the restoration periods. But it is a double identity of sufficient theoretical 
importance to warrant highlighting it thus, since the larger controversies, which 
are for most historical purposes of greater importance, can easily overshadow 
and obscure it.7
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Language in seventeenth-century Britain was almost as embattled as was mu-
sic. The decline of Latin as an institutional lingua franca and the consequent ‘tri-
umph’ of the English language – to borrow the title from the classic study by 
Richard Foster Jones8 – meant that the proper object for grammatical theory 
correspondingly shifted from the classical languages to the vernacular. This was 
directly reflected in the controversy between Protestant and Catholic theologians 
concerning the availability for lay persons of scriptural texts in translation, which 
opened the way to their interpretation without clerical guidance.9 A third factor 
was the perceived need for new vocabulary and grammar for classification and 
argumentation called for by the empirical sciences which were emerging with 
the Baconian ‘instauration of knowledge’.10 The cumulative effect of these various 
impulses was a major readjustment in the status of the language arts, foreground-
ing the study of grammar in such a way that it became a central focus of attention 
for thinkers of all disciplines (as we shall see in the following section) and, para-
doxically, back-grounding and denigrating the art of rhetoric as an independent 
discipline. In England (though not to the same extent elsewhere in the English-
speaking world) the concept of rhetoric during this period developed pejorative 
overtones as the art of linguistic decoration, concealment and deceit, in contrast 
to an ideal of the unadorned ‘plain style’, which became a mainstream Protestant 
aspiration for both liturgical and scientific purposes.
The starting point of the paper will be an examination of seventeenth-cen-
tury schemes for the construction of a philosophical language, and the position 
of such schemes in the context of the trivium and quadrivium. As an interlude, 
I shall then look at the satirical treatment of philosophical language schemes 
by Swift in Gulliver’s Travels, focussing on the art of combinatorics, which, for 
contemporaries, brought together the arts of grammar and music under a single 
rubric. In the concluding section, I shall look at the changing relations between 
language and music in the context of what I shall call ‘linguistic eschatology’ (lin-
guistic first and last things).
2 From real character to philosophical language
Any history of grammatical theory in Britain needs to take account of the impact 
of philosophical language schemes, which originated in the early seventeenth cen-
tury as part of Francis Bacon’s call for a general reform of learning, and which pe-
tered out towards the end of the 1680s. The intellectual tide on which these ideas 
floated was a pan-European one, the debate including such figures as Descartes, 
Comenius and Leibniz.11 But where continental thinkers tended to adopt a largely 
speculative approach, British scholars commonly produced practical implementa-
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tions of their ideas. Notable exponents included Francis Lodwick, George Dal-
garno and John Wilkins.12
The theory of philosophical language needs to be situated against the back-
ground of both the classical and the vernacular tradition in Western grammatical 
thought, as has been documented in the magisterial studies by Arthur Padley.13 
But the development is one that transcends the traditional boundaries of gram-
mar as a self-contained study. The ideal philosophical language was designed to 
be a representational system that was simultaneously to fulfil a wide spectrum of 
functions, serving as a mathematical algebra, a system for exact scientific nomen-
clature, a means of international communication between scholars, a pedagogi-
cal primer to train children in logical thinking and, into the bargain, offering a 
system of shorthand and of cryptography. In point of fact, there were tensions 
within the central circle of thinkers from the very start as to what primary aims 
and objectives the schemes should set themselves, and as the projects unravelled, 
the component threads ran in a variety of different directions.
One useful way of documenting the scope and impact of such schemes is to 
position them within the framework of the liberal arts. As a contribution to 
grammatical theory, philosophical language schemes belong straightforwardly 
with the other language arts of the trivium. However, from their inception they 
subverted the very division between trivium and quadrivium, not just because 
of their scope (relating as they do to the various disciplines in which they are to 
be used), but more importantly as a result of the theory of signs on which they 
rest. This is implicit in the very concept of a ‘real character’, which can be defined 
as a representational system where the signs do not stand for words (as in our 
received writing systems) but stand directly for things. This conception is based 
on a radical scepticism and suspicion of language, which is elaborated by various 
seventeenth-century thinkers from Francis Bacon himself to John Locke. The 
point of interest here is that a ‘real’ character, thus defined, straddles the primary 
division between the trivium and the quadrivium. As a representational system (a 
‘character’ in the seventeenth-century sense), it belongs with the artes sermocinales 
of the trivium; but since the signs of the real character stand not for words but 
things (res), it belongs equally with the artes reales of the quadrivium. Its primary 
function, at least for thinkers such as Wilkins, was precisely to serve as a classifi-
catory tool for the mathematical and physical sciences.
It is from this pivotal point that one can document a radical divergence of 
opinion as to how a real character (i.e. an ancillary written system) was to be 
elaborated into a philosophical language (a system, both spoken and written, ca-
pable of fulfilling the same range of communicative purposes as the received hu-
man languages). George Dalgarno, who had originally joined forces with John 
Wilkins, began to feel that if a philosophical language were to embody the tax-
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onomies of the various sciences, about which there was philosophical disagree-
ment, it would be a case of quot capita, tot sententiae – as many different opinions 
as there were different heads – and that such shifting sands could not be an ad-
equate foundation on which to build. An alternative approach, therefore, was to 
see the primary purpose of a philosophical language as being a tool for analysis 
and argumentation, rather than as a repository of encyclopedic knowledge. Dal-
garno was not alone in conceiving of a philosophical language in this way. Hooke’s 
notion of a ‘philosophical algebra’14 was along the same lines, and the ideas of Seth 
Ward and John Wallis, despite their scepticism about the need for a universal 
language as a separate invention, were closer to Dalgarno than to Wilkins in this 
regard (Cram 1994).15
A central point that Dalgarno stresses is that his philosophical language does 
not rest only on a grammatical foundation which he has invented (i.e. the morpho-
logical elements and the syntactic rules for combining them) but equally on the 
logical analysis of the concepts whose internal structure is to be thus represented. 
Furthermore, Dalgarno’s art of signs is intended not just to be a grammar and a 
logic, but to serve the full range of functions involved in the trivium, including 
rhetoric. In the preface to Ars Signorum, he advises his reader: ‘Take care that in 
forming your judgment you do not separate things which are not to be separated, 
namely the logical and the grammatical parts; but so as to come to a fairer verdict 
keep foremost in mind the ultimate aim, namely ease of communication.’16 As the 
system works out, no separate art of rhetoric is required, since the logical resolu-
tion of notions itself renders them clear and distinct, and the process of translat-
ing a text into the philosophical language from English (or Latin for that matter) 
will serve precisely to separate out and discard any rhetorical tropes whose func-
tion is purely ornamental. Dalgarno’s art of signs is in practice a rhetoric as well as 
a grammar and a logic: it will serve all the communicative functions of traditional 
rhetoric – other than those whose purpose is to decorate, conceal, or deceive. But 
while Dalgarno’s Ars Signorum can thus be characterised as coextensive with the 
traditional trivium of grammar, logic and rhetoric, it differs from his own earlier 
schemes, and from Wilkins’s Essay, in de-coupling itself from the disciplines of 
the quadrivium. Where Wilkins’s scheme is based on an exhaustive encyclopedic 
taxonomy of concepts, and hence commits its users to the associated epistemo-
logical and ontological assumptions, Dalgarno’s scheme is based on the simplest 
possible set of primitives (and possibly no more than an ‘alphabet’ of simple no-
tions), from which taxonomies of whatever sort can be constructed.
It is doubtless oversimplifying the difference between Dalgarno’s and Wilkins’s 
scheme to state it thus baldly. However, the ‘breach of judgement’ between the 
two men, which was perceived at the time to be one of fundamental principle,17 
can be usefully restated in terms of the respective orientation of their schemes 
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within the architecture of the liberal arts: Wilkins’s scheme is intended to sit 
above both the trivium and the quadrivium as whole; Dalgarno’s is intended to 
sit above the trivium as a whole, but to be fundamentally independent of the qua-
drivium (although, of course, as a ‘real character’ it will serve to articulate proposi-
tions relating to the artes reales). It was Dalgarno’s contention that the dwindling 
of public interest in philosophical language schemes, which had already set in by 
the 1680s, was a direct result of the failure among those involved to reach any con-
sensus about the foundations of such a scheme, even though their professed aim 
was precisely to engineer methodological consensus of this sort. Dalgarno was at 
least partly correct in this view, although it must be added that a factor of equal 
importance was the advent of radically new ways of thinking about language and 
epistemology. This was typified by the work of John Locke, which undermined 
the very theory of signs on which Dalgarno and Wilkins relied, both thinkers 
assuming that the set of radical notions to be represented are the same for any 
rational human being, and that language is no more than a nomenclature for such 
universal notions.
One further step in the development of Dalgarno’s thought is relevant to the 
larger trends which we are exploring here. At the start of his work, Dalgarno 
assumed that his art of signs could serve both as a system of shorthand as well 
as a real character – indeed his work on Ars Signorum grew directly out of an 
attempt to improve an existing shorthand system. It was only considerably later 
that he came to believe that this was a profound mistake, as can be illustrated by 
the simplest of examples. In a real character, which aims to resolve all complex 
notions into their simplex constituents, the English words here and there will be 
resolved into THIS-PLACE and THAT-PLACE, respectively, and likewise now 
and then will translate as THIS-TIME and THAT-TIME. The component ele-
ments THIS, THAT, PLACE and TIME will already be part of the set of basic 
primitives (needed to translate the corresponding English words), so the logi-
cal analysis can be effected ‘for free’. In other words, the philosophical language 
needs no separate and independent radical signs corresponding to the English 
here, there, now and then.
But notice that this process of logical resolution, the central feature of Dal-
garno’s real character that sets it apart from Wilkins’s, means that it cannot func-
tion as a shorthand system when serving to translate an English text. In fact, 
it works precisely the other way round. It is English that functions here as a 
shorthand system for conveying the complex notions analysed out by the real 
character, and not vice versa. The same will hold for received languages in gen-
eral. What emerges from Dalgarno’s later work is thus not just the conception of 
a philosophical language that is arguably more elegant and consistent than that 
of Wilkins, but also a more sophisticated view of existing human languages, rec-
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ognising that they need, in effect, to be shorthand systems (in contrast to a full 
logical analysis of human thought) for the purposes of practical communication 
and argumentation.
3 Interlude: Gulliver at the Academy of Lagado
Whatever the reasons for the sharp decline in scientific concern with philosophi-
cal languages by the 1680s, one measure of the change in the intellectual climate 
of opinion was the emergence of caricature and satire aimed at these projects 
following the turn of the century. Such attacks, the best known of which were 
by Jonathan Swift and his circle, were part of a much larger onslaught on the 
old style liberal arts curriculum and in particular on syllogistic logic, which con-
tinued to be an obligatory and central component of university education for all 
subjects and the medium for both college and university education. A broadly 
based satire along these lines, of delicious literary merit in its own right, can be 
found in the account of the intellectual development of the fictitious Martinus 
Scriblerus, a collaborative construction by a group of writers including Jonathan 
Swift.18 More relevant for our present purposes is the account in Swift’s Gulliver’s 
Travels of the visit to the Academy of Lagado, a thinly veiled caricature of the 
Royal Society.19 Although the various scientific projects depicted here are made 
to appear hare-brained, they are in fact closely modelled on actual experiments 
reported in the Transactions of the Society. This holds also for the account of 
Gulliver’s visit to the School of Languages, which highlights two central aspects 
of philosophical language schemes.
Gulliver’s first port of call at the Academy of Lagado is the School of Lan-
guages, where he finds three professors in consultation about ways of improving 
the language of their own country. Two projects are being pursued. The aim of 
the first of them is ‘to shorten Discourse by cutting Polysyllables into one, and 
leaving out Verbs and Participles, because in reality all things imaginable are but 
Nouns.’ Swift has here yoked together two principles indeed propounded by the 
actual language projectors: one is the logical reduction of the parts of speech to 
the absolute minimum, and the other is the maxim that a simplex idea should be 
represented by a sign which is likewise simplex.20
The second scheme is more radical, since its aim is to abolish words altogether, 
on the grounds that ‘since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more 
convenient for all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to ex-
press the particular Business they are to discourse on’. Here Swift presses the idea 
of a ‘real character’ to its logical conclusion. Communication is effected by flour-
ishing exemplars of the things which are the objects of the exchange, words thus 
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simply being rendered redundant. There is however a snag in the implementation 
of this scheme, as with other projects at the Academy:
[If ] a Man’s Business be very great, and of various kinds, he must be obliged 
in Proportion to carry a greater bundle of Th ings upon his Back, unless he 
can aff ord one or two strong Servants to attend him. I have often beheld two 
of those Sages almost sinking under the Weight of their Packs, like Pedlars 
among us; who, when they met in the Streets, would lay down their Loads, 
open their Sacks, and hold Conversation for an Hour together.
(Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, p. 15721)
The ludicrousness of this scene is, appropriately, graphic enough to have inspired 
more than one of the book-illustrators for subsequent editions of Gulliver’s Trav-
els to flourish an image of it for their readers.22
In another part of the Academy, Gulliver visits the Projectors in Speculative 
Learning. Here he is invited to inspect a combinatorial device which takes up the 
greater part of both the length and breadth of the room. This consists of a frame 
holding multiple rows of blocks with written characters inscribed on them, each 
row of which can be turned independently by means of iron handles projecting 
out from the sides of the machine. The professor in charge of this project sets his 
engine to work by commanding his forty pupils each to take hold of one of the 
forty iron handles and to give it a sudden turn, so that each time this happens 
the overall configuration of the blocks is changed. Where they find three or four 
words which combined to form a sentence, this is dictated to other boys who act 
as scribes. Gulliver reports that:
Th e Professor shewed me several Volumes in large Folio already collected, 
of broken Sentences, which he intended to piece together, and out of those 
rich Materials to give the World a compleat Body of all Arts and Sciences.
(Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, p. 156)
As with the previous project, what we are presented with here is a caricature. But 
the scope of the two projects combined is not unrepresentative of the more heady 
manifestos of what a philosophical language might achieve. Such a tool would be 
a means not only of representing things (rather than words) in an analytic and 
self-revealing way, but also for generating new knowledge across the full gamut 
of the liberal arts.23
Two aspects of the Lagado schemes are worth highlighting, since they point 
towards a developing link between grammar and music. Firstly, although it is 
quite accurate to identify these schemes with those of the British philosophical 
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language projectors, they may with equal accuracy be characterized in a more 
abstract way as an ars combinatoria, an ‘art of combinatorics’. This is the label used 
by Leibniz for the mathematical scheme on which he worked throughout his life-
time, and which was intended to have a range of philosophical and scientific uses 
beyond those of a universal language in the narrower sense.24 One of the features 
of this scheme of relevance for our present purposes is the range of its application 
not just to language but also to music.
In a perfect language, Leibniz argued, people would not stand and argue, but 
would sit down together and say ‘Let us calculate’. Along similar lines, Leibniz 
comments on the combinatorial nature of music as follows:
Music charms us, although its beauty consists only in the agreement of 
numbers and in the counting, which we do not perceive but which the soul 
nevertheless continues to carry out, of the beats or vibrations of sound-
ing bodies which coincide at certain intervals. Th e pleasures which the eye 
fi nds in proportions are of the same nature, and those caused by other sens-
es amount to something similar, although we may not be able to explain 
them so distinctly.
(Leibniz, Principles of Nature and of Grace)25
The art of combinatorics in this construal thus starts to embrace both a theory 
of language and a general theory of aesthetics. Although this is a more typically 
eighteenth-century development, and perhaps more characteristic of continental 
than British thinkers, similar sorts of issues concerning the perception and emo-
tive force of music were being tackled in an experimental way towards the end of 
the seventeenth century in the circles of the Royal Society.26
The second noteworthy feature of the combinatorial project which Gulliver 
witnesses at Lagado is its implementation on what is called an ‘engine’ in contem-
porary parlance, i.e. a physical machine. In modern parlance, this is the hardware 
on which the software of the combinatorial scheme will run. Such machines were 
indeed being developed at this time: well-known examples include the rotary cal-
culating machines constructed by Leibniz and Pascal and various devices using 
sliding rods (the origin of the modern slide-rule) based on the model of ‘Napier’s 
bones’, invented by the Scotsman John Napier.27 An omni-purpose machine of the 
latter sort was invented by Athanasius Kircher, designed for a range of functions 
including arithmetic, geometry, cryptography and, last but not least, the com-
position of music.28 A musical ‘composition box’, based on Kircher’s device and 
thought to have been the property of Samuel Pepys, is preserved in the library of 
Trinity College, Cambridge University.29
 David Cram
4 From the language of Adam to the language of the angels
So far, we have considered a number of developments in the theory of grammar 
and music in relation to the position of these two disciplines within the tradi-
tional structure of the liberal arts. In this final section, I will examine the role of 
grammar and music in connection with a range of theological issues which can be 
grouped together under the rubric of ‘linguistic eschatology’, involving questions 
about the origin of language and the language of the afterlife. These issues were 
a continuing preoccupation throughout the seventeenth century and formed an 
integral dimension of speculation about the nature of both language and music. 
There is, however, a fundamental change in the relation between language and 
music in this context, and the overall direction of this change matches the trajec-
tory of the other developments we have been following.
Let us begin with the question of the origin of language.30 For most seven-
teenth-century thinkers, the theoretical challenge of constructing a philosophical 
language was in effect coextensive with that of reconstructing the language of 
Adam – the perfect language of paradise before the Fall and before the confusion 
of tongues at Babel. One point of theological difference of opinion was whether 
this language was divinely inspired or of human invention. John Wilkins sub-
scribed to what was the more common view that language was divinely inspired, 
since it is evident from scriptural authority that ‘the first Language was con-creat-
ed with our fi rst Parents, they immediately understanding the voice of God speak-
ing to them in the Garden’.31 George Dalgarno, by contrast, found scriptural sup-
port for the opposing view that, far from being a supernatural gift, language was 
of human invention (albeit by the pre-lapsarian Adam ‘in his state of innocency’), 
citing the verse in Genesis 2.19 which asserts quite explicitly that God brought the 
animals to Adam to SEE what he could call them (Dalgarno’s emphasis).32 Th ere 
were similar diff erences of opinion as to whether the confusion of tongues at Babel 
was to be viewed as a supernatural event, the result of divine intervention, or a 
metaphorical account of a natural event (the divergence of languages at the coloni-
sation of the world by the sons of Noah being similar to that observable in modern 
times by the divergence of Latin into the Romance languages). Th ese theological 
points have direct implications for philosophical language schemes. If language is 
of human invention by origin, then it is in principle reconstructible by human ef-
fort. But if language is of divine origin, then the very idea of attempting to reverse 
Babel must be seen as an act of hubris or worse, as Dalgarno reports being told.
Parallel to these considerations regarding the origin of language, there are 
similar traditions concerning the origin of music. Thus, while Genesis 4: 21 tells 
us that Jubal was the father of all who play the harp and organ, and was by im-
plication the inventor of music, Job 38: 7 informs us that previously, at the very 
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dawn of creation, ‘the morning stars sang together’. What is of importance for 
our present discussion is that, although music and language were strongly linked 
together under the rubric of the art of combinatorics, there is no dynamic con-
nection between the two as regards the accounts of their first origins. The two 
traditions simply sit side-by-side, each with its own set of complications. Music 
does not have any significant role in seventeenth-century accounts of language 
origin, nor in teasing apart differences of stance in the subsidiary controversies. 
However, the situation is very different if we attempt a broad-brush comparison 
between seventeenth-century debates about the origins of language with those 
which were being conducted in the second half of the eighteenth.33 Two of the 
most influential treatises on the origin of language from this latter period are 
those of Rousseau34 and Herder,35 and in both of these music is viewed as an 
integral part of the social and communicative context which gave rise to human 
speech.36 In subsequent discussion of first origins throughout this and the follow-
ing century, opinions varied widely as to the priority given to language and music, 
and to the mediating role assigned to song (the fitting of words to music) and to 
poetic meter (the fitting of musical structures to words). But if one stands back 
far enough from the individual trees to catch a glimpse of the wood as a whole, 
one can discern a step-change from an earlier view of language and music as inde-
pendent combinatorial objects with a common Platonic existence to a later view 
in which both are seen as social, communicative and aesthetic productions. What 
is emerging here is a category of study – that of the humanities – which overlays 
and bridges the earlier divide between the trivium and the quadrivium.
A parallel development can be discerned when we turn from eschatological 
first things to last things. It is curious that so little attention has been paid to 
this aspect, given the vast scholarly literature devoted to philosophical language 
schemes as a process of ‘debabelization’ – the reversal of Babel as distinct from the 
reconstruction of the Adamic language. But even a brief foray can be illuminat-
ing.37 Following commonplace biblical hermeneutics, the typological counterpart 
of the confusion of tongues at Babel is the gift of tongues at Pentecost. But sev-
enteenth-century interpretations of Pentecost turn out to be very different from 
those which serve as the foundation for most modern Pentecostal churches. As in 
the case of the interpretations of Babel, there is a fundamental distinction to be 
drawn here between supernatural and natural interpretations of what is meant by 
speaking in tongues in the account of Pentecost in Acts 2: 1-15. On the one hand, 
there is glossolalia, by which is meant speaking in a supernatural language that is 
different from any know human language (commonly termed ‘holy gibberish’), 
and on the other hand, there is xenolalia, by which is meant speaking in a known 
human language to which the speaker has not been previously exposed and has 
not learnt in the usual way. Reports of glossolalia, or ‘holy gibberish’, are not un-
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common in seventeenth-century Britain, particularly among the more extreme 
puritan sects.38 But it may come as a surprise to modern readers that the standard 
Anglican interpretation of the biblical account of speaking in tongues does not 
take it to be glossolalia, but xenolalia.39 The gift of tongues is construed not as the 
gift of a supernatural object (a divine language) but of supernatural knowledge of 
a natural object (a human language).
These eschatological considerations have strong but potentially contradictory 
implications for the project of debabelization and the construction of a philo-
sophical language. On the one hand, if the gift of tongues at Pentecost involved 
a natural language rather than a supernatural one, then it should in principle be 
within the reach of human ingenuity to achieve by study what was granted to 
the apostles by miraculous intervention. The project of debabelization is thus 
feasible, even if one subscribes to the further assumption that the age of miracles 
is past. On the other hand, if debabelization in this manner is feasible, then there 
is in principle no need for an additional new language over and above the existing 
ones. This results in a quite distinct position, which one can label ‘sympathetic 
but sceptical’, adopted by several of those in the circle of Wilkins and Dalgarno: 
the arguments designed to demonstrate that a philosophical language is feasible 
likewise show that it is unnecessary.40
What then of the language of the afterlife? For those subscribing to a notion of 
glossolalia, the answer is straightforward: holy gibberish gives us a small glimpse 
of this – even though it may not be wholly accessible to human reason. The same 
holds for those in England who followed in the tradition of Jacob Böhme and 
subscribed to the notion of a mystical ‘Natursprache’ which is accessible only by 
intuition and through inspiration.41 But for scholars such as Wilkins and Dal-
garno, the difficulty in giving an account of the language of the afterlife was simi-
lar to that of giving an account of the language of Adam. From this perspective, 
as Thomas Burnet affirms in his encyclopedic treatise on The State of the Dead 
and of Departed Souls at the Resurrection, the answer is simple: we cannot know 
what the language of the afterlife will be, even though many people have invented 
dialogues of the dead: ‘Mortuorum dialogos finxere multi, sed quâ linguâ collo-
quuntur, nescio’.42 One might think, he goes on to speculate, that each would use 
the same mother tongue as they had used on earth, the Greeks Greek, the Latins 
Latin, and so on. But what of the island of Britain, which has several languages 
of different origins? ‘Shall we speak Welsh in our aërial Bodies, or Saxon, or Nor-
man, or as we do at this Day, a Mixture or Compound of them all? If the Life to 
come were to be regulated at this rate, I am afraid there would be a Confusion of 
Tongues, worse than that of Babel’.43
There is however another way that the question about the language of the 
afterlife can be formulated, namely: what is the language of the angels? One sev-
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enteenth-century answer to this question (which in this form has a rich medieval 
pedigree) was provided by John Dee’s conversations with the angels, an account 
of which was published by Meric Casaubon at precisely the time that Dalgarno 
and Wilkins started collaborating on a combined project.44 But most mainstream 
thinkers would have followed Thomas Burnet in dismissing such hubristic specu-
lation out of hand, along with the other constructed ‘dialogues of the dead’. An 
alternative answer, which commended wider acceptance, is a more radical one: 
the language of the angels is not a language, but music. And this brings us back 
to our main topic.
The idea that music is the language of the angels is the view taken by Richard 
Baxter, the author of The Saints Everlasting Rest, a discussion, as the title page 
announces, of the blessed state of the saints in their enjoyment of God in glory.45 
This view can be supported by a multiplicity of biblical statements, from both the 
Old and New Testaments, that the function of the angels is to sing everlasting 
praise. Human prayer, by contrast, has a number of functions other than that of 
praise, including petitions and confessions, which of course do not apply in the 
realm of the angels and the saints.46 It is the element of praise that is the one that 
makes the soul resonate, and thus bridges between the human and the angelic 
spheres: ‘[T]he body is the soul’s instrument; and when it lies unstringed, or un-
tuned, the musick is likely to be accordingly but dull.’47
The key concept here is that of harmony, and a juxtaposition of sermons de-
voted to this topic, one from the 1640s and one from 1724, points up both the 
continuity and the change in religious attitudes to music over the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century. The earlier sermon was published anonymously and 
announces itself as ‘a plea for the abolishing of organs and other musick out of 
the Protestant churches of Great Britain’, but the title of the sermon is ‘The Holy 
Harmony’.48 This might at first sound paradoxical, but the argument against in-
strumental music is precisely that, by attracting attention to itself, it disturbs wor-
ship as it prevents the soul from resonating in the appropriate harmonic way. 
This puritan attack on instrumental music, under the banner of harmony, can be 
contrasted with a sermon preached in 1724 at the Three Choirs Festival, an an-
nual event established very early in the eighteenth century. In promoting church 
music, Henry Abbot urges that:
If Singing be the Employment of Angels, and Eternity must be spent in 
Praises and Th anksgivings; if Cherubs and Seraphs are to be our future 
Companions [...] methinks it should be the utmost endeavour of every 
Soul, that desires to be a Member of that blessed Choir, to take all oppor-
tunities of joining in Chorus with those here below.
(Abbot, The Use and Benefit of Church-Music, pp. 20-21)49
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In the first sermon, harmony was invoked as grounds for banning instrumental 
music from worship; in the second, as grounds for promoting it.
In a sermon at the same annual event two years later, Thomas Bisse preached 
on the same theme, but with a wider approach. Rather than invoking scriptural 
authority alone, Bisse begins by giving a survey of recent scientific investigation 
of music and the effects of music, and on this basis he concludes:
For as I believe, and have reasons so to do from the representations of 
Scripture, that harmony will be an ingredient, surely no small one, in the 
enjoyments of the life to come: so I am emboldened in this belief, from the 
former meditations on its nature, end and causes.
(Bisse, Music the delight of the sons of men, p. 33)50
The range of specific topics which Bisse touches on amounts to a remarkably 
comprehensive account of the current state of the art. They include: the nature, 
end and causes of harmony; music and the auditory nerves; the comparison of 
hearing and vision; the effect of music on the passions; the effects of music on 
animals; the phenomenon of deafness and tone deafness; and the effects of theat-
rical as distinct from church music.51 And it is noteworthy that, in documenting 
these investigations, Bisse makes specific reference to publications by John Wal-
lis,52 who, as we have seen, straddles the divide between the study of language and 
the study of music.
5 Coda: What is a ‘natural language’?
This study has examined aspects of seventeenth-century thought concerning lan-
guage and music and the relations between them. Many of the individual issues 
involve matters which are pulled in different directions by larger theoretical and 
theological concerns. Close-up, it is not always easy to discern any larger picture 
into which these smaller pieces fit. What I have tried to show is that, for a modern 
student of the period, one can go a long way towards illuminating the contempo-
rary significance of these issues by situating them robustly on the received map 
of the trivium and quadrivium. By doing so, one can identify a range of smaller 
developments which are part of much larger fundamental changes, which they ei-
ther drive or are driven by, and which in the longer run modify the very map itself. 
The effect is not so much the simple replacement of one paradigm by another, but 
a process of ‘palimpsesting’ a new map on top of an existing one.
 The example I started out from was that of music and its realignment 
from the quadrivium to the trivium. I would like to finish with a parallel exam-
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ple from the study of language, and a similar pair of before-and-after snapshots 
involving the term ‘natural language’. In modern usage, the term ‘natural language’ 
is used in contradistinction to an ‘artificial language’ or a ‘man-made language’: 
English and French are natural languages, Algol and Esperanto are artificial or 
man-made languages. Seventeenth-century usage can be confusing for the mod-
ern reader, since although a similar sort of distinction is made, the term ‘natural 
language’ is quite differently anchored. Thus, for Dalgarno (whose usage is repre-
sentative), English and French are termed ‘instituted languages’, in contradistinc-
tion to a ‘natural language’ (or ‘language of nature’), which would include exam-
ples ranging from the Adamic language at one extreme to the language of gesture 
at the other. This contrast can be put in a diagram as follows:
seventeenth-century: instituted versus natural
 instituted language = English, French, etc.
 natural language = Adamic language, gesture, etc.
eighteenth-century: natural versus artificial
 natural language = English, French, etc.
 artificial language = Algol, Esperanto, etc.53
This is not just a question of relabelling. What is more important than the ter-
minological change is an associated switch in polarity. It so happens, confusingly 
but helpfully, that the term ‘natural language’ migrates from one pole to the other, 
following a change in theoretical focus of interest. In the seventeenth century 
there is a common assumption that if one wants to know how language works, 
then knowledge of ‘natural’ language will afford this; the construction of a philo-
sophical language is thus part of the attempt to understand ‘natural language’ in 
this sense. By the eighteenth century this older polarity has been largely overlaid 
by a new one: if one wants to understand human language, then it is to the study 
of received languages such as English and French that one must look – ‘natural 
languages’ in the new sense. This is the framework that informs the eighteenth-
century investigations by Rousseau and Herder of the origin of language (in the 
sense of individual human languages) in contrast to seventeenth-century investi-
gations (in the sense of the language of Adam).
These developments are messy and multi-faceted ones. But I would argue that 
this shift in the meaning of the term ‘natural language’, like the previously dis-
cussed shift in the alignment of music, is symptomatic of the advent of a new 
distinction that overlays and overwrites the older distinction between the trivium 
and the quadrivium – the distinction between the sciences and the emerging cat-
egory of ‘the humanities’.
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mise of the Quadrivium and the Beginning of the Scientific Revolution: Boethius in the 
Sixteenth Century’, Intellectual News  (): -.
 George Sarton, A History of Science. Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Cen-
turies B.C. (New York: Norton, ).
 On Greek musical theory, see Martin L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, ), and Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo’s Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, ). 
Scholarly editions of the major Greek texts on music were published in this period by 
Marcus Meibom, Antiquæ musicæ auctores septem: Graece et Latine. Marcus Meibomius 
restituit ac notis explicavit (Amsterdam: Elzevir, ) and John Wallis, Claudii Ptolemaei 
Harmonicorum libri tres, nunc primum Graece editus Johannes Wallis (Oxford: From the 
Sheldonian Theatre, ).
 Joachim Burmeister, Musica Poetica (Rostock: S. Myliander, ). On music theory at 
this period, see Floris H. Cohen, Quantifying Music: The Science of Music at the First 
Stage of the Scientific Revolution, - (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
), Penelope Gouk, Music, Science and Natural Magic in Seventeenth-century England, 
(New Haven/London: Yale University Press, ), Rebecca Herissone, Music Theory 
in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), and Benjamin 
Wardhaugh, Music, Experiment and Mathematics in England, - (Farnham: Ash-
gate, ). Major seventeenth-century treatments of music theory include Johannes Ke-
pler, Harmonices mundi libri v (Lincii Austriae: Sumptibus Godofredi Tampachii, ), 
Marin Mersenne, Harmonie universelle, contenant la theorie et la pratiqve de la musique 
(Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, ), and Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia uniuersalis siue ars 
magna consoni et dissoni (Rome: Ex typographia hæredum Francisci Corbelletti, ).
 For a discussion of the realignment of music from quadrivium to trivium, see Elisabeth 
Kotzakidou Pace, ‘The Conceptual Affinity between the Arts of Music and Rhetoric in 
the German Renaissance,’ Language and History  (): -; cf. Hans Heinrich Un-
ger, Die Beziehung zwischen Musik und Rhetorik im .-. Jahrhundert (Würzburg, ) 
and Brian Vickers, ‘Figures of Rhetoric/Figures of Music?’ Rhetorica  (): -.
 See the English translation of Comenius’s tract ( Jan Amos Comenius, Orbis Sensualium 
Pictus. The Visible World, London, ), where the Artes Sermonis, glossed as ‘Arts Be-
longing to the Speech’, include Grammar, Rhetoric, Poetry and Music.
 See David Cram, ‘Language and Music: Th eme and Variations in the History of Linguis-
tics’, in: Jan Noordegraaf et al. (eds.), Amicitia in Academia. Composities voor Els Elff ers 
(Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek VU; Münster: Nodus, -, ) and David 
Cram, ‘Language and Music: Th e Pragmatic Turn,’ Language and History  (): -.
 Richard Foster Jones, The Triumph of the English Language: A Survey of Opinions Con-
cerning the Vernacular from the Introduction of Printing to the Restoration (London: Oxford 
University Press, ).
Relations between Grammar, Rhetoric and Music
 This was a point of difference which theologians such as John Wilkins saw as more funda-
mental to the Protestant/Catholic divide than the metaphorical versus literal understand-
ing of transsubstantiation ( John Wilkins, Ecclesiastes, or, a Discourse concerning the Gift of 
Preaching, London: Samuel Gellibrand, ). 
 Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform - (Lon-
don: Duckworth, ).
 For a brief general survey, see Jaap Maat & David Cram, ‘Universal Language Schemes in 
the Seventeenth Century’, in: Sylvain Auroux et al. (eds.), History of the Language Sciences 
(Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, ), Vol. .: -.
 On Lodwick, see Vivian Salmon, The Works of Francis Lodwick: A Study of his Writings 
in the Intellectual Context of the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, ) and Wil-
liam Poole, ‘The Divine and the Grammarian in the Seventeenth-Century Universal Lan-
guage Movement’, Historiographia Linguistica  (): -. For a detailed account 
of the schemes of Dalgarno and Wilkins, with reference also to Leibniz, see Jaap Maat, 
Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno, Wilkins, Leibniz (Dordre-
cht; Boston, MA: Kluwer, ). On the larger philosophical and intellectual context, see 
Rhodri Lewis, Language, Mind and Nature: Artificial Languages in England from Bacon to 
Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
 Arthur G. Padley, Grammatical Theory in Western Europe, -: The Latin Tradi-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), ch. , and Arthur G. Padley, Gram-
matical Theory in Western Europe, -. Trends in Vernacular Grammar. Vol I. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, ), ch. .
 Mary B. Hesse, ‘Hooke’s Philosophical Algebra’, Isis  (): -
 David Cram, ‘Universal Language, Specious Arithmetic and the Alphabet of Simple No-
tions’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft  (): -.
 ‘Cave autem ne inter judicandum, non separanda separes, id est, partem Logicam & Gram-
maticam; sed ut sententiam æqius feras, finem ultimum (Communicationis facilitatem) 
primo respice’ (George Dalgarno, Ars Signorum, vulgo character universalis et lingua philo-
sophica, London, : sig. Ar; David Cram & Jaap Maat, George Dalgarno on Universal 
Language: ‘The Art of Signs’ () ‘The Deaf and Dumb Man’s Tutor’ and the Unpublished 
Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, , ).
 David Cram, ‘George Dalgarno on Ars Signorum and Wilkins’ Essay’, in: E.F.K. Koerner 
(ed.), Progress in Linguistic Historiography (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, ): -.
 Edited with very useful introduction and commentary by Kerby-Miller (Charles Kerby-
Miller, ed., Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works, and Discoveries of Martinus Scrible-
rus; Written in collaboration by the members of the Scriblerus Club, John Arbuthnot, Alexan-
der Pope, Jonathan Swift, John Gay, and Robert Harley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
); see especially chapter VI on gymnastics and music and chapter VII on rhetoric, 
logic and metaphysics.
 A key for contemporary readers who may have missed the allusions was provided in Coro-
lini di Marco, The flying island, &c. Being a Key to Gulliver’s voyage to Laputa, Balnibarbi, 
Glubbdubdribb, Luggnagg, and Japan (London, ). For modern readers, most editions 
provide the necessary notes and commentary. 
 In the historical survey by Ian Michael of treatments of the parts of speech, Dalgarno is 
identifi ed as the only thinker who reduces them to a single category (Ian Michael, English 
Grammatical Categories and the Tradition to , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
, -). Th e principle that a simplex notion should be represented by a corresponding 
simplex was a commonplace among the projectors from the early tract by Ward onwards 
 David Cram
(Seth Ward, Vindiciae Academiarum, containing, some briefe animadversions upon Mr Web-
sters Book, stiled, Th e Examination of the Academies, Oxford: Leonard Lichfi eld, ).
 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, edited by Albert J. Rivero (New York / London: Norton, 
 []).
 These can readily be found by using Google Images, or one of the other digital search 
engines. These modern resources, incidentally, communicate precisely by flourishing not 
words but images of things. 
 And this is not to mention the additional functions of providing a tool for shorthand and 
cryptography, for reforming primary education, for teaching language to the deaf, for serv-
ing as an art of memory, for propagating the gospel, and for civilizing barbarous nations; 
see the broadside advertisement published by Dalgarno in , reprinted in Cram and 
Maat, George Dalgarno on Universal Language, -. A similar programmatic list can 
be found in [Sir] Thomas Urquhart, Logopandecteison, or, an Introduction to the Universal 
Language (London: G. Calvert & R. Tomlins, ).
 On Leibniz’s work in this area see Olga Pombo, Leibniz and the Problem of a Universal 
Language (Munster: Nodus Publikationen, ) and Maat, Philosophical Languages in 
the Seventeenth Century. The primary Leibniz texts tend to be fragmentary and dispersed; 
see the classic study by Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, d’après des documents in-
édits (Paris: Alcan, ) and the more informal collection in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
L’Harmonie des langues. Présenté, traduit et commenté par Marc Crépon (Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, ).
 [], cited in Leroy E. Loemker (ed.), Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , ). On Leibniz’s theory of mu-
sic, see Rudolf Haase, Der Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Conrad Henfling: ein Beitrag 
zur Musiktheorie des . Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, ).
 For examples of such work, see John Wallis, ‘A Letter of Dr. John Wallis, to Mr. Andrew 
Fletcher; Concerning the Strange Effects Reported of Musick in Former Times, beyond 
what is to be Found in Later Ages’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 
 (August ): - and Thomas Salmon, ‘The Theory of Musick Reduced to Ar-
ithmetical and Geometrical Proportions’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London  (), No. , -. For contextual discussion, see Cohen, Quantifying 
Music and Wardhaugh, Music, Experiment and Mathematics in England.
 John Napier, Rabdologiae seu numerationis per virgulas libri duo (Edinburgh: Andreas 
Hart, ). On seventeenth-century calculating machines, see Abraham Wolf, A History 
of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the th and th Centuries (London: Allen and 
Unwin, ).
 For a contemporary illustration of Kircher’s machine, see Gaspar Schott, Organum math-
ematicum libris IX explicatum (Wurzberg: J. A. Endter, ), and for a photographic il-
lustration of a surviving example, see Gerhard F. Strasser, Lingua Universalis: Kryptologie 
und Theorie der Universalsprachen im . und . Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
). For discussion of combinatorics and ‘aleatory’ music composition, see Eberhard 
Knobloch, ‘Musurgia universalis: Unknown Combinatorial Studies in the Age of Baroque 
Absolutism’, History of Science  (): -. 
 An illustration of Pepys’s ‘musarithmica mirifica’ can be found in Robert Theodore Gun-
ther, Early Science in Cambridge (Cambridge: Printed for the author at the University 
Press, ), .
 The best general discussion of this topic is the six-volume and extensively indexed work 
by Arno Borst, Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und 
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Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker,  vols. (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, ); see especially 
volume , part . See D.C. Allen, ‘Some Theories of the Growth and Origin of Language 
in Milton’s Age’, Philological Quarterly  (), - for a smaller-scale survey. 
 John Wilkins, An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (London, 
), .
 ‘From divine Authority the case seems so clear that one may think it needs no further 
proof but barely producing Genesis . which is express and full beyond contradiction 
that Adam was Author of a language and a perfect one too, but it is far from giving the 
least intimation that this was a supernatural gift, that if the whole series and circum-
stances of the History be considered, the contrary seems rather to follow; for what should 
be the meaning of these words, Genesis .: And brought them to Adam to SIE [sic] what 
he would call them’ (Dalgarno’s emphasis) (Cram & Maat, Dalgarno on Universal Language, 
).
 For a more detailed discussion than is possible here, see Paul Salmon, ‘The origin of lan-
guage debate’, in R.E. Asher (ed.) Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Oxford, [V]: 
-, ; Downing A. Thomas, Music and the Origins of Language: Theories from 
the French Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ) and the collec-
tion of essays in Joachim Gessinger & Wolfgang von Rahden, Theorien vom Ursprung der 
Sprache (Berlin: de Gruyter, ).
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Essai sur l’origine des langues: où il est parlé de la mélodie, et de 
l’imitation musicale’, in Traitées sur la musique (Geneva: Société typographique, ).
 Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Berlin: Christian 
Friedrich Voss, ).
 Translations of the tracts by both Rousseau and Herder, with notes and commentary, can 
be found in John H. Moran & Alexander Gode (eds.), On the Origin of Language: Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages ; Johann Gottfried Herder, Essay on the 
Origin of Language; Translated, with Afterwords, by John H. Moran and Alexander Gode 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ).
 This will be explored further in a forthcoming expanded version of David Cram, ‘Lin-
guistic Eschatology: Babel, Pentecost and Babylon in Seventeenth-century Linguistic 
Thought’, paper presented at the Henry Sweet Society colloquium, Oxford, April .
 For a survey and discussion of the political and ecclesiastical context, see Nigel Smith, 
Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion, - (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, ).
 For a representative discussion, with cross-reference to other contemporary works, see 
Matthew Henry, An Exposition of the Old and New Testament (London: Partridge and 
Oakey, ) and his notes on Acts, ch. .
 This is the position of Robert Boyle and John Wallis, among others; see David Cram, 
‘Universal Language, Specious Arithmetic and the Alphabet of Simple Notions’, Beiträge 
zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft  (), - for further discussion. 
 Richard Nate, ‘Jacob Böhme’s Linguistic Ideas and their Reception in Seventeenth-Centu-
ry England’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft  (), -.
 Thomas Burnet, De statu mortuorum et resurgentium liber (London, ), .
 Thomas Burnet, A Treatise concerning the State of the Dead, and of Departed Souls at the 
Resurrection (London: For the booksellers of London and Westminster,  [A transla-
tion of De statu mortuorum et resurgentium liber]), -.
 John Dee, A True & Faithful Relation of what Passed for Many Yeers between Dr. John Dee 
[...] and Some Spirits: Tending (had it Succeeded) to a General Alteration of Most States and 
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Kingdomes in the World (London: T. Garthwait, ). For a discussion of Dee’s angelic 
language in the context of philosophical language, see Umberto Eco, The Search for the 
Perfect Language (Oxford: Blackwell, ), ch. .
 Richard Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest: or, A Treatise of the Blessed State of the Saints 
in their enjoyment of God in Glory (London: Thomas Underhil & Francis Tyton, ).
 For a contemporary analysis of the functions of prayer, see John Wilkins, A Discourse 
Concerning the Gift of Prayer (London: Samuel Gellibrand, ), chapters IV and V.
 Baxter, The Saints Everlasting Rest, .
 Anon., The Holy Harmony: Or, A Plea for the Abolishing of Organs and Other Musick out 
of the Protestant Churches of Great Britain [...] (London: R. Austin and A. Coe, ).
 Henry Abbot, The Use and Benefit of Church-Musick, Towards Quickning our Devotion. A 
Sermon Preach’d [...] September ,  (London: Jonah Bowyer, ).
 Thomas Bisse, Music the Delight of the Sons of Men. A Sermon Preached at the Cathedral 
Church of Hereford, [...] September ,  (London: W. & J. Innys, ).
 Compare the range of topics listed by Bisse and those examined in the studies by Penelope 
Gouk, ‘Music’, in: N. Tyacke (ed.), History of the University of Oxford; vol. IV, Seventeenth-
Century Oxford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) -, and Wardhaugh, Music, 
Experiment and Mathematics in England.
 Wallis, Claudii Ptolemaei Harmonicorum libri tres,, and ‘A Letter of Dr. John Wallis, 
to Mr. Andrew Fletcher, August .
 The use of ‘natural language’ in the sense of ‘a language that has evolved naturally, as dis-
tinguished from an artificial language’ (OED sense a) emerges during the eighteenth 
century. The earliest attestation given by the OED are in Lord Monboddo in  and 
Friedrich Max Müller in .
Th e Artes Sermocinales in Times of Adversity




This paper explores some of the developments in grammar, logic and rhetoric that 
took place in Europe in the seventeenth century. These disciplines were tradition-
ally seen as belonging together, as they each dealt with language in a particular 
way. For this reason, they were called the ‘artes sermocinales’, or arts of discourse. 
The seventeenth century was a period of radical changes in intellectual history at 
large, and this paper investigates how the arts of discourse were affected by these 
changes. In particular, it was a period in which the prestige of the arts of dis-
course declined, and in which some influential figures argued that much of what 
they had to offer was of little use. Yet these arts contained a number of doctrines 
which proved to be so deeply entrenched that they survived almost unscathed in 
the next centuries. Thus, as usual, we find both change and continuity, and the 
challenge is to get a clear view of what this consisted of.
It will be useful, then, to ask a few rather obvious questions that may help 
clarify some of the issues involved, and which I think are ones that may be prof-
itably asked in investigating other aspects of the history of the humanities as 
well. To begin with, which were the basic concepts, tenets, and methods used by 
experts in a certain discipline? How did they define their subject, and how did 
they view the relations with other disciplines? Was there consensus about this, or 
were there different factions or schools? If so, what were the differences between 
them? Which problems, if any, did the practitioners of the discipline try to solve? 
These and similar questions are concerned with what may be called ‘internal’ as-
pects. Questions about ‘external’ aspects include topics like the institutional con-
text of a discipline: how and where were people taught, and how many teachers 
and students were there? What position did the study of a discipline occupy in 
society? If these questions can be clearly answered, it is possible to ask about the 
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dynamics of both internal and external aspects. In other words, it is then possible 
to examine if there were any significant changes in the content of a discipline or 
in the context in which it existed.
In order to outline both change and continuity in the arts of discourse in sev-
enteenth-century Europe, then, I shall first briefly address the questions men-
tioned. Next, I discuss some criticisms that were levelled against these arts by 
leading writers. Finally, I examine a few developments that took place, not neces-
sarily as a direct consequence of these criticisms, but clearly connected with the 
trends that motivated them.
2 Th e status of grammar, logic and rhetoric
From classical times onward, grammar, logic (or dialectic), and rhetoric formed 
the trivium, a cluster of three distinct but closely related disciplines, each dealing 
with language in a particular way: it was commonplace to characterize grammar 
as the art of speaking correctly, logic as the art of speaking truly, and rhetoric as 
the art of speaking elegantly, or persuasively.
From a modern point of view, it may seem puzzling that all three were seen 
as dealing with language. That grammar is about language is still straightfor-
ward, and the same goes for rhetoric, perhaps somewhat less so. But logic as 
we know it today might seem to be far less clearly related to language. It may 
rather be viewed as a branch of mathematics or philosophy. For the period we 
are considering, logic was undoubtedly a discipline that dealt with language, and 
this is a difference that is important for our understanding of its history. What 
logicians were doing in the seventeenth century, and also what grammarians and 
rhetoricians were doing, overlaps only partly with what practitioners of these 
disciplines do today.
This raises the issue of what a discipline is, and how we identify it. How much 
change do we allow a subject to undergo without questioning its identity? These 
are questions that inevitably arise when we are writing a history of the humani-
ties. A natural answer would be that we identify a discipline by its subject matter. 
But this does not really help: as the example of logic shows, this may change over 
time, and worse, we cannot always determine what a particular subject matter is 
independently of the discipline that studies it. A possible solution may be sought 
in the fact that similarities and differences between various stages are in general 
not sufficient to decide the identity question. If there is a causal chain between the 
stages, change may be colossal without forcing us to state that identity has been 
lost: babies turn into old people, an orchestra changes personnel. Thus, a disci-
pline may become unrecognizable and yet remain the same in a relevant sense.
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However this may be, in the seventeenth century this problem was not acute. 
Although there were different views of the scope and use of logic, nobody doubt-
ed that it was a single, fairly clearly defined discipline, and that much of what 
it was about was of a linguistic nature. And the same applies to grammar and 
rhetoric.
A further common characteristic of grammar, logic and rhetoric was that these 
disciplines were almost universally called ‘arts’. They were commonly regarded as 
instrumental disciplines, consisting of a series of precepts and rules, rather than 
sciences related to a certain field of inquiry. When textbook writers described 
the use of these arts, what they habitually did, they emphasized skills rather than 
theory. The arts were presented and perceived as gateways to the world of learn-
ing rather than the substance of learning as such. Nevertheless, there was a strong 
theoretical component as well, in that the rules of art were based upon and inter-
linked with the analysis and description of language structure and use.
A feature also shared by the arts of discourse is that all three of them had a 
long tradition behind them, and that most of their basic concepts and distinc-
tions had been in place since Antiquity. As was also observed by their critics in 
the seventeenth century, practically all terms and rules they contained came from 
the classical tradition, and virtually every element of the theories they employed 
could be traced back to a classical source. These were Priscian and Donatus for 
grammar, Aristotle for logic, and Cicero and again Aristotle for rhetoric.
In order to answer further questions about the internal aspects of the arts of 
discourse, we must consider them separately. It goes beyond the scope of this pa-
per to provide a satisfactory account of even the most basic concepts, distinctions 
and insights they encompassed. Nevertheless, an overview of what an educated 
person would have become familiar with in the course of learning grammar, logic 
and rhetoric does not require a thick book. In fact, short synopses of these arts 
were frequently produced in the seventeenth century. That this was possible is 
partly due to the fact that a common doctrinal core existed in each of the three 
arts, in spite of the existence of different schools in logic and rhetoric, and dif-
ferent approaches in grammar – differences which will be ignored here. If we 
compare writers on these subjects, we find differences in wording, differences 
in emphasis, and differences in organization, but at least as far as textbooks are 
concerned (which is of course not all that one should take into account), we also 
find an overall similarity, the same patterns and the same themes rehearsed over 
and over again. As an indication of what a useful synopsis would spell out in 
more detail, an extremely short summary of grammar, logic and rhetoric follows, 
in that order.
Grammar, defined by many as ‘the art of reading and writing’, was a rather 
clearly delineated body of doctrines with its own set of technical terms and sub-
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jects that were presented in a fixed order, following a compositional progression 
from the smallest elements of speech to the largest units. A customary grammar 
was about a single language, and the pattern it followed was originally devised 
for Latin. Grammars usually consisted of four parts: the first was usually termed 
‘orthographia’, and its subject was called ‘littera’. Under this heading spelling was 
discussed, but also phonetics. The second part was called ‘prosodia’, which was 
concerned with the syllable, and in which matters such as pronunciation and em-
phasis were discussed. The third part, usually called ‘etymologia’, was in many 
cases the most lengthy one. It dealt with the definitions of the various word class-
es and their subdivisions, as well as the categories such as number, case, person, 
tense, etc. The fourth and final part, often called ‘syntax’, was concerned with top-
ics such as agreement and government. An example of agreement is that adjec-
tives are in the plural if the corresponding substantive is; an example of govern-
ment is that if verbs combine with nouns, the latter must adopt a certain case, e.g. 
the accusative.
Definitions of logic varied. Some frequent ones were ‘the art of reasoning’ and 
‘the art of directing the mind in discerning truth from falsity’. Sixteenth-century 
definitions of humanist logic, which was a mixture of rhetoric and logic follow-
ing a pattern devised by Cicero, became increasingly rare. In seventeenth-century 
logic we find a similar pattern, and a similar compositional structure as in gram-
mar. First, the elements of discourse, namely words, were treated; next, words 
combined into propositions, and finally propositions combined into discourse 
and reasoning. The chapters on terms or words usually contained an exposition 
of the Aristotelian categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation and others), 
the predicables (such as genus, difference and species) and related subjects. The 
chapters on propositions dealt with the square of opposition and topics such 
as the conversion of propositions. The third part, dealing with discourse and 
reasoning, contained the theory of syllogisms, their figures and moods. Other 
standard topics of discussion were either contained in one of the first three parts, 
or were assigned a part of their own; these were, among other things, different 
sorts of proofs, the topics of invention and the fallacies.
Rhetoric, finally, was often defined as ‘the art of teaching or speaking well, in 
order to persuade’. It also had its standard inventory of technical terms, distinc-
tions and themes. A pattern that was often followed was the one deriving from 
Cicero’s division of the art of rhetoric into five different arts: the art of invention, 
containing discussion and examples of the ‘topics’ or commonplaces and their 
use in finding arguments to defend a case; the art of arrangement, distinguishing 
and describing the various parts of an oration; the art of style, which discussed 
the figures of speech, such as metaphor with its variants, e.g. synecdoche and 
metonymia; the art of memory, containing mnemonic precepts; and the art of 
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delivery, treating the use of voice and gesture. In the course of the seventeenth 
century, a number of textbooks appeared which discussed the figures of speech 
thoroughly but exclusively; others were mainly filled with examples of good 
writing.
As regards the external aspects of the arts of discourse, it is first of all to be 
noted that they formed the foundation of all academic education. Pre-university 
education was dominated by Latin grammar. Schoolboys spent years grappling 
with the declinations, conjugations and other intricacies of the Latin tongue, in 
order to get access to the world of learning, from which girls were largely shut off. 
A major part of undergraduate studies at the university was devoted to rhetoric 
and logic. A thorough grounding in the arts of discourse was a preliminary to 
the study of more advanced subjects such as law, medicine and theology. Instruc-
tion in the arts included the study of textbooks but also practice in verse writing, 
declamation and disputation, all conducted in Latin. As a result, almost every 
educated person to be found in seventeenth-century Europe had a good com-
mand of Latin, and was familiar with the ‘terms of art’ of grammar, logic and 
rhetoric. They all knew (or at least had once been required to know) what a sole-
cism is, and what synecdoche is and catechresis, which types of amplification 
could be employed, and what the difference is between a syllogism in Barbara and 
one in Celarent. And all of them, albeit with unequal success, could apply this 
knowledge in speaking and writing. The arts of discourse thus formed a common 
body of knowledge and skill shared by the learned, whether natural scientist, 
philosopher or lawyer. They shaped manners of thinking and forms of expression 
in ways that may go unnoticed, because universally shared intellectual idioms 
tend to remain unarticulated among insiders. Thus, the importance of the arts of 
discourse for the intellectual atmosphere in seventeenth-century Europe should 
not be underestimated, although it often is.
Universities throughout Europe were similar enough to allow teachers to 
move between countries, which they often did. At most universities, the curricu-
lum remained humanistic in organization and spirit. The ideal of education was 
all-round erudition rather than specialization. Those teaching the arts typically 
mastered several of them, and combined their teaching with a post devoted to 
other subjects such as astronomy or geometry. Universities were still the main 
centre of intellectual activity, although other institutions became increasingly 
important. Scientific academies and societies were founded, and more and more 
influential thinkers worked outside the universities, some of them in a setting 
related to the church, others as independent scholars or in the service of royal 
and other courts.
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3 Critics and reformers
The arts of discourse had taken a central position in education for centuries, 
but in the seventeenth century this position was challenged by a series of critics. 
This was a period in which prominent thinkers called for a radical revision of the 
entire framework of knowledge. A leading representative of this movement was 
Descartes, who influentially argued for the importance of starting afresh in natu-
ral philosophy as well as epistemology. The method he devised for arriving at true 
knowledge entailed that no element of traditional knowledge could be taken for 
granted without scrutinizing it anew. Indeed, much of it should be discarded in 
order to arrive at new insights. Another extremely influential writer was Francis 
Bacon, who undertook to examine existing disciplines in order to sort out what 
was useful in them and what not, and to detect gaps in knowledge and flaws in 
method.
Both Bacon and Descartes were highly critical of the arts of discourse, with 
logic serving as the main culprit. A major point of criticism was that it was inca-
pable of offering, or guiding the way, to new knowledge. And new knowledge was 
precisely what had become the most important item on the agenda. This is what 
Bacon said on logic: ‘The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability 
to the errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions than 
to help the search after truth. So it does more harm than good’.1 And Descartes 
commented on logic: ‘Dialecticians [that is, logicians] are unable to formulate a 
syllogism with a true conclusion unless they are already in possession of the mat-
ter of the conclusion, i.e. unless they have previous knowledge of the very truth 
deduced in the syllogism. It is obvious therefore that they themselves can learn 
nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and hence that ordinary dialectic is of 
no use whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth of things.’2
A further criticism, especially found in Bacon, is that the arts of discourse were 
all concerned with language. His main objection against traditional learning as a 
whole was that it centered on ‘words’ rather than ‘things’, ‘[Aristotle] being always 
more solicitous to provide an answer to the question and affirm something posi-
tive in words, than about the inner truth of things’.3 Bacon’s criticisms of the arts 
of discourse were motivated by a strong dissatisfaction with their subject matter, 
namely words or language. His famous theory of the idols identified the idols of 
the market-place, those associated with language, as the most pernicious ones. 
In Bacon’s view, language itself exerted a sometimes harmful power over sound 
thinking and judgment. True progress could not be expected until the linguisti-
cally focused arts of discourse were replaced by methodical investigation of the 
natural world. In this respect, Bacon can be seen as an early proponent of the 
belief that there is an antagonism between ‘hard’, useful science on the one hand, 
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and the arbitrary and inconsequential opinions of the humanities on the other. 
Yet Bacon was certainly not in favour of abolishing the traditional arts altogether, 
and his writings also contained suggestions for linguistic studies which were en-
thusiastically taken up by a number of scholars later in the century.
In more general terms, what many found objectionable about the arts of dis-
course was that they were so obviously linked with an attitude towards learning 
which was oriented towards the past. Training in the arts consisted of studying 
classical sources and emulating classical models. The study of logic required 
a painstaking effort to master the moods and figures invented by Aristotle. 
The study of grammar and rhetoric was intimately connected with the ideal 
of literary excellence and erudition treasured by the humanists. This ideal was 
thoroughly authority-bound, seeking examples and wisdom in the writings of 
Horace and Cicero. This clashed with a forward-looking attitude, a sense of 
beginning, an expectation of new discoveries which became ever more wide-
spread.
4 Th ree trends
In the remainder of this paper, I point up three trends which took place against 
the background just sketched. The first concerns only logic; the second both 
grammar and logic; and the third a new development in the study of language, 
connected with grammar as well as logic. That rhetoric thus drops out of the pic-
ture is a consequence of the many limitations of this short paper.
4.1 Eclecticism and distance to the tradition in logic textbooks
Most of what was written on logic in the seventeenth century is to be found 
in textbooks. In the medieval period, the popular standard format was a com-
mentary on the work of earlier logicians, mainly Aristotle. It was not unusual that 
in these commentaries new additions to logical theory were propounded. In the 
post-medieval period, the commentary format became ever less frequently used, 
and new additions were increasingly rare. The humanists reorganized logic ac-
cording to a rhetorical pattern derived from Cicero, at the expense of formal logic. 
Much of what had been omitted by the humanists was restored in most of the 
textbooks produced in the seventeenth century, although the medieval additions 
received scant attention. Most textbooks thus presented a more or less detailed 
account of Aristotelian logic. The number of different textbooks appearing in 
this period was larger than ever before, but there was very little that their authors 
added or changed to the conventional wisdom.
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An example, although not fitting in all respects, of such a textbook is John 
Wallis’s Institutio Logicae of 1687.4 Wallis was a founder member of the Royal 
Society, but did not agree with the negative Baconian assessment of logic shared 
by the majority of the fellows. His book is traditional in more sense than one. 
It presents a detailed and lucid account of the standard subjects of Aristotelian 
logic, but it also aims to purify logic from what Wallis regarded as distortions, 
especially some novel distinctions that had been introduced by Ramus (Pierre 
de la Ramée) in the sixteenth century. These concerned singular propositions, 
which Ramus assigned a separate status, distinct from universal and particular 
propositions, and hypothetical syllogisms, which Aristotle, according to Ra-
mus, had failed to recognize as a distinct type of inference. Wallis argued at 
length that Ramus was mistaken on both counts.5 What is important in the 
present context is Wallis’s manner of presentation in the non-polemical sec-
tions. In explaining and defining basic notions of logic, he consistently takes a 
third person’s stance. The terms introduced are those that ‘ logicians’ use. The 
explanation is one that shows what ‘they’ mean by these terms. The doctrines 
and the system are thus described from a distance. The reader is presented 
with a very well-informed account of the terms, doctrines and insights that 
form an impressively coherent whole. In fact, Wallis’s book could serve as a 
useful introduction to Aristotelian logic to a modern reader. But the theory is 
presented as something that was invented and completed by Aristotle, with no 
need of revision. Wallis insisted that logic was a useful and even indispensible 
discipline, but judging from how he presented it, logic was not a subject with a 
research agenda.
A similar attitude towards traditional logic, although far more critical than 
Wallis’s, can be found in the Port Royal logic.6 As the authors state in a pref-
ace, they had undertaken to provide an account of what they considered to 
be useful in logic, at first assuming that this could be written up in a single 
day. This reflects a rather disparaging approach to the subject, in line with the 
Cartesian evaluation of it. The assumption is that there is a finished body of 
doctrines, inherited from the past, which can be assessed as to their tenability 
and usefulness. The intention is to sift through them with a view to retaining 
the useful bits. Some parts of the system turn out be valuable, some appear to 
be superfluous on inspection, and others, such as the Aristotelean categories, 
are even dangerous as they lead to misconceptions. This approach led to a much 
admired work on logic, in which many of the standard ingredients of logic are 
rephrased in Cartesian fashion, while it jettisons a number of less central topics 
in the process.
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4.2 A new research programme: philosophical grammar
In the course of the seventeenth century, a type of grammar often called ‘philo-
sophical grammar’ emerged, or rather re-surfaced, as it was in a sense a revival of 
medieval speculative grammar. It was Bacon who had noted that a more scientific 
type of grammar was desirable, as opposed to so-called popular grammar, which 
is ‘for the speedy attaining of languages’. This philosophical grammar, by contrast, 
was to examine ‘the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and 
prints of reason’.7 Bacon’s proposal was in line with a trend in seventeenth-century 
grammar which became more and more concerned with establishing connections 
between language and rational thought, while the boundaries between logic and 
grammar became increasingly indistinct. The emergence of philosophical gram-
mar marked the beginnings of a new research programme; the challenge was to 
find out how language and thought are connected. The study of language in this 
context was not an art consisting of precepts and rules, but a scientific effort.
A work on grammar that was explicitly presented as philosophical was Car-
amuel’s Grammatica Audax (1654),8 the first part of which was said ‘to discuss 
philosophically, abstracting from all languages, the method and technical vocabu-
lary [‘second intentions’] of the art of grammar’. Caramuel discusses a peculiar 
mixture of logical, grammatical, metaphysical and theological topics, and consti-
tutes an admittedly bold (audax) attempt to connect them all together.
Another example of a work in which the increase of logical considerations in 
grammar writing is clearly visible is Vossius’s De Arte Grammatica (1635),9 the 
most comprehensive work on grammar to appear in the seventeenth century. This 
monumental work follows the traditional plan, treating letters, syllables, words, 
and syntax in the usual order, and is humanistic in spirit, presenting a grand syn-
thesis of existing scholarship on more than 1,400 pages. But Vossius’s grammar 
has many traits which it shares with philosophically oriented grammars. It pre-
fers semantic criteria over criteria of linguistic form wherever possible and gives 
prominence to logical considerations. To cite a single example, Vossius defends 
the view that noun and verb should be seen as the primary word classes to which 
the other ones are subordinate or even reducible. This view, as Vossius indicates, 
derives from Aristotle and was common in the logical tradition from Antiquity 
onwards.
A final example is the Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660) by Arnauld and 
Lancelot, also known as the Port Royal grammar,10 which was a very influen-
tial grammar of the philosophical type. This relatively short treatise is a general 
grammar in that it discusses the technical vocabulary of grammar with respect 
to universal properties of languages. It is also a rational grammar in that the au-
thors are concerned throughout to show that languages are rationally constructed 
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inventions. They claim that in order to understand the foundations of grammar, 
it is necessary to know ‘what goes on in our mind’. When they go on to specify 
these mental processes, it turns out that they are the three operations tradition-
ally distinguished in logic as the mental counterparts of linguistic units: con-
ceiving, judging and reasoning, which correspond to words or terms, sentences 
or propositions, and discourse or syllogisms, respectively. And there are several 
other aspects of this grammar which show a mixture of logical and grammatical 
approaches.
There are some general characteristics that these philosophical grammars have 
in common. First, linguistic form and usage are given less prominence than se-
mantics; these grammars are concerned with general linguistics rather than the 
structure of particular languages. Second, logical terminology and distinctions 
are frequently used, and attempts are often made to reduce usage to underlying, 
‘logical’ structures. Third, some of these works criticize existing languages for 
being irregular or otherwise defective. Fourth, these grammars are traditional in 
the sense that most of the traditional concepts and distinctions of grammatical 
theory are retained, although alternative systems of parts of speech are some-
times proposed.
4.3 New horizons in linguistics
The opposition between words versus things mentioned earlier opened the way 
to a new approach to language, according to which natural languages were just 
one of a range of possible symbolic systems capable of representing and com-
municating knowledge. From this perspective, natural languages were primarily 
seen as a tool, the efficacy and usefulness of which can be judged on independent 
grounds. And if they failed to meet certain standards, which they in fact did, it 
seemed obvious that they should be replaced by better ones. Thus, both the goals 
and the methods of the study of language changed: from describing existing us-
age, with a view to copying the classical models (essentially a reproductive activi-
ty) to exploring and devising new methods of communication and representation 
(a constructive enterprise). This approach was fed by a fresh appreciation of what 
symbolic systems in general could accomplish. The example of Chinese writing, 
among other things, showed that written symbols could be used to represent 
things, rather than words. This type of writing was known as a ‘real character’, 
as opposed to a vocal character representing words, such as alphabetical writing. 
The concept of a real character appealed to many writers, and various proposals 
to put this in practice were put forward.
In the 1660s two artificial languages were published, which were meant to ful-
fill the same functions as natural languages. Their authors duly emphasized the 
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primacy of things over words. In Ars Signorum,11 George Dalgarno stated that 
this art of signs should follow the art of things. And John Wilkins, in his Essay, 
claimed that ‘things are better than words’,12 which was completely in line with 
what he said in an earlier treatise, claiming that a newly invented real charac-
ter would contribute to ‘the spreading and promoting of all Arts and Sciences: 
Because that great part of our Time which is now required to the Learning of 
Words, might then be employed in the Study of Things’.13
In theory, then, everything seemed clear enough. A newly invented artificial 
language was to be built from scratch, and to take real things as a starting point. 
The task facing the language planners entailed first of all devising a new vocabu-
lary, which had to provide a transparent representation of ‘things’. But this pre-
sented an enormous practical problem. Existing languages were no longer eligible 
as a model in determining which things needed to be named for the defects of 
existing languages in this regard were precisely the problem that the artificial 
language was supposed to solve. The language planners needed a language-inde-
pendent inventory of ‘things’ that were to be provided with a name. This issue was 
debated by Dalgarno and Wilkins, who disagreed about the solution. I will focus 
on the course of action eventually taken by Wilkins. In his project there was a 
strong connection between linguistic and scientific concerns.
Wilkins, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, resorted to logic. That is to say, he 
used a method which was closely similar to what each and every undergraduate 
was familiar with from the first part of a logic course, which treated of the cat-
egories. Exactly why Wilkins did so is not entirely clear, but it is certain that the 
logic textbooks provided at least the rudiments of the inventory of things that 
Wilkins was looking for. The logic textbooks, as noted, started with a treatment 
of terms, and arranged them according to the ten Aristotelian categories. Aris-
totle himself had never gone into any such detail, and neither had his commen-
tator Porphyry, whose famous tree was expressed in a single, not so very long 
sentence. In the course of history, the tree of Porphyry was fleshed out in ever 
more detail, and by the time Wilkins was taught logic, the manuals he must have 
used provided an all-encompassing inventory of existent things, in hierarchical 
arrangement. Thus, the category of substance was illustrated by a Porphyrian 
tree in which not only humans, but also animals, plants, and non-living things 
had their proper place. Not only the category of substance, but other categories, 
especially those of quantity, quality and relation, were divided into subordinate 
categories in a similar way. Authors of these textbooks usually explained that 
it was up to the various disciplines to study and describe the things designated 
by the terms in these classificatory tables, but still it was logic that provided an 
all-embracing categorization, and in this way brought the various disciplines 
together.
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Wilkins used similar tables as a basis for his artificial words, using many of the 
traditional categories and their subdivisions, although not without modifications. 
In doing so, he let an important component of the traditional art of logic, heavily 
criticised by Bacon and closely associated with the words of the master officially 
denounced by the Royal Society14, in through the back door.
However, as indicated, the classificatory tables of the logic textbooks only pro-
vided the top of the hierarchy. To make these tables suit his purposes, Wilkins 
had to expand them to contain much greater detail. In order to achieve this, he 
asked and got assistance from various experts, notably John Ray, who helped him 
draw up the tables of plants, and Francis Willoughby, who assisted with the tables 
of animals. Thus, Wilkins managed to integrate knowledge belonging to botany 
and zoology into a linguistic project, entirely in the spirit of the logic textbooks, 
leaving it to the experts to fill out the details of the overall classification.
As it happened, Wilkins’s project was considered a failure shortly after the Essay 
was published. And those involved in the project realized that the attempt to merge 
science and linguistics in this way would be unsuccessful even when they were still 
working on it. Th e scientists, such as Ray, were convinced that it was useless to 
try and classify plants and animals using a pre-conceived, linguistically motivated 
pattern.15 And Wilkins himself, when writing the Essay, realized that the purpose 
of constructing a practicable artifi cial language was ultimately incompatible with 
scientifi c accuracy. Instead, it was commonsense notions as articulated by natural 
languages which, he perceived, would have to be taken into account rather than 
scientifi c theory. Although many modern commentators have held the view that 
Wilkins’s philosophical language was primarily meant to provide a means for 
expressing new scientifi c knowledge, we have his own word that it was not.16
5 Conclusion
To conclude, the traditional artes sermocinales survived the seventeenth century 
almost undamaged. Grammars modelled on the classical pattern continued to be 
written in the centuries afterwards, textbooks on logic and manuals of rhetoric 
repeating the teachings of the ancients who invented them were produced or re-
printed in great numbers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Formal disputations, in the form of thesis defences which heavily relied on syl-
logistic reasoning, remained part of academic life until well into the nineteenth 
century, and rhetorical terminology is still taught and used in language teaching. 
At the same time, however, a series of new developments had been set in motion, 
which gradually caused the traditional arts to become more and more marginal-
ized and ultimately superseded by new approaches to the study of language.
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Manuscript Hunting and the Challenge of 
Textual Variance in Late Seventeenth-Century 
Icelandic Studies
Már Jónsson
Denmark has formerly produced very learned men... But at present learning is 
there at a very low ebb... Th ere is but one university, which is at Copenhagen, 
and that mean enough in all respects.
Robert Molesworth in 16921
The fervent collecting of ancient and medieval manuscripts – in Italy and Greece 
from the late fourteenth century, in France, Germany and England from the early 
fifteenth century, and in Spain and Iceland from the late sixteenth century on-
wards – resulted not only in the accumulation of new texts and information. It 
was also a reason for perplexity as scholars struggled to design methods for sifting 
evidence, for defining options, and for making choices concerning the texts they 
wished to use or publish, their struggle at times ending in despair and exhaus-
tion. As more and more manuscripts were brought to light and made accessible 
in continuously growing libraries and private collections, scholars needed new 
tools to understand and manage textual variance. Which manuscripts should be 
used, and how could their quality be gauged? Why did their texts differ? How 
should they be transcribed and published? Should vernacular texts be translated 
into Latin? What kind of comments were needed – factual, historical, or textual?
Such technicalities, in other words the painstaking travails of textual scholar-
ship, deserve to be a focus of attention in an overarching history of the humani-
ties. This history should not restrict itself to the brilliant ideas of philosophers 
and theologians. Developments in the humanities were based on the ‘rough’ mate-
rial of ancient textual sources, and in this article I hope to show how scholarship 
in the Early Modern age needed to plough through vexed issues of textual vari-
ance, manuscript hunting and compilation that, although often coming to dead 
ends and not always resulting in successful publications, were nevertheless semi-
nal to developments in history writing, philology, and language scholarship.
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I will focus on an area to which the history of scholarship has paid scant at-
tention: the kingdom of Denmark-Norway in the late seventeenth century. 
Somewhat earlier, the English antiquarian Henry Spelman characterized this 
‘unlearned’ kingdom as being on ‘the confines of the Arctic Circle’.2 Although an 
abundance of Icelandic and Norwegian medieval texts and manuscripts was re-
discovered and the first editions appeared in 1664-1673, none of them was based 
on a critical asessment of manuscripts. In the 1680s and 1690s a renewed effort 
was made that, had it succeeded, would have delivered interesting results. Lam-
entably, however, this endeavour did not produce editions, partly due to a lack of 
funds but chiefly because of methodological difficulties. The scholars involved 
were aware of the value of vellum manuscripts but unable to solve the problem of 
textual variance, that is the fact that manuscripts of any specific work differed in 
many ways, and a scholar who wanted to produce an edition would have to make 
choices based on critical discernment and clear principles.
Instead of using standards of philological correctness of our present age to 
judge these late seventeenth-century efforts, I shall base my estimate on the ex-
ceptional insights of the late fifteenth-century Florentine scholar Angelo Poli-
tian, the enfant terrible of late medieval and early modern scholarship. In a way, 
Politian’s philological ideals were so close to modern procedures that they seem 
almost too good to be true; his practice in that sense resembles what Ezio Ornato 
has called ‘una semplice curiosità archeologica’.3 Politian’s example was only fol-
lowed by scholars in more recent times, but nonetheless his philological ideal can 
be used as a benchmark for developments in the Early Modern period. Arrogant 
and impatient at times, he was an incredibly observant scholar who wished to 
outperform his contemporaries as he strove to establish better versions of ancient 
Greek and Roman texts through linguistic refinement and the meticulous obser-
vation of manuscripts. He wanted to base his work on a thorough investigation 
of as many manuscripts as possible, preferring older ones but not discarding more 
recent texts that might be copies of ancient books. Politian’s work demonstrates 
his critical assessment of the quality of manuscripts and the ways in which they 
were related. He made very careful collations of manuscripts and printed edi-
tions, rigorous transcripts of texts that he borrowed, and emendations, judicious-
ly based on other texts written by the same author or his direct environment.4 
Politian loathed inexactitude and harshly criticized his predecessors and contem-
poraries for making too many mistakes. In his Miscellanea prima of 1489, for one, 
he attacked the late Domizio Calderini for his sloppy method. Jacopo Antiquari, 
Calderini’s friend in Milan, complained about this in a letter and claimed that 
since Calderini was long dead, it was like attacking a ghost. Politian retorted on 
30 November 1489 that he could not know whether Calderini would have cor-
rected his mistakes if he had still been alive:
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How should I know this? Are you really saying that it is always and ev-
erywhere a good idea to expect intellectual progress? [An usquequaque de 
ingeniorum profectu bene sperare est?] Were not all of this particular per-
son’s fi nal contributions even more inaccurate?5
In Politian’s view, progress came with hard work. His influence, however, was lim-
ited – like Calderini, in this respect, he died too soon. Most scholars continued 
to make many mistakes, and even the best were careless in their choice of manu-
scripts and variants. When Erasmus, for instance, published his Greek edition 
of the New Testament in Basel in 1516, he used five manuscripts. One of them 
is preserved, a twelfth-century vellum now known to be devoid of textual value. 
Although aware of the value of old manuscripts, Erasmus relied mostly on recent 
ones with scant merit. Where the Greek text was lacking, he even added bits of 
his own translation from the Vulgate, thus revealing, to quote L.D. Reynolds 
and N.G. Wilson, ‘a lack of a set of logical principles for the evaluation of manu-
scripts’. In his edition of the works of Seneca in 1515 and 1529, Erasmus recognized 
the worth of a ninth-century manuscript he had acquired, but he did not use it 
much: ‘Instead of basing his text of these works upon this prime witness, he drew 
on it spasmodically to emend what he had before him.’6 It soon became standard 
practice for most editors to use fi rst editions as a basic text – textus receptus or 
textus vulgatus – adding selected readings from manuscripts that were mentioned 
only vaguely (‘emendatio ope codicum’) and various conjectures (‘emendatio ope 
ingenii’), at times original, but just as often borrowed or stolen.7 Th ere were some 
exceptions, however. In around 1530-1570, scholars of Roman law, such as Antonio 
Agustín, Piero Vettori, Jacques Cujas and Joseph Scaliger, criticized older editions 
severely, tracing the genealogy of manuscripts and publishing transcripts of those 
they considered important. They normalized orthography and corrected errors, 
and even made typographical distinctions between variants and conjectures.8
Such efforts were consolidated every time that scholars made a determined 
effort to gather manuscripts in growing libraries. Although most libraries were 
private, the biggest ones, kept by kings, dukes and universities, were public. From 
the 1640s onwards, this enabled Dutch scholars such as Nicolaas Heinsius and 
Isaac Vossius to produce better editions, partly through their ingenuity in mak-
ing emendations and conjectures based on a wider knowledge of texts, but also 
through a closer scrutiny of manuscripts. Scholars came to prefer their specific 
texts above earlier editions, although at times some were overwhelmed and only 
produced heaps of variants without distinction.9
This process of strenuous and uneven progress was mirrored further to the 
north, but developed more slowly and with less spectacular results in terms of 
editions. Influenced by Italian humanists, scholars in Northern Europe had be-
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gun searching for documents and manuscripts already in the early sixteenth cen-
tury. Interesting texts were discovered such as the plays and poetry composed by 
Hrotsvitha von Gandersheim in the tenth century; they were edited and pub-
lished by Konrad Celtis in Nürnberg 1501. In 1515, his friend Konrad Peutinger 
used recently found manuscripts to publish The History of the Goths, written by 
Jordanes in the sixth century, and The History of the Longobards by the ninth-
century historian Paulus Diaconus.10 In 1514, Christiern Pedersen, a Danish stu-
dent of theology in Paris, published the extensive early thirteenth-century Latin 
History of the Danes (Gesta Danorum) by Saxo Grammaticus – and was actually 
among the first editors to use the blurb text for claiming that this was the first 
time a text appeared in print: ‘nunc primum literaria seriæ illustratæ tersissime 
que impressæ.’11 Later, he wished to make a Danish translation of Saxo with de-
tailed explanations on Nordic history. Aware of the existence of manuscripts of 
medieval sagas of Norwegian kings, he hired a Norwegian man of learning who 
knew the old language to make excerpts. A Danish translation of Saxo first ap-
peared in 1575, when the historian Anders Sørensen Vedel concluded one. The 
first Danish translation of the Norwegian kings’ sagas appeared in Copenhagen 
in 1594 and a more thorough one in 1633, when Ole Worm, in his introduction, 
compared the writings of the thirteenth-century Icelandic historian Snorri Stur-
luson to Greek and Roman historical works, stating that they were just as useful 
and truthful.12
As late as the 1630s, the Dutch historians Johannes Meursius and Johannes 
Pontanus wrote eloquently on the medieval history of Denmark without using a 
single manuscript.13 It was by then well known that medieval manuscripts of great 
interest for the medieval history and culture of Scandinavia were to be found 
in Iceland. The first batches were sent as gifts to the Danish king in 1656 and 
1662 by the learned bishop Brynjólfur Sveinsson who hoped that Icelandic texts 
would be published with a Latin translation and a scholarly commentary.14 Swed-
ish scholars, arguing with Danish ones about the age of their two nations, also 
showed an interest in Icelandic texts containing references to Swedish kings. In 
1664-1673, a series of text editions appeared in Uppsala and Copenhagen with 
translations into Danish, Swedish and Latin, but all of them were worse than 
anything produced in Europe at the time. Any available manuscripts were used 
regardless of their scholarly value, mostly recent and inexact copies from Iceland, 
and the editors’ commentaries reveal a credulous attitude towards the text and a 
blatant lack of critical zeal.15 This was the scholarly norm when Árni Magnússon, 
or Arnas Magnæus as he will be called here, arrived in Copenhagen in 1683, at the 
age of twenty, to study theology at the university just like many promising young 
men of good families in Iceland. A year later he became assistant to Thomas 
Bartholin the Younger, the recently appointed royal antiquarian, and provided 
Manuscript Hunting
numerous Icelandic texts for his fairly voluminous book on the fearlessness of 
medieval Danes, published in Copenhagen in 1689.
Magnæus developed rapidly as a textual scholar. In 1684-1685 he made hun-
dreds of short excerpts from Icelandic manuscripts of sagas and historical works, 
using recent copies available in the city, most of them of disputable quality, cop-
ied without care for reading purposes and not for scholarly use. The Icelandic 
vellums that belonged to the king and the university were all at Stangeland, on 
the west coast of Norway, with the Icelander Þormóður Torfason or Thormod 
Torfæus, royal historiographer of Norway.16 Magnæus’s method of transcription 
was simple. He used his own orthography and expanded the abbreviations in 
the manuscript he copied (exemplar), so that he gave everything his personal 
touch. Bartholin and Magnæus did not care about the age of the manuscripts or 
texts they used. To them, all texts were equally interesting, and they used what 
was at hand, such as an early seventeenth-century copy of Knytlinga saga, a saga 
on Danish medieval kings that Ole Worm had received from Iceland some dec-
ades earlier. In collaboration with an unknown Icelander, Magnæus copied the 
legendary Hrólfs saga kraka from a paper copy and translated it into Latin.17 He 
also made a copy of the Norwegian thirteenth-century Speculum regale (Konungs 
skuggsjá), again in collaboration with an unknown scribe, but now from a vel-
lum manuscript that belonged to Peder Resen, professor of law at the university. 
In one place, Magnæus commented on the fact that a leaf was missing. He cor-
rected what the other scribe had done, and they both modernized the spelling.18 
Although one of his exemplars was on vellum and the other a recent copy, the 
method was consistent. The goal was to make texts readable and accessible, so 
that information would be available on a variety of relevant issues. The tran-
scripts were meticulous, and few changes were made, except for the spelling. This 
is how Icelandic scribes had worked earlier in the century. Magnæus followed 
their tradition and not without success.
In 1685-1686, Magnæus changed his mind completely, as if he suddenly discov-
ered that things could be done so much better. In the spring of 1685, he went to 
Iceland in order to collect manuscripts for Bartholin; he stayed until the autumn 
of 1686. He found nothing that Bartholin needed, but obtained for himself a few 
legal codices and made copies of medieval legal texts in a manner totally differ-
ent from what he had done so far, in more detail and with greater exactitude. 
As he returned to Copenhagen, he responded to this ‘revelation’ by transcrib-
ing several texts from a late fourteenth-century collection of Icelandic sagas, re-
cently acquired by Resen from a student who had been with Torfæus as a scribe 
for three years. The transcript is exceptionally detailed and can be situated on 
what philologists now call the diplomatic level. Magnæus strove to imitate the 
orthography and abbreviations of the original, and succeeded except for minor 
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inconsistencies in some details. He emended the text in a few places and put his 
additions within square brackets.19 This ‘new’ method seems to have been based 
on a mixture of foreign models and personal fascination due to direct contact 
with vellum manuscripts.
The exceptional attention to detail was probably inspired by his reading of 
scholarly books and editions in Bartholin’s library of at least 2400 volumes. Here, 
Magnæus had access to hundreds of editions of classical and medieval texts and 
to the most recent scholarly feats of Jean Mabillon and others – not to mention 
Angeli Politiani opera, published in Paris in 1519.20 By now, Magnæus had decided 
to acquire as many Icelandic texts as possible in good copies, probably hoping to 
establish a research library of sorts. However, he soon found the newly developed 
diplomatic method too time-consuming and opted instead for a somewhat easier 
way of copying texts in a normalized orthography with expanded abbreviations. 
He did not go so far, however, as to use his own orthography like he had done 
earlier. In the winter of 1687-1688 he copied another fourteenth-century vellum 
of Icelandic sagas, Möðruvallabók, with two friends who studied at the univer-
sity, Ásgeir Jónsson and Eyjólfur Björnsson. They expanded all abbreviations and 
wrote all names with a majuscule. Corrections were not indicated, and not all 
medieval letter-forms were maintained.21
In the autumn of 1688, Torfæus came to Copenhagen to claim his salary that 
was long overdue. He was working on books on the medieval history of Denmark 
and Norway, published in 1702 and 1711, respectively. He befriended his much 
younger countryman Magnæus who confided that he planned an edition of a cru-
cial historical work, the early twelfth-century Book of Icelanders (Íslendingabók).22 
Written by chieftain, priest and historian Ari Thorgilsson the Wise, it succinctly 
narrates the discovery and colonization of Iceland in the late ninth century and 
its subsequent Christianization. The edition was intended for scholarly readers 
and was to contain a Latin translation and an extensive historical commentary. It 
would have added invaluably to the knowledge of Icelandic medieval history and 
was accepted for publication in Copenhagen in spring 1691, but never appeared. 
My contention is that Magnæus abandoned the edition because textual and fac-
tual inconsistencies in medieval manuscripts stretched the limits of his method. 
Rather than accepting these inconsistencies as some sort of challenge by integrat-
ing them in his work, he discontinued the project.
Magnæus’s first problem was that he had no decent copy of the text and had to 
use whatever manuscript he could lay his hands on. To our present knowledge, an 
early thirteenth-century vellum manuscript was extant in Iceland in around 1650. 
A highly qualified scribe, Jón Erlendsson, made two copies for the aforemen-
tioned Bishop Brynjólfur before the manuscript disappeared, one of them (AM 
113 b fol.) better than the other (AM 113 a fol.) – now both in the Arnamagnæan 
Manuscript Hunting
collection. Several copies were soon made of the version that was most faulty; 
subsequent copies of these copies grew more deficient with each generation. At 
some point in 1688, Magnæus received one of those bad copies, unfortunately not 
preserved, and made a copy for himself that he intended to use in his edition.
In the summer of 1688, the Book of Icelanders was published together with the 
much longer Book of Settlement by Bishop Thordur Thorlaksson at the only print-
ing press in Iceland. The text was based directly on the manuscript AM 113 a fol. 
with a few judicious corrections. The editorial principles are explained in a short 
introduction, but there is no commentary and no translation. When Magnæus re-
ceived the printed book in the autumn of that year, he must have realized that this 
edition was far better than the copy he had made for himself. Paradoxically, he 
showed no sign of using the edition in his work but instead insisted that Torfæus 
should send him a manuscript of the text even if it contained exactly the same text 
as the printed edition.23 In early 1690, Magnæus added to his copy a few marginal 
notes based on this manuscript, but should have made many more had he wanted 
to be thorough and consistent. In 1691 and 1692, Magnæus received both of Jón 
Erlendsson’s mid-century copies from Iceland and corrected his text in various 
places on the basis of the better copy, but again not consistently. Simultaneously, 
he collated that copy with the other good one. He now had the best manuscripts 
and knew it, but as he saw that there were more and different copies, he seems to 
have lost his way and instead of redoing the text, he abandoned the project.
Magnæus’s other problem was the commentary. The Book of Icelanders is only 
five thousand words in length, but poses intricate issues of chronology that ap-
peared insoluble – and some of them really are. Magnæus went to stay with Tor-
fæus at Stangeland for a few months in 1689. On his way back to Copenhagen, he 
wrote a letter asking Torfæus where he had read that the Norwegian king Harald 
Fairhair was born at the moment that King Gorm of Denmark had been in power 
for seven years. Torfæus replied that this conclusion was ‘ex hypothesi’, since me-
dieval chronicles claimed that Gorm became king in the year 840 and Harald was 
born in 848. The problem Magnæus and Torfæus encountered was that medieval 
chronicles and kings’ sagas hardly ever mention dates and do not agree with each 
other on how many years various kings stayed in power. About Harald Fairhair, 
allegedly the first king of a unified Norway, Magnæus concluded at one point that 
there was so much confusion that he saw no possibility of figuring out anything 
at all. Torfæus claimed that only the oldest historians should be used and not the 
ones that followed them. No author, however, could be entirely trusted since all 
of them made their own guesses and even mixed things up. For this reason, Tor-
fæus repeated, a scholar had to work ‘ex hypothesibus’. Having done what could 
be done, the scholar should decide, or better still the community of scholars, or 
as Torfæus wrote on 2 October 1690: ‘It is best that both of us agree, and Bar-
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tholinus, and exclaim a single adieu!’ When Magnæus insisted, Torfæus offered to 
include his arguments in the book. Magnæus should also publish both versions, 
and it would be left to the readers to decide. Any further discussion would be a 
waste of time and paper.24 Torfæus went on to write several learned volumes, dis-
cussing various options for a variety of problems in the texts, but Magnæus only 
produced handwritten notes.
It needs to be said that a contributing factor to Magnæus’s failure to produce 
an edition of the Book of Icelanders may have been the perceived or real lack of 
interest in Nordic medieval history on the continent. This lack of interest is ap-
parent, for instance, in the fact that the only writers of Danish history mentioned 
in Adam Rechenberg’s general presentation of necessary learning, published in 
Leipzig in 1691, were Saxo Grammaticus and Pontanus, whose Rerum Danica-
rum historia was published sixty years earlier.25 Perhaps in response to this lack 
of interest, Magnæus published a short Danish medieval chronicle in Latin in 
Leipzig in 1695, transcribed from an old vellum manuscript (‘pervetusto codice 
membraneo’) that belonged to the university library in Copenhagen. In his in-
troduction Magnæus shows his debt to his predecessors by connecting his mod-
est effort to famous names in the scholarly world, praising Marcus Meibomius, 
Roger Twysden and Jean Mabillon for their exemplary editions. His hope of pub-
lishing a manuscript fragment on Danish kings did not come true, however. In his 
own words, this was because of the reluctance of German printers to print a text 
in the Icelandic language, although it is clear that his Latin translation was far 
from ready and the commentary in shambles, as Magnæus constantly changed his 
mind, and he was, as with The Book of Icelanders before, overcome with doubts.26
The lesson Magnæus learned from his erudite struggles was that instead of 
writing and publishing, he should do two things, both of them within what can be 
called Politian’s program of a necessary assessment of the quality of manuscripts 
and the making of rigorous transcripts of borrowed ones:
1. Transcripts should be made with great care and exactitude. One example of 
this notion will have to suffice, relative to two Icelandic vellum manuscripts in the 
Ducal Library in Wolfenbüttel, registered as Icelandic mythology and poems.27 
In the early months of 1697 the dukes sent their librarian Hertel to Stockholm 
in order to pay their respects to Sweden’s new king. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
philosopher, historian and head-librarian in Wolfenbüttel, had recently become 
interested in septentrional matters and sent one of the manuscripts to his corre-
spondent, the Swedish scholar Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeld. Leibniz did not know 
the contents but thought that the manuscript was written in verse without rhyme 
‘en Islandois ou en vieux Scandinave’. Sparwenfeld persuaded Hertel to take the 
manuscript to Magnæus in Copenhagen, something Leibniz agreed to afterwards:
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Mr. Hertel left our Icelandic manuscript with Mister Arnas Magnæus in 
Copenhagen, if it is useful to him, so much the better. Libraries and manu-
scripts need only be available for the use of skilled people.28
Magnæus had the aforementioned Ásgeir Jónsson, again in Copenhagen, make 
a copy of the two Icelandic thirteenth-century family sagas: Eyrbyggja saga (AM 
450 a 4to) and Egils saga (AM 461 4to). As the first and last pages were illeg-
ible, Magnæus copied them himself. He already had several copies of both sagas 
and filled two gaps in the Wolfenbüttel manuscript with a text from other ver-
sions. Another scribe helped him to compare the transcript with the original, and 
Magnæus concluded that, although not copied letter by letter and except for the 
poems and some important sentences, the transcript was reliable. In June 1701 he 
sent the manuscript back with a report on its contents.29 In his collection as it 
survives to this day, there are at least 500 copies that he made or had his assistants 
make, all of them based on these principles, besides thousands of transcripts of 
Icelandic, Norwegian and Danish charters and other documents.
2. All extant manuscripts should be tracked down. Many interesting and quite 
dramatic stories could be told about Magnæus’s search for manuscripts. A good 
example is his chase after a fourteenth-century manuscript of the historical work 
Sturlunga saga, only preserved there and in another contemporary manuscript, 
acquired by Magnæus in 1699 (AM 122 a fol.). The so-called Reykjarfjarðarbók 
(AM 122 b fol.) was torn to pieces in 1676-1679 as it was damaged by moisture. 
The owner, a well-to-do farmer, gave leaves to his friends for use as book covers. 
Magnæus was informed about the manuscript’s tormented existence in 1693 and 
went on to trace its remains for three decades. In all, he retrieved 30 pages out of 
an estimated 180 that made up the original manuscript. At least seven colleagues 
sent him one or more leaves, the last two leaves arriving in 1724.30 His painstak-
ing efforts can be seen in his request to Árni Gudmundsson in 1707, as he asked 
where and when the first known owner at Reykjarfjörður had obtained the book. 
Was it complete when Árni saw it? If not, what was missing: how much or how 
little, in the beginning, middle or end? Was the whole book readable or was it 
damaged because of moisture or black stains? Who exactly possessed leaves, and 
would it be possible to retrieve them?
When Magnæus died on 7 January 1730, his collection comprised close to 
three thousand manuscripts and fragments, almost one-third of them on vellum. 
Half of those are fragments of less than six leaves. In a limited sense it can be 
claimed that he thus came close to the idea of recensio – fully developed in the late 
eighteenth century, according to Timpanaro – as he desired to gather together all 
manuscripts of a determined text, not only vellums but also seventeenth-century 
copies.31 In this wish for completeness, Magnæus went further than any contem-
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porary scholar or collector of manuscripts. Unlike Politian, however, he never 
developed a clear sense of how to manage the difference between manuscripts. He 
was not alone in this, as shown from the careless and arbitrary method of Lenglet 
de Fresnoy in his edition of Le Roman de la Rose in 1735; but it must be said that 
some or even many editors of that time were more scrupulous.32
In the course of his studies, Magnæus’s understanding of textual variance 
hardly improved, as can be seen in his handling of some seventeenth-century 
copies of an otherwise lost medieval text on church history called Hungurvaka. 
It was hopelessly confused, and I shall spare the reader the details. Before 1700, 
one of his assistants made a copy (a) of one (b) of these manuscripts and Mag-
næus collated it with another one (c). He then asked another assistant to make a 
copy (d) of his collated copy (b), but without the added variants (‘varias lectio-
nes’). In 1724, Magnæus compared this second copy (d) ‘accuratissime’ with the 
original (b) used to produce the first copy (a), making numerous corrections. 
Finally, he collated his copy (d) with a third seventeenth-century manuscript 
(e) and wrote down all the differences in the margins. His copy now contained 
an ‘accuratissima collatio’ of the two oldest manuscripts (b, e) of this important 
text, as he happily concluded. The only reason for doing all this appears to have 
been to throw away the first copy (a), useless since he now had its text on the 
margins of other copies.33
Returning to the Book of Icelanders in his later years, Magnæus concluded, er-
roneously as we have seen, that as a young man he had copied the text as exactly 
as he then could. In around 1720 he made an exact copy of his best copy and most 
likely recognized that his own version of 1688-1690 was useless, although he did 
not discard it. He copied some of his old commentary and revised a number of 
items.34 When, ultimately, he did not publish an edition, he now justified his inac-
tivity by claiming that the world of books was replete with products of vanity. He 
had never intended to write books himself and was convinced, as he explained to 
an assistant, ‘that a man could spend almost his whole life in putting together a lit-
tle booklet’.35 As a philologist, Magnæus gradually gained a finer understanding of 
the quality of texts and manuscripts, but this understanding was never brought to 
fruition in printed editions. His scholarship, seminal as it may have been for the 
origin of Icelandic studies, did not reach the public arena of European philology. 
The Republic of Letters allowed the participation of Scandinavian scholars of 
course, but there was limited interest in northern languages, culture and history. 
The thriving Anglo-Saxon studies in England were the closest field of research, 
much of it just as admirable in the details and the driving force the same, that is to 
replace or at least displace the old view that the origin of European languages and 
culture should be sought in Greek or Roman Antiquity.36 There was little contact, 
however, and scholars of medieval Iceland remained isolated.
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We can thus safely conclude that Magnæus’s diligent but inconspicuous schol-
arship, inspired as it may have been by the wish to transplant the ideas of human-
istic philology to Scandinavia, was only partly successful in the sense that his ac-
tivities did not become an integrated part of the wider European developments in 
philology and historiography. His image in the historiography of the humanities 
therefore remains that of a hunter for manuscripts and maker of copies, and he 
left the task of coping with textual variance to posterity by donating his collection 
to the University of Copenhagen after his death. To be fair, some of the problems 
he encountered remain unresolved to this day.
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Spinoza in the History of Biblical Scholarship
Piet Steenbakkers
1 Libertines at large
Let us start with prayer – to wit with Spinoza’s Prayer, as found in an anonymous 
manuscript of 1678–79: ‘Think with the learned, speak with the vulgar; the world 
wants to be deceived, amen.’1 The text is, of course, spurious, but it does give us 
a glimpse of Spinoza as seen by his contemporaries. The manuscript is a note-
book for private use, with unconnected and slapdash, barely readable jottings 
on a range of topics, mainly politics (passionately anti-Orange), religion and – 
most importantly – sex; our author has a marked fascination for perversities and 
monstrosities in this area. The choice of subjects suggests average pub talk,2 yet 
there is method in it. The author, whom I have been unable to identify so far,3 
was a friend and follower of Hadrian Beverland (1650–1716).4 In 1678, this young 
Utrecht libertine had just published his controversial ‘philological treatise’ Pecca-
tum originale (On Original Sin), which revealed the sexual drive to be the unique 
and supremely powerful motive force behind the workings of Nature. The origi-
nal sin that besets the human race and informs all our actions is the craving for 
sexual intercourse (coeundi pruritus). Beverland’s vitalism may be considered an 
unsophisticated foretaste of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Given the mechanis-
tic consensus of the period, he certainly qualifies as an original thinker. Though 
Beverland pays lip service – albeit with ill-concealed sarcasm – to orthodoxy by 
branding Spinoza as a sly deceiver (vafer impostor)5 and an atheist, his critique 
of religion and his metaphysics owe a great deal to the philosopher. What makes 
Beverland unique and interesting is the way he connects biblical criticism with 
his own theory of Nature as a blind procreative force. Many of these insights 
have found their way into the commonplace book of 1678–79; hence the amount 
of space devoted to sex. In this perspective there is a strong connection with 
religion: like classical paganism and religions generally, Judaism originally was 
a fertility cult, and the Bible should be read from that perspective. The author’s 
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language is at times rather smutty – undoubtedly on account of the privacy a 
notebook affords. He obviously admires Spinoza, and refers to his views on reli-
gion several times, as in this quote:
From Beverland6 – Th e Bible as we read it is not the true Bible, as can be 
shown from the Hebrew language, and as Spinoza also states. True is only 
that it secures the covenant made by the Israelites with God. Th e rest, 
which was added by Joshua and others, was written and invented by the 
Jews.7
The Bible is here presented as a historical, human document, with all the prob-
lems of transmission that this entails, rather than as the word of God, pure 
and simple. Though uncommon and dangerous, such a view was not entirely 
unheard of in 1678. In fact, puzzles and doubts about the historicity and au-
thenticity of the books that constitute the Bible had been around for a long 
time; for example, in the rabbinic midrash of the end of the first century CE and 
later, and in De doctrina christiana of Augustine. Yet for a long time, none of 
this was to have any serious consequences for the status of the Bible as the word 
of God: any discrepancies that arose could be accomodated by ‘harmonizing’ 
the potentially antithetical readings. In the early seventeenth century, the situ-
ation was still basically the same. Though Protestantism had launched an en-
tirely new programme of reading and interpreting the Bible, summed up in the 
formula sola scriptura, this did not immediately spark off any serious debates 
about the authority of the Bible as such. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
however, the situation had changed dramatically. To what extent the Bible was 
to be regarded as a genuine document, or as the word of God, had become a 
serious problem not only for the learned, but for the ordinary flock as well. The 
Utrecht manuscript is an instructive illustration of the gradual dissemination 
of these doubts.
It would be preposterous to try and explain the complex, often contradictory 
process of the change in attitude towards the Bible in the course of the seven-
teenth century as the effect of Spinoza’s work. Yet it is striking that after he had 
published his Tractatus theologico-politicus in 1670, there is a general tendency, on 
all sides of the controversy, to associate any attempt at a historical critique of the 
Bible with Spinoza. Much of this, undoubtedly, will boil down to polemics and 
rhetoric. Even so, the question remains why Spinoza was considered to have such 
an impact.
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2 A research project, and Spinoza’s place in it
The topic of Spinoza’s contribution to biblical criticism is a fascinating one, on 
account of at least two factors: the unparalleled status of the Bible in Western 
civilization, and the part allegedly played by Spinoza in the dramatic decline of 
that status. The Dutch philosopher is often referred to as a pioneer in textual 
criticism of the Bible, but much research remains to be done: what exactly was his 
contribution, how original was it, how does it relate to the ‘sacred philology’ that 
preceded it? These and many other questions will be studied in a new research 
project, Biblical Criticism and Secularization in the Seventeenth Century, which 
Henk Nellen (of the Huygens Institute of the Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences), Dirk van Miert, Jetze Touber and I have started in November 
2009. What I offer here are some preliminary observations on Spinoza’s contri-
bution to the development of biblical scholarship. We want to situate this within 
the broader tradition of philology of a humanistic lineage, a scientific discipline 
whose role, we feel, has been underrated in historical research so far. Rather than 
assuming, unhistorically, that Spinoza’s interpretation was unprecedented or, 
conversely, brushing aside his achievements as unoriginal, we want to find out 
why and how it was that biblical criticism in the course of some 150 years devel-
oped from an originally academic debate into a maelstrom of public controversy, 
and what Spinoza’s part in this was.
Charting the development of biblical criticism in the Netherlands from 1575 
to 1725, we will first deal with a number of scholars who worked in Leiden Uni-
versity ( Josephus Justus Scaliger, 1540–1609; Daniel Heinsius, 1580–1655; Con-
stantijn L’Empereur, 1591–1648) and with Dutch Arminians (Hugo Grotius, 
1583–1645; Simon Episcopius, 1583–1643; Étienne de Courcelles, 1586–1659). We 
will then move on to the highly controversial work of Isaac de La Peyrère (1596–
1676) and Isaac Vossius (1618–89), after which the research will focus primarily 
on a single thinker, and one outside the walls of academe at that: Benedictus de 
Spinoza (1632–77), and on the circle around him (especially Adriaan Koerbagh, 
1632–69, and Lodewijk Meyer, 1629–81). From there, the overview will be ex-
panded to include the reception of Spinoza’s critique of the Bible, its impact, and 
the ensuing debates among philosophers, scholars, theologians, clergymen and 
the general public until the early eighteenth century. This part of our survey will 
include the Arminian theologian Philippus van Limborch (1633–1712), the Car-
tesians Lambert van Velthuysen (1622–85) and Christoph Wittich (1625–87), the 
controversial theologians Balthasar Bekker (1634–98) and Frederik van Leenhof 
(1647–1712), as well as Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) and Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736).
Though Spinoza owes his position in the history of philosophy first and fore-
most to his Ethica (1677), his contemporaries knew him virtually only as the au-
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thor of the infamous Tractatus theologico-politicus. Though an intervention in the 
political debates of the period, it is not a typical pamphlet. In fact, the contem-
porary political situation is only touched upon in the preface and the epilogue. 
The main part of the book is dedicated to politico-theological issues such as the 
nature and status of prophecy and of miracles, the election of the Hebrews, the 
question of who holds authority in religious matters (jus circa sacra), the relation-
ships between faith and philosophy, between the law of nature and divine law, 
and the power of the state. Since the advocates of theocracy in all these issues 
appeal to the word of God as revealed in Scripture, Spinoza dealt at length with 
all relevant Bible verses. But his interest in Scripture was not merely instrumen-
tal: he was convinced that he had found a solid method of interpreting the text. 
His systematic point of departure is that the Bible should be understood from 
itself alone (ex sola scriptura). On the face of it, this looks akin to the Protestant 
formula of sola scriptura (God’s word as the only source and measure of faith), but 
Spinoza’s principle aims at something completely different: explaining the Bible 
through itself is to lay bare the meaning it had for its authors and their audiences. 
From that perspective, the biblical message is a purely moral one; it does not teach 
any philosophical or scientific truths.
It is nowadays fairly common to consider Spinoza’s critical analysis of the 
Bible in the Tractatus theologico-politicus a landmark in the history of biblical 
textual criticism.8 Though much in chapters 7 (on the exegetical method) to 
13 (conclusion: the Bible does not teach philosophy but obedience) is far too 
technical and too detailed for many if not most present-day readers,9 there can 
be no doubt that Spinoza himself saw his reading of the Bible as essential to 
the project of the Tractatus theologico-politicus.10 As the correspondence shows, 
Spinoza remained an avid reader of Scripture throughout his life. 11 That his 
interest was not strictly ‘philosophical’ but had strong philological and linguis-
tic penchants, too, is clear not only from the sustained and meticulous analysis 
Spinoza offers in chapters 7–13, but also from his endeavour to write a Hebrew 
grammar, the Compendium grammatices linguae Hebraeae, published in 1677 as 
part of Spinoza’s Opera posthuma. It remained unfinished, and we have no in-
dications as to the date or purpose of its composition, but there is a manifest 
connection with Spinoza’s treatment of the Hebrew language in the Tractatus 
theologico-politicus.12 Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, Spinoza, for all his math-
ematical rigour, did not contribute anything at all to the development of mathe-
matics; nor to the development of physics, despite his skill in optics.13 But he did 
indeed leave his mark on the subsequent history of biblical scholarship. Before 
the nineteenth century, scholars had no qualms about combining mathematics, 
natural philosophy and philology, a mix that no longer seems obvious to us. The 
concept of ‘science’, particularly in the English-speaking countries, now virtually 
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coincides with that of the natural sciences. This is not the case with German 
Wissenschaft (nor with Dutch wetenschap, for that matter) and, more important-
ly: such a concept of science is a fairly recent phenomenon – it was unknown in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.14 In the early modern period, ‘science’ 
included philology. We must of course also be aware that the term ‘philology’ 
as we understand it today is itself a historical product – like ‘science’ – again 
shaped to a considerable degree by nineteenth-century practice. Though the 
word has ancient origins, it acquired its modern content, implying such diverse 
aspects as the historical study of languages, textual criticism and hermeneutics, 
only gradually in the Italian Renaissance, and more specifically in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, owing to scholars like Josephus Justus Scaliger, Isaac 
Casaubon, Daniel Heinsius and Gerard Vossius. Precisely because of its ency-
clopedic, comprehensive and polymathic character, philology did not demarcate 
itself clearly from theology, law, medicine, philosophy, history or the study of 
nature.15 Though Spinoza never uses the term, he obviously works within the 
horizon of what his contemporaries would have labelled critica sacra or philologia 
sacra,16 and those who reacted critically to his analysis of the history of the Bible 
could not resist playing down his originality, by spelling out his debts both to the 
humanistic philological tradition and to other philosophers.17 As far as Spinoza 
was concerned, in investigating the historia of the Bible he was not involved in an 
undertaking essentially different from what he was doing in the Ethics or in the 
Hebrew grammar – a text he had also intended to expound more geometrico. Nor 
is it any different from the study of nature. The following quotation is Spinoza’s 
account of his method of studying Scripture, in the beginning of chapter 7 of the 
Tractatus theologico-politicus:
To sum it up briefl y, I say that the method of interpreting Scripture does 
not diff er at all from the method of interpreting nature, but agrees with it 
completely. For just as the method of interpreting nature consists above all 
in putting together a history of nature, from which, as from certain data, 
we infer the defi nitions of natural things, so also to interpret Scripture it 
is necessary to prepare a straightforward history of Scripture and to infer 
the mind of the authors of Scripture from it, by legitimate reasonings, as 
from certain data and principles. For if someone has admitted as principles 
or data for interpreting Scripture and discussing the things contained in it 
only those drawn from Scripture itself and its history, he will always proceed 
without any danger of error, and will be able to discuss the things which 
surpass our grasp as safely as those we know by the natural light.18
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3 Secularization and confessionalization19
A few words about two key notions, secularization and confessionalization, may 
be helpful. The term ‘secularization’ means different things to different people in 
different periods.20 As we employ it, secularization involves assigning a secular, 
non-sacred status to the Bible, which in turn results in questioning the claims to 
truth upheld by the established churches. The term itself, to be sure, does not 
occur in the seventeenth century, but we think it is useful and even indispensable 
to describe the complex process of the gradual erosion of the dominant position 
of religion and church, eventually resulting in a separation of philosophy and sci-
ence. It is now quite common to explain this proces of secularization as caused by 
the Scientific Revolution and by radical changes in philosophy.21 We do not take 
issue with the importance of the innovations in the natural sciences and in philos-
ophy in that period, but we think that there is another factor as well, one that has 
so far received little or no attention, viz. the advances in philological research of 
the Bible. The results made many educated people less inclined to consider bibli-
cal revelation normative for the explanation of the Book of Nature. The process 
never was straightforward or linear. An interesting development that – on the 
face of it – would appear to go against secularization is that of confessionaliza-
tion: the increasing importance of the organizational and dogmatic boundaries 
between the many different denominations that had come into existence after 
the Reformation. They vindicated their raison d’être in unabated controversy and 
tried to obtain political dominance in order to impose their religious views on 
others. In doing so, all appealed to Scripture. In the Tractatus theologico-politicus, 
Spinoza dryly quotes the Dutch proverb geen ketter sonder letter, ‘no heretic with-
out a text’, that is, without recourse to a passage from Scripture with which to 
underpin his heresy.22 But paradoxically, this strategy – endorsing one’s denomi-
national views with Bible quotes – would ultimately be conducive to seculariza-
tion. One of the tactics was to show that a competitor’s claim was based on an 
erroneous interpretation of Scripture, or on a corrupt reading; an accusation for 
which textual criticism could provide the ammunition. For polemical purposes, 
this might produce some short-term profit, but in the end it only helped to un-
dermine the status of the Bible. An example of how this worked is the fate of the 
great Roman Catholic Bible scholar Richard Simon (1638–1712). In order to sub-
vert the Protestant principle of sola scriptura – the doctrine that the Bible is the 
sole spiritual authority – and to argue that the tradition of the Roman Catholic 
Church was needed to establish the meaning of Scripture, Simon presented a 
sustained historical critique of the Bible, showing that its textual problems were 
legion. Simon had the bad luck of publishing his Histoire critique du Vieux Testa-
ment in 1678, and he immediately came under the suspicion of crypto-Spinozism, 
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as many of his findings seemed to corroborate those of Spinoza in the Tractatus 
theologico-politicus.23 Thus, a strategy that had originally pretended to back up 
the views of the church – in this case the Roman Catholic Church – eventually 
resulted in a general weakening of the belief that the Bible was God’s word and 
thereby incontrovertible and incorruptible.
4 Spinoza’s position
So what about Spinoza’s place in the history of Bible scholarship? However inno-
vative, nay revolutionary, his analysis of the Bible in the Tractatus theologico-politi-
cus may have been, it is obvious that he did not start from scratch. For one thing, 
Spinoza’s approach to matters of textual criticism is to be understood within 
the framework of humanist scholarship,24 and it is firmly grounded in the tradi-
tion of Lorenzo Valla and Desiderius Erasmus: the Bible is a text, and it should 
be handled with the same tools as classical texts. In a highly suggestive chapter 
captioned ‘The Overthrow of Humanist Criticism’, Jonathan Israel argues that it 
was precisely ‘Spinoza’s principal innovation and strength as a text critic’ that he 
did not stick to traditional humanist philology, but uncompromisingly anchored 
his text criticism in his metaphysics.25 That was what put textual criticism on 
a par with the scientific revolution of the period. In that context, Israel quotes 
Spinoza’s equation of the methods of interpreting Scripture and of interpreting 
nature (Tractatus theologico-politicus, chapter 7), and then continues:
Th is was merely one of many diff erent manifestations in the late seven-
teenth- and early eighteenth-century West in the fi eld of scholarship of the 
prior ‘revolution’ in philosophy rooted in Descartes and Hobbes and then 
carried further by Spinoza, Bayle, and many others, changes that trans-
formed text criticism, and hence the foundations of all scholarly erudition, 
and, for the fi rst time, made hermeneutics a fundamental aspect of philoso-
phy itself.26
The rest of the chapter is dedicated mainly to presenting the often scathing com-
ments of scholars, in particular Jean Le Clerc, on the achievements of their hu-
manist predecessors. In this way, Israel sets up an insuperable opposition between 
the old Renaissance textual critics, and the ‘new critique’, as he labels it, of people 
like Spinoza, Bayle and Le Clerc, the ‘three leading figures of the Dutch Early 
Enlightenment’.27 As I understand it, the implication of this picture is that hu-
manist philology as such is a powerless tool, and that only by infusing it with 
his radical metaphysics did Spinoza manage to turn it into a truly revolutionary 
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discipline. This looks like yet another heroic version of the querelle des anciens 
et des modernes. In our project, Henk Nellen and I have chosen quite a different 
perspective, viz. that of a continuous development. We will show that philological 
research carried with it an explosive load that was bound to detonate sooner or 
later. Scholars like Le Clerc may have dissociated themselves from their predeces-
sors, but that did not prevent them from following in their footsteps when it came 
to philological skills. That biblical scholarship became such a controversial issue 
in the latter half of the seventeenth century cannot be explained in terms of the 
grafting of a new metaphysical system onto the old philological stock. For one 
thing, it is not at all clear that Le Clerc was a partisan of the new metaphysics, 
if that refers to Spinoza’s metaphysics. In philosophy, he was an eclectic thinker, 
much closer to Descartes and to his friend John Locke than to Spinoza.28 For 
another, philology carried with it a potentially explosive load, as the development 
of the relationship between textual criticism and systematic theology in the sev-
enteenth century shows.
Spinoza did not only build on the humanistic philological tradition. His Jew-
ish education had given him a solid training in the Tanach, the Hebrew Bible, 
and in the Medieval Jewish tradition of biblical commentary, especially Abraham 
ibn Ezra (1093–1163), whose interpretations he quotes on several occasions.29 
Thus, ibn Ezra had already presented evidence that excluded Moses’s authorship 
of every single word of the Torah.30 Another important Jewish source is Maimo-
nides (1135–1204), though as far as the exegetical method is concerned, the influ-
ence is a negative one only. For those who, like Lambertus van Velthuysen, had 
missed the point that Maimonides’s rationalist position is rejected as a matter 
of principle in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Spinoza spells it out once again 
in his letter to Jacob Ostens: ‘Furthermore, I do not see why he says that I think 
that all those will agree with me who deny that reason and philosophy are the in-
terpreters of Scripture. For I have refuted the views both of these and of Maimo-
nides.’31 Spinoza’s account of the Bible was also influenced by such contemporary 
authors as Thomas Hobbes, Louis Cappel and Isaac de La Peyrère.32 Even so, 
the powerful analysis Spinoza offers in the Tractatus theologico-politicus cannot 
be reduced to an eclectic blend of various influences. One of the challenges of 
our project is to explain why precisely Spinoza’s interpretation of the Bible had 
such an enormous impact. A preliminary and no doubt partial explanation of the 
extraordinary effect of the Tractatus theologico-politicus may be found in Spino-
za’s uniquely detached position, one that allowed him to question the received 
opinions about ‘the word of God’ in a profound and radical way, unequalled by 
any of his predecessors or contemporaries. Let me be clear: in characterizing his 
position as detached, I do not wish to suggest that he was an impartial observer, 
somewhat along the lines of Mannheim’s ‘freischwebende Intelligenz’. The im-
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portant thing about Spinoza’s position is rather that he had left Judaism and 
never converted to Christianity. As a thinker without a commitment to any of 
the religious denominations around him, without any financial, professional or 
personal obligations, Spinoza could address the questions that many others had 
raised before him without wondering whether the answers would fit in with his 
religious convictions.33 His critique carried more weight than that of any of his 
predecessors, closely entwined as it was with his metaphysics and his critique of 
religion.
Philology in the seventeenth century was not only a ‘science’ in approximately 
the modern sense of the word but also the most sophisticated of the ‘humanities’. 
As Spinoza’s combined application of textual criticism, historical investigation, 
critique of religion, moral and political philosophy in the Tractatus theologico-
politicus shows, an early modern scholar saw no boundaries nor incompatibilities 
between the various disciplines that we now distinguish as separate sciences and 
humanities.
 Notes
 ’t gebet van spinosa/ sentire cum doctis loqui cum vulgo mundus vult/ decipi, amen’ (Ms 
, University Library Utrecht, fol. r). The manuscript is a fragment (it starts in the 
middle of a sentence, even in the middle of a word) of  densely scribbled pages, mostly 
in Latin, with interspersions in Dutch. Jetze Touber, Jeroen van de Ven and I are prepar-
ing an edition of it, which will appear in Lias: Journal of Early Modern Intellectual Culture 
and its Sources.
 There is some affinity with collections of jokes and anecotes like the one compiled by 
Aernout van Overbeke, –, but the Utrecht manuscript evidently was not in-
tended for circulation, as Overbeke’s was; Aernout van Overbeke, Anecdota sive historiae 
jocosae: een zeventiende-eeuwse verzameling moppen en anekdotes, ed. Rudolf Dekker & 
Herman Roodenburg (Amsterdam: Meertens-Instituut, ). Moreover, its libertine 
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lesteyn, but Nel lesteyn died in ; Pieter Anton Tiele, Catalogus codicum manu scripto-
rum bibliothecae universitatis Rheno-Trajectinae. Vol.  (Utrecht: Kemink, ) , No 
.
 For Beverland, see Rudolf de Smet, ‘Beverland, Hadrian (–)’, in: Wiep van 
Bunge et al. (eds), The dictionary of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Dutch philosophers 
(Bristol: Thoemmes, ), –.
 Hadrian Beverland, Peccatum originale kat’exochèn sic nuncupatum, philologice problèma-
tikôs elucubratum à Themidis alumno (Eleutheropoli [Leiden?]: s.n., s.a. [‘absque Ubi & 
Quando’] ), .
 Most entries are preceded by a reference to their source (often an oral one, apparently); an 
indication that the manuscript is a commonplace book.
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 ‘ex Beverland, biblia ea quae nos legimus, ut ex/ hebraicâ lingua demonstrari potest et 
etiam affir-/mat spinosa non sunt vera biblia. solum hoc verum/ quod allegat faedus ab 
israelitis cum Deo factum/ reliqua quae Josua etc. addidere a Judeis/scriptum fictumque 
est’ (Ms , UL Utrecht, fol. r). 
 P.T. Van Rooden, ‘Spinoza’s bijbeluitleg’, Studia Rosenthaliana  (), –: , n. , 
provides an extensive list of references in order to illustrate his point that Spinoza is gen-
erally considered a precursor or even founder of modern Bible scholarship – a view that 
Van Rooden himself does not endorse. The scholarly results presented in the Tractatus 
theologico-politicus do not, so he argues, depend on Spinoza’s method, but on a perceptive 
reading of the Bible. Van Rooden’s list of references is not intended to be exhaustive, and 
many more publications could be added, e.g. M. Vexler, ‘Spinoza et l’autorité de la Bible’, 
Revue des études juives  (), –; J.D. Woodbridge, ‘Richard Simon’s Reaction to 
Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus’, in K. Gründner & W. Schmidt-Biggeman (eds), 
Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner religiösen Wirkung (Heidelberg: Schneider, ), –; J. 
Lagrée & P.-F. Moreau, ‘La lecture de la Bible dans le cercle de Spinoza’, in J.R. Armogathe 
(ed.), Le Grand Siècle et la Bible (Paris: Beauchesne, ), –; Manfred Walther, 
‘Biblische Hermeneutik und historische Erklärung: Lodewijk Meyer und Benedikt de 
Spinoza über Norm, Methode und Ergebnis wissenschaftlicher Bibelauslegung’, Studia 
Spinozana  (), –, Rüdiger Otto, ‘Johann Christian Edelmann’s Criticism 
of the Bible and its Relation to Spinoza’, in W. van Bunge & W. Klever (eds), Disguised 
and Overt Spinozism around : Papers Presented at the International Colloquium, held 
at Rotterdam, – October  (Leiden: Brill, ), –; , Richard H. Popkin, ‘Spi-
noza and Bible Scholarship’, in Don Garrett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), –; J. Samuel Preus, Spinoza and 
the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), Roy 
A. Harrisville & Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch Spinoza to Bre-
vard Childs (nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, ; first ed. , as The Bible 
in Modern Culture: Theology and Historical-Critical Method from Spinoza to Käsemann); 
Travis L. Frampton, Spinoza and the Rise of Historical Criticism of the Bible (New York, 
NY: Clark, ), Brayton Polka, Between Philosophy and Religion: Spinoza, the Bible, and 
Modernity (Lanham, MD: Lexington, ), Steven Nadler, ‘The Bible Hermeneutics of 
Baruch de Spinoza,’ in Magne Sæbø (ed.), Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of its 
Interpretation, vol. : From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, ), –. 
 Thus, Wernham in Benedictus de Spinoza, The Political Works: The Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus in Part and the Tractatus Politicus in Full. Ed./trans. A.G. Wernham (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, ) includes less than one page from chapter  and not a 
single line from the chapters –; that is to say, only about one per cent of the entire 
text of these chapters. Wernham’s selection is, of course, guided by his intention to pres-
ent Spinoza’s political thought. Still, given the importance Spinoza himself attached to 
the interpretation of the Bible in the context of his politics, the asymmetry is striking. 
The lack of interest in these exegetical chapters is, I think, itself due to the erosion of 
the status of the Bible. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were consid-
ered significant. This is illustrated, for instance, by the separate publication of the highly 
technical chapters  and  in London in , anonymously and without the publisher’s 
name, Tractatus de primis duodecim Veteris Testamenti libris, in quo ostenditur eos omnes ab 
uno solo historico scriptos fuisse: deinde inquiritur quisnam is fuerit, et an huic operi ultimam 
manum imposuerit, idque, ut desiderabat, perfecerit. (Alternative title on p. : Tractatus de 
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scriptore Pentateuchi &c. &c.) (London: s.n., ). As far as I have been able to ascertain, 
this separate edition is not mentioned in any of the Spinoza bibliographies.
 See Spinoza’s account of his method of studying Scripture, in the beginning of chapter  
of the Tractatus theologico-politicus (to be quoted in full below), and also the final para-
graph of Letter  (to Albert Burgh, December ): there Spinoza proudly affirms that 
the fundamental principle of the Tractatus theologico-politicus – viz. to explain Scripture 
through Scripture alone (‘quòd scilicet Scriptura per solam Scripturam debeat exponi’) 
– has been apodictically proved to be true and well-established by him in chapter , see 
Benedictus de Spinoza, Complete Works, translated by Samuel Shirley, (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, ), .
 Especially the exchanges with Van Blijenbergh and with Oldenburg. See in particular 
Letter  (to Van Blijenbergh,  January ), with the candid avowal: ‘For my part, 
I plainly and unambiguously avow that I do not understand Holy Scripture, although 
I have devoted quite a number of years to its study’ (Spinoza, Complete Works, trans. 
Shirley, ); Letter  (to Oldenburg, autumn ), in which he explicitly connects the 
study of the Bible with the need to defend the freedom to philosophize (); Letter  
(to Oldenburg, December ), end; Letter  (to Oldenburg,  February ).
 See J.M. Hillesum, ‘De spinozistische spraakkunst’, Chronicon Spinozanum  (), –
; Joël Askénazi & Jocelyne Askénazi-Gerson, Spinoza: Abrégé de grammaire hébraïque 
(Paris: Vrin, ); and also Lodewijk Meyer’s note on the projected contents in the preface 
to the Opera posthuma (sig. *r); cf. Fokke Akkerman, ‘Th e Preface to Spinoza’s Posthu-
mous Works’, in: Studies in the Posthumous works of Spinoza: on style, earliest translation and 
reception, earliest and modern edition of some texts (PhD thesis, Groningen University, ), 
–: ; according to Meyer, Spinoza had intended to supply a preface in which he 
would have covered some topics already touched upon in the Tractatus theologico-politicus. 
 Cf. Alan Gabbey, ‘Spinoza’s Natural Science and Methodology’, in Don Garrett (ed.), The 
Cambridge companion to Spinoza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), –
. The two anonymous tracts, on chances and the rainbow, attributed to Spinoza, were 
not written by him, but by Salomon Dierquens (–): see J.J.V.M de Vet, ‘Salomon 
Dierquens, auteur du Stelkonstige reeckening van den regenboog et du Reeckening van kans-
sen’, in F. Akkerman & P. Steenbakkers (eds), Spinoza to the Letter: Studies in Words, Texts 
and Books (Leiden: Brill, ), –.
 ‘In modern use, often treated as synonymous with “Natural and Physical Science”, and 
thus restricted to those branches of study that relate to the phenomena of the material 
universe and their laws, sometimes with implied exclusion of pure mathematics. This is 
now the dominant sense in ordinary use.’ (Oxford English Dictionary, entry ‘Science’, sense 
b. I consulted the online version; this entry is from the Second Edition of .) The 
narrowing down of science to the natural and physical sciences (excluding pure math-
ematics) dates from the nineteenth century; the OED’s earliest attestation is from . 
Helmut Pulte, ‘Wissenschaft III: Ausbildung moderner Wissenschafts-Begriffe im . 
und . Jahrhundert’, in Joachim Ritter et al. (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philo-
sophie, vol.  (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, ), –, offers a 
compact survey of the historical vicissitudes of the notion of ‘Wissenschaft’ (and its cog-
nates) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
 Axel Horstmann, ‘Philologie’, in Joachim Ritter et al. (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Phi-
losophie, vol.  (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, ), –: –.
 Salomon Glassius’s epoch-making Philologia sacra came out in five volumes from  
to . Another important study was Christophorus Cellarius’s Sciagraphia philologiae 
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sacrae: difficiliores quaestiones plerasque, & linguarum orientalium usum genuinum delineans 
(second, expanded edition ).
 This is a topic, for example, in Regnerus à Mansvelt’s Adversus anonymum theologo-politi-
cum, published posthumously in . 
 I quote from an as yet unpublished translation by Edwin Curley, who kindly put his text at 
my disposal. The passage is to be found, with variants, in Shirley’s translation of Spinoza’s 
Complete Works, .
 This section owes a great deal to the proposal for the research project that Henk Nellen 
and I drew up collaboratively, and many of the ideas propounded here – certainly the best 
ones – come from Nellen.
 OED, s.v. secularization: ‘The conversion of an ecclesiastical or religious institution or 
its property to secular possession and use; the conversion of an ecclesiastical state or sov-
ereignty to a lay one’, in various senses. The oldest occurrence of the word attested there 
() is in the legal sense of transfer of property from ecclesiastical to secular possession; 
the more general senses seem to date from the latter half of the th century.
 E.g. Henk Jan de Jonge, Van Erasmus tot Reimarus: ontwikkelingen in de bijbelwetenschap 
van  tot  (Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit, ); Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlighten-
ment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, – (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, ) and Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation 
of Man, – (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ); Floris Cohen, De herschep-
ping van de wereld: het ontstaan van de moderne natuurwetenschap verklaard (Amsterdam: 
Bakker, ). Against Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, ), Cohen makes a case for the notion of a Scientific Revolution that 
started around . 
 Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, chapter , beginning (Complete Works, trans. 
Shirley , ).
 For the knotty question of Spinoza’s real influence on Simon, see the excellent analysis by 
J.D. Woodbridge, ‘Richard Simon’s Reaction to Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus’, 
in: K. Gründner & W. Schmidt-Biggeman (eds), Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner religiösen 
Wirkung (Heidelberg: Schneider, ), –; on the basis of newly discovered manu-
scripts. Woodbridge also has his doubts about the portrait of ‘Simon as a heartfelt de-
fender of Roman Catholic tradition against the Protestant principle of Sola Scriptura’ 
().
 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, –; quote .
 Ibid., ; my emphasis.
 Ibid., .
 Cf. Steenbakkers, ‘Clerc, Jean le’. In Wiep van Bunge et al. (eds.), The Dictionary of Seven-
teenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes, ), –.
 Other Jewish commentators that Spinoza knew and benefited from are Rashi and Ger-
sonides. See Carl Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der 
Wissenschaften herausgegeben von Carl Gebhardt ( volumes, reprinted ; vol.  pu-
blished in ), vol. , . 
 Nadler, ‘Bible Hermeneutics’, –. Spinoza himself refers to Ibn Ezra (‘liberioris in-
genii vir et non mediocris eruditionis’) in this context: Tractatus theologico-politicus, chap-
ter . Cf. Akkerman’s edition: Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus/Traité 
théologico-politique, texte établi par Fokke Akkerman, traduction et notes par Jacqueline 
Lagrée et Pierre-François Moreau (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, ), ; 
and Gebhardt’s edition: Spinoza, Opera ed. , III, .
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 Letter , February  (Spinoza, Complete Works, trans. Shirley , ). Spinoza 
quotes Van Velthuysen’s letter (Letter ; Complete Works, trans. Shirley , ).
 For La Peyrère, see in particular Richard H. Popkin, Isaac La Peyrère (-): His Life, 
Work and Influence (Leiden: Brill, ), and Popkin, ‘Spinoza’.
 An older contemporary for which this may also hold, at least in part, is Isaac Vossius; 
see Thijs Weststeijn, ‘Spinoza sinicus: an Asian Paragraph in the History of the Radical 
Enlightenment,’ Journal of the History of Ideas  (), –: .
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1 Introduction
The decree concerning the edition and the use of sacred texts adopted by the 
Council of Trent in its fourth session on 8 April 1546 was sometimes understood 
as prohibiting any emendation of the Vulgate version of the Scripture. The Synod 
demanded that the Vulgate be considered authentic in all liturgic matters, on ac-
count of its long-standing usage and approbation in the Catholic Church. By such 
an ordaining, did the Council only attempt to secure the authority of the Vulgate 
in the doctrinal controversies, or did it rather aim at condemning corrections of 
the standard Latin version introduced in conformity with the Hebrew and Greek 
originals? Was the Tridentine decree propounding a merely juridical meaning of 
the authenticity of the Vulgate, or did it state that the Vulgate was absolutely in 
accordance with the divine inspiration of the Holy books? If the second option 
was the right one, then not only a critical study of the Bible was made impossible, 
but moreover any vernacular version elaborated from the original languages of 
the Bible had to be suspected of heresy.
It is known that the humanist concern for the original textual sources of Chris-
tian theology was expressed in a new Latin translation of the New Testament, 
Erasmus’s Novum Instrumentum (1516), whose peculiarity was the publishing of 
the Greek text compiled from a few manuscripts alongside the Latin.1 The second 
edition (Novum Testamentum, 1519), containing a more thoroughgoing correction 
of the Vulgate, was used by Luther for his German translation from the Greek 
(1522). William Tyndale, who published an English version in 1526, The Newe Tes-
tament as it was written and caused to be written by them which herde yt, followed 
Erasmus’s third edition (1522). Indeed, Erasmus’s undertaking of a Latin transla-
tion emending the Vulgate through the examination of Greek manuscripts was 
enough to incite the disapproval of Roman Catholics.2 The return to the graeca 
veritas of the New Testament signalled for them the loss of religious uniformity: 
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the theological orthodoxy supported by the divinely inspired Vulgate was threat-
ened if the humanist philological and critical legacy happened to be imported 
in biblical scholarship. In their opinion, the lengthy common use of the Vulgate 
meant its truth and integrity, thus changes made in the Vulgate from the Greek 
New Testament inevitably led to a departure from the authority of Scripture. In 
this respect, the minute revision of the Greek New Testament published in 1550 
by Robert Estienne3 was censured by the Faculty of Theology in Paris. Roman 
Catholics deemed further that the widening of the audience for the Holy Writ 
through the translation of restored original texts into the major vernacular lan-
guages could only induce the propagation of heresy in Western Europe. Pandora’s 
box was open as soon as the universality of the standard Latin version was under-
mined both by its emendation from the original languages of Scripture and by its 
translation into modern languages.
The history of French translations of the Bible in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries pre-eminently displays such a Catholic hunting of the theo-
logical reformism supposedly lodged in the textual corrections of the Vulgate. 
Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples’s translation of the New Testament (1523) failed to be 
approved by the Sorbonne. Lefèvre was guilty of reviewing the Vulgate according 
to the Greek text. In 1525, the Parliament of Paris and the Faculty of Theology 
did prohibit any translation of the Holy texts. The successive editions in 1534 
and 1541 of the Saincte Bible en françoys which Lefèvre had first published in 1530 
in Anvers were condemned as propitious to Protestantism. Not surprisingly, the 
first French translation of the Bible directly from Hebrew and Greek originals, 
published in 1535 near Neuchâtel, was the work of a Protestant, Pierre Robert 
Olivétan. Known as the Bible de l’Épée after its 1640 edition by Calvin, it was 
the source, through several revisions,4 of the Bible de Genève (1588),5 which was 
still dominant among French-speaking Protestants at the end of the seventeenth 
century.6 The Catholic counterpart to Olivétan’s translation came from the theo-
logians of Louvain7 who initiated a rewriting of Lefèvre d’Étaples’s Saincte Bible. 
They suppressed the corrections of the Vulgate inserted by Lefèvre according 
to the ancient Hebrew and Greek. Lefèvre’s French translation was thus made 
strictly concordant with the standard Latin version. So was born in 1550 the first 
Bible de Louvain. In 1566, another French version of the Bible was published – for 
the first time in Paris – by the theologian René Benoist. This translation was 
principally from the Vulgate, not from the differing Hebrew and Greek texts, but 
Benoist claimed the right to use the heretical versions as often as they were true. 
The Parisian Faculty of Theology condemned Benoist’s Bible as early as 1567. 
However, a revision achieved by the theologians of Louvain8 allowed its reedition 
in 1578 in Anvers, giving birth to the second Bible de Louvain, which was unin-
terruptedly reprinted in the Netherlands and in France for many decades. The 
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Sorbonne persisted in the meanwhile in its opposition to translations of the Bible 
in vernaculars.9 In 1647, in the foreword to his translation of the New Testament, 
François Véron tried to champion the reading of the Bible in French. The same 
claim was made in 1649 by Michel de Marolles, who contended in the Preface 
to his own version of the New Testament that the Tridentine Council had not 
prohibited the reading of Scripture in vernaculars. However, these claims were 
merely urged by the anti-Protestantism of their authors.
Was thus a Catholic French version of the Bible in the seventeenth century 
bound to be elaborated merely in resistance to the Calvinist Bible de Genève? Not 
at all. The project of a new translation of the New Testament examined from 1657 
to 1660 by some of the Solitaires of Port-Royal (Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Nicole, 
Claude Lancelot, Antoine Le Maître, Isaac-Louis Le Maître de Sacy)10 consti-
tuted a notable break within the modern history of the French Bible. Supervised 
by Antoine Arnauld11, the discussions of the Solitaires dealt with the very prin-
ciples of translation. For the first time, the thesis of the necessity of a transla-
tion of Scripture into vernaculars was defended for positive reasons, which were 
genuinely linguistic reasons. The point was clearly stressed afterwards by Antoine 
Arnauld, in his Défense des versions en langue vulgaire de l’Écriture Sainte (1688). 
The argument alleged by Port-Royal concerning the translation of the Bible into 
vernaculars was that the Latin version of Hieronymus was itself nothing other 
than such a translation. Had Latin continued to be used in Western Europe as a 
vernacular language, instead of maintaining itself as a dead language of erudites, 
Scripture would have still been intelligible to everybody. The original languages 
of Scripture were vernacular languages for those who used them and for their 
audience. The oldest versions, and Hieronymus’s translation as well, facilitated 
the passage of the ancient Hebrew and Greek to other vernaculars. So, it would 
be absurd for texts that were originally expected to be understood by a whole 
linguistic community to now be transmitted without caring about the linguistic 
changes of the audience. The other reason why Port-Royal launched the project 
of a new French translation of the Bible was the important transformation the 
French language had undergone since the end of the sixteenth century. The trans-
formation was so great that the Louvain version could be considered in the mid-
seventeenth century as offering only a dead version of the Bible, unintelligible to 
speakers of living French. The necessity of a new version was called for by the 
grammatical and lexical standardization of French. ‘Purity of language’ could be 
now adopted as the translator’s slogan, and indeed it was the banner of Sacy, who 
completed the translation of the New Testament initiated by his brother Le Maî-
tre12 and then undertook the translation of the Ancient Testament. At the begin-
ning of 1666, the draft of Sacy’s translation of the New Testament was the object 
of a collective examination and correction under Arnauld and Nicole’s direction.13 
 Martine Pécharman
The revised version was printed by Elzevier at Amsterdam and published in 1667, 
under the address of an editor in Mons. This new translation, the so-called Mons 
New Testament, achieved great triumphs,14 but it also aroused great hostility.15 
Port-Royal was suspected by the Jesuits of founding faith on sola Scriptura and of 
making the ecclesiastical tradition unnecessary. Port-Royal was taxed with cryp-
to-Protestantism. In his defence of the Mons translation against these attacks, 
Arnauld vindicated the right for any Christian, not only for scholars, to read the 
New Testament. This universal right was for him the correlate of the attribution 
to Scripture itself, not to an external interpretation, of the ultimate criterion for 
determining the meaning of difficult passages.
The manner in which the ex-Oratorian Richard Simon16 opposed Port-Royal’s 
version of the New Testament was quite different. Simon’s theological formation 
in 1658-1662 had been rather unusual. Instead of devoting himself to the study of 
works of spirituality, he had learnt Hebrew and Syriac, read all books of scriptur-
al critique, and acquired an amazing historical knowledge of the Bible’s versions. 
After that, he had gained expertise in both Judaism and the oriental Christian 
doctrines. In 1669, his mastery in the latter area led him to denounce the ama-
teurism displayed in Arnauld and Nicole’s Perpétuité de la foi de l’Église catholique 
touchant l’Eucharistie, concerning the use of Greek and oriental sources.17 At the 
moment of the publication of the New Testament, Simon had issued no judge-
ment on the Port-Royal version. His own method of translation of the Bible 
was elaborated later on, and realised in 1676.18 So, Simon was from the outset of 
another calibre than the challengers mocked in Arnauld’s Défense des versions for 
mistaking knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, as well as translation of the Bible in 
a vernacular, with heresy. The interest of Simon’s remarks on Port-Royal’s ver-
sion, published in 1690 as a part of a general examination of the various versions 
of the New Testament, comes from the fact that they cannot be detached from his 
own methodological concern. They form part of his altogether innovative doc-
trine of an historical critique of the Bible, first displayed in 1678 with the Histoire 
critique du Vieux Testament19 and pursued afterwards with the three volumes of 
the Histoire critique du Nouveau Testament (1689 for the text, 1690 for the ver-
sions, 1693 for the commentaries). This doctrine affords an interesting contrast 
to Port-Royal’s principles of translation. Simon deems that faith is drawn from 
the oral tradition in the Church and would be well-grounded even without the 
reading of Scripture. As a consequence of this theological superiority of tradition 
over Scripture, the biblical texts must be considered strictly as texts, that is to say, 
they must be studied for their literal status. The problem of translation which 
is primordial for Port-Royal is thus only secondary for Simon: what matters in 
his eyes is not the equal intelligibility of the text in whatever language, but the 
history of the text since its original state. A biblical text consists for Simon in an 
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irreducible plurality that translation cannot overcome, a plurality which must 
persist in the margins and the notes of the version. While Port-Royal focuses on 
what Scripture mentally conveys to its audience, the real stake for Simon consists 
in the plural existence of any biblical text, its historicity and materiality. Now, 
once specified at the end of the seventeenth century, this theoretical divorce on 
the topic of the methodology of translation, supported by two distinct notions of 
critique (its textual meaning versus its logical meaning), may appear as opening a 
radical division in linguistic studies, insofar as the choice will be between Simon’s 
historical way (the development of textual criticism with the help of philology and 
paleography) and Arnauld’s philosophical way (the analysis of human judgements 
with logical tools).
2 Richard Simon’s art of critique
According to Richard Simon, the divine inspiration source of the Bible texts does 
not imply their literal infallibility, and there is no ‘singular providence’20 safe-
guarding them from the common destiny of all books whose primitive form is 
lost. Their transmission is liable to defects and falsifications, it requires a series of 
copies which multiply the chances for alterations. The mere supposition of these 
changes is enough to imply the necessity of critique. Simon defines critique as ‘a 
term of art’ relating to the works ‘in which the various readings are examined in 
order to re-establish those that are true’.21 Critique is the condition sine qua non 
to the end of reconstructing ‘in some manner’22 the original of texts that have been 
corrupted. The historical approach to texts, viz. the knowledge of their different 
‘states’ and ‘revolutions’,23 affords an indispensable resource against their tempo-
ral destruction or decay. Biblical critique conforms to this general defi nition. It 
considers the diverse alterations and the various readings of the holy texts as facts 
whose causes or reasons must be explained. On account of the loss of their ‘fi rst and 
true original’,24 the literality of these texts must be indirectly rediscovered through 
a method of comparison, by judging the readings that can be said to be authentic 
in relation to altered copies. Simon dismisses ‘a mere catalogue of the diverse read-
ings’,25 as well as their multiplication without necessity:26 as a judicative art, critique 
must consist in the discernment of true and reliable readings from falsifi ed ones, or 
else it could restore nothing. By conjecturing the probable causes of the variants 
and determining ‘the origin of most of the copists’ mistakes’, critique provides the 
means to ascertain ‘the true reading of the Bible text’.27 In place of the primitive 
text that was not preserved, it re-institutes a substitutive or resembling text which 
embodies all that ‘must be preserved’ – as uncorrupted – from the diff erent succes-
sive readings.28 However, this restoration of literality does not mean a necessary 
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preference for the oldest readings:29 their antiquity cannot equate them with the 
lost holy texts, they are not closer to the perfection of the original than later copies. 
Th e art of critique is not the business of antiquarians.
Nor is biblical critique the business of theologians.30 In Simon’s view, it is an 
art of grammarians, whose concern is not the religious, but the textual truth. Had 
all the Bible exemplars disappeared, religion would not be annihilated.31 Critical 
judgment, which opposes textual destruction, is independent of the ecclesiastical 
tradition; it is grounded in the very plurality and diversity of copies of the holy 
texts. Local additions or suppression needed for restoring the literal meaning es-
cape theological considerations, and reciprocally, a theologian lacks the capacity 
of discriminating true readings from false ones. Critique does not go beyond the 
opacity of Scripture: grammar and theology are two complementary jurisdictions 
that must not infringe their respective limits. The method for translating the 
Bible must be assessed accordingly. Translation requires only the historical cri-
tique of the text, without any interference from theological issues. Only critique 
can give the rules for a ‘true translation’ of the Bible, representing the first original 
‘as far as possible’.32 Both an extensive and accurate knowledge of all exemplars 
and a reasoning from the various readings as from different facts are necessary in 
order to establish the succedaneum of the lost original: the best reading is then 
preserved ‘in the body of the translation’, while variants are included ‘in the mar-
gins’.33 Thus, when Simon’s Histoire critique des Versions du Nouveau Testament 
devotes a lengthy discussion to a ‘peculiar examination’ of the Port-Royal version 
of the New Testament,34 the criterion of the evaluation lies in the necessary deduc-
tion of the method of translation from the method of critique. Simon’s purpose 
is not to detect hints of heresy in the Mons version. Taking things strictly from 
the viewpoint of the definition of biblical critique, his objections denounce the 
Mons version as a counter-model of a genuine translation, chargeable with two 
main infractions to the ‘rules of critique’, those rules whose invocation constitutes 
Simon’s Leitmotiv.
2.1 Th e rule of grammatical literality
In Simon’s eyes, through fear of an excessive literality which might turn the ver-
sion of the New Testament into an unintelligible text, Port-Royal has fallen into 
the opposite defect: an excessive distance from the literal text. The former defect 
would have been less prejudicial than the second. It is easy to provide clarifica-
tions when the holy text is made obscure by an excessively literal translation. But 
at the other extreme, translation is threatened by substituting a merely human 
sense for God’s Word in many passages. Simon considers that the Port-Royal 
manifesto in the Preface of the Mons New Testament35 is misleading. It claims that 
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the purpose is not to explain ‘the core of things’, le fond des choses, but to make the 
sense of the holy text intelligible for everybody. The Mons version is vindicated 
as ‘an absolutely simple translation’, une traduction toute simple, nothing more. But 
Simon deems that ‘under the pretence of not leaving the sense of some passages in 
suspense and without determination (suspendu et indéterminé)’, the Messieurs ‘take 
their ease and establish their opinions’ in all these passages.36 The Mons version 
is almost always very distant from the literal text; it is ‘more an explained transla-
tion than a simple translation’.37 On the pretext of caring about the intelligibility 
of the text, the Messieurs incorporate a commentary into their translation. They 
transgress the rule that bans explanations (a fortiori theological elucidations) to 
the notes. The primary rule is the translation’s accordance with ‘the grammatical 
or the literal sense’.38 Simon rejects as excessive and inappropriate the requisite of 
clarifications: a translation must differ from an explanation. He considers that 
there are a lot of ‘useless phrases and words’ in the Mons version39 by comparison 
with the Vulgate adopted as the source text. The Messieurs often use several 
words for translating just one. Any such elucidation of one Latin word by means 
of additional French words ought to be located in the margin.40 The frequent use 
of circumlocutions and the accumulation of synonymous words in the Mons ver-
sion leads Simon to the conclusion that Port-Royal aims at something other than 
the literality of the holy text: its theological interpretation. Preference has been 
given to ancient patristic commentaries over the text itself. This cannot be really 
a translation of the evangelic and apostolic writings: Port-Royal substitutes for 
them a pseudo-text mainly reconstructed from the Augustinian commentaries. 
While the chief rule of critique requires dissociating the grammatical or literal 
sense from the theological sense, the Mons New Testament abounds with theo-
logical prejudices.41 It does not constitute a translation but rather ‘a paraphrase’.42
2.2 Th e rule of linguistic uniformity
The authors of the Mons version claim that they follow a middle way or tempéra-
ment43 between a translation from the Vulgate and a translation from the Greek 
text of the New Testament. The Greek text as well as the Vulgate version are found 
together in the Mons translation. When the Greek text contains more than the 
Vulgate, these additions are included in the body of the translation. Moreover, 
when differences between the two texts suggest that the Greek is to be preferred 
to the Latin, these Greek differences are also inserted in the body of the transla-
tion instead of being translated in annotations. In these passages, the Vulgate 
itself is dismissed to the margin. This is an awful method in Simon’s eyes, an al-
together non-critical method. Biblical critique prohibits ever abandoning the Latin 
text once it has been chosen as the source text. The Greek variants have to be 
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marked only in notes, they cannot constitute a real part of the text. The alterna-
tive is either a complete translation following the Greek or a complete translation 
following the Latin.44 No middle way is allowed. The rule of textual uniformity 
forbids mixing Greek and Latin together. If the Vulgate is acknowledged as the 
source text, the translation must always represent the Vulgate, even though this 
conformity with the Latin proper terms sometimes does not provide a clear and 
distinct meaning.45 The problem is not to decide whether the Vulgate exhibits 
the accurate evangelic or apostolic sense or not, but merely to have the literal text 
transferred into French. As a direct consequence of the choice of the Vulgate as 
the source text, it is impossible to leave the Latin aside in the body of the transla-
tion. The ‘natural place’ of the Greek,46 even in cases where it can be considered 
as a better reading than the Latin one, is separate from the body of the version, 
in footnotes or in the margin. Moreover, Port-Royal’s transgression of the ‘rules 
of critique’ when disregarding the necessary alternative of Latin or Greek is ag-
gravated for Simon by the Messieurs’ restriction of Greek text to Greek ‘ordinary 
editions’47 or to the surviving Greek manuscripts, as if the lost Greek manuscripts 
used for the old Latin version did not matter at all.48 Port-Royal commits a fallacy 
here : a Greek variant that occurs only secundum quid is considered as occurring 
simpliciter.49 On the contrary, the method of biblical critique provides an indefi-
nite extension for the Greek of the New Testament, as well as for the Hebrew of 
the Old Testament: Greek and Hebrew must also cover the Greek or the Hebrew 
which can be inferred by means of a conjecture from ancient versions. This exten-
sive view of the different states of the original text is the only ground for asserting 
that some passage belongs to it or not. The Messieurs consider that the Greek 
is sometimes to be preferred to the Latin, but their limitation of the Greek text 
of the New Testament to the Greek directly known from common editions (or at 
best from preserved manuscripts) makes the critical restoration of the original 
text impossible. Port-Royal has no idea of the compass of knowledge necessary in 
order to reconstitute the letter of the original.
3 Antoine Arnauld on the method of translation
Simon contends that the Mons New Testament succeeds only in showing that 
Port-Royal has no acquaintance with the art of critique. The fact that more words 
are encountered in their version than in the Vulgate indicates that the Messieurs 
did not translate the source text, but precipitated themselves into theology50. By 
means of a continually roundabout way of speaking,51 they put the theological 
sense of the text, discovered by exegesis, in place of its grammatical and literal 
sense, discovered by critique. But indeed, according to Arnauld, this opposition 
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alleged by Simon collapses. The true choice is not between theology and gram-
mar (this is for Port-Royal quite a fictitious choice), but between two manners 
of interpreting the grammatical nature of a text. Indeed, on the question of the 
diversity of languages, we might contend that Simon is to be ranked on the side 
of Descartes assuring that ‘there are only two things to be learnt concerning all 
languages, namely the signification of words, and the grammar’ (Letter to Mer-
senne of 20 November 1629).52 When asking for a translation based on the dis-
tinction between the grammatical sense and the theological sense of the holy 
text, he understands the grammatical sense as apprehended by means of the 
knowledge of some language’s idiomatic terms together with the knowledge of 
its specific grammatical rules. But the translators’ manifesto in the Preface of 
the Mons New Testament53 appeals to another knowledge than this one, which 
satisfies Simon. The comparison between the Greek text and the Latin text does 
not mean for Port-Royal that grammatical difficulties encountered in the course 
of the translation can be solved by acquaintance with these particular languages. 
Claude Lancelot’s new methods of Latin (1644) and of Greek (1655) do not sup-
ply sufficient foundations for a translation from these languages: translation ul-
timately finds its principles in the Grammaire Générale et raisonnée (1660), where 
Arnauld expounds, at Lancelot’s request, the reasons for what is common to the 
different grammars or ‘arts of speaking’ and what is peculiar to each one.54 Gen-
eral grammar provides the knowledge of the ‘natural manner in which we express 
our thoughts’.55 This knowledge attests to a deeper manner of being Cartesian 
than the one we may attribute to Simon. The best way of being Cartesian on 
the matter of the plurality of languages consists in founding the ‘diverse forms 
of the signification of words’56 on the various operations of the human mind. 
Words were designed by men only for the expression of their thoughts from one 
to another. So, instead of referring immediately to the usual meaning of words in 
particular languages, it is necessary for translation to refer first to the distinction 
between the modes of signifying thoughts. As a requisite and direct consequence 
of the intentionality of human language, there exists a general distribution of 
all words into signs of conceptions and signs of relations between conceptions57 
– a classification more fundamental than the lexical polymorphism of dictionar-
ies. Before being located in a vocabulary and a grammatical method constitutive 
of one language among many others, words are located within a division of the 
expression itself, that is to say, within the division of the different parts of dis-
course.58 The ordinary use of words in some particular language cannot be made 
independent of men’s general use of speech in order to signify their thoughts 
to each other. Words explain our mind’s ‘whole secret’59 before being arbitrary 
sounds attached to certain ideas: words are parts of the discursive signification of 
mental contents before being elements of an idiom. Thus, according to Arnauld’s 
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reply to Simon’s objections – in parts VI and VII of the Difficultés présentées à 
M. Steyaert (1691) –60 the requirement of grammaticality against the theological 
purpose imputed to Port-Royal misses the point because Simon’s grammaticality 
is not the right one. Grammatical knowledge must involve first the knowledge of 
human discourse, the knowledge of speech in its mental foundation. The demand 
for a literal translation of the Vulgate is quite inappropriate: to strive for a word-
for-word symmetry61 would be to ignore the natural modes of the signification 
performed by words. Arnauld mocks his censor: Simon ‘counts the words’62 in the 
Mons New Testament in order to prove that the excess of the French version over 
the Vulgate is the mark of a disguised commentary. This is a wasteful occupation, 
the occupation of a bad grammarian, because the number of words is quite indif-
ferent in regard to the natural expression of men’s thoughts. The true criterion 
for judging whether a translation is verbose must be derived from the exigencies 
of the partition of speech into modes of signification, not from its material parti-
tion into different sounds. As long as the Mons New Testament merely expresses 
all the parts of discourse indispensable to the signification of some thought, none 
of the words used in the translation is in excess relative to the source text. The 
natural way of expressing thoughts allows degrees according to the different lan-
guages: the French language prefers a complete expression of a thought,63 whereas 
the Latin language prefers using fewer words. Simon contends that there are too 
many words in the Mons New Testament. According to Arnauld and Lancelot’s 
General Grammar, he should have said that the Vulgate is elliptical. The fact to 
be emphasized is that neither the Mons New Testament nor the Vulgate is defec-
tive: each one performs the expression of thoughts in a natural way. The ellipsis 
of Latin and the periphrasis of French find a common foundation in the mental 
principles of human speech. Simon’s conception of the literality of a text is not 
grammatically justified. The ‘grammatical and literal sense’ he claims must not be 
identified with words taken in their materiality, but with words as far as they have 
an expressive end. A literal translation of the New Testament must therefore be 
rejected on account of the expressive nature of well conceived literality.
We may go on to argue that, from Arnauld’s viewpoint, Simon’s ignorance 
of the true grammaticality is aggravated by his lack of logical concern. Had he 
meditated on Arnauld’s Défense de la traduction du Nouveau Testament imprimée 
à Mons (1667, against Maimbourg) and Nouvelle Défense de la traduction du Nou-
veau Testament imprimée à Mons (1680, against Mallet),64 he would have under-
stood that Arnauld and Nicole’s Logic or Art of Thinking (1662) ought to be the 
second handbook or vade mecum of every translator. The abundance of words 
in the Mons New Testament is not only the result of the fact that French and 
Latin observe a different proportion in their construction of the common parts 
of speech. This abundance, which is never a superfluity, also depends on the im-
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portance in human language of what the Logic calls ‘complex terms in meaning’.65 
Terms used in a discourse may often appear simpler than they really are: in fact, 
‘part of what they contain in the speaker’s mind is implicit and not expressed’.66 
In this case, there are more thoughts in the mind than words in the verbal ex-
pression. Translation must restore for the reader the conditions of the achieved 
use of language in a direct intercourse. It therefore requires the discernment of 
passages where explicitly expressed thoughts do not equate the thoughts which 
are actually signified. The sense of the source text cannot merely be its distinctly 
expressed sense because the author sometimes tacitly makes additions of terms 
which are not marked in the verbal expression. These purely mental additions 
are the ones which the Mons New Testament tries to represent in the expression 
itself by proceeding to additions of words as often as the understanding of the 
original depends on such a development in the version. Translation, in this way, 
makes its expressed terms adequate to the original’s conceived terms; it ensures 
that the literal text represents the author’s whole thought instead of just being 
representative of his words. The literal holy text is not changed in the Mons New 
Testament because the words which must be added are simply the correlatives of 
tacit terms involved in the original’s expressed words.67 On the contrary, with-
out these additions in the expression, the literal text would be altered, since the 
transposition from one language to another would compromise the immediate 
intellection by the reader of what remains understated in the source text. There 
is no ‘abridgement’ (abrègement) in the author’s mind68, but only in the expression 
of the author’s sense, and thanks to translation the reader’s mind is able to supple-
ment all the ideas which were signified in the source text without all of them be-
ing expressed. What Simon mistakes for a theological sense is nothing other than 
the entire impression that is to be produced in the reader’s mind by all the ideas 
signified in the source text. The New Testament is to be viewed as a speech com-
plying with the rules of men’s ordinary language. The sense represented in the 
Mons version is not a sense established by exegesis and borrowed from ancient 
patristic commentaries, but the sense which must naturally get into the reader’s 
mind. So, Simon’s rule of literality is of no use in translation. His rule of textual 
uniformity is also doomed to collapse, as far as the true criterion of translation 
belongs inseparably to grammar and logic. If any uniformity is to be required, it is 
only a semantic and logical one: the unity must be placed at the level of the sense 
intended by the author. Whenever some passages are encountered where the Vul-
gate reading cannot be the sense of the holy author, it would be an absurdity and 
a crime against logic to maintain conformity with the Latin. This would amount 
to giving a copyist’s mistake a value equal to the true text. The rule of absolute 
uniformity prohibiting any substitution of the Greek sense to the Latin one in 
the French version cannot be a true rule of critique: Simon subjects translation to 
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a ‘fictitious rule’ (prétendue règle).69 By relying upon pseudo-rules and chimerical 
principles, Simon’s art of critique merely proves itself to be a negation of critique 
instead of proving its capacity to attain the methodological status of an ars judi-
candi. For Arnauld, Simon is dramatically forgetful of the claimed judicative end 
of his art of critique when he alleges that, once somebody has chosen to translate 
the New Testament from the Vulgate, the sense of the Greek text must never ap-
pear in the body of the version, ‘however one would be convinced that it is the 
sense of the canonical author’.70 Hence, Simon’s statement that ‘every translation 
must represent the original as far as possible’71 cannot be adopted as a rule of cri-
tique without being transformed in order to underline that ‘the most considerable 
perfection of a version of N.T. consists in representing, as far as possible, concern-
ing the sense, the first original’.72 This is the only uniformity to be looked at: by 
contrast with this semantic requirement, Simon’s precept of linguistic uniformity 
amounts to ‘nothing’.73
4 Antoine Arnauld’s redefi nition of critique
According to Arnauld, if critique has to attain the judicative end defined by Si-
mon, it cannot escape being questioned about its logical criterion. The ‘rules of 
critique’ are not self-validating, their normativity must be derived from the nor-
mativity of logic. A true method is expected to be reflexive, and not to be merged 
with material considerations. The art of critique is thus to be integrated within 
the reflections on the manner in which men think and form their judgment – 
defining the ‘art of thinking’74. The critique’s true object is not the comparison of 
surviving manuscripts, nor the hypotheses about lost manuscripts, but the prob-
lem of the proofs entitled to give evidence for preferring one reading over others. 
Critique should not be understood as the quantitative art of philologists who 
number manuscripts and state the frequency of any variant through all exemplars 
of a text. Arnauld’s definition of critique says that it is ‘a conjectural science, which 
teaches us to bear a good judgment on authors and their writings’.75 Critique has 
both a matter-subject (the facts given by readings) and a form (the consequences 
drawn from the facts)76: true critique is defined by its formal dimension, not by 
its material one; it is committed to a kind of reasoning which is not the one ac-
knowledged by Simon. As characterized by Simon, biblical critique serves only a 
subordinate end in Arnauld’s eyes. Its ultimate end ought to be linked to another 
question than that of the authenticity of a reading. The real question deals with 
the kind of certainty that the human mind is able to attain when direct acquain-
tance with things is impossible. The first original text is absent, and its represen-
tation is imperfect as far as all its copies are, in various degrees, defective: thus, it 
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is necessary, whenever textual differences are met with, to give reasons for prefer-
ring one reading over another. There must be proof for sustaining the separation 
between exemplars we can believe in and exemplars whose authority we have to 
negate. Biblical critique cannot exist as biblical without primarily bearing the fea-
tures that are the components of the very concept of critique. So, biblical critique’s 
main end is not the correction of the original text through its different exem-
plars’ inventory – extended by Simon to the supposition of inaccessible states 
of the original, inferred from the most ancient versions. This is only subaltern; 
the principal is to support one’s judgment on the original text by the weighing of 
proofs drawn from this comparison. The mixing of Greek and Latin in the Mons 
New Testament is then definitively justified by the new definition of critique. Ar-
nauld asserts that ‘according to the rules of critique’, one can be certain that some 
passage in the holy text bears ‘more conformity’ to the lost original either in the 
known Greek text or in the Vulgate.77 Thus, critique cannot command that trans-
lation from the Vulgate be placed under the constraint of a general rule which 
would oblige one always to prefer Latin to Greek. Simon’s intangible rule that 
the literal sense of the Vulgate must constantly be the sense of the Mons version 
would make the Messieurs unforgivable sinners if they had inserted just one pas-
sage from the Greek into the body of their translation78: one is already too much 
for Simon, there is no possibility of weakening the fault. But this rule of literal 
uniformity, this requirement of a general choice, tends to indicate that Simon’s 
method is a defective one. Simon does not acknowledge the necessity of weighing 
conflicting reasons, when the Latin and the Greek texts cannot agree, in order to 
attain conformity with the author’s intention of signification. He mislocates the 
object of critique and thus makes this art self-contradictory, since his demand of 
textual uniformity prevents the mind from being confronted with problems of 
decision. Instead of prescribing the mode of judgment by which the mind, when 
facing opposite possibilities, can be inclined to one side of the scales rather than 
the other, Simon’s pseudo-rule of critique makes uncertainty permanent. The 
only way to ensure critique’s preservation as an ars judicandi must consist in re-
placing Simon’s consideration of the ‘grammatical and literal sense’ of the text by 
Arnauld’s consideration of the sense of the discourse – a sense whose continuity 
admits of local choices between Latin and Greek.
As far as the problem of variants of the holy text amounts to a problem of final 
judgment on the best one regarding the author’s meaning, it must be formally 
considered as the same as the general problem of judgment on factual matters. 
For instance, argues Arnauld, if a passage such as The First Epistle of John, c. 5, 
v. 7 (concerning the ‘three that bear witness in heaven’), is found in a great num-
ber of manuscripts (both Greek and Latin) of the New Testament while it is not 
found in others, the question is to determine ‘which ones are to be believed as pre-
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sumably more conformable to the apostolic original’.79 This cannot be achieved 
without comparing the alternative degrees of verisimilitude of two antithetic sup-
positions: the hypothesis of a suppression and the hypothesis of an addition. 
Confronted with such a textual difference, critique has to balance the reasons pro 
and contra both the prior presence/posterior omission and the prior absence/
posterior addition of the passage. These reasons pro and contra may be equally 
strong. Consequently, the work of critique is to decide how the textual change 
could have happened in an easier way. The most probable hypothesis is the one 
that succeeds in making us conceive of the more easily producible mode of trans-
formation of the text. Presumably, what was easier to do is what has been done. 
The two branches of the alternative (either a suppression or an addition of the 
passage) are seemingly two equivalent ways of explaining the textual difference. 
But the suppression hypothesis is ‘one hundred times more probable’80 than the 
addition hypothesis, because it corresponds to a normal careless habit of copy-
ists. In this example, the extension and enumeration of the occurrences of the 
respective absence or presence of the verse are useless in regard to the essential 
question: which one of these two changes is most credible in mente, according to 
its degree of ease in re? The true object of biblical critique, as an art of discerning 
truth from falsity, is not the history of the text, but the proofs conveying a suffi-
cient reason for choosing locally one sense rather than another one. The essential 
quality consists in the discernment of accurate and inaccurate proofs. The ability 
to separate conclusive arguments from non-conclusive ones, the knowledge of the 
difference between weak conjectures and strong conjectures, enter into the nature 
of true biblical critique. In order to know how to discriminate a true reading from 
a false one, one has to be aware of the difference between persuasive reasons and 
unconvincing reasons. Arnauld develops this argument in an appendix to the Dif-
ficultés, the Dissertation critique touchant les exemplaires grecs sur lesquels M. Simon 
prétend que l’ancienne Vulgate a été faite.81 This Dissertation highlights the flaw in 
Simon’s method of extension of the different states of the text to ones which are 
merely supposed. Instead of limiting itself to the directly knowable exemplars, 
Simon’s critique combines these ‘certain facts’ with ‘uncertain facts’, merely con-
jectural.82 According to Arnauld, from one observed fact, it is impossible to infer 
something that cannot be observed, as if it were another fact. This would amount 
to putting a factual certainty and just a supposition on the same level, that is, it 
would introduce doubt into the principles underlying our judgment on the truth 
or falsity of some reading. Critique must follow an analytical method conceived 
in Arnauld and Nicole’s Logic in the manner of Descartes’ Rules for the Direction 
of the Mind.83 In every question, it is necessary to separate what is still unknown 
from what is already known, in order to determine what precisely is to be sought. 
In this way, the conditions of the resolution of the problem are clearly stated. This 
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Cartesian first precept of analytical method, which requires the prior determina-
tion of the particular object of the research, constitutes an inescapable rule for 
biblical critique. Qua critique, biblical critique cannot escape the discrimination 
between the mere numbering of certain facts on one side, and the conceiving of 
antagonist hypotheses, sustained by several proofs, on the other. The weighing 
of the proofs must be antecedent to the choice of one hypothesis as the most 
probable one, whereas in Simon’s manner of dealing with biblical critique, what 
is a mere conjecture happens to be dissimulated among assured facts. The true 
critical method consists in deducing reasons showing the improbability of some 
hypothesis and the probability of its opposite.84 The decision pro or contra the 
truth of some doubtful text must depend on the examination of all circumstances 
particular to the question. The art of critique forbids any decision founded upon 
one proof only; it requires a comparison between several proofs, in order to ap-
preciate their relative value and weight. Arnauld writes: ‘a proof, when considered 
separately, may seem a strong one, which will be recognized as a very weak one 
and not deserving any attention, when counterbalanced by other ones, stronger 
and with a better foundation’.85 Biblical critique is not consistent with its judica-
tive end until it determines the degrees of conviction of proofs alleged pro and 
contra conflicting hypotheses about the sense of problematical passages.
Thus, for Arnauld, biblical critique cannot be restricted to textual problems; 
its true nature has to be determined by an epistemology of the critique. Indeed, 
as early as 1662, in the Art of Thinking, the logical principles were established 
according to which it became possible to obtain the true definition of critique. 
The ‘rules of critique’ which Arnauld summarizes in order to invalidate Simon’s 
pseudo-critique belong to the rules characterized in the 4th Part of the Art of 
Thinking as ‘the rules for directing reason well in beliefs about events that de-
pend on human faith’86, or ‘the rules ... helpful for judging about past events’.87 
Simon’s objections to the Mons New Testament have a remarkable effect: they 
give Arnauld the opportunity of making plain the inclusion of critique into logic, 
as an art of judging. The true critique, and therefore the true biblical critique, is 
a part of logic when logic no more constrains the ‘rules of reason’ to geometrical 
proofs, but extends them to ‘the judgments we make concerning truth or falsity 
of human events’88. If these ‘human and contingent events’89 are past, what are the 
precepts to be followed in order to afford convincing arguments for the belief 
in their truth? Reasons for believing in the truth of some fact are not simply on 
the side of the possibility of this fact. Arnauld holds as ‘a certain and indubitable 
maxim’ that ‘the mere possibility of an event is not a sufficient reason to believe 
in it’,90 because it cannot exclude the possibility of the contrary. The event and its 
opposite are equally possible. How then can it be ‘right to believe in one and not 
in the other‘?91 The possibility of a fact never constitutes the reason why this fact 
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becomes credible while its opposite does not. If we believe in a fact in spite of the 
possibility of its falsity, it is because we have a reason to believe that it is not false. 
Now, according to Arnauld, what is drastically wanting in Simon’s conception 
of critique is this notion of reasons determining the belief in an event. Because 
probabilities are unequal, where possibilities are equal, truth or falsity must be 
assigned to a fact in virtue of what seems more likely when all its circumstances 
are taken into consideration92. The ultimate principle of the ‘rules of critique’ lies 
in this way of conviction – the necessary one in our judgments on contingent 
facts. In his refutation of Simon’s position on critique, Arnauld affirms that cer-
tainty in the field of biblical critique, as well as in any reasoning on human facts, 
depends on the accumulation of motives for believing. He writes that it is necessary 
to constitute a ‘heap of proofs’ (amas de preuves)93 because without their consid-
eration all together, we are liable to omit particular circumstances which might 
reinforce our belief, and in return pay attention only to general circumstances 
which, however general, are merely weak reasons. The first commandment of cri-
tique is the same as the logical imperative stating in the Art of Thinking that ‘it is 
necessary to join circumstances, not to separate them’94. Critique could not be an 
ars judicandi if the reasons for believing or not believing a fact remained scattered. 
Instead of separating the reasons for believing from the reasons for disbelieving, 
the function of critique is to gather them together. Simon in contrast confuses 
what must be the order of the probable and the mere order of the possible: far 
from trying to accumulate the required ‘heap’ of circumstantial proofs, he freely 
piles hypotheses up. Now, it is in everyone’s power to feign possibilities and to 
imagine hypotheses detached from the consideration of given circumstances. But 
as for a factual judgment, critique must be ruled by the quest for the greatest like-
lihood, based on the assembling of all the circumstances associated with the fact 
under examination. Indeed, Arnauld’s development of the problem of the ‘rules 
of critique’ into the problem of the weighing of reasons from given circumstances 
in order to determine the most probable exceeds mere opposition to Simon: the 
debate on critique may be deemed to participate in the emergence of a new logical 
sphere – named the ‘art of estimation of likelihoods’ in Leibniz’s New Essays on 
Human Understanding.95
Thus, under the pressure of Simon’s attacks on Port-Royal’s method in trans-
lating the New Testament, Arnauld has been prompted to give to his logic, not 
indeed a new extension, but its whole extension, so as to make it obvious that 
critique cannot be severed from the ‘new observations appropriate for forming 
judgment’,96 by which the Art of Thinking completes traditional logic. What re-
mained concealed, or implicit, in 1662 becomes explicit in the Difficultés proposées 
à M. Steyaert, when challenging Simon’s conception of textual critique. Simon’s 
objections to the Mons New Testament eventually produce a wholly undesirable 
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effect in his eyes: biblical critique is absorbed by logic. The true location of the art 
of critique is within the art of thinking, to the extent that this art contains rules 
for other truths (which are not less evident) than the geometric ones. The art of 
judging, through widening to factual judgments endowed with a moral certainty, 
provides critique with a real epistemic status.
5 Conclusion
The way suggested by Arnauld might be called the universalist way, as it preserves 
an organic link between logic, grammar and critique, preventing them from be-
ing disassociated. At different levels of abstraction, they depend on the unity 
of the human mind. This mentalist unity does not allow the subordination of 
humanities to the reign of historicity. Contrasting with Arnauld’s requirement of 
an explanation of the historical from the universal, Simon’s textualist way deals 
with tradition and the remains of temporal destruction. According to him, the 
science of texts must be purely historical and autonomous: the criteria of conjec-
tural logic appended by Arnauld to his logic of judgement are not the criteria of 
textual criticism. The humanities are accordingly sciences claiming for historical 
tradition against mental structures. Leaving aside what might be viewed in his 
conception of textual critique as a myth of the original state, Simon must be 
acknowledged as the forerunner of a movement leading from the mid-eighteenth 
century in Germany to substitute comparative philology and textual genealogy 
for critique.97 A major shift in theology results from this substitution: theology 
evolves into the historical reconstruction and analysis of biblical texts. The target 
is henceforth not the mere emendation of the Bible’s books, but the identifying 
and dating of their different strata, as well as the distribution of manuscripts 
between some fundamental families.98 Yet after confronting Simon and Arnauld’s 
conceptions of critique, a permanent difficulty in the history of humanities has to 
be highlighted: these sciences can put the emphasis either on the products of the 
mind (the erga) or on the mental activity underlying them (the energeia). They 
can scrutinize either the modes of survival of mental products or the immediate 
effects of the actual presence of the mind. Simon asks for documentary evidence 
and opposes the vanishing of material testimonies: as a champion of tradition, he 
affords the humanities the status of sciences of irreversible historical singularities 
surviving temporal decay. Arnauld’s concern, on the contrary, is about the unceas-
ing productivity of forms derived from the nature of the human mind. The two 
ways have been followed in the subsequent history of humanities, yet the reign of 
comparative philology has been less ephemeral than the influence of the explana-
tions in terms of mental structures. Now, the different fortune of the historical 
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way and of the mental way cannot keep us from being eventually confronted with 
a doubt: if it is strictly detached from the science of the natural productivity of 
the human mind and unconcerned by logical rules, can the science of historical 
singularities really be adequate?
 Notes
 The manuscript of Lorenzo Valla’s Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum had been former-
ly published by Erasmus (). The Latin translation of the Pauline Epistles published in 
 by the French humanist Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples also influenced him. This legacy 
lays the first foundations of the Greek Textus Receptus – so named after the second El-
zevier edition of the Greek New Testament ().
 Erasmus’s edition was denounced as erroneous, not on account of the lacunas and faults in 
the Greek text (inferior to the Greek original in the Complutensian Polyglot, already com-
piled at the University of Alcalà de Henares but only published after ), but because 
of the replacing of the Vulgate with a new Latin version. 
 This edition afforded for the first time a critical apparatus of the Greek text. Robert Esti-
enne was one of the sixteenth-century pioneers in lexicography (Thesaurus linguæ latinæ, 
-; Dictionarium latinogallicum,  ; Dictionaire françoislatin, ).
 This last revision was made by Théodore de Bèze. Calvin performed the first revisions by 
himself. 
 Among English-speaking Protestants, the English Geneva Bible () remained popular 
during the first half of the seventeenth century, although competed against by the King 
James Version or Authorized Version ().
 Reprints during this period took place in France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
 Principally Nicolas de Leuze.
 Mainly Jacques de Bay.
 Only new French versions which were actually merely slight revisions of the Louvain 
Bible (by Pierre Besse in , by Claude Deville in , by Pierre Frizon in ) suc-
ceeded in being approved. Jacques Gorbin’s genuine new version from the Vulgate (), 
commissioned by King Louis XIII, failed to be approved.
 The list is not exhaustive. Moreover, Blaise Pascal also played a part in the discussions. As 
the meetings took place in the castle of the Duc de Luynes (the translator of Descartes’ 
Meditationes), they were named the Conférences de Vaumurier.
 See the entry ‘Arnauld, Antoine (-)’ in the Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century 
French Philosophers (New York, London: Thoemmes-Continuum, ).
 Le Maître’s translation of the Gospels and of the Apocalypse from the Vulgate was ready as 
earlier as . But the Conférences de Vaumurier showed the necessity to have recourse 
to the Greek text in order to emend the Vulgate. At the death of Le Maître in , Sacy 
took up the torch.
 In , the Oratorian Denis Amelotte published the fi rst part (Gospels and Acts) of his 
translation of the New Testament – the whole publication was completed in . Amelotte 
did presumably plagiarize the Port-Royal manuscript of the version of the Gospels.
 The full title was: Le Nouveau Testament de Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, traduit en français 
selon l’édition Vulgate, avec les differences du grec. Five thousand copies were sold in Paris 
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within a few months. The Mons New Testament had five editions in , four in . In 
, forty thousand copies had been sold. As to the Ancient Testament, its publication in 
Paris staggered from  to . The whole Port-Royal’s Sainte Bible, contenant l’Ancien 
et le Nouveau Testament (thirty-two volumes) was published in . For two hundred 
years, this masterpiece of classic language was the reference Bible in France. 
 The Mons New Testament was the target of a royal censure, of an episcopal ordinance 
placing it on the Index in , and of two papal condemnations, by Clement IX in  
and by Innocent XI in . 
 See the entries ‘Simon, Richard (-)’ in the Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century 
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, fasc. . Richard Simon was excluded from the Oratory in May  (see below, note 
)
 Simon developed his negative comments on Port-Royal’s Perpétuité de la foi in the Preface 
to his unpublished Additions aux Recherches curieuses sur la diversité des langues et religions. 
 In , Simon handed the manuscript of a Projet d’une nouvelle version de l’Écriture Sainte 
to the Protestant ministers of Charenton, who had asked him for a new version of the 
Bible.
 The Histoire critique du Vieux Testament was presumably already written in , but 
Simon reworked it. The chapter denying Moses’s authorship of the whole Pentateuch in-
cited Bossuet to demand the interdiction of the book: the copies were burnt in July , 
two months after Simon’s exclusion from the Oratory. An expanded edition was printed 
in Rotterdam in .
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Framing a New Mode of Historical Experience
Th e Renaissance Historiography of Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini
Jacques Bos
Most disciplines in the humanities are not very concerned with their own history. 
Although the dialogue between contemporary scholars and their predecessors 
might extend into a somewhat further past than in the natural and social sciences, 
the various fields of the humanities tend to reflect just as little on their own his-
tory as, for instance, chemistry or psychology. Historians seem to be the main 
exception to this tendency: unlike most other disciplines, history has a long tra-
dition of examining its own past. In many university programmes the history of 
historical writing is a compulsory course, and there is a wide range of textbooks 
on this subject. Traditionally, overviews of the development of historiography 
tended to focus on the succession of different speculative ideas on the course of 
the historical process and on the emergence of empirical methods of studying the 
past. A characteristic variety of Whig history in this field is the idea that with the 
advancement of modernity, theological and philosophical perspectives on the past 
lost their position to an increasingly critical and empirical approach to history. 
The main turning point in this narrative is the early nineteenth century, when 
historiography became a professional academic discipline that defined itself as a 
‘science’ in contrast to the Enlightenment’s explicitly normative perspective on the 
past and the grand speculative designs of Hegelian philosophy of history.
An important topic in recent discussions of the development of historiogra-
phy, but largely ignored in the traditional Whig perspective, is the rise of modern 
historical consciousness. History as a discipline can only emerge in a cultural 
context in which the past is recognised as essentially different from the present 
but nevertheless connected with it. In his 2005 book Sublime Historical Expe-
rience, the Dutch historical theorist Frank Ankersmit suggests that the rise of 
modern historical consciousness can be related to the disastrous events that took 
place in Italy in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, especially the 
invasion of Italy by the French king Charles VIII in 1494 and the sack of Rome 
in 1527 by the German emperor Charles V. For Renaissance historians such as 
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Machiavelli and Guicciardini, these events were deeply traumatic, in the sense 
that they painfully experienced that the old world of the Italian city-states in 
which they had played a significant role was irretrievably lost. A similar sense of 
rupture was brought about among conservative historians by the French Revolu-
tion in the early nineteenth century. According to Ankersmit, these painful expe-
riences played a crucial role in the development of historical consciousness. They 
amounted to a ‘sublime dissociation of the past’, and with this dissociation the 
past became a potential object of study.1
An interesting question is how these crucial moments in the development 
of historical consciousness affected historical writing exactly. In the early nine-
teenth century, historicism redefined historiography by emphasising its empiri-
cal or even ‘scientific’ character. As a result, history became a clearly recognisable 
discipline. In the context of the sixteenth century, we cannot speak of the for-
mation of academic disciplines in the modern sense of the word. Nevertheless, 
sixteenth-century Renaissance historians did create a more or less coherent ana-
lytical framework around the new mode of historical experience of their time. In 
this essay I shall focus on Machiavelli and Guicciardini, and investigate how they 
turned the past into an object of study. Two dimensions of their historical writ-
ings will be examined more closely. In the first place I shall look at the ontological 
assumptions present in their work, focusing on their views on human agency and 
individuality. Furthermore, I shall discuss the way in which they defined history 
in relation to other branches of learning, especially rhetoric and political theory. 
Rhetoric dominated the humanist historiography of the fifteenth century, but 
played a less important role in the writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini. In-
stead, their historical work was closely intertwined with political theory – a field 
in which they were just as active as in history. Machiavelli is nowadays primarily 
known as a political philosopher, and Guicciardini also wrote some notable tracts 
on politics. Apart from that, their historical writings almost exclusively deal with 
political themes, which are not only presented as historically important but also 
as practically relevant.
1 Humanist historiography
Before turning to the work of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, it is necessary to pay 
some attention to their immediate predecessors, the humanist historians of the 
fifteenth century. Humanist historiography has two main sources, both literally, 
as a supply of information about the past, and metaphorically, as a model for 
historical writing. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the genre of the 
chronicle flourished in the Italian city-states. These chronicles were primarily 
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instruments for the expression of civic pride: they sought to glorify the present 
and immediate past of the city by constructing a connection with events that took 
place in a distant past. Florentine chronicles usually started with the establish-
ment of the city in the Roman era, which was supposed to enhance its position 
among the other powers of northern Italy. Influenced by the chronicle writers of 
the later Middle Ages, the humanist historians of the fifteenth century adopted a 
perspective centred on political history and civic identification. Despite this simi-
larity in perspective and material, the form of humanist historical writing was 
totally different from that of the chronicle, which was merely a chronologically 
ordered list of events. With regard to its literary aspects, fifteenth-century histo-
riography was indebted to the standards set by early humanists such as Petrarch, 
and to their efforts in recovering classical texts – including historical works – that 
could serve as models for emulation.2
An important example of humanist historiography is the work of Leonardo 
Bruni (c. 1370-1444). As chancellor of Florence, Bruni played an important role 
in the political life of his era. He was highly praised by his contemporaries and by 
later fifteenth-century humanists, and is sometimes considered the first modern 
historian. In 1415 he began to write his famous Historiae florentini populi, which 
was still unfinished at the time of his death. In the twelve books of this work, 
he discusses the history of Florence, from the foundation of the city as a Roman 
colony to his own age. The emphasis is on the period between 1250 and 1402, the 
year of the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti of Milan, whose expansionist politics 
in northern Italy were a major threat to the position of Florence. Bruni almost 
exclusively focuses on political history, taking his commitment to his city as a 
starting point.3 As he expresses it himself in his preface, he intends ‘to write about 
the deeds of the Florentine people, their struggles at home and abroad, their cel-
ebrated exploits in war and in peace’.4
Bruni’s Historiae clearly refl ect humanist theories on the nature of historical 
study. Th ese theories are mainly expressed in letters, dedications and speeches. 
Furthermore, there are some treatises on historical theory, such as the dialogue 
Actius, written by the Neapolitan humanist Giovanni Pontano (1426-1503). Texts 
of this type are relatively scarce, however. Since this genre did not exist in Antiq-
uity, fi fteenth-century humanists had no models for the exposition of their views 
on the nature of historiography and had to base their theoretical explorations on a 
few brief remarks on history by Aristotle and Cicero. Following Aristotle, the hu-
manists of the fi fteenth century placed poetry above history, they repeated Cicero’s 
claim that truth was the basic requirement for historiography, and elaborated on 
his views concerning the most appropriate style and topics for historical writing.5
An essential aspect of humanist historiography is its emphasis on imitation. 
Humanist historians first of all aspired to emulate the style of their Roman pre-
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decessors. Sallust’s work provided an important example, and Livy was even more 
admired for his manner of writing. Most of the formal aspects of Bruni’s Histo-
riae, such as their annalistic structure, are modelled after Livy’s Ab urbe condita.6 
Humanist historians are also oriented on classical examples in their choice of 
subject matter. They write histories of city states, like Livy, or wars, like Sal-
lust. Lengthy descriptions of battles and the insertion of speeches and character 
sketches are other aspects of humanist historiography that can be attributed to 
the use of classical models. Another important element of humanist historical 
writing is its moral dimension, expressed in the phrase that ‘history teaches by 
example’. In the light of this emphasis on the ethical relevance and practical ap-
plicability of historiography, the requirement of being true to the facts plays a 
secondary role. Humanist historians are mainly concerned with constructing a 
rhetorically convincing and stylistically admirable narrative, while they are less 
apprehensive about the way they deal with their sources. It is not uncommon, for 
instance, for a humanist historical work to be largely based on only one source.7
Perhaps the most important characteristic of humanist historiography is its 
rhetorical orientation. It can be argued that rhetoric was the heart of the human-
ist project.8 According to Nancy Struever, rhetoric and history are closely related 
fi elds, in Antiquity as well as in the Renaissance, because they both deal with ‘the 
fl ux of human event and character’ to which they convey form and meaning with-
out trying to escape or transcend it by means of rigorous abstractions, as is often 
done in the sphere of religion and philosophy. Ideally, rhetoric is more than a com-
plex set of rules to compose and embellish spoken and written discourse. Th is view 
of rhetoric, to Struever, distorts its true nature and fails to acknowledge its politi-
cal and ethical dimension. Rhetoric, she argues, should simultaneously function as 
aesthetics, pragmatics, and psychology. Th e Sophists achieved this goal, but Hel-
lenistic rhetoric had lost its practical relevance and tended towards mannerism. 
Struever claims that Renaissance humanists renewed ‘the self-conscious purpose 
and public role of the rhetorician’. Th is opened the way for an essentially rhetori-
cal form of historical writing, visible in the work of Bruni and others, that made 
sense of the past by dealing with aesthetic, political and ethical ambivalences.9 
By interpreting the rhetorical nature of humanist historical writing in this way, 
Struever takes up a position in a long debate about the evaluation of this episode 
in the history of historiography. In the nineteenth century Jacob Burckhardt is 
highly negative about the rhetorical orientation of humanist historians, reproach-
ing them that their work was mainly aimed at exciting and charming the reader by 
stylistic means, as if it were poetry.10 A diff erent strand in this debate is represent-
ed by Hans Baron, who regards the rhetorical aspects of the writings of Bruni and 
other humanist historians as a somewhat distracting layer beneath which the real 
character of their work, a politically motivated ‘civic humanism’, becomes visible.11
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2 Th e tragic histories of Machiavelli and Guicciardini
Humanist historiography was an important aspect of the intellectual context in 
which Machiavelli and Guicciardini turned to the past. The political context of 
their work was largely shaped by the ‘Calamità d’Italia’ from 1494 onwards. In 
this period a set of dramatic events overturned the old order in which the vari-
ous Italian states had competed over power. In 1494 Charles VIII of France in-
vaded Italy, invited by Ludovico Sforza of Milan, who sought an ally against the 
Republic of Venice. In Florence the ensuing war resulted in a change of regime. 
The Medici were deposed, and Florence had a republican government until the 
Medici returned in 1512. The French invasion of 1494 was the beginning of several 
decades of war between changing alliances of Italian states and foreign powers. 
In 1526 Pope Clement VII, born Giulio de’ Medici, formed the League of Cognac 
with France, Venice, Florence and Milan to drive the Habsburg powers – the 
Holy Roman Empire and Spain – from Italy. The war between the League of 
Cognac and Emperor Charles V brought about one of the most disastrous events 
in Italian history: the sack of Rome by German troops in 1527.12
Machiavelli and Guicciardini were both actively involved in Florentine politics. 
As a result, the catastrophes that disrupted the Italian status quo also affected 
their personal lives. In 1498, when Florence had a republican regime, Niccolò Ma-
chiavelli (1469-1527) became secretary to the Second Chancery, a function that 
involved the tasks of a senior clerk and an ambassador.13 When Medici rule was 
restored in 1512, he was removed from office. In his country house near Florence, 
he turned to literature, political theory and history. In 1520 he was commissioned 
to write a history of Florence by the Medici Pope Clement VII. He finished his 
Istorie fiorentine in 1525, and the text was published for the first time in 1532. It 
consists of eight books, starting with the foundation of the city and ending with 
the death of Lorenzo il Magnifico in 1492. Machiavelli’s central thesis is that the 
main problem in Florentine history is the internal strife between various factions. 
He ends his work on a very pessimistic note. The death of Lorenzo de’ Medici in-
augurates a disastrous period in Italian history that Machiavelli does not expect 
to end soon:
Whether they had just cause for mourning was soon after shown by the 
result, for when Italy was deprived of his advice, those who were left found 
no way either to satisfy or to check the ambition of Lodovico Sforza, 
the guardian of the Duke of Milan. No sooner was Lorenzo dead than 
Lodovico’s ambition stimulated the growth of those evil seeds that not long 
after, since no living man could destroy them, devastated – and are still 
devastating – Italy.14
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A central point in Machiavelli’s analysis is that the Italians themselves are to 
blame for Italy’s desperate situation. It was not brought about by an impersonal 
historical force or by the expansionist strategy of the French. Ludovico Sforza’s 
ambition is a central factor in Machiavelli’s explanation of the ‘Calamità d’Italia’, 
and perhaps even more important is the inability of others to stop the sequence 
of disastrous events. It is not unthinkable that Machiavelli also includes himself 
in this group because of his role in Florentine politics in the decades before and 
after 1500.
Machiavelli’s younger contemporary, Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), was 
born into one of the grand aristocratic families of Florence and educated as a law-
yer.15 In 1512 he became ambassador at the Spanish court, and under the Medici 
Pope Leo X, he was governor of various papal territories. In 1537 Guicciardini 
involuntarily retired from political life after the death of Alessandro de’ Medici, 
the first Duke of Florence. In the three years between his fall from grace and his 
death, Guicciardini turned to history. He wrote his most famous work in this 
period, the Storia d’Italia, dealing with the events in Italy between 1490 and 1534. 
Guicciardini’s perspective is just as pessimistic as Machiavelli’s: in his eyes, Italy’s 
fate had taken an irreversible turn for the worse in the decades that he describes. 
This was not caused by impersonal forces, but by erroneous decisions of the peo-
ple involved in Italian politics. Guicciardini also included himself among those 
who had brought about the ‘Calamità d’Italia’. In the late 1520s he wrote a short 
text, with the title Oratoria accusatoria in which he speaks accusingly to himself 
for advising Pope Clement VII to form the League of Cognac against France:
Because of you Rome was so cruelly sacked, with so much damage to so 
many of our citizens; because of you heretics control the holy places, be-
cause of you they have thrown the relics to the dogs ... You are the plague, 
the ruin, the fi re of the whole world ... enemy of God and of man, enemy of 
the patria.16
Of course, this self-accusation has a very rhetorical character, and might possibly 
exaggerate Guicciardini’s negative view on his own involvement in Italian politics. 
Yet, it nevertheless emphasises the idea, also present in Machiavelli’s analysis, 
that human agency is the key factor in explaining the disastrous turn taken by 
Italian history. Especially the Italians themselves are to blame: at the end of the 
day, they brought about their own downfall.
The view of Machiavelli and Guicciardini on the Italian past is essentially 
tragic. They have a strong sense that the old Italian order is irretrievably lost 
after the succession of crises that started in 1494. This is the experience that 
Ankersmit describes as a ‘sublime dissociation of the past’. Ankersmit does not 
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connect this kind of historical experience with a notion of human agency, but in 
my opinion the traumatic experience that the world of the past is forever gone 
presupposes the idea that this rupture is caused by our own actions. In a world 
ruled by impersonal forces or by divine providence, such a traumatic dissociation 
of the past would hardly be conceivable. An interesting parallel can be found in 
Aristotle’s analysis of Greek tragedy. In a tragedy the hero undergoes a reversal of 
fortune that is not the result of external causes or a fundamental character flaw, 
but is caused by a mistake of some kind made by the protagonist himself. In the 
end, the hero realises what has happened, which amounts to a traumatic recogni-
tion of the true nature of the sequence of events he has started.17
3 Th e description of characters
As we have just seen, the tragic view of history in the writings of Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini presupposes a sense of human agency. Nowadays, agency is usu-
ally connected with individuality: we ascribe agency to individual persons who 
make choices against the background of their unique life histories. This modern 
conception of individuality also involves the idea that we have an inner life that 
is not directly accessible to others. It is questionable whether such a notion of 
individuality is already present in the work of Machiavelli and Guicciardini. One 
indication that they might have had a different view on the self is the frequent use 
of character sketches in their historical writings.
These character sketches should be seen in the light of the central position 
of the concept of character in early modern psychological and anthropological 
knowledge. With the term ‘character’ early modern authors referred to types 
that could be recognised on the basis of external actions and features, and not 
to unique individuals with a hidden inner core. Classical thought was the main 
source of inspiration for this discourse on character. In Greek and Roman rheto-
ric, character was an important topic, both in a ‘subjective’ sense, dealing with the 
ways in which the speaker could display the qualities of his own character, and in 
an ‘objective’ sense, which involved the techniques of describing the characters of 
other people, such as the accused in a lawsuit. In both cases the central concern 
was to show that someone belonged to a certain category of people and was there-
fore likely to be trustworthy or to behave in a particular way. In ethical thought 
we find a similar conception of character, for instance in Aristotle’s descriptions 
of virtuous types in the Nichomachean Ethics, and in medicine the notion of char-
acter was linked with humoral physiology, resulting in a typological view of man 
in which the constitutive elements of the body and the characteristic traits of the 
soul were closely connected.18
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In this discourse on character, which was remarkably continuous from An-
tiquity until the seventeenth century, mental dispositions were depicted by list-
ing a set of typical actions or characteristic physical features. A good example is 
Aristotle’s analysis of greatness of soul (megalopsuchia) in the fourth book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics:
It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from oth-
ers, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty 
towards men of position and fortune, but courteous towards those of mod-
erate station. ... He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than 
useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his indepen-
dence more. Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a 
slow gait, a deep voice and a deliberate utterance.19
Machiavelli and Guicciardini frequently use the same technique of depicting 
characters. In the seventh book of the Istorie fiorentine, Machiavelli describes the 
characteristics of Cosimo de’ Medici, the first Medici ruler of Florence, who gov-
erned the city between 1434 and his death in 1464:
He was of ordinary stature, of olive complexion and of dignifi ed bearing. 
He was without learning but very eloquent and abounding in natural pru-
dence; by means of the last he was obliging to his friends, merciful to the 
poor, helpful in consultation, cautious in advice, swift in execution; in his 
sayings and replies he was keen and weighty.20
Guicciardini also regularly employs character sketches in his historical writings. 
In the first book of the Storia d’Italia he depicts the character of the French king 
Charles VIII. Here as well, a mental disposition is represented by a list of physi-
cal features and typical actions:
Charles, from boyhood on, was of very feeble constitution and unhealthy 
body, short in stature, very ugly ... Not only was he without any learning 
and skill but he hardly knew the letters of the alphabet ... He was neglectful 
of almost all eff ort and enterprise, and those aff airs which he did take care 
of, he managed with very little judgment or wisdom.21
It could be argued that the use of this kind of character sketches by Machiavelli 
and Guicciardini is merely a literary device that does not in any way reflect an un-
derlying view of the self. In his analysis of the character sketches in Machiavelli’s 
work, Peter Bondanella claims that these sketches should be seen in the light of 
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similar portraits of persons in the writings of Livy or Plutarch. While these por-
traits were meant to function as moral examples, Machiavelli’s character sketches 
were intended as illustrations of certain principles of human nature.22 In this 
view, it is assumed that the sixteenth-century conception of the self is essentially 
the same as ours; Machiavelli only uses different literary techniques to portray 
persons than we would do. The contextualisation in Bondanella’s argument is 
exclusively diachronic, connecting Machiavelli with Livy and Plutarch, but not 
with authors working in other fields than history. As argued above, Machiavelli’s 
character sketches should also be contextualised synchronically, by relating them 
to the early modern knowledge of man centred around the concept of character. 
In this discourse the modern notion of a highly individual self with a unique life 
history and a hidden interior was absent. This suggests that the psychological 
simplicity of Machiavelli’s character sketches is not just the result of a particular 
technique of portraying persons, but an indication of a conception of the self that 
differed from the modern view.
Two aspects of this early modern notion of the self should be highlighted 
here because they are especially relevant for historical writing. In the first place, 
there is a rather direct connection between character and action, since actions are 
assumed to be signs of an underlying mental disposition. The relation between 
character and behaviour is essentially transparent, in contrast to the modern per-
spective in which the hidden interior of individuals cannot be related to their 
actions in a similarly straightforward way. Furthermore, the early modern dis-
course on character has a prominent moral dimension.23 This is clearly visible in 
the character sketches of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, which are descriptive and 
evaluative at the same time. This morally orientated view of the self is mirrored 
in a mode of historical writing that does not keep away from judgments on the 
past, unlike modern academic historiography with its emphasis on disinterested 
objectivity.
4 Rhetoric, political theory and historical method
Machiavelli and Guicciardini were educated in the humanist tradition, which es-
sentially means that they were immersed in rhetoric. Furthermore, the human-
ist historiography of their fifteenth-century predecessors had a fundamentally 
rhetorical character, although, as we have seen above, there has been an intensive 
scholarly debate about what that involves. Therefore, an important question is 
how the historical writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini are related to the 
rhetorical tradition. According to Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli fully endorses the 
rhetorical approach to historiography. This is visible in his use of rhetorical tech-
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niques, in the amount of attention he pays to the effect of political speeches on 
the course of history, and in his view that historiography has to address the moral 
and political issues of the present.24 There are also indications, however, that sug-
gest that Machiavelli and Guicciardini had a different attitude towards the rhe-
torical tradition. The fact that they wrote in Italian and not in Latin should be 
mentioned here, because this can be seen as a sign that they had started to move 
away from the classical rhetorical models of humanist orthodoxy. Furthermore, 
rhetoric and humanist historiography were not the only factors in the intellectual 
context in which Machiavelli and Guicciardini were active. It should be noted, 
for instance, that the vernacular tradition of the chronicle was another important 
source of inspiration for their historical writings.25
Felix Gilbert observes a fundamental conflict between the pragmatic view of 
history held by Machiavelli and Guicciardini and the rhetorical outlook of their 
humanist predecessors. In his opinion, the pragmatic view of Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini involved a focus on the practical political use of historical knowl-
edge; paying attention to the details of political life in the past was indispensable 
in this perspective. Humanist historians were also concerned with political histo-
ry, but, according to Gilbert, they subordinated the political content of their his-
torical narratives to the traditional rhetorical objective of moral instruction. The 
stylistic framework they had constructed for historical writing was so restricted 
that the analysis of practical politics could hardly be fitted in.26 This antithesis is 
probably not as pointed as Gilbert claims. Machiavelli and Guicciardini did not 
totally discard the rhetorical apparatus that their humanist predecessors used in 
describing the past, and it would be exaggerated to describe humanist historical 
writing as a literary activity without a practical or political dimension, only con-
cerned with fulfilling certain stylistic requirements. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
denied that Machiavelli and Guicciardini started to move away from the frame-
work in which the humanists had cast their historical work. This shift towards a 
‘post-humanist’ perspective can be related to the dissociation of the past brought 
about by the ‘Calamità d’Italia’. Unlike their fifteenth-century precursors, Ma-
chiavelli and Guicciardini saw the past as a world that was irretrievably lost. As 
a consequence, the past became an object that could be studied, and rhetoric was 
not the most suitable tool to approach such an objectified past. Rhetoric, when 
it is not seen as merely a set of stylistic prescripts, can be helpful to make sense 
of the ambivalences inherent in social life. It can also be used to make the past 
relevant, for instance as a source of moral examples, but that presupposes that 
the past is contiguous with the present. A past that is experienced as a strange 
object cannot be incorporated straightforwardly in rhetorical discourse. It has 
to be examined with other means, and its significance for the present has to be 
demonstrated from a different perspective.
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In the work of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, political theory replaced rheto-
ric as the field of learning most narrowly intertwined with history.27 Machiavelli 
draws attention to this relation in the preface to the Istorie fiorentine:
If any reading is useful to citizens who govern republics, it is that which 
shows the causes of the hatreds and factional struggles within the city, in 
order that such citizens, having grown wise through the suff erings of oth-
ers, can keep themselves united.28
The use of history lies in its contribution to our knowledge of politics. This is 
also visible in Machiavelli’s more theoretically oriented writings. The Discorsi are 
probably the most telling example: here Machiavelli develops a theory of citizen-
ship and liberty in a commentary on a historical work, the first ten books of Livy’s 
Ab urbe condita. Guicciardini also mixes political theory with history. His Dialogo 
del reggimento di Firenze is a discussion of the ideal form of a republican govern-
ment in Florence. The first of the two books of this dialogue between three Flo-
rentine politicians deals with the recent history of the city, comparing the regime 
of Lorenzo de’ Medici with the way Florence was governed after the revolution of 
1494. On the basis of this historical analysis, Guicciardini develops his ideas on 
the best possible form of government for Florence.29
Just before the passage from the preface of the Istorie fiorentine quoted above, 
Machiavelli remarks that ‘if anything in history delights or teaches, it is what is 
presented in full detail’. In these words, the rhetorical tradition clearly resonates: 
delectare and docere are conventional goals of rhetoric. Yet, with this phrase he 
criticises Leonardo Bruni for not discussing internal strife in his history of Flor-
ence, suggesting that he considered these affairs ‘so paltry as to be unworthy of 
preservation in writing’.30 This shows the ambivalence of Machiavelli’s relation 
with the rhetorically oriented historiography of the humanists, but it also points 
to something else. For Machiavelli, the past is an object of research that should be 
examined in detail and without omitting unwelcome elements. With this attitude 
towards the past, one might expect a special interest in historical method and a 
practice of carefully examining sources in order to establish indisputable facts. 
Yet, there are no traces that Machiavelli made an effort to reshape the study of 
history in this respect. Guicciardini, however, was highly concerned with giving 
a factually accurate account of the past. In a lengthy commentary on the Discorsi, 
he criticises Machiavelli for oversimplification and fitting his material into his 
thesis.31 Because of his focus on factual correctness, Guicciardini meticulously 
analysed his sources. His archive has been preserved, and his papers show that 
he had a preference for using documentary evidence and carefully compared all 
available reports about the events he intended to describe.32 This is a major differ-
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ence between Guicciardini and the humanist historians of the fifteenth century. 
Yet, he did not develop a systematic methodology of historical research. Texts 
on that subject only began to appear in the second half of the sixteenth century, 
resulting in a flourishing tradition of artes historicae in the seventeenth century.33
5 Conclusion and outlook: Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the 
history of the humanities
In the writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, we can observe a crucial early 
stage in the development of modern historical consciousness. As a result of the 
trauma of the ‘Calamità d’Italia’, the past is dissociated from the present and be-
comes an object of study. This does not necessarily mean that Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini saw the past as a ‘foreign country’, as it is described by a modern 
author,34 since such a perspective presupposes a post-Romantic sense of radical 
historicity in which historical interpretation has become fundamentally problem-
atic. Yet, they definitely considered the past as a different region than their own 
dwelling place in the present. In this respect they differed from the historians that 
preceded them. Fifteenth-century humanist historiography regarded the past as 
a source of moral examples for the present. This implies that past and present 
belong to a continuous space, which can be imbued with meaning with the instru-
ments provided by the rhetorical tradition.
Machiavelli and Guicciardini are important transitional figures in the devel-
opment of historical writing. The historical consciousness that becomes visible 
in their work is a significant rupture in our thinking about the past, but around 
1800 this historical consciousness would deepen into the conviction that the past 
was radically different from the present and could only be understood in its own 
terms. Human agency was a central element in the historical thought of Machi-
avelli and Guicciardini, but they did not have a modern notion of individuality, 
similar to that of nineteenth-century historicism. They started to disentangle 
historiography from its rhetorical framework, and in Guicciardini’s work we can 
observe the first traces of a critical historical method. Yet, he did not elaborate 
this method. This elaboration took place in the artes historicae of the early mod-
ern period, but it was not before the early nineteenth century that history became 
a discipline in the full sense of the word.
The turning points in the development of historiography indicated here, the 
sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, are also frequently identified as impor-
tant moments in the history of other branches of learning in the field of the 
humanities. This suggests an important line of investigation for a comparative 
historiography of the humanities, which would have to entail an examination of 
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the roles of humanism and historicism in the development of the various fields 
of the humanities. As argued in this essay, paying attention to the underlying 
ontological assumptions about the self, society and history in these intellectual 
currents would significantly enrich such an analysis. Another element that should 
be included in a comparative historical investigation of the development of the 
humanities is the relative status of the various branches of the humanities in the 
course of their development. History had a rather modest position in Antiquity 
and the Middle Ages. According to Aristotle, history was inferior to poetry, be-
cause it dealt with particular events, and not with with the kinds of things that 
occur, with the universal aspects of human life.35 Perhaps as a result of this influ-
ential theoretical depreciation of history, in Antiquity the art of writing history 
was not codified in a similarly extensive way as the arts of, for instance, rhetoric 
and poetry. In line with this, history was not included in the artes liberales of the 
Middle Ages, but it gained an important position in the Renaissance as a source 
of moral examples and practical political inspiration. As we have seen, the devel-
opment of Renaissance historiography involved a weakening of its ties to rheto-
ric, the dominant branch of learning of the period. It was not before the later six-
teenth century that methods and theories of historical writing became the object 
of systematic codification in the genre of the artes historicae. In the nineteenth 
century, however, the position of history among the other fields of the humani-
ties was radically different. History was leading the way for the other branches of 
the humanities in claiming the status of an academic discipline based on empiri-
cal methods. The philosophical foundation of this claim was established in his-
toricism, which defined the historical method in relation to an ontology centred 
around individuality and historicity. In the course of the nineteenth century, the 
other fields of the humanities also adopted a historicist perspective. Just as his-
tory had done, they turned themselves into institutionalised academic disciplines, 
but in order to reach this goal they had to redefine their subject matter as a set of 
fundamentally historical phenomena.
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Philosophy’s Shadow
Jacob Brucker and the History of Th ought1
Wouter J. Hanegraaff
No tradition, intellectual or otherwise, can exist or stay alive without demarcating 
its own identity from something that is seen as representing its negative counter-
part, its ‘other’; and as a result, this ‘other’ necessarily accompanies any tradition, 
as the shadowy background or dark canvas which allows it to draw the contours 
of its own identity in the first place. The presence of this shadow can therefore 
never be forgotten; but in order to fulfill its role as a negative background, neither 
can it be brought into the full daylight of memory and recollection. In short, it 
must be selectively remembered and selectively forgotten.
My intention in this article is to demonstrate this basic fact at the example 
of eighteenth-century Enlightenment historiography of philosophy. Critical 
historical research shaped and defined its own identity as an academic disci-
pline decisively during the later seventeenth and the eighteenth century; and 
this happened by means of a complicated and often painful process of deciding 
what, exactly, had to be rejected, and on what basis such a rejection could be 
rationally legitimated and explained. The final outcome was that Enlightenment 
historiography created the popular image of a ‘counter-tradition’ which was seen 
as encompassing and representing everything the Enlightenment and its heirs 
rejected as wrong. In order to define its very identity, the Enlightenment needed 
to construe the memory2 of pagan, occult, superstitious and irrational religion 
and thought as an essentially unified tradition of unreason from which the light 
of rational philosophy and science had now finally managed to extricate and lib-
erate itself. But at the same time, this tradition had to be sharply excluded from 
the true history of thought: the history of philosophy henceforth had to focus on 
the progress of reason, not on the tenacious persistence and endless resurgence 
of unfounded beliefs. As a result of this process of exclusion (which can really 
be described metaphorically as one of expurgation, purification, even exorcism), 
enormous bodies of traditional thought that were still discussed seriously and at 
great length by the early pioneers of the history of philosophy in the seventeenth 
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century were increasingly marginalized in the historiography of the eighteenth, 
the nineteenth and eventually the twentieth century. The final result was a dra-
matic loss of historical memory, which we are now only beginning to correct – a 
correction that should be an indispensable part of any attempt to write the his-
tory of the humanities.3
A central player in this process was the historian of philosophy Jacob Brucker, 
who was born in Augsburg on January 22, 1696, and studied philosophy and the-
ology in Jena.4 Reading the accounts of his life, one can only be amazed at his ex-
treme productivity: during his career he published about 20,000 pages on the his-
tory of philosophy,5 and while his works made him famous, they were all written 
in his spare time, next to his very busy work as a pastor in the Evangelical church, 
where at times he had to give sermons twice or three times a week and teach 
Latin for eight hours each day, while also visiting the sick, leading funerals, doing 
administrative work, and looking after his seriously ill wife.6 According to a con-
temporary biographer, his Herculean labours on the history of philosophy were 
at least partly therapeutic: in addition to a weak physical constitution, Brucker 
suffered from heavy attacks of ‘melancholy’, and only by studying extremely hard 
could he distract himself from his fears and depressions.7 The manner of Bruck-
er’s death in 1770 could not have been more symbolic for this Stubengelehrter and 
exemplary representative of the Protestant work-ethic: he fell in his study while 
trying to lift a heavy volume from an upper shelf.
Of those 20,000 pages published by Brucker during his lifetime, many be-
longed to his multi-volume history of philosophy published in German in 1731-
1736, and its strongly revised Latin version first published in 1742-1744 and re-
published in a further expanded edition in 1766-1767.8 The German version is 
titled Kurze Fragen aus der philosophischen Historie: it seeks to cover the entire 
history of thought from before the Flood until the present day, and does so in a 
question-and-answer format. The title is deceptive, for while the questions may 
be short enough, the answers are anything but; and increasingly from one volume 
to the next, everything Brucker cannot put in his main chapters he puts in his 
notes, which are printed in small letters and often turn into minor monographs 
of their own, with incredibly detailed references and bibliographies. In response 
to the increasing demand for a Latin version accessible to a non-German reader-
ship, Brucker decided to re-write the entire history anew, and in even greater de-
tail – but with fewer footnotes – and the result is his Historia critica philosophiae, 
which is now generally considered the monument of the history of philosophy in 
the eighteenth century.
The importance of this work can hardly be overestimated. It became the indis-
pensable source of information on the history of philosophy throughout Europe, 
and far into the nineteenth century. Of particular importance is its relation to 
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two other famous and extremely influential reference works: the so-called große 
Zedler, and Diderot’s Encyclopédie. Johann Heinrich Zedler’s Großem vollständi-
gen Universal-Lexicon appeared in 64 volumes and four supplement volumes from 
1732-1754 and stands as the German lexicographical monument of the Baroque 
era. Its many articles in the domain of philosophy, while published anonymously, 
are in fact mostly paraphrases or literal copies of Brucker’s work;9 in other words, 
Brucker was the invisible but omnipresent authority on philosophy in this larg-
est and most influential of all German lexicons. Even more interesting is the case 
of Diderot’s famous Encyclopédie, which was first announced around the time 
the Zedler was completed10 and appeared between 1751 and 1765. For its many 
contributions on the history of philosophy, Brucker was again the decisive source: 
Diderot in fact plundered the Historia critica philosophiae without any scruples, 
while taking care to turn the heavy and serious prose of the German Protestant 
minister into elegant French. His editorial work has been described as a ‘master-
work of adaptation and subtle deception: by a few interventions, Diderot artfully 
change[d] ... the serious chapters of the Historia Critica into a graceful reading 
full of allusions and double entendres, which were excellently suited to the esprit phi-
losophique’.11 If we take account of the well-known centrality of the Encylopédie to 
the French Enlightenment, the centrality of ‘philosophy’ to Diderot’s project, and 
the paradigmatic role of the French philosophes in defi ning internationally what 
the Enlightenment was supposed to be all about, one understands Lucien Braun’s 
conclusion in his standard work on the history of the history of philosophy:
In the second half of the eighteenth century, there appear a whole series of 
works that are based exclusively on the Historia critica; and in that regard, 
there is nothing in the domain of the history of philosophy that can be com-
pared to this work. It is the monument to which all the Enlightened spirits 
in Europe referred at the time ... Th e eighteenth century is dominated by 
Brucker: here he is the only point of reference.12
To understand the concept of philosophy that informed Brucker’s work, we have 
to first look at a crucial development in the intellectual history of the second half 
of the seventeenth century, which has been referred to as ‘anti-apologeticism’.13 
This quintessentially Protestant perspective was directed against the ‘apologetic’ 
position dominant in Roman Catholic theology. ‘Apologeticism’, in this context, 
refers to the idea of a prisca theologia or philosophia perennis, according to which 
the divine revelation had not been restricted to the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
but also had its conscious or unconscious14 representatives among the pagans. 
The concept of a translatio sapientiae15 made it possible to envision a certain 
amount of concordance between pagan traditions and Christianity, so that the 
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teachings of ancient sages like Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, or Plato could 
be seen as containing elements of religious truth.
Now this concept of a translatio sapientiae came under sharp attack by the Lu-
theran historian of philosophy Jacob Thomasius (1622-1684), one of the teachers 
of Leibniz and sometimes seen as the earliest pioneer of the modern history of 
philosophy. His central thesis, developed most explicitly in his Schediasma his-
toricum (1665), was that Christianity had been infected not just since the Renais-
sance, but already since the first centuries by pagan philosophies that were in fact 
alien to and incompatible with the biblical faith.16 In other words, Thomasius 
exposed the so-called ‘hellenization of Christianity’17as a perversion, and argued 
for a strict separation between Christian theology and the philosophies of the pa-
gan nations. The two could have nothing in common; and as a result, any idea in 
Christian theology that turned out to be adopted from pagan philosophy, notably 
Platonism or Aristotelianism, had to be expurgated from it. Of course, the result 
was that the whole of Roman Catholic theology now had to be seen as deeply 
corrupt and unacceptable; and Thomasius contrasted it in the sharpest possible 
terms with his Protestant ideal of an exclusively biblical piety.
Thomasius traced all pagan philosophies to their origin in the teachings of 
Zoroaster: it was from Zoroastrian sources that Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
Epicurianism and so on had emerged.18 The essence of this pagan/Zoroastrian 
philosophy was its belief in the eternity of the world, which implied the equally 
despicable doctrines of dualism, pantheism and materialism, all of which were 
wholly incompatible with the biblical creatio ex nihilo.19 The Platonic philosophy, 
in particular, by means of which paganism had most seriously infiltrated Christi-
anity, implied a doctrine of emanation, according to which the soul had its origin 
in an eternal, divine substance and would return to it again: this emanationism, 
in turn, implied a doctrine of ‘enthusiasm’ (Schwärmerei), because human beings 
could supposedly gain knowledge (gnosis) of their own divine origin by means of 
mystical illumination. Having come from Zoroastrianism, all these pernicious 
doctrines had infiltrated Christianity particularly in the form of Platonism, and 
this Platonic/Christian syncretism was the essence of all the sectarian move-
ments up to the present day.
The impact of Jacob Thomasius’s anti-apologeticism has been traced in the 
work of a series of later German Protestants, notably Friedrich Christian Bücher, 
Balthasar Köpke, Johann Wilhelm Zierold, Ehregott Daniel Colberg, Gottfried 
Arnold, and notably Jacob Thomasius’s son Christian, and Christoph August 
Heumann.20 Essentially, as the implications of anti-apologeticism were taken 
to their logical conclusions by these authors, the result was a strict separation 
between the history of philosophy on the one hand and the biblical revelation 
on the other, which were now seen as resting on entirely different foundations. 
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Thomasius senior had sought to define the nature of true Christianity as incom-
patible with anything pagan, but his son Christian used his father’s arguments 
instead to present the history of philosophy as a wholly autonomous discipline.21 
It was not so much that pagan philosophies must be wholly rejected, but that they 
had to be recognized for what they were: the attempt to understand the world by 
purely human means, without the aid of revelation. This approach culminated in 
the work of the founders of the modern history of philosophy, Christoph August 
Heumann22 and, finally, Jacob Brucker.23 In all the authors I have mentioned, the 
internal logic of Protestant anti-apologeticism finally led to a sharp distinction 
between three main domains in the history of thought.
1 History of Philosophy
Th e fi rst of these was the history of philosophy, the central concern of 
Heumann and Brucker. It had to be written according to a methodology of 
eclecticism; that is to say, the historian’s task was to survey the entire history 
of thought and select from it only the traditions that were in accord with 
sound human reason. It is on this basis that these historians laid the foun-
dations for the modern history of philosophy as an autonomous academic 
discipline.
2 Biblical Revelation
However, all the authors in this tradition were deeply pious Lutherans, 
convinced of the superiority of the Christian revelation. Th ey were not 
Voltairean critics of religion. On the contrary, they strictly distinguished 
between biblical faith as the absolute and exclusive foundation of religion, 
and human reason as the no less exclusive foundation of philosophy. Rea-
son and revelation could not be contradictory, but they were autonomous 
and incommensurable: each of them should keep strictly within its own 
domain, to avoid the ‘apologetic’ confusion and crypto-pagan syncretism 
that had been the very essence of Roman Catholic theology.24
3 (Crypto)Pagan Religion
Th ird, and most important in the present context: as a result of this radical 
anti-apologetic separation between revelation and reason, late seventeenth-
century historiography was left with a very large domain of currents and 
ideas that belonged to neither of the two camps, because they were char-
acterized precisely by syncretic mixtures between the two. Essentially, 
this third domain represented the continuation of pagan religion concealed as 
Christianity. It shared its pagan foundations with philosophy, but it diff ered 
from philosophy in not being based on reason. With Christianity it shared 
its religious nature, but it diff ered from Christianity in that it was not based 
on revelation.
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Interestingly, the logic of the theory implied that this third category, of heresy and 
superstition, could not be strictly distinguished from Roman Catholicism: the 
image that these Protestant authors had in mind was that of ‘hellenized Christi-
anity’ as a single great tree of heresy, of which all superstitions were the branches 
and the fruits.
Coming now to Brucker’s grand historiographical project: in order to clearly 
distinguish philosophy from everything that merely looked like it, he needed to 
discuss all forms of pagan syncretism in meticulous detail and demonstrate that 
they were not actually based on reason but on superstition. As a result, his Kurze 
Fragen and Historia Critica in fact consist of two interwoven strands, referred to 
as ‘philosophia eclectica’ and ‘philosophia sectaria’: the one traces the history of 
philosophy from its earliest beginnings, and the other traces the history of its 
polemical ‘other’: philosophy’s shadow.
To understand Brucker’s approach to it, we must note the peculiar combina-
tion in all his work of Protestant biblicism and rational criticism. For Brucker the 
truth of the biblical revelation is a matter of faith beyond rational demonstration, 
but in evaluating historical materials he thinks and argues entirely as an Enlight-
enment thinker. The history of thought is approached as a history of human 
opinions. Like his predecessors, Brucker thinks of them as ‘systems’ of thought, 
which can be described in terms of a limited number of basic doctrinal proposi-
tions. With respect to all kinds of pious traditions and ideas concerning ancient 
wisdom, Brucker typically gives an overview of the arguments that are being ad-
duced, examines the available evidence, and finally decides whether or not it is 
reasonable to maintain those beliefs.
Heumann had still used theological criteria to divide the history of philoso-
phy into three main periods: the great caesuras for him were the birth of Christ 
and the advent of the Reformation. Brucker’s subdivision was roughly similar, 
but used a non-theological nomenclature: the great turning points were now the 
beginning of the Roman Empire and the ‘restoration of letters’ in the late Middle 
Ages/early Renaissance. Through all these periods, we can trace the history of the 
‘philosophica sectaria’. In the first period, the central place in that regard is taken 
by the Chaldaean/Zoroastrian and the Egyptian system, alongside the birth and 
development of true philosophy among the Greeks. The second period is domi-
nated, at least for our concerns, by two great systems: Neoplatonism and Kab-
balah. In the third period, finally, both of these systems are revived and combined 
during the Renaissance, and against their background there emerges yet a third, 
relatively autonomous system of sectarianism, that of Theosophy25. Although 
Brucker clearly distinguishes these various ‘systems’ and treats them separately, 
his discussion shows that they are essentially branches of one and the same great 
tree of pagan superstition.
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R e f o r m a t i o n
B i r t h  o f  C h r i s t
Th e pedigree of ‘philosophia sectaria’ according to Brucker
The Chaldaean/Zoroastrian and the Egyptian systems belong to the category 
of ‘philosophia barbarica’. The Chaldaeans are the oldest and described as whol-
ly drenched in the darkest idolatry and superstition: their system of thought is 
based not on the light of sound reason but merely on blind tradition and priestly 
deception, and expressed in obscure images and language.26 Their system com-
bines the basic errors of all false philosophy: atheism, metaphysical dualism, ab-
sence of divine providence, and the doctrine of emanation. This emphasis clearly 
reflects the lingering influence of Jacob Thomasius: while biblical faith is based 
on theistic belief in a creatio ex nihilo, paganism is based on belief in the eternity 
of the world, from which derive the false doctrines of dualism, pantheism or ema-
nationism. As for Zoroaster, Brucker concludes that there is so much confusion 
about his identity that it is no longer possible to find out the truth; but the many 
writings attributed to Zoroaster are in fact not by him.27 Notably this holds true 
for the famous Chaldaean Oracles, which Brucker attributes quite correctly to lat-
er Platonists28 and describes as a compendium of pagan superstitions. Likewise, 
the ‘secret doctrines’ of the Egyptians consist of nothing but idolatry and super-
stition; Brucker discusses Thoth or Hermes as their originator, and emphasizes 
the spurious nature of the writings attributed to him.29
Nothing found in this ‘philosophia barbarica’ actually deserves the name phi-
losophy, and the beginnings of Greek thought are hardly more impressive. The 
first stirrings of real philosophy come with Thales and Pythagoras, later fol-
lowed by Socrates;30 but much of the later development of both Pythagoreanism 
and Platonism is in fact a perversion that distorts Plato’s teachings by mixing 
them up with a variety of oriental pagan superstitions derived from Chaldaea 
and Egypt.
T h e o s o p h y
N e o p l a t o n i s m K a b b a l a h
C h a l d e a n  /  Z o r o a s t r i a n  /  E g y p t i a n
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This brings us to the first of the three main systems or clusters of ‘sectarian-
ism’ in Brucker’s scheme: that of Neoplatonism. Brucker of course does not use 
that modern term: somewhat confusingly, he speaks of the ‘secta eclectica’31 while 
pointing out on many occasions that it is in fact an example of ‘syncretism that 
puts a knife to the throat of healthy philosophy’.32 Neoplatonism is crucial to 
Brucker’s story because it succeeded in becoming the most successful and influen-
tial of all the sects. He discusses it in great detail and sees it as part of a deliberate 
pagan strategy to counter the rise of Christianity:
Since the pagan theology, through its many fables and other absurd teach-
ings about the gods, had come to be a horror not only for the Christians, 
who were now spreading all over the world, but even for the philosophers 
themselves ... they sought to give themselves a better image by explaining 
the fables in a mystical manner ... And because, moreover, they saw that 
the Christian religion, being a highly reasonable philosophy, was accepted 
widely, also by great and respected men, and was defended by good people 
with clear proof, they put much eff ort into plundering the philosophical 
doctrines of the ancients and bringing them into a system in such as way that 
they looked more similar to the Christian teaching, and more reasonable as 
well. And this is how the ratio philosophandi eclectica came into existence.33
Since most of the Neoplatonists had a melancholic temperament, they were con-
tinuously led astray by the products of their overheated imagination; in short, 
their entire system rested on an ‘unfounded enthusiasm’.34 They deliberately 
sought to infiltrate Christianity and corrupt it from within, for example by pro-
moting their own theurgical theories as the true explanation for the miracles of 
Jesus and his apostles, and by introducing fraudulent texts – such as the Her-
metica – that superficially looked Christian but were in fact grounded in pagan-
ism. As for the ancient philosophers whose authority they claimed, their true 
doctrines were completely distorted by the Neoplatonists:
they also hatched all kinds of books, as scandalous and harmful miscar-
riages of their weird brains, and put them as strange eggs into the nest of 
the ancient philosophers, presenting them as Chaldaean, Egyptian, Zo-
rostrian, Hermetic, or Orphic monuments, and thereby made the entire 
history of philosophy extremely uncertain.35
In fact, the Neoplatonists produced so many dangerous ‘eggs’ of their own that 
finally their teachings spread as an infectious plague all over Europe and Asia, 
while absorbing most of the other sects in the process.36
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What, then, is the essential doctrine of Neoplatonism? It teaches that there is 
one God with whom the human soul has a natural connection and to whom he 
therefore seeks to return. There are hierarchies of higher, spiritual beings, such as 
gods, spirits, and angels, which are invisibly present everywhere. The purpose of 
prayer is to get in contact with these beings, and this happens by means of ecstatic 
trances. Fortune-telling is an important part of such rituals, and in sum, one can 
clearly see that the real purpose of this system is to promote ‘all the horrors of pa-
gan superstition’ and idolatry.37 The great problem, of course, is that it succeeded. 
This was partly due to the naivety of Christians, who used Platonic terminol-
ogy to convert the heathens, and thereby unwittingly welcomed the virus, which 
ended up infiltrating the very body of Christian theology.
I can be much shorter about the second great system, the Kabbalah, not be-
cause Brucker pays it any less attention38 but because it is based upon essentially 
the same process: biblical faith being infected by pagan thought. Kabbalah re-
lates to the Old Testament as Neoplatonism relates to the Gospel: in both cases, 
the purity of the biblical revelation is heavily compromised by the pernicious 
influence (the ‘syncretic pest’39, as Brucker calls it) of paganism, derived from 
the Chaldaeans and Egyptians, and from degenerated Pythagoreanism and Pla-
tonism as well. And in both cases the result was, in Brucker’s opinion, an impen-
etrable mass of irrational speculation, expressed by means of obscure language 
and imagery.
The revival of Neoplatonism and Kabbalah after the restoration of letters in 
the Renaissance is meticulously analyzed by Brucker,40 with separate chapters 
for central figures such as Plethon,41 Ficino,42 Pico della Mirandola,43 Reuchlin,44 
Giorgio,45 Agrippa,46 Patrizi47 and so on. These authors dug up the old Neopla-
tonic writings, along with the spurious texts attributed to Hermes, Zoroaster 
or Orpheus and the Jewish Kabbalah, as far as they understood it, and patched 
together a new philosophical system. It should be noted that, surprising perhaps, 
Brucker’s analysis here is far more neutral and businesslike than before. Most 
of these authors are discussed respectfully, as honest Christians who had good 
intentions but were simply deluded. Brucker refutes their ideas essentially on 
scholarly grounds, by pointing out philological errors, misdatings, incorrect his-
torical interpretations and so on. In the end, all these errors can be traced back to 
the polluted source of Neoplatonism in late antiquity, and to the idea of a philoso-
phia perennis or translatio sapientiae:
For because they were of the opinion that the ancient Hebrew, Chaldaean, 
Egyptian, Orphic, Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy was essentially 
one and the same thing, and that it all emanated from the ur-ancient divine 
philosophy, they concluded that everything in it had to be in harmony with 
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the Christian religion, and as a result they attempted to reconcile these 
teachings – perverted and wrong anyway, and packed together from all 
kinds of fraudulent texts – with the Christian religion.48
Brucker’s third great system, that of Theosophy, stands somewhat on its own 
in his work.49 He writes that it was created in a more recent period by authors 
who (quite rightly) abhorred all pagan and sectarian philosophy, but neverthe-
less ended up inventing a new variation of it. Their systems are based not on 
the light of reason but on claims of internal, divine illumination; by means of it, 
they believe to have privileged insight into the deepest mysteries of nature and 
know the secrets of magic, alchemy, astrology and other such sciences. They call 
their system Theosophy, and also see it as a kind of Kabbalah.50 Strictly speak-
ing, in Brucker’s opinion, they belong to the history of theology rather than of 
philosophy, but he discusses them nevertheless, with his usual attention to detail 
and an impressive apparatus of notes and references. The most important repre-
sentatives are Paracelsus and his pupils,51 Valentin Weigel,52 Robert Fludd,53 Jacob 
Böhme and his followers,54 father and son Van Helmont,55 Pierre Poiret,56 and 
the Rosicrucians.57 In evaluating Theosophy as a whole, Brucker highlights its 
rejection of healthy rationality in favour of inner illumination, and its underlying 
system of emanation which teaches that all comes from God and returns to him.58 
Taken together, it all clearly comes down to a dangerous doctrine of Schwärmerei 
and self-deification, grounded in the ‘secret hybris’59 of the human heart, which 
undermines sound reason along with Holy Scripture.
This must suffice as a sketch of how Brucker construed the nature and his-
tory of philosophy’s shadow up to his own time. What is the moral of this story? 
Scholars in my own field of research, the history of hermetic philosophy and 
related currents or ‘Western esotericism’, study precisely the entire complex of 
currents and ideas that were excluded from real philosophy under Brucker’s in-
fluence. In doing so, we are trying to correct a dramatic loss of historical memory 
about very large and important areas of thought and cultural activity that range 
across the disciplines: from philosophy and religion to science and even art. As 
we have seen, Brucker himself thoroughly and critically studied all the systems 
he saw as ‘pagan or quasi-pagan error’, but historians of philosophy after him 
concluded (quite logically, from their point of view) that since all this was now 
proven to be mere irrational superstition, henceforth it no longer deserved to be 
studied or discussed in the context of real philosophy. As a result, the traditions 
in question vanished from their histories and from the textbooks, but no other 
academic discipline picked them up. As a result, they became the almost exclusive 
reserve of occultist amateur historians during the nineteenth century who were 
seen, quite correctly in most cases, as academically suspect, to say the least. This 
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is how the entire domain to which Brucker and his predecessors had still devoted 
countless hours of study became a ‘no go area’ for scholars. In short, as a casualty 
of the process of academic specialization and disciplinization – or in other words, 
of the ‘making of the humanities’ from the early eighteenth century onwards – it 
was exorcized from acceptable academic discourse and henceforth had to survive 
as best it could in a kind of academic twilight or no-man’s land outside the recog-
nized disciplines of the humanities.
It is my conviction that as historians, we ignore this domain at our peril. 
Brucker was quite right that most of it does not constitute anything like rational 
philosophy, but that is hardly a reason for academics to ignore its very existence 
or its importance as a factor in religious and cultural history. In scholarly research 
there should be no excuse for ignorance, but unfortunately, historical ignorance 
concerning these domains has been the rule in academia since the eighteenth cen-
tury. Since the 1960s, and decidedly since the early 1990s, the study of these cur-
rents and ideas has begun to return to scholarly agendas; critical historiography is 
again becoming the norm here, although slowly; and we are beginning to discover 
how much of our history we have forgotten that we should have remembered. 
Ironically, Jacob Brucker should now be recognized not only as one of the most 
important early specialists in the very field that he helped to marginalize, but also 
as a model of historical criticism whose indefatigable labours and sharp insights 
are still a cause for respect and admiration.
 Coda: Anti-Eclectic Historiography
As indicated in this chapter, Jacob Brucker’s historiography of philosophy was 
grounded in the type of Enlightenment eclecticism pioneered by authors like 
Christian Thomasius and Christoph August Heumann. In the generations after 
Brucker, this methodological approach came to be superseded by that of system-
atic philosophy, and its centrality in the decades before and after 1700 has only 
recently begun to be rediscovered.60 However, in defining their object of research, 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century historians such as Dieterich Tiede-
mann61 and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann62 did inherit Brucker’s general way of 
distinguishing between ‘true’ and ‘false’ philosophy on the basis of Enlightenment 
eclecticism. The basic perspective was expressed by Heumann already in 1715, in 
a biting passage that deserves to be quoted here in full:
From what has been said thus far, it clearly follows that the philosophy by 
which the papists were driven into paganism, and which is known as phi-
losophiam barbaricam, is necessarily a false and fake philosophy. So adieu, 
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dear Philosophia Chaldaeorum, Persarum, Aegyptiorum, &c, that one usually 
makes such a fuss about, out of blind veneration of Antiquity. [Heumann 
now refers to Michael Maier’s and Morhof ’s references to secret philosoph-
ical orders in antiquity, and continues:] ... I am certain that all these Col-
legia sacerdotum Aegyptiorum, Orphaicorum, Eumolpidarum, Samothracum, 
Magorum, Brachmanum, Gymnosophistarum and Druidum, which Morhof 
sometimes calls occulta, then again arcana, or secreta and secretiora ... that 
all of these were schools, not of Wisdom, but of foolishness [Th orheit], 
which attempted to bring superstitio in formam artis and sought to draw 
profi t from deceiving the people. ... So nobody should hold it against me 
if I have not the slightest respect for all those Collegia philosophica secreta, 
but judge that the passing of time has quite rightly made a secret of these 
mysteries, by dumping them into the sea of oblivion; and that even if the 
writings of these philosophorum barbarorum were preserved by posterity, 
they would deserve to be sent ad loca secretiora right away, for superstitious 
idiocies belong in no better library.63
Although Brucker did discuss all the traditions to which Heumann was referring, 
he was doing so only to wave them a definitive and final goodbye: ‘adieu, dear 
Philosophia Chaldaeorum, Persarum, Aegyptiorum, &c ...’. Accordingly, the new 
histories of philosophy by Tiedemann and Tennemann no longer began in Persia 
or Egypt but in ancient Greece, with Thales; and the ‘oriental’ tendencies of mid-
dle and neoplatonism (in our terms), as well as their revivals in the Renaissance, 
were discussed essentially as phenomena of degeneration which endangered the 
healthy development of ‘true’ philosophy. This approach became the normative 
one in textbooks of history of philosophy up to the present day.
From the perspective of the history of philosophy, which was concerned with 
defi ning and demarcating its identity as an academic discipline, such an exclusion 
of ‘pseudo-philosophy’ is understandable enough. Nevertheless, from the perspec-
tive of a comparative study of the humanities, the legacy of Enlightenment eclecti-
cism is particularly problematic. Taking the example of the pivotal work of Bruck-
er, we have been looking at a process of exclusion that has straight parallels in most 
other historical disciplines: not only has the history of philosophy restricted itself 
since the eighteenth century to that of ‘real’ philosophy, but likewise it has broadly 
been assumed that the history of Christianity should be about whatever is consid-
ered to be ‘real’ Christianity,64 the history of science should be about ‘real’ science,65 
and even the history of art should be about ‘real’ art.66 In short, eclecticism seems 
to be deeply ingrained in all the modern disciplines of the humanities.
Against approaches of this kind, I would argue that a comparative study of the 
humanities should be grounded in anti-eclectic historiography. The core of such an 
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approach is that it questions the selective procedures by which historians since 
the period of the Enlightenment have been defining and demarcating their disci-
plinary fields. It argues that such procedures are ideological and normative, and 
seeks to correct the historical distortions they have created by calling attention 
to the role and significance of those currents and ideas that, as casualties of the 
process of academic professionalization, have ended up in the reservoir of ‘reject-
ed knowledge’. As a result, anti-eclectic historiography questions the established 
canon of modern intellectual and academic culture and emphasizes that our com-
mon heritage is of much greater complexity than one would infer from stand-
ard academic textbooks. Obviously, this program does not reflect an apologetic 
agenda but a historiographical one: its concern is not with the truth (or, for that 
matter, the falsity) of such things as alchemy, astrology, mysticism, or magic, but 
with the importance of recognizing the currents and ideas to which these labels 
refer as significant historical factors in the development of Western culture, and 
hence as legitimate objects of research.
The implications of such a program should not be underestimated. It is not 
just a matter of re-claiming some areas that had been neglected by earlier genera-
tions, or criticizing hegemonic discourses. Inevitably, an anti-eclectic historiogra-
phy will also have to question the very way in which the various disciplines have 
defined themselves, and how they have divided the field of humanities among 
one another. To give just one example here, the study of alchemy has been tossed 
around by scholars like a hot potato: too religious, occult or ‘spiritual’ for his-
torians of science, too scientific for historians of Christianity, too mystical for 
historians of philosophy, too technological and practice-based for intellectual 
historians. However, even though no discipline seems to really want it for its 
own, others should not have it either: hence historians of science will protest if 
Jungian psychologists try their hand at interpreting alchemical symbolism, some 
Jungians think that scientists should stay away from alchemy, and all parties agree 
that it has been wholly misunderstood by the ‘occultists’ (except, of course, the oc-
cultists themselves, who are bound to accuse their competitors of ‘reductionism’ 
and academic blindness).67
Clearly, inter- and multidisciplinarity is the minimal requirement in fields 
like these; but more radically, re-integrating alchemy and other areas of ‘rejected 
knowledge’ as normal fields of study in the humanities will require a critical revi-
sion of the disciplines as such and a correction of their ingrained selectiveness. Ide-
ally, the practice of anti-eclectic historiography implies that the criteria for what 
is and what isn’t included or taken seriously in a given field of research should not 
be determined by any traditional discipline and its theoretical or methodological 
conventions, but should be derived directly from the requirements of whatever it 
is that is being studied. The modern study of Western esotericism could be seen 
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as a testcase field in this regard. As a relative newcomer in the academy it is not 
yet overly burdened with specific disciplinary commitments; and since it concen-
trates precisely on what the humanities have traditionally excluded as ‘rejected 
knowledge’, one might say that its very raison d’être consists in compensating for, 
and correcting, the historical effects of academic eclecticism.
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I will refer to Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem 
deducta (orig. -),  Vols. (Lipsiae: Literis et Impensis Bern. Christoph Breitkopf, 
). 
 As demonstrated by Behler, ‘Eine unbeachtete Biographie’, -.
 Ibid., . 
 Gregorio Piaia, ’Jacob Bruckers Wirkungsgeschichte in Frankreich und Italien’, in: 
Schmidt-Biggemann & Stammen, Jacob Brucker, -: .
 Braun, here quoted from the German edition by Rainer Jehl, ‘Jacob Brucker und die ‘En-
cyclopédie’’, in: Schmidt-Biggemann & Stammen, Jacob Brucker, -: .
 The term was introduced by Sicco Lehmann-Brauns in his indispensable study, Weisheit 
in der Weltgeschichte: Philosophiegeschichte zwischen Barock und Aufklärung, Frühe Neuzeit 
 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, ).
 Ibid., , with reference to Paul’s Areopagus speech (Acts : -): the ‘unknown God’ 
of the Gentiles is really the God of Christianity. Among many other examples, including 
notably patristic apologists from Justin Martyr to Eusebius and Clement of Alexandria, 
a particularly clear statement comes from Augustine: ‘The very thing which is now called 
the Christian religion was with the ancients, and it was with the human race from its 
beginning to the time when Christ appeared in the flesh: from when on the true religion, 
which already existed, began to be called the Christian’ (Retractationes I..).
 See the chapter of that title in Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia Perennis: Hi-
storische Umrisse abendländischer Spiritualität in Antike, Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, ), -. In this context, it is useful to also look at 
Jan Assmann’s reflections on translation: whereas the pantheons of ancient polytheisms 
were crossculturally translatable, monotheism was based upon the principle of untrans-
latability: the God of Israel could not be equated or compared with any other supreme 
deities and therefore has no parallel in other religious cultures ( Jan Assmann, Moses the 
Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism [Cambridge Mass. & London: 
Harvard University Press, ], - and passim). From that perspective, any concept of 
translatio sapientiae in an officially monotheistic context must inevitably create tensions.
 See the detailed analysis in Lehmann-Brauns, Weisheit, -; and Giovanni Santinello’s 
chapter on Thomasius in Francesco Bottin, Luciano Malusa, Giuseppe Micheli, Giovanni 
Santinello & Ilario Tolomio, Models of the History of Philosophy: From Its Origins in the 
Renaissance to the ‘Historia Philosophica’, International Archives of the History of Ideas 
: Models of the History of Philosophy I (Dordrecht, Boston & London: ), -
.
 The standard treatment remains Wilhelm Glawe, Die Hellenisierung des Christentums in 
der Geschichte der Theologie von Luther bis auf die Gegenwart (Berlin: ); and cf. the 
excellent short discussion of the ‘hellenization theorem’ in Lehmann-Brauns, Weisheit, 
-. The term ‘hellenization of Christianity’ (famous, of course, from its earlier usage by 
Adolf von Harnack) is extremely problematic, as it reflects the normative theological idea 
of an originally ‘pure’ apostolic Christianity infected or contaminated ‘from outside’ by 
hellenistic paganism, as emphasized by Glawe himself: ‘The typical characteristic of the 
concept of the hellenization of Christianity [is its] pernicious influence [ihre verderbliche 
Einwirkung] on the simplicity of the apostolic teaching upon which the church’s credo is 
based’ (ibid., -; and cf. his closing remarks on p. , according to which the hellenistic 
‘form’ of Christian dogma can be kept separate from its ‘content,’ so that ‘in their innermost 
essence, the objective truths of the religion of salvation and those of hellenism were so 
disharmonious, heterogeneous and without any mutual affinity that a syncretism of their 
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highest values as a permanent product had to be excluded from the outset’). In a famous 
essay, Jonathan Z. Smith has demonstrated how precisely this non-historical bias, based 
upon the Protestant anti-Catholic polemics of the early modern period, has survived as 
a hidden assumption basic to the mainstream of new testament scholarship and study of 
ancient religions (Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and 
the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago, ) esp. -, -).
 Interestingly, Thomasius seems to have been overlooked by Michael Stausberg in his oth-
erwise extremely thorough and comprehensive Faszination Zarathushtra: Zoroaster und 
die Europäische Religionsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit,  Vols. (Berlin & New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, ).
 It is a profound irony that this doctrine, in spite of its undisputable centrality to the 
anti-apologetic program, is not actually biblical: it was first introduced by Theophilus of 
Antioch (Apol. ad Autolycum, .).
 Lehmann-Brauns, Weisheit, -.
 See discussion in Lehmann-Brauns, Weisheit, -.
 Christoph August Heumann, Acta philosophorum, das ist, Gründliche Nachrichten aus der 
Historia Philosophica, nebst beygefügten Urtheilen von denen dahin gehörigen alten und neu-
en Büchern (-), facs. Reprint, vol. I parts - (Thoemmes: Bristol, ).
 Concerning the relation between these two, there is reason to suspect that Brucker’s de-
pendence on Heumann may have bordered on plagiarism. An eighteenth-century biogra-
pher of Brucker, Paul von Stetten, found it hard to understand how Brucker could have 
created his works in the towns where he was living: ‘He lacked the advantages of a rich 
public library ... and particularly in the beginning, his material circumstances were really 
not of such a nature that he could have spent much on buying the important works with-
out which he could not do’ (Paul von Stetten, ‘Jacob Brucker’, Hausleutners Schwäbisches 
Archiv (Stuttgart, ), -: , as quoted in Theo Stammen, ‘Jacob Brucker: 
‘Spuren’ einer Biographie’, in: Schmidt-Biggemann & Stammen, Jacob Brucker, -: ). 
In , at Brucker’s request, Heumann had shown extraordinary generosity by sending 
him extensive manuscripts by himself about the history of philosophy. Brucker had prom-
ised Heumann to return these manuscripts within a year’s time, and later claimed that he 
had indeed tried to do so; however, he had entrusted the task to a certain Mr. Stübner 
in Leipzig, who turned out to be unreliable and had lost the materials! (this painful epi-
sode is described by Georg Andreas Cassius, Ausführliche Lebensbeschreibung des um die 
gelehrte Welt hochverdiente D. Christoph August Heumanns (Kassel: ), f, quoted in 
Mario Longo, ‘Geistige Anregungen und Quellen der Bruckerschen Historiographie’, in: 
Schmidt-Biggemann & Stammen, Jacob Brucker, -:  note ).
 As shown in meticulous detail by Lehmann-Brauns, the cruel irony was that this very 
separation ultimately ended up undermining the legitimacy of theology as such, even 
Protestant theology: without realizing it, the anti-apologists were cutting the tree on 
whose branches they were sitting themselves, and opened the door for a process towards 
secularization that went far beyond anything they had ever wished or expected.
 On the sources of the term ‘theosophy’ in late antiquity, see Jean-Louis Siémons, Théoso-
phia: Aux sources néoplatoniciennes et chrétiennes (Paris: Cariscript, ); on ‘theosophy’ 
as understood in the early modern period, see Antoine Faivre, ‘Christian Theosophy’, in: 
Hanegraaff et al, Dictionary, -. Obviously, this traditional usage has nothing to do 
with the nineteenth-century Theosophical Society of H.P. Blavatsky.
 Kurze Fragen I, -; Historia I, -. 
 Kurze Fragen I, -; Historia I, -.
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 Kurze Fragen I, ; Historia I, . As is well known, the Chaldaean Oracles had been 
attributed to Zoroaster since George Gemistos Plethon in the fifteenth century (see e.g. 
Stausberg, Faszination Zarathushtra I, -).
 Kurze Fragen I, -; Historia I, -. About the debate on the dating of the Her-
metic writings, see Martin Mulsow (ed.), Das Ende des Hermetismus: Historische Kritik 
und neue Naturphilosophie in der Spätrenaissance. Dokumentation und Analyse der Debatte 
um die Datierung der hermetischen Schriften von Genebrard bis Casaubon (-) (Tü-
bingen: Mohr Siebeck, ).
 Kurze Fragen I, -, ; Historia I, -.
 Kurze Fragen III, -; Historia II, -.
 Kurze Fragen III, .
 Kurze Fragen III, -; cf. corresponding discussion in Historia II, .
 Kurze Fragen III, -; cf. Historia II, -. On melancholy in relation to scholar-
ship and Neoplatonism, see also the chapter by Marieke van den Doel in this book.
 Kurze Fragen III, .
 Kurze Fragen III, .
 Kurze Fragen III, .
 Kurze Fragen IV, -, -; Historia II, - (‘De philosophia Iudaeorum 
esoterica, sive cabbalistica’).
 Kurze Fragen IV, -.
 Historia IV, - (‘De restauratoribus philosophiae Platonicae’), - (‘De restaura-
toribus philosophiae Pythagoreo-Platonico-Cabbalisticae’).
 Kurze Fragen V, -.
 Kurze Fragen V, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen V, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, , as part of Brucker’s general critical conclusions about the ‘pythag-
orean-platonic-kabbalistic philosophy’; and cf. the corresponding section in Historia IV, 
-.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, .
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, -; Historia IV, -.
 Kurze Fragen VI, .
 Ulrich Johannes Schneider, ‘Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy’, in: Donald R. 
Kelley (ed.), History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern 
Europe (Rochester, New York: The University of Rochester Press, ), -. The 
standard work on eclecticism in its various manifestations is Michael Albrecht, Eklek-
tik: Eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
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(Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, ). It is important to recognize that 
the Enlightenment interpretation of eclecticism (where the historian’s own rational judg-
ment becomes the criterion of selection) was a relatively new departure at the time: see 
Michael Albrecht, ‘Thomasius – kein Eklektiker?’, in: Werner Schneiders (ed.), Christian 
Thomasius (-): Interpretationen zu Werk und Wirkung, mit einer Bibliographie der 
neueren Thomasius-Literatur (Hamburg: Felix Meiners, ), -; and Lehmann-
Brauns, Weisheit, -.
 Dieterich Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie,  vols. (Marburg: Neue Akade-
mische Buchhandlung, -).
 Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie,  vols. (Leipzig: Johann Am-
brosius Barth, -).
 Christoph August Heumann, ‘Von denen Kennzeichen der falschen und unächten Phi-
losophie’, Acta Philosophorum  (), -.
 See Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘The Dreams of Theology and the Realities of Christianity’, 
in: J. Haers & P. de Mey (eds.), Theology and Conversation: Towards a Relational Theology 
(Leuven: Peeters, ), -.
 See e.g. the notoriously problematic status of alchemy in the history of science. For a short 
introduction with references to the most important critical studies, see e.g. Lawrence M. 
Principe, ‘Alchemy I: Introduction’, in: Wouter J. Hanegraaff (ed.) et al, Dictionary of Gno-
sis and Western Esotericism (Leiden: Brill, ), -. A classic defense of the ‘internal’ 
history of science against the one that sees science as ‘an irreducibly social and cultural 
phenomenon’ is Mary Hesse, ‘Hermeticism and Historiography: An Apology for the In-
ternal History of Science’, in: Roger H. Stuewer (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy 
of Science, vol. : Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on Science (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, ), -.
 See in particular the traditionally controversial status of ‘the spiritual in art’ among art 
historians in the wake of critics like Clement Greenberg.
 To get a sense of these various approaches to alchemy and their polemical and apologetic 
positions, see the currents debate about Lawrence M. Principe’s and William R. New-
man’s ‘new historiography of alchemy’: William R. Newman & Lawrence M. Principe, 
‘Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of a Historiographical Mistake’, Early 
Science and Medicine  (), -; idem, ‘Some Problems with the Historiography of 
Alchemy’, in: William R. Newman & Anthony Grafton (eds.), Secrets of Nature: Astrol-
ogy and Alchemy in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press, 
), -; Hereward Tilton, The Quest for the Phoenix: Spiritual Alchemy and Rosi-
crucianism in the Work of Count Michael Maier (-) (Berlin & New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, ), - and -; Brian Vickers, ‘The ‘New Historiography’ and the 
Limits of Science’ (essay review on Newman, Principe and Lauren Kassell), Annals of 
Science : (), -; William R. Newman, ‘Brian Vickers on Alchemy and the 
Occult: A Response’, Perspectives on Science : (), -.
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